

THE
WORLD
TODAY

Some features to be found in FEBRUARY'S

Contemporary Review

now on sale 5s.

The Prime Minister and the Dissolution of
Parliament *R. M. Punnett*

Somerset Maugham: an Appreciation . *Wilfred Altman*

Towards a Hindu-Christian Dialogue . *Anthony Adair*

New Light on Barbellion *H. R. Cummings*

And many more, together with current Book Reviews in the
Literary Supplement

IN
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, 36 Broadway, London, S.W.1
Founded 1945

FOUNDED in 1945, **THE WORLD TODAY** is issued under the auspices of
the Royal Institute of International Affairs and published monthly by
the Oxford University Press.

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION (12 issues a year)

including postage inland and overseas

35s.

(in the U.S.A. and Canada \$5.30)

Students' rate 30s. a year (U.S.A. and Canada \$4.80)

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsgents or to the
Oxford University Press, Press Road, Newnham, London, N.W.10
(telephone Dollis Hill 8080)

*The Royal Institute of International Affairs is precluded by the terms of its
Royal Charter from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international
affairs. Any views expressed in this publication are, therefore, purely
individual.*

THE WORLD TODAY


The Royal Institute of International Affairs

CONTENTS

Notes of the month	43
The crisis in Nigeria	
The U.S.S.R. as peacemaker: Tashkent and after	
 Britain's place in Europe	
The text of an address by Sir Con O'Neill	50
 Pan-Africanism after Rhodesia	
JOHN HARGREAVES	57
 Soviet and Chinese policies in the Middle East	
GEOFFREY WHEELER	64
 Recent trends in Czechoslovakia	
I. Economic reforms	
II. Slovak nationalism	
H. HANAK	78

EDITOR: MARGARET CORNELL

February 1966

• Vol. 22. No. 2

Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

Australian Outlook

*Journal of the Australian Institute of
International Affairs*

Volume 19, No. 3

December 1965

DYASON MEMORIAL LECTURES

I. China's Policy and Outlook

II. South East Asia

Sir Robert Scott

ARTICLES

Singapore as a Sovereign State

Peter Boyce

Australia's Immigration Policy: Some

Malaysian Attitudes *Gavin W. Jones and Margaret Jones*

Congolese Foreign Policy and African 'Middle
Powers'

J. L. Vellut

Afro-Asian Disunity: Algiers,

1965

T. B. Millar and J. D. B. Miller

BOOK REVIEWS

by Anthony Clunies Ross, Harold F. Bell, A. W. W. Godfrey,
T. B. Millar, Air Marshal Sir George Jones, John Reynolds,
Rex Mortimer, Soebardi, Israel Getzler, W. R. Roff

Subscription (including postage): Australia \$2.50, U.S.A. and
Canada \$2.81, United Kingdom £1. Single copies 85 cents.

Australian Institute of International Affairs

124-6 Jolimont Road, East Melbourne, Victoria

THE WORLD TODAY

The Royal Institute of International Affairs

CONTENTS

Notes of the month	223
Commonwealth trade	
McNamara versus Congress	
 Recent developments in NATO	
PHILIP WINDSOR	227
 U.N. voting: tyranny of the majority?	
SYDNEY D. BAILEY	234
 Egypt 1966: the assessment of a revolution	
P. J. VATIKIOTIS	242
 The politics of colour television	
MICHAEL PARROTT	252
 Independence for Guyana	
B. A. N. COLLINS	260

EDITOR: MARGARET CORNELL

June 1966
Vol. 22. No. 6

Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Volume 20, Number 1

April 1966

ARTICLES

In Defence of Development

Irving S. Friedman

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Australian Parliament

H. B. Turner

Singapore and Malaysia: The Monetary Consequences

P. J. Drake

The Okinawa Conflict and the U. S.-Japan Alliance

Akio Watanabe

The Latest Reform in Soviet Industrial Management and Planning.

A Symposium

I The Old System and the New

Gregory Clark

II The Origins and Significance of the Reform

Raymond Hutchings

III The Recent Evolution of Planning Theory and Practice

Ulrica McFarlane

Some Aspects of Future Australian-New Zealand

Defence Co-operation

A. D. Robinson

REVIEW ARTICLE

Keeping Up with Africa

Ian Hancock

BOOK REVIEWS

by Trevor Pyman, J. G. Starke, Paul Freedman, Hanno Weisbrod, Bruce Grant,
J. A. A. Stockwin, Lance Castles, G. A. Kertesz, A. G. L. Shaw, P. Harrison-Muttlley

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION (three issues) in Australia \$2.40 a year or 85c. a copy;
in the United Kingdom £1, in the U. S. A. and Canada \$2.81

Subscriptions should be addressed to **The Commonwealth Secretary,
THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**
124 Jolimont Road, East Melbourne, C.2, Victoria

A thorough documentation of
International Affairs through an
objective analysis of world events.

All the documents of Italian
Foreign Policy.

RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI

Weekly Political and Economic Review

300 Italian lire

Foreign subscription: 15,000 Italian lire

Issued by

ISTITUTO PER GLI STUDI DI POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE

Via Clerici 5, Milano, Italy

THE WORLD TODAY

The Royal Institute of International Affairs

CONTENTS

Notes of the month	269
Britain, the U.N., and South Arabia	
The Chilean copper industry	

The Chinese puzzle: Cultural revolution and the dismissal of P'eng Chen	
JOHN GITTINGS	275

SPD at Dortmund: Ulbricht sets the pace	
DAVID CHILDS	285

Japan's place in the world	
R. P. DORE	293

Political aspects of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU	
MARCUS WHEELER	307

EDITOR: MARGARET CORNELL

July 1966
Vol. 22. No. 7
.

Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

the quarterly journal of the World Peace Foundation offering the most inclusive and up-to-date account of the recent activities of international organizations

Summer 1966

Volume 20, Number 3

ARTICLES

- Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations* *Inis L. Claude, Jr*
Scandinavia, NATO, and Northern Security *Nils Ovreik*
Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers, 1945-1965 *Robert L. Rothstein*
Edwin Gunn's Commitment to World Government *Arthur N. Holcombe*

COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARIES

Recent activities of the General Assembly, IMCO, ILO, UPU, and WMO.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Recent books and articles, both United States and foreign.

\$6.00 a year; \$16.00 for three years
\$2.00 a copy; Student rate: \$4.00 a year

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

40 MT VERNON STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02106, USA

*The American University of Beirut announces
the publication of two series on Middle East affairs:*

CHRONOLOGY OF ARAB POLITICS

A quarterly compiled exclusively from leading Arabic newspapers and national press agencies of the countries of the Eastern Arab World.

ARAB POLITICAL DOCUMENTS

An annual collection of the most important Arab political documents of the year for countries covered in the CHRONOLOGY.

Both publications are available in Arabic and English editions as from 1 January 1963.

Annual subscription:

The CHRONOLOGY: Arabic \$4; English \$7
The DOCUMENTS: Arabic \$7; English \$8

Order From:

The Department of Political Studies and Public Administration
American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon

THE WORLD TODAY

The Royal Institute of International Affairs

CONTENTS

The crisis in foreign aid ESCOTT REID	315
Changes in Communist advice to developing countries L. SIRC	325
Kenya's 'little general election' GEORGE BENNETT	335
Political trends in India B. SHIVA RAO	344
The 23rd CPSU Congress and the new Soviet Five-Year Plan RAYMOND HUTCHINGS	351

EDITOR: MARGARET CORNELL

August 1966
Vol. 22. No. 8

Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

A thorough documentation of
International Affairs through an
objective analysis of world events.

All the documents of Italian
Foreign Policy.

RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI

Weekly Political and Economic Review

300 Italian lire

Foreign subscription: 15,000 Italian lire

Issued by

ISTITUTO PER GLI STUDI DI POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE

Via Clerici 5, Milano, Italy

ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSSENPOLITIK

**keeps you informed on Austrian foreign policy and international
relations.**

The recent issues contained articles by:

Walter Bringolf, Der neutrale Staat und seine Verteidigung

Urs Schwarz, Europa and die Strategie Amerikas

*Rudolf A. Métall, Die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation im Rahmen der
Vereinten Nationen*

Kurt Sonthelmer, Politikwissenschaft im Atomzeitalter

Shepard Stone, Die Rolle der Stiftungen in der Gesellschaft

*Documents on Austria and the economic integration of Europe; the
question of South Tyrol*

Chronicle of Austrian Foreign Policy

Reviews

Published by:

**Österreichische Gesellschaft für Außenpolitik und
Internationale Beziehungen**

WIEN I, JOSEFSPLATZ 6

THE WORLD TODAY

The Royal Institute of International Affairs

CONTENTS

Note of the month	301
The postponement of the Arab Summit	
Towards the super-Power deadlock	
NEVILLE BROWN	306
U.S. hegemony and the future of Latin America	
CELSE FURTADO	375
Arms sales and arms control in the developing countries	
GEOFFREY KEMP	386
Indonesia and Malaysia: the changing face of confrontation	
MICHAEL LEIFER	395

EDITOR: MARGARET CORNELL

September 1966

Vol. 22. No. 9

Correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *The World Today*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, S.W.1.

AMIN MUSSA IN
PERIODICALS

No. 61

SURVEY

October 1966

GERMANY—TODAY AND TOMORROW

is the subject of a special enlarged issue of SURVEY

Among the topics discussed by leading students of current German affairs are American, British, and French attitudes towards Germany and German reunification, Germany's policy towards Russia and East Europe, and the change in West German public opinion. Other articles deal with internal developments in the Federal Republic and the DDR, the succession problem in East Germany, and the troubled relationship between the party and the intellectuals in East Germany.

Annual subscription £1 10s. or \$4 Free specimen copy on request

Editorial Office. SUMMIT HOUSE, 1 LANGHAM PLACE, LONDON, W 1

Subscription Office. 133 OXFORD STREET, LONDON, W.1

RACE

The Journal of the Institute of Race Relations

36 Jermyn Street, London, S.W.1

VOLUME VIII

JULY 1966

NUMBER 1

Michael Banton · *Race as a Social Category*

N. D. Deakin, Daniel Lawrence, Jonathan Silvey,
M. J. LeLohé · *Colour and the 1966 General Election*

Philip Mason · *Gradualism in Peru: Some Impressions on
the Future of Ethnic Group Relations*

Gustav Jahoda, Thelma Veness, I. Pushkin · *Awareness of Ethnic
Differences in Young Children: Proposals for a British Study*

Ravi L. Kapil · *Integrating Disparate Colonial Legacies:
The Somali Experience*

quarterly 40s or \$6 a year 12s 6d or \$2 single copies

Oxford University Press

Press Road, Newnham Lane, London, N.W.10

Notes of the month

The crisis in Nigeria

In January 1965 the Federal Republic of Nigeria almost plunged over the precipice into chaos; in January 1966 the plunge may finally have happened, though at the time of writing it was too early to be sure. The attempted military *coup* in the early hours of Saturday, 15 January 1966, must have come as a great shock to commentators on Nigerian affairs—including the present writer—but even now, looking back, one can see that it was a logical outcome of events in Nigeria over the past few years. Moreover, whatever may be the final outcome of current events, it is certain that Nigeria will never be the same again.

The myth of Nigerian stability has died hard, finding repetition in Britain in newspapers, and radio and television commentaries, even while they were reporting the murder of two regional Premiers and the kidnapping of the federal Prime Minister. Yet it was apparent only eighteen months after Nigeria became independent in October 1960 that the great rambling edifice which the British had built in collaboration with various Nigerian leaders, and within the context of which political power was handed over, was built upon the most shifting of sands. In May 1962 the federal Government declared a state of emergency in the Western Region and dispossessed the Action Group, the party which commanded the allegiance of most of the Yorubas, the dominant tribe in the West, and had controlled the region since 1951. At one blow this destroyed the basis upon which the Nigerian edifice had been built—the division of the country into three regions, each dominated by one ethnic group and each controlled by a party based on that ethnic group. At the federal level this gave a spurious air of party competition, but its true logic was that the central Government should be a coalition of all three parties, which it was in 1951–4 and 1957–9. After the federal election of December 1959 the dominant party in the East, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC),¹ and that in the North, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), formed a federal Government themselves, leaving the Action Group to become the Opposition in the federal Parliament. Even then the balance might have been preserved if the coalition partners had been content to remain politically inactive, but by taking

¹ Now retaining the same initials, but with its name changed to the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens.

advantage of a split within the Action Group and declaring the state of emergency in 1962—on very dubious grounds—the NPC and NCNC set in train the events which have culminated in the attempted military *coup*.

Two questions, therefore, arise at this point. Why did the other two parties undertake this onslaught on the Action Group in 1962, not only removing it from the basis of its power, the Government of the West, but putting its leader, Chief Awolowo, and some of his lieutenants on trial for plotting to overthrow the federal Government? What path have events taken since May 1962 which has led to the current crisis? The first is the more difficult question to answer. One factor certainly is simply the dislike, even hatred, felt by some of the NCNC and NPC leaders towards Chief Awolowo and his party: it is doubtful, for instance, if the late Sardauna of Sokoto ever forgave the Action Group for the onslaught it launched on his Northern 'fief' in the 1959 election. A more important long-term factor, however, is the new image which the Action Group began to try to build for itself immediately after its defeat in that election, by adopting a new policy of 'Democratic Socialism' and obviously setting out to appeal to social discontents which cut across region and tribe. It was a dispute over this new policy which was largely responsible for the split in the Action Group in May 1962. Chief Awolowo believed that a party which could successfully exploit the general themes of social and economic dissatisfaction might well end as the dominant force in Nigerian politics. The late Chief Akintola did not believe that this sort of competition was possible at the federal level after 1959, and the NPC and NCNC, which from their own points of view had an equal interest in thwarting Chief Awolowo's new plans, intervened to support him.

As a result, events after 1962 tended on the surface to emphasize region and tribe, rather than class and ideology. Politics in the West became a question of internecine strife among the Yorubas, particularly after the creation of a new Mid-West Region in mid-1963 left the West ethnically homogeneous. The anti-Awolowo faction of the Action Group, now reconstituted by Chief Akintola as the United People's Party (UPP) was installed as the Government of the West by the federal Government after the emergency, but was never accepted by the majority of Yorubas more especially since it obviously danced to a tune played by the NPC. Gradually, too, a rift appeared between that party and its federal coalition partner, the NCNC. The latter found itself treated with disdain by the northerners, and, more than this, came to realize during 1963 that far from being able to manipulate the 'unsophisticated' NPC leaders it was itself likely always to remain the junior partner in the coalition. Political power at the centre, in terms of seats in the Federal House of Representatives, is tied constitutionally to the population of each region. Thus the North, with more than half the population, gets

more than half the seats. A new census in May 1963 brought this issue to a head, and the whole operation was eventually scrapped because the NPC and NCNC could not agree on mutually satisfactory population figures for the regions. In November 1963 the census was taken again, but the NCNC still refused to accept the North's version of its population figures.

By mid-1964 things were deteriorating rapidly. In March most of the NCNC leaders in the West deserted their old party and joined Chief Akintola and the UPP in forming the new Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). This left the NCNC still strong in the Mid-West and East, whose Governments it controlled, but more than ever linked in the popular mind with the Ibo people of the East, who now found themselves the target of great abuse from the NPC and its Western satellite, the NNDP. With the prospect of a new federal election by the end of the year, therefore, the NCNC performed an about-face and allied itself with Action Group in the United Progressive Grand Alliance, while NPC and NNDP came together as the Nigerian National Alliance. (Both Alliances also included minor parties representing various special interests.) The election was finally set for 30 December 1964, and the campaign for it was bitter and violent. It also became evident that in the West and North the NNDP and NPC Regional Governments were determined to use their control of the administration to influence things in their favour, with the result that on the eve of the poll the Grand Alliance ordered its supporters to boycott the voting. As a result, the NPC swept the North, which was to be expected anyway, and the NNDP the West, an unlikely result in a free election. Crisis followed, and in the first few days of January 1965 it seemed as if the Federation might even break up, with talk of secession by the East. Dr Azikiwe, who had become President when Nigeria became a republic in October 1963, at first supported the Grand Alliance in rejecting the election result, and refused to send for Sir Abubakar Tafawa Bewlewa, the outgoing Prime Minister and federal leader of the NPC. On 4 January, under considerable pressure, he capitulated, however, and Sir Abubakar was asked to form a new 'nationally based' federal Government, which he did by bringing in some NCNC federal leaders as Ministers.

The reputed Nigerian genius for compromise seemed to have triumphed, and only the Action Group was left out in the cold. In fact, two issues remained unresolved. First of all, the strife in the West was not settled; it was still not known whether Akintola's NNDP or the imprisoned Awolowo's Action Group was more acceptable to the Yorubas. Secondly, everything which had happened since mid-1962 had served to create in the minds of young educated people all over Nigeria a profound disgust with politics and politicians. More than this, a groundswell of popular discontent was rising, more especially in the towns, directed at

the politicians not merely because of their obvious concern with power above all else, but also because urban unemployment was growing and prices were rising, and the only people who seemed to be getting richer were the political leaders. In May and June 1964 this economic discontent led to the calling of a successful general strike by the more militant trade-union leaders, the handling of which revealed once more the incompetence of the politicians. Again, in August 1965 the traders of Lagos were provoked into demonstrations by changes in import duties which appeared to them to favour the business interests of one of the federal Ministers, and at their expense.

Thus by October 1965 the long-term trends which the Action Group's new policy of Democratic Socialism, adopted at independence, had anticipated seemed to be growing strong. The particular issue which that party faced in that month, however, was again a regional one, that of control of the West, for on 11 October the long-awaited regional election was held. Yet this trial of strength between Action Group and NNDP again resulted in frustration. The latter, desperate at the possibility of being dislodged from a power which it had wielded with a heavy hand against its opponents, seems to have rigged the election even more flagrantly than in the previous December, and emerged with a large majority. The patience of supporters of the Grand Alliance (in whose name the campaign against the NNDP had been waged) now ran out, and serious disturbances in various parts of the West followed, continuing through November and December, with a death-roll perhaps running into hundreds. As these progressed it became apparent that these riots expressed not merely the frustrations of the recent election, but also the general contempt with which politicians were now regarded.

It was in this context that some of the junior army officers struck. Just as in the Middle East or Asia or Latin America, military *coups* carried out because of disgust with the incompetence of politicians are now by no means unknown in Africa. Dahomey, Nigeria's western neighbour, the Central African Republic, and Upper Volta have provided examples in the last few weeks. The details of the Nigerian *coup* are at present obscure. However, it is significant that the targets for assassination were the Sardauna of Sokoto, symbol of the preponderance of the 'feudal' North and his main southern ally, Chief Akintola.² Moreover, in its broadcast the Supreme Revolutionary Council promised an end to all the abuses for which the system had become notorious in recent years. At the time of writing it would appear that the *coup* has failed, though the army, in the person of Major-General Ironsi, has in effect taken over. Nevertheless Nigeria will never be the same again, in the eyes of the world or internally. Even if the Federation holds together, from now on the politicians will

² Since this Note was written the Federal Military Government announced on 22 January that Sir Abubakar's body had also been found. — *Ed.*

be 'running scared'; behind them the army will always be waiting, and next time the majority of units may not remain loyal. Above all, whoever is in power in the future, be it President Azikiwe, General Ironsi, or a figure yet to emerge, the problems of tribal rivalries, unemployment, inflation, and the disillusionment of the educated will still be waiting to be solved.

K. W. J. Post

The U.S.S.R. as peacemaker: Tashkent and after

Of the parties to the Tashkent Conference, the host country alone appeared unquestionably a beneficiary. Following Mr Kosygin's offer, last September, of Soviet 'good offices' as a step towards a settlement of the Indo-Pakistan dispute,¹ the reservations expressed first by Pakistan and then by India aroused doubts as to whether this Soviet debut in the field of international peacemaking would materialize. Even when Mr Shastri and President Ayub Khan finally agreed to the detailed arrangements, scepticism about the outcome of the meeting persisted and, in many quarters, was dispelled only by the signing, on 10 January, of the Joint Declaration. Modest though the content of the Declaration may be, however, the very fact that such a document could be agreed appears to constitute a significant achievement of Soviet diplomacy.

The immediate Soviet gains from this initiative are considerable. First, they have gained the gratitude of both India and Pakistan and, by their appearance of scrupulous impartiality, have, without alienating the former, increased their influence with the latter. Second, they have won, in greater or less measure, the plaudits of all save the Chinese (who, apart from a brief factual report, studiously ignored the conference) and their associates. Third, they have been able to represent the meeting as a defeat for Western 'scepticism' and 'pessimism' (an *Izvestiya* editorial of 13 January commented: 'As for Western commentators, many of them find it hard to conceal their irritation at the fact that as a result of the meeting the international prestige of the land of the Soviets has grown still greater'). Fourth, they have strikingly reaffirmed their interest in Asia and will have further undermined the Chinese contention that the Soviet Union 'is not an Asian Power'. Finally, thanks to the venue of the meeting, they have elicited tributes from the Indian and Pakistani leaders to the achievements of a Soviet Asian Republic and to the goodwill of its inhabitants.

The conference was, not least, a personal triumph for Mr Kosygin. While the Russians, in preparing the ground for the meeting, stressed its bilateral character and offered Mr Kosygin's assistance only 'if both sides deem this useful', it became clear from the comments of participants and

¹ See 'India, Pakistan, and Kashmir' by A. S. B. Olver, in *The World Today*, October 1965

Observers that his role, particularly on the penultimate day, must have gone beyond that of affording 'good offices'. Thus an Indian spokesman characterized the Soviet Premier's conduct of the opening day's session as 'correct, cautious, and constructive', but a report in the *Pakistan Dawn* two days later asserted: 'Premier Kosygin's role in the Tashkent talks, though behind the scenes, holds the key to their successful conclusion'; and Mr Shastri, in his last statement to correspondents, spoke of the 'great and noble role' which he had played.

It should perhaps be noted that Mr Kosygin, in the cause of bringing the parties together, did not hesitate to awaken memories of the former colonial status of the sub-continent or directly to describe the dispute as 'the heritage of the long period of domination by the colonisers, who set the enslaved peoples against one another'. The leading Soviet commentators Zhukov and Maevsky (in *Pravda* of 10 January), expanding this theme, set the outcome of the meeting in the context of the East-West struggle as a whole: 'Friendship between India and Pakistan strengthens both the two countries and peace in Asia; enmity between them weakens each of them and plays into the hands of those who do not desire peaceable, good-neighbourly relations between Pakistan and India and who are fanning the flames of the war of aggression in Vietnam in their endeavour to undermine the successes of the national liberation movement on the Asiatic continent.'

What of the implications of the Soviet initiative for the future? As far as Soviet relations with the sub-continent are concerned, it might seem to require scrupulous adherence to the line of impartiality which has marked the treatment of the dispute by Soviet publicity since last autumn. Certainly, the Russians have, during the last twelve months or more, been genuinely anxious, without prejudice to their good relations with India, to bring about a *rapprochement* with Pakistan. They may moreover, consider that a by-product of the 'spirit of Tashkent' should be the elimination from the Pakistani press of the frequent anti-Soviet items which have gratefully been reproduced by the Chinese. However, Pakistani correspondent who inferred that 'the Soviet Government' initiative in calling the Tashkent meeting is itself evidence of the neutralist stance in the Indo-Pakistan dispute' may have been in some measure mistaking appearance for reality. Unquestionably, the Russians will sincerely welcome a *détente* between India and Pakistan; but there are no grounds for supposing that they will cease assistance to India. It is not without interest that during the period of the Tashkent meeting a new long-term Soviet-Indian trade agreement, envisaging an increase by 1970 in the volume of trade between the two countries to almost double the 1964 level, was concluded in New Delhi.

At the same time, it will have been clear to the Russians that the Pakistanis, in accepting their offer of good offices, risked incurring the

displeasure of the Chinese. The latter virtually ignored the conference, but chose on 6 January to deliver a sharp Note to India alleging that the Indian Government had of late made a 'frenzied effort to create tension by armed force along the Sino-Indian border and the China-Sikkim border'. The timing of this Note was, as an Indian spokesman at Tashkent remarked, 'odd' and appeared designed (as even a Soviet commentator conceded¹) to stiffen the Pakistani delegation's attitude.

Finally, could the limited success achieved at Tashkent be a harbinger of a Soviet conciliation initiative in Vietnam? This appears extremely unlikely. While the Soviet press hailed the 'good example' of the Tashkent Declaration, a Soviet delegation to Hanoi reaffirmed support for the 'four points' and signed an agreement for supplementary Soviet aid to North Vietnam. Moreover, the Indo-Pakistan dispute and the Vietnam conflict are scarcely analogous either in dimensions or as regards the political and ideological standing of the contestants *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.

A CORRESPONDENT

¹ Quoted by *The Hindu*, 9 January 1966.

Britain's place in Europe

This is the text of the central part of the address by Sir Con O'Neill, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, to the Committee for Belgium-Netherlands-Luxembourg Co-operation in The Hague on 14 January 1966. It seems to us useful to publish the major part of this address by a senior Foreign Office official, as short excerpts only have appeared in the press. Editor.

IN speaking today of 'Britain's Place in Europe' I shall omit altogether its most important aspect--that of defence. I do so because, in this respect things are relatively satisfactory. There are problems enough, now and for the future. But at least, in this field, Britain knows she needs the rest of Western Europe, and the rest of Western Europe knows it needs Britain. And we all know, and I hope we shall never forget, that we all need the United States. Europeans should never forget that they owe their security, and their liberty to plan their future in this way or in that entirely to the overwhelming power of the United States deployed in their defence.

I remember some years ago attempting, in another lecture, to define the objects of foreign policy, and coming to the conclusion that there were only two: food and freedom. These were the objectives in the only two spheres with which the relations between States are fundamentally concerned: economics and defence. We in Europe seem, at the moment to have organized our freedom, our defence, fairly well. What we have been less successful in organizing is our food--which I use as shorthand for the whole complex of welfare, prosperity, growth, and development. I know, of course, there is more to the Community complex than that freedom comes into it too.

I have no doubt that public opinion in Britain is more and more coming to see our future as involving closer and closer connections with the rest of Western Europe. And it is unquestionable that younger people do so more than older ones, which is a good augury for the future. One remarkable British profession of European solidarity recently was the Plowden report, published at the end of last year, on the future of the British aircraft industry. This report declared that our aircraft industry would have no satisfactory future except in the closest co-operation with the aircraft industry of the rest of Western Europe. And I could quote countless other instances to prove that 'European' feelings are steadily growing in Britain. There is no doubt that we have long since been compelled by the course of history to conclude that there is no future for a

in isolation or the assertion of national independence. But I know well that many people in Europe are not so much impressed by evidence of our growing commitment to Europe as exasperated that it is not yet more complete. Maybe I can best devote most of the rest of my time to trying to explain why it is that some people in Britain still find it so hard to go all the way.

I will begin with two problems which I personally regard as having much less influence on our attitude than many people in Europe attribute to them. First is the problem of the so-called British 'special relationship' with the United States. Some people outside Britain believe it is our determination to cling exclusively to that relationship which makes us reluctant to commit ourselves fully to Europe. Whether our relationship with the United States is 'special' I do not know. It is certainly important to us and will remain so. But few people in Britain now believe that a deeper commitment to Europe would harm it. Many believe that on the contrary it would strengthen it, and that if the history of the last ten years has not taught us that, we are unteachable. This of course implies that the kind of United Europe we contemplate will be a partner, not a rival, of the United States. We are still convinced that is what the great majority of Europeans desire.

Then there is the problem of 'supranationality'. Here I must not be dogmatic. I know that many people in Europe attribute to us an extreme reluctance to accept the integration at which the European Communities aim. Personally I believe they are wrong. Of course there would be problems for us, as there have been and are for every Member State. But experience in many fields has taught us that every international relationship affects our sovereignty and that exaggerated national independence is ineffective. The problem lies more in the practice than in the principles; and I venture to express the purely personal view that, should we ever succeed in joining the Community, we may well be found to be the champions rather than the opponents of its 'supranational' aspects.

So much for two problems which seem to me less important than they are sometimes said to be. Let me turn now to some problems which are more difficult. I shall deal mainly with external trade, agriculture, and the Commonwealth.

I deal with trade only to make one simple point. The structure of our foreign trade made it more difficult for us than for the Six Member States of the Community, ten years ago, to think mainly in European terms; and still does today, though decreasingly so. For most of the Member States of the Community, not merely now but already ten years ago, trade with each other was the most important sector of their trade. For us it was not so. Of our ten largest export markets in 1957, the year before the European Economic Community was established, only two-- Germany and the Netherlands-- became members of the Community.

- They occupied seventh and eighth place among our markets. The other eight were the United States, Australia, Canada, India, South Africa, New Zealand, Sweden, and the Irish Republic. By 1964 the picture had changed. Germany had become our third biggest market; and Holland, our sixth; France and Italy had entered the list of our ten best markets. But in 1965 certainly Italy and possibly France will have dropped out of our best ten once more: our exports to France and Italy fell rather sharply last year. Nevertheless, the Community market is now a more important one for us, and especially so in that the Community is one of the few areas with which, in most of the last five or six years, we have had a favourable balance of trade.

Contrast the situation of your own country, Holland. Already in 1957 the other four Community markets (counting Belgium and Luxembourg of course as one) were your first, second, fifth, and seventh most important export markets. Together they took over 41 per cent of your exports at a time when the Community as a whole took only 14½ per cent of ours. In 1964 the Community took a much larger share of our exports—20 per cent—but it took 55 per cent of yours.

Nor were, or are, the Community markets the only European market we are interested in. Though for us EFTA is a foreign market of only 4 million people—less than a quarter of the Community total—our exports to EFTA are, and were in 1957, three-quarters of our exports to the Community. You, the Netherlands, are by far our best export market in the Community per head of population. Yet on this basis you are only half as good a market as Sweden.

So from the trade point of view it was not so easy for us, ten years ago as it was for you to concentrate so much on the area of the Community and put all our eggs into the Community basket. To concentrate on the whole Western European market would have been easier. This is one of the reasons why EFTA is so important to us, and will remain so should there ever be another chance of enlarging the European Community.

The problem of agriculture

Now for agriculture. You must have noticed, from some recent speeches in Britain, that the Common Agricultural Policy of the Community is still regarded as one of the main obstacles to our entry into it. I should, I think, begin by saying something about agriculture in Britain: for I think there are widespread misconceptions about it. I am sure that these are not held here; but I believe many people in Europe think of British agriculture as insignificant in scale, inefficient in production, and more heavily protected or subsidized than agriculture in the Common Market. I do not believe that any of these three propositions is true.

To begin with scale, we do not, of course, in Britain, and we cannot aim at agricultural self-sufficiency. But we do produce a lot of food. The

in 1963 the total value of our agricultural and horticultural output, excluding subsidies, was almost exactly two and a half times as great as that of agricultural output in the Netherlands on the same basis. So it is quite an important industry.

As for efficiency, two and a half times your production was produced by just less than two times your labour force. In the United Kingdom, in 1963, 4 per cent of the total labour force was engaged in agriculture and it produced 4 per cent of the gross domestic product. In Netherlands agriculture in the same year, 10 per cent of the total labour force produced 9 per cent of the gross domestic product. The figures for the same year for Germany and France, with less efficient agricultural industries, are of some interest. In Germany, 12 per cent of the labour force produced 5 per cent of the gross domestic product; in France, 20 per cent produced 9 per cent.

Thus our agricultural industry is efficient. Measured in terms of rising productivity, it is one of our most efficient industries. This of course has been for years, and will probably long remain, a feature of agriculture in all developed Western countries.

To compare degrees of subsidy and protection is the most difficult of all, because our systems are so different. Under our system subsidies can be exactly identified and measured; under the Common Agricultural Policy, they cannot, because they are largely represented by protective levies or duties at the border. I have heard it objected to our system, as a kind of proof of its highly protectionist character, that a large proportion of the net profit of the whole industry is provided by subsidies. What else can one expect? We should have done our sums very badly if it were otherwise. The purpose of subsidies, as of protection at the border, is to extend the margin at which domestic agriculture is profitable. What proportion, I wonder, of the net profit of agriculture in the Common Market is represented by levies at the border? Probably no less. In the circumstances producer prices are perhaps the only fair measure of comparison; and I think our agriculture can stand it. For instance, the guaranteed wheat price in Britain—the price which *includes* the subsidy or deficiency payment—is less than 70 per cent of the wheat price received by the producer in the Netherlands; less than 75 per cent in the case of France. It is not easy to compare all our prices with Community prices, but certainly for all cereals our prices—our guaranteed prices including subsidy—are substantially lower; so they are for beef. For milk they are, by now, about the same. For pig meat and eggs they are higher.

I have tried to prove that our agriculture is important, efficient, and not more subsidized than in the Common Market. What then, you may ask, are we worrying about?

For part of the answer one has to go fairly far back into history. For over 100 years we have made no attempt to be self-sufficient in food or,

THE WORLD TODAY

- except in war-time, to maximize our agricultural output. For most of the time our agriculture enjoyed virtually no protection; today it enjoys, like yours, a good deal. That is why there are by now less than 4 per cent of our labour force engaged in agriculture—far fewer, I think, than in any other country in the world, except perhaps Hong Kong, Monaco, and the Vatican City. That is why we have followed a cheap-food policy, importing so much of what we need at world prices, and protecting our own industry not so much by duties or levies as by deficiency payments to producers. The phrase 'world prices', I have noticed, produces different reactions in different countries. For many world prices are wickedly low, based on cheap labour or concealed subsidies. One hears that opinion sometimes in Britain too, but only from the farmers, of whom we have a few. For British opinion in general, world prices are satisfactorily low, based on efficiency.

This explains part of our objection to the Common Agricultural Policy. To adopt it would end our cheap-food policy, thus raising our cost of living and our industrial costs. It would involve disrupting important trading links. And it would lead, at current prices, to an upsurge of production in Britain, especially of cereals, which we think would be uneconomic and undesirable. Nor is that all. The Common Agricultural Policy, we feel, was based largely on the interests of countries which are surplus producers and hence exporters of foodstuffs. That we shall never be, except for some marginal products. There can, I think, be no dispute that the present policy does not suit the interests of countries which are net importers of food, as we are, since, apart from the other features I have mentioned, it involves accepting a large share of the cost of subsidizing the exports of others.

I felt I should go into this subject at length, because we must face the facts. I am saying no more than that the Common Agricultural Policy would be hard for us to accept; I am not saying that we could never accept it, or anything like it. Indeed we have accepted it once already, subject to some mitigations and transitional arrangements, when we negotiated three or four years ago. Since then the development of the policy, and especially the movement of prices in the Community, have not made things any easier for us. But we recognize, of course, that every member of the Community, when it was first founded, had to accept some arrangements it disliked in return for others it liked better. Should things so develop that our membership of the Community became possible again, no doubt we should be prepared to do the same.

Extra-European Involvement

The third of the three main difficulties I said I would speak of was the Commonwealth. I am trying to sketch some of the reasons why some people in Britain still find it hard to accept a complete commitment to

Europe. So I shall not speak of detailed commercial arrangements or even of historical sentiment; both are changing to some extent. Indeed the Commonwealth is the wrong word for what I am talking about; it would be better to speak of extra-European involvement. The Member States of the Community have by now ended most of their direct extra-European responsibilities, and I dare say they are all the stronger for it. We have not. We are still today deeply, directly, and expensively involved, in Arabia, in South East Asia, in Africa. It gives our thinking a different slant.

I know there are some people in Europe who regard this involvement of ours as a kind of sentimental luxury, a foolish indulgence of past dreams of imperial grandeur which we should at once abandon to concentrate on our proper European tasks. And there are many people in Britain who heartily wish we could do so, while recognizing that we cannot possibly do so overnight. Certainly our balance of payments would be in a far healthier state if we did. The Americans, by the way, who know something of the problems of all continents, do not seem to share the European view I referred to above. They seem anxious that we should continue to play an active part not only in Europe. Whoever is right, the facts are plain and so are the consequences. Steep and rapid though the decline of our responsibilities in the world has been, the process is not yet over. Our involvement will no doubt grow less; but it cannot vanish overnight. And it still conditions our thinking and makes it harder for us to accept an exclusive commitment to Europe. I am not speaking of aid; the members of the Community act generously in that field, as, I hope, do we. Perhaps the best solution, in extra-European involvement of other kinds, is that ours should grow less and the Community's should grow more. Western Europe as a whole should be ready to contribute to the security, as well as the prosperity, of other continents which are in trouble. For those troubles affect not only their interests, but those of Europe too.

So much, then, for some of the main factors which delay and complicate a British commitment to Europe. But there can be no doubt that readiness to accept such a commitment has grown very significantly in the last ten years. I think it is growing still; and perhaps what most checks it today is the fact that, as things stand, there is no reason to suppose we would be allowed to join the Community even if we tried again. The present British Government, of course, is bound by the policy laid down by the Labour Party over three years ago. But I do not think you would be wrong if you feel you have detected some increase of sympathy and interest in its recent statements. Let me quote some of them.

The Labour Party policy I referred to took the form of five conditions for British entry into the Community. They were: satisfactory arrangements for Commonwealth trade, for our EFTA partners, for British agriculture; and the ability to conduct British foreign policy, and to plan

the British economy, independently. Mr Wilson declared last March 'Our ultimate aim is a common European market embracing Britain and as many other European countries as are prepared to join.' Mr Stewart said in April: 'I want to dispel any impression which may exist that Britain wishes to stand aloof from Europe, and still harbours the idea that she has the prospect of an independent future.' Mr Padley, Minister of State, said in June: 'The five conditions will be interpreted pragmatically in the realities of 1965-6-7-8.' Mr Stewart, speaking of the five conditions, said in September: 'We must keep our eyes on facts, and facts can change.' Mr Stewart said in December: 'The Government are ready and willing to join EEC provided that essential British interests are safeguarded. The Government have also on several occasions made it known that they would like to see a wider European unity. It follows, I think from those two things that such a wider European unity would partake more of the nature of EEC than of EFTA.' So I think there is some movement, on our side.

Notice that some of these statements say, 'provided that essential British interests are safeguarded'. That surely is a perfectly natural, proper, and legitimate requirement. It was only because they judged that it safeguarded their essential interests that the original parties to the Treaty of Rome signed it in 1957.

This brings me to express, as delicately as I can, a fear I have long felt. The wish to join the European Community is not the same thing as the wish to undergo conversion to a new religion. Yet some people seem to feel it ought to be exactly that. The Treaty of Rome has been described as a highly negotiated instrument, many of whose provisions reflected hard bargaining from national interest. So of course it is, and so it should be. Yet it has come to be regarded as Holy Writ, whose every comma breathes divine inspiration; and not only the Treaty of Rome, but each of the many thousands of complicated decisions which have implemented it. Having lived some time in Brussels, I have often observed the process at work. A difficult decision has to be taken. Each member approaches it on the basis of national interest. Tough bargaining ensues. Compromises are fought out. Eventually, by straining some texts and undermining some principles, a solution is reached—useful, sensible, but not, one would have thought, sacred. Yet almost immediately, by some curious process of alchemy or hypnotism—or could it be by propaganda?—the new decision takes its place in the dogma. It becomes yet another, indeed the only possible, expression of the Community Spirit, pre-ordained, mystic, sanctified, and eternally inviolable.

So if ever we come to negotiate again for membership, I hope the Community will not seek to insist on baptism by total immersion. No doubt we shall be ready to accept a great deal—we were last time—but not everything. We, and the other European States who will be seeking

entry with us, must be able—as you have been throughout the last ten years - to try to safeguard our essential interests.

Whether that moment will ever come, no one can tell. For myself, I feel the world will have gone sadly wrong if it never does. But only a rash man, in Europe as it is today, can look forward with confidence for more than a few weeks. One thing is certain. No future effort to enlarge the Community can succeed unless all concerned—the present Member States and all new candidates for membership—sincerely wish the enterprise to succeed, and regard it as being in their interest that it should. That has been the trouble up to now: interests have never coincided enough.

Pan-Africanism after Rhodesia

JOHN HARGREAVES

As an organized political force, pan-Africanism clearly belongs to the post-war world. The Manchester conference of 1945, attended by so many future celebrities, provides a satisfactory starting-point for study; the Accra conference of 1958 can be taken as marking the arrival of pan-Africanism as a serious element in international relations. In this short-term perspective, it may seem that the ideology or theory of the movement has been developed, first as a useful weapon in struggles against colonial rule, later as a means of increasing the unity and effectiveness of new African States in international affairs. Perhaps as a natural reaction against over-selling of the idea, a tendency seems to be developing to play down its political effectiveness in these roles. The rapid pace of decolonization is judged to owe more to changes in the international power situation, and in African society, than to the ideological vigour of nationalist movements; the prospects of united action, and still more of organic unity, among African States seem to be reduced by considerations of parochial politics or personal pride. Even unity of outlook, always confined to a limited range of questions involving foreign imperialism, is liable to break down if it has to be translated into action, the latest example of this being the ragged response to the call of the Council of the Organization of African Unity for the breaking of diplomatic relations with Britain if the Rhodesian revolt was not crushed by 15 December. Hence this tendency to regard pan-Africanism as a sort of exploded

Professor Hargreaves is head of the Department of History of Aberdeen University.

Sorelian myth, which has served its limited purposes and will henceforth be of diminishing political importance.

The contribution of historians has so far chiefly been to extend the time-perspective within which the movement can be regarded, by pointing to pan-African ideas in the activities or writings of Africans or Afro-Americans before 1945. Largely thanks to the enthusiasm of Professor George Shepperson, and his extraordinarily broad knowledge of out-of-the-way sources, it is now generally acknowledged that the concept of underlying unity among African peoples was not invented by Azikiwe or Nkrumah but can be traced back into the nineteenth century, on both sides of the Atlantic. For Decraene, therefore, the 'dawn of pan-Africanism' comes with Sylvester Williams and the London meeting of 1901. Lagum uses the same date, with a somewhat unsteady backward glance to E. W. Blyden. Soviet historians prefer to see this dawn in the not very successful 'League against Imperialism' of the 1920s. But if pan-Africanism is interpreted more broadly still, to include not merely the idea of the unity of peoples of African descent but also assertions of identity and claims for political rights on behalf of particular peoples, we may legitimately take our search for origins back much further, and include the anti-slavery writings of eighteenth-century Africans like Equiano and Cugoana, the associations of freedmen which developed in the United States after 1787, and the Settler resistance to the paternalist government of the Sierra Leone Company. We can even include among our early texts the retort of a Senegalese woman to an arbitrary British governor of the 1770s – that 'though her skin was black, her heart was white and her blood as good as his'.¹

Does the establishment of this longer historical context of African demands have any practical implications? In the first place, it suggests that the roots of the pan-African 'myth' go much deeper than many observers of the contemporary scene imagine; and that consciousness of these roots may increase the fervour with which the assumptions of pan-Africanism are accepted. It may also suggest the uncomfortable and unpalatable conclusion that pan-African consciousness has developed largely in reaction to racial prejudice and discrimination by Europeans and white Americans. Certainly most African leaders are anxious to discourage appeals based on race; like earlier 'pan-' movements, pan-Africanists prefer to emphasize, often to exaggerate, cultural unity and common political interest. Certainly the pan-African ideal is now continental, embracing light-skinned peoples of the north. All the same, that Senegalese woman in her retort to Governor O'Hara was expressing a recurrent tendency to see Africans' grievances as directly related to their colour; and a recurrent reaction has been the assertion of racial solidarity

¹ London, Public Record Office, C.O. 267/1, Governor Macnamara to Lord Dartmouth, 29 January 1776.

(though often in the defence of genuine political or social principles). It would be a lengthy and depressing task to trace the history of Negro racial reactions against racialism, from the questionable verdicts of a few nineteenth-century Sierra Leone juries and Edward Blyden's acute prejudice against mulattoes to the explicit racialism of Marcus Garvey and his latter-day heirs in America. But it might remind us that defensive racialism could easily become a more prominent feature of the pan-African myth.

This point may seem so simple as to be hardly worth emphasizing. Yet people in Britain continue to behave in ways which, by wilfully emphasizing the solidarity of the white world, can only strengthen the temptation for Africans to see their relations with that world in a racial light. Thus the Belgian parachute operation at Stanleyville in November 1964 was widely presented in the British press as a rescue operation for Europeans, although, as the official British statement¹ made clear, it was not confined to them, and substantial numbers of Asians in particular were in fact evacuated. The Rhodesian problem obviously contains dangers of the same sort, and I would like to make an impressionistic attempt to relate these somewhat ponderous generalities to the present crisis.

The Rhodesian question

How strongly do Africans in distant parts of the continent feel about Rhodesia? To such a question it is difficult to provide any very exact answers; newspaper comment, an imperfect source at the best of times, is likely to reflect chiefly the intention of a ruling party to play the question up or down as the case may be. But my personal impression, after a short but intensive period recently of lecturing to mainly university audiences in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, is that the feeling there of involvement is spontaneous, strong, and by no means ill-informed. Questions concerning British responsibilities were regularly raised, with much ingenuity of phrasing, after lectures on relatively remote historical problems. Even those who admitted the political and logistic difficulties of military intervention bitterly resented the British Prime Minister's statement before the declaration of UDI which seemed to exclude the use of force; the qualifying clauses of the statement were not generally quoted and the interpretation was drawn that the British Government was a direct accomplice in UDI, or at least was not taking it as seriously as it would a rebellion in an African or Asian colony. In such protests as the much-publicized three-mile march of Fourah Bay students to the British High Commission in Freetown, posters reading 'Hang Wilson' were present along with those condemning Smith. There is much scepticism about the argument that Britain disagrees with the OAU only about the

¹ By Mr George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons, 25 November 1964.

means of ending the rebellion, not about the end; colonial rebellions by non-whites, it is argued, have always been dealt with by more forceful means. Pointing out the constitutional differences between Britain's position in Rhodesia and in Aden or British Guiana has only limited effects; why, it is asked, should such a difference exist in the first place? Use of the 'kith and kin' argument (even when stated in the concrete form that a sizable number of Britons have family connections in Rhodesia) provokes a mixed response; to some Africans it explains British hesitations without excusing, to others it merely confirms the view that racial lines in the last resort count more than principles. There is a subsidiary tendency to explain British policy by economic interest, but the racial interpretation seems to predominate.

For those who know West Africa, there should be no need to add that this barrage of criticism against British policies does not prevent British visitors being received everywhere with the greatest friendliness, hospitality, and personal courtesy. I met some very critical audiences and some very sharp questions; but never once was there even the remotest suggestion of behaviour similar to that recently of the 'civilized' electors of Rhodesia towards British Members of Parliament. Even in conversation with old friends and colleagues, however, the Rhodesian problem tends to obtrude itself. While I was in Sierra Leone one of the delegates to the OAU Council meeting in Addis Ababa threatened to leave the Commonwealth. There seemed little enthusiasm for this, and his statement was played down in the local press; but such a step remains a real possibility. Some of those who advocate it may be doing so rather lightly, assuming that it would be as easy to re-enter the Commonwealth later, once honour is satisfied; when discussing proposals for university exchanges and so on. I was conscious of slight shocks of surprise when it was realized that some of the established schemes may be jeopardized if Sierra Leone leaves the Commonwealth.

After the Lagos conference there might be a tendency to assume that the dangerous corner has now been passed; that the 'wise men' have successfully isolated the 'wild men' and successfully demonstrated the wisdom of British statecraft. But no African leader will regard that demonstration as complete until a decisive change has begun in the balance of political power within Rhodesia. If the rebellion were indeed to be ended as some are urging, by a compromise with Smith and a return to an unchanged 1961 Constitution, every African Government would conclude rightly or wrongly, that white racial solidarity was predominating over the professed ideals of the multiracial Commonwealth.

The French-speaking States

In the French-speaking States the problem of whether to remain in the Commonwealth is of course not present (indeed, President Bour-

Guinea during his recent West African tour was advancing the idea of a French-speaking Commonwealth²). None of these States has very important commercial or cultural relations with Britain, but such contacts as they have seem to be welcomed on general internationalist grounds. There is perhaps some understanding of British difficulties—and of the consequent difficulties of African members of the Commonwealth—on the part of those governments which a few years ago had to review their own attitude towards France in the light of the Algerian war.

But against these moderating tendencies the Addis Ababa resolution of 13 December, calling on members of the OAU to sever relations with Britain unless the rebellion was crushed by the 15th, produced a strong moral pressure not to seem lacking in pan-African zeal. During the first two weeks of December the position appeared to be genuinely open; some Heads of State seem to have been embarrassed by the enthusiasm of the assembled Foreign Ministers, and might have welcomed action by the British Government which would have made it easier to avoid complying. It seems a very great pity that the oil embargo was announced just after, rather than just before, 15 December. But probably Guinea would have broken in any case; Sekou Touré's violent rupture with France in November suggests that, faced with growing economic difficulties at home, he was already moving into a mood of intransigent anti-colonialism. After his action, there appears to have been something of a domino effect among those States with the heaviest investment of emotional capital in the pan-African idea. The action of Congo (Brazzaville) was no doubt predictable; but in Mali the decision to break was taken by the Political Bureau in the absence of President Modibo Keita, and apparently with some reluctance. Mauritania's decision to break is interesting, since less than four years ago her very existence was a major grievance of the militantly anti-imperialist Casablanca group. Her subsequent economic good fortune has not only ensured her survival as a State but has encouraged President Mokhtar to develop an interestingly independent foreign policy. Young Mauritania, influenced by ideas of Arab socialism seem to aspire to the role (which in very different circumstances Mauritania has played in the past) of bridge or interpreter between Arab and Negro Africa; to achieve this it is necessary to overcome lingering suspicions that Mauritania is still an imperialist puppet-State.

It would, however, be dangerous to conclude that the worst is over, now that the militants have made their protest, and that the remaining francophone States will remain as tolerant of British policy as they were of Mr Wilson's speech to the United Nations General Assembly. Even if there is less public interest than in Commonwealth Africa, this does not mean that the support of the other governments can be taken for granted.

² Especially in his speech at Dakar University, 24 November 1965.

'Three of the four Entente Governments,⁴ meeting at Niamey on 12 December, issued a declaration that they were 'des gens sérieux' who would view such questions realistically; but President Hamani Diori of Niger has since been reported as saying that 'we cannot accept a foreign minority forever dominating an African people'.⁵ Also there have been changes in Dahomey and Upper Volta (and in the Central African Republic). General Soglo and Colonel Lamizana were brought to power by concrete, local discontents and may not have Rhodesian freedom at the top of their agenda; but this does not mean that the urban population who called them in are indifferent to pan-African appeals.

In Senegal, although President Senghor seems to have decided that it would be unwise to act on the 15 December deadline, there was apparently a keen debate in the Political Committee of the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* (UPS) and the Government's decision was uncertain for some days. The Foreign Minister, M. Doudou Thiam, who moved the resolution in the OAU Council, appears to have found more support for a break within the party than had been expected. And in Senegal there still exists a legal Opposition which can be expected to urge a stronger line. Moreover, President Senghor himself is now committed to re-establishing close relations with Mali, and to making progress with the important regional scheme for development of the Senegal river basin. It is clear that if Senegal is to maintain the industrial growth begun when she could still count on access to the market of French West Africa, and if Dakar is still to support the impressive apparatus of a major capital city, this latter scheme is likely to become increasingly important. But Senegal's partners would be precisely those three francophone States which have led the way in breaking off relations with Britain. Early in December Senghor visited Modibo Keita in Mali, and the joint communiqué expressed their general commitment to the liberation of Zimbabwe and the implementation of the OAU resolution. The UPS newspaper *L'Unité Africaine* on 16 December appeared to justify the maintenance of relations by expressing confidence in the efficacy of Britain's action to take over the Rhodesian Reserve Bank; but this is not the end of the matter. The Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) has so far concerned itself more with practical problems than with ideological pan-Africanism (Mali, Guinea, and Mauritania are not members); but the meeting of its Foreign Ministers at Tananarive in January, though primarily concerned to discuss a permanent charter for the Organization, seems to have kept the matter of Rhodesia under review.

The Rhodesian question might seem to offer good facilities for a critical experiment by political scientists concerned to classify African States as 'militants' or 'moderates', 'idealists' or 'pragmatists'. Undoubtedly it

⁴ Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, and Niger subsequently joined by Togo.

⁵ *Le Monde*, 19-20 December 1965, *West Africa*, 25 December 1965.

has revealed differences of policy and temperament among African leaders. But, as Doudou Thiam himself wrote (of the former Casablanca and Monrovia groups), 'the difference is one rather of style and behaviour than of fundamental principle.'⁴ A first reaction to the resolution of the OAU Council might be that its uneven implementation has damaged the myth of continental unity in the pan-African cause; that it was a sort of 'emotional spasm', in the feverish atmosphere of an international conference, which was repudiated by those 'gens sérieux' who valued the maintenance of amicable relations with Britain more highly than demonstrations of principle.⁵ But if economic sanctions do not end the rebellion with reasonable speed, or if the Smith regime somehow contrives to survive until the new meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers arranged for July 1966, pressures will certainly develop in both English and French-speaking States to conform to the intransigent position; pan-African unity will be re-established.

And I fear this would mean, not merely a general whipping-up of rhetorical pan-Africanist feeling, but a strengthening of that strand of destructive racialism mentioned earlier. The British Government might find itself, however unjustly, identified with the forces upholding colonialism in southern Africa; there could be a disastrous collapse of the policies hitherto followed by successive Governments towards African States. Whether this would create more than a transient emotional unity in Africa is another question. But the notion of African military intervention would certainly be revived; even if invasion by an OAU expeditionary force seems improbable, there would be attempts to get foreign military assistance and to organize infiltration from Zambia. And the moderate governments would be under strong pressure to give at least token collaboration. One should not therefore discount the possibility that Rhodesia will furnish not merely renewed life to the pan-Africanist myth, but some practical expression of it.

⁴ Doudou Thiam, *The Foreign Policy of African States* (London, Phoenix Books, 1965), p. 69.

⁵ This seems to be the interpretation of *West Africa*, 18 December 1965.

Soviet and Chinese policies in the Middle East

GEOFFREY WHEELER

Both the Soviet Union and China are now taking an active interest in the Middle East and the object of the present article is to consider the strategic implications of their policies and activities in this area. It should be remarked at the outset that far more is known about Soviet than about Chinese intentions and methods in the Middle East. Russian and later Soviet interest in the area has been continuous for over 150 years, whereas China is a newcomer. There is a large amount of past and current specialized Russian literature in which the course of Russian and Soviet thinking can be traced with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Chinese specialized literature, on the other hand, is either non-existent or impossible to obtain, and information about Chinese views on Middle Eastern problems has to be gleaned from scattered items in radio broadcasts and press material. Soviet writing, which deals voluminously with Western policies in the Middle East, has so far dealt only with general Chinese attitudes towards the Afro-Asian countries.

Soviet policy

The Soviet conception of the Middle East (as a political division of the world) is different from that of the West. Although Soviet writers occasionally use the terms Middle or Near East, they more often use the phrases South-West or West Asia in which they include Turkey and Afghanistan but not, of course, Egypt. The Asian part of the Middle East, it is important to remember, borders immediately on the almost exclusively Muslim southern fringe of the U.S.S.R., as it did on the southern fringe of the Tsarist Russian Empire from the end of the nineteenth century. In fact, from the point of view of culture and to a considerable extent of race, the Middle East and the southern Muslim fringe of the U.S.S.R., now occupied by the six Muslim Soviet republics, are one; they were both part of the Muslim East of the Caliphates. But the two parts have developed quite differently: with the exception of Aden, South-West Asi-

Col. Wheeler is the Director of the Central Asian Research Centre, London, author of *Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia* (London, O.U.P. for Institute of Race Relations, 1960) and *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965). This article is appearing simultaneously in German in *Europa-Archiv*, Bonn.

Now consists of ten independent States in place of the three States, two independent and one semi-independent, which existed at the time of the Revolution. The Muslim peoples of Russia are in no sense independent and are still firmly within the confines of the U.S.S.R.; but their proximity to and affinity with the non-Soviet Muslims is still a matter of great concern to the Soviet Government.

One other preliminary point should be made; Russia's relations with Islamic countries are of much longer standing than, and have been very different from, those of the West. For 250 years Russia was ruled by a Muslim people, the islamized Mongols. In the middle of the sixteenth century the purely Muslim Tatar khanates of Astrakhan and Kazan became integral parts of *Russia* as distinct from the Russian empire. In the eighteenth century the Crimean khanate followed suit. By the end of the nineteenth century the Russian empire as a whole not only contained some 25 million Muslims, but its frontiers marched with those of the only two Muslim States which could be regarded as fully sovereign—the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Russia, therefore, had good reason to attach far more importance to the Muslim world than did the West. The Russians have always regarded Islam as hostile to them, and Communism, while recognizing and even exaggerating the power of Islam as a counter-revolutionary force, seeks to represent it as artificially maintained by Western imperialist intrigue. While affecting to think of the Middle East States without respect to Islam, the Soviet Government undoubtedly reckons with the prevalence and staying power of Islamic culture both inside and outside the U.S.S.R.

Before the Revolution, Russia's aims in the Middle East could be described as the replacement there of Western by Russian political, economic, and cultural influence, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean. Since the Revolution, there has been a tendency in the West to regard these aims as superseded by that of establishing international Communism in the Middle East as if this were an aim in itself. Of recent years, however, it has become apparent that, while the Soviet Union is prepared to use Communism when and where it seems appropriate as a means to an end, her ultimate objective is now as much concerned with the national security, national economy, and national prestige of the Soviet or Russian State as it was before the Revolution. But these national considerations are often found to be in serious conflict with those affecting the international position of Communism, and the Soviet Government sometimes experiences difficulty in finding ideological justification for its foreign policies.

While the long-term aim of Soviet policy is likely to remain fairly constant, there has already been considerable modification of Soviet tactics and methods and there is likely to be more in the future. The suddenness of some of these changes has gained for the Soviet Union a reputation for

unpredictability, and there is also a widespread belief that the Soviet Government has a far better understanding than the West of Middle Eastern problems and that ever since the Revolution the development of its Asian policy has proceeded according to plan. The Soviet Government is certainly in a position to spring more surprises than other governments. This is due partly to the strict Communist Party discipline and the very efficient security and censorship measures which result from it; and partly to the fact that the Soviet Union has not until recently had an economic and military stake in the Middle East comparable with that of the West. This means that the Russians have been able to take risks and go away with ill-considered actions and errors of policy in a way that the Western Powers, with their party systems, sensitive public opinions, and large private financial interests, cannot. It is probably true that the Soviet Government has at times shown a better understanding of Middle Eastern national aspirations than the West, and has a much more practical approach to what the West still calls Oriental studies. But it is doubtful whether the Russians have displayed any greater acumen in assessing political situations and potentialities; indeed, it is worth taking a brief look at some of the miscalculations made by them during the past forty years or so. Although many of these miscalculations were as great as any committed by the West, none of them ever received much publicity either at the time or later, none of them impaired the authority of the Communist Party inside the U.S.S.R., and most of them have now been forgotten.

Early Soviet miscalculations

Early Soviet policy in the Middle East was based on the belief that Communism, or at least Socialism, would prove an instant attraction to peoples who in the past had been dominated or exploited by Turkey, Britain, or Tsarist Russia, and whose countries at the end of the first World War were in a state bordering on anarchy and partially or wholly under Western occupation. The Soviet Government was aware of the nationalist movements which by 1920 were well under way in the Arab countries and in Turkey and Persia; but it misunderstood their character and believed that it would be a comparatively easy matter to gain control of them, at any rate in Turkey and Persia, and to manipulate them to the Soviet advantage. These hopes proved illusory: the Turkish nationalists were quite prepared to accept Soviet arms and money in their struggle against the West, but they had no use for Communism and continued to regard Russia as their traditional enemy. In Persia, Soviet tactics included an attempt to create a Soviet Republic in the northern province of Gilan, the establishment of eight Soviet consulates and a number of commercial organizations, clubs, and propaganda agents, the creation of a Persian Communist Party, and the exploitation, if not the actual insti-

tion, of mutinies in the Persian army. The effect of these ill-conceived and badly executed actions was further to rally the forces of Persian nationalism which had already been set in motion by the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919, and, in the event, Soviet interests and prestige suffered much more heavily than British. By 1934 all but one of the Soviet consulates and all the trade agencies and clubs had been closed.

During the second World War Soviet influence in the Middle East gained a new lease of life. As an ally of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union was given a respectable introduction to the new Middle East States, and diplomatic representation which had hitherto been confined to Turkey and Persia was extended to most of the Arab countries. A further advantage was gained from the Soviet military occupation of North Persia in 1941. During the next five years, Soviet influence in Persia increased to the point when the Soviet Government decided to embark on another attempt to do away with Persian independence. The attempt to organize a separatist movement in Persian Azerbaijan seems to have resulted from some extraordinary Soviet miscalculations. They believed that the Persian Government, in the person of the Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, was in their pocket and that the Western Powers would not interfere, partly because of war-weariness and partly because Britain would be ready to revert to the division of Persia into spheres of Russian and British influence. Evidently timed to coincide with the start of the separatist movement in December 1945 was a Soviet demand that Turkey should return to the U.S.S.R. the provinces of Kars and Ardahan ceded to her in 1921, and should also agree to a revision of the Montreux Straits Convention. Turkey's refusal was followed by a concentration of Soviet troops on the Turkish frontier, coinciding with the heavy reinforcement of the Soviet army of occupation in North Persia. A combination of Persian astuteness and Western support in the United Nations completely defeated Soviet plans in Persia, while Turkey, also confident of Western support, stood firm against Soviet pressure. The net result of Soviet miscalculation in 1945 and 1946 was to postpone the establishment of normal Soviet relations with Persia and Turkey for over ten years.

Developments since 1955

Apart from the establishment of diplomatic missions, Soviet influence did not make much progress in the Arab countries until 1955, when the conclusion of arms deals constituted an important advance. The Soviet Union had been one of the first countries to recognize the new State of Israel and it seemed for a time that the Soviet Government saw a better future in friendship with Israel than with the Arab countries, particularly since in 1948 Britain's relations with Israel were tense, while she had come out in strong support of the Arab League. By 1950, however, there had been considerable Soviet rethinking. Soviet attempts to browbeat

Turkey and Persia and to detach them from the West had failed; Anglo-Israeli relations had greatly improved; anti-Western and neutralist tendencies had increased in the Arab countries, and particularly in Egypt; and the Soviet Union began to take an interest in so-called 'liberation struggles' and in Arab unity. The year 1955 saw the foundation of the Baghdad Pact, with what appeared to both the Middle East and the Soviet Union as strong militarist implications; of the Bandung Conference with its affirmation of the five principles of peaceful co-existence and of great advances by the pan-Arab nationalist ideology of Colonel Nasser. The adjustments of Soviet policy and ideology which were necessary to take advantage of these developments were made during 1955 and received formal confirmation at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. This Congress disclosed a new Soviet attitude towards so-called 'bourgeois nationalist' governments of Asia and Africa, although they were still supposed to be under the economic tutelage of the West, their *political* independence was for the first time recognized as well as the fact that the 'bourgeois nationalists' were, at any rate for the time being, the *de facto* rulers of their countries. In literature published after the Congress it was emphasized that not only local Communist Parties, the peasants, and the industrial proletariat where it existed, but all strata of society, including the big bourgeoisie, the armed forces, and the clergy, were to be regarded as taking part in the struggle for national liberation from the West and as such to be deserving of Soviet support.

It is probable that this change in Soviet attitude was due to Soviet realization that Communism as a movement had made far less progress in the Middle East than had been expected. At this point, therefore, it may be convenient to consider the extent of the impact which Communist doctrines have so far had on Middle East society. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, leading French authorities on Communism in the Muslim world, have estimated that in 1956, when the movement was at its zenith, the total of registered Party members in the Arab countries, Turkey was only between 30,000 and 50,000 and it has certainly decreased since then. Membership of the Persian Tudeh Party started to fall in 1946, has been clandestine since 1949, and is probably now very low indeed. In none of the Muslim countries of the Middle East does the Communist Party enjoy any legal political status; Communist influence is confined to certain sections of the bourgeois intelligentsia and its contact with the masses to the still very small industrial proletariat. In addition, at almost all levels of society there is some confusion between the attraction of Marxism and sympathy with, or respect for, the Soviet Union as a rich and powerful State, with which it is possible for governments to maintain good relations while persecuting local Communists. It would nevertheless be a mistake to assume that Communism has made only insignificant progress in the Middle East and that the continu-

presence of the religion and philosophy of Islam provides an impregnable bastion against it. Islam and Communism have certain aims in common, notably the continued struggle against the West and so-called Western imperialism. Many Middle Eastern regimes have been impressed by the material progress made in the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union and have accepted the Soviet claims about their full sovereignty. Many of them also have declared a preference for a socialist system of government, although not as yet for the scientific or Marxist socialism advocated by the Soviet Union. Except to Persia and Turkey, neither Tsarist nor Soviet Russia has ever been a military menace and the Arab States have never thought of Communism as aiming at imposing the same kind of political and economic mentorship as that thought to be exercised by Western imperialism.

Soviet views on the tactical use which can be made of Middle East communists have changed: local Communist Parties are no longer regarded as the spearhead of Soviet penetration and are precluded from becoming identified with opposition to national bourgeois governments; but local Communists can perform useful Soviet services as expert political advisers inside the ruling nationalist-revolutionary parties. This tactic was approved at a meeting of Arab Communist representatives—most of Communist Parties—reported by *Pravda* as having been held in an unspecified place in December 1964.

By 1950 the progress of Soviet influence in Turkey and Persia had been blocked by a combination of three factors: the ineptitude of the Soviet approach, traditional fear and dislike of Russia, and Western military and economic support. The new Soviet tactics which resulted from recognition of this situation involved the by-passing of Turkey and Persia and concentration on the Arab States and, further east, on Afghanistan and India. During the 1950s the new Soviet policy was greatly aided by the trend of Western policy and action in the Middle East. Britain attempted to develop a Middle East defence organization which failed to attract any of the Arab States except Iraq, whose association with the Baghdad Pact of 1955 was to prove only temporary. Events now began to play into the hands of the Soviet Union. The West had attempted to rally the military potential of the Middle East against what seemed to the Arab countries to be a purely hypothetical threat of attack from the Soviet Union; but in 1956 it was not the Soviet Union but the West which attacked the Middle East in the shape of the Suez operation. It was not difficult for the Soviet Government to convince the Arab world that it was Soviet intervention which had obliged Britain and France to call off this operation, and Soviet prestige rose accordingly. The Soviet Union now came forward as the champion of pan-Arab nationalism against Western, and particularly British, so-called imperialism and colonialism. During 1957, Soviet writers were lyrical in their praise of Arab unity and

Arab nationalist aspirations and louder than ever in their condemnation of the reactionary regimes in Iraq and Jordan, regimes kept in place, they claimed, only by British support. Meanwhile, however, Nasser's pan-Arab nationalist ideology was advancing faster than the Soviet Union either expected or wanted. The creation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958 was greeted with only qualified approval. Nasser's subsequent campaign against Communism, the revolution in Iraq in July 1958, and reactions to it in Jordan and the Lebanon, and perhaps most of all, the renewed Anglo-American co-operation in the Middle East were decisive in modifying the Soviet attitude to Arab nationalism.

In the autumn of 1958, Western commentators were predicting the early establishment of a Communist regime in Iraq. Whether or not this was ever a real possibility, there can be no doubt that it would not have been in the interests of the Soviet Government, which did all it could to curb the enthusiasm of the Iraqi Communists. In the Soviet view, the establishment of a Communist government in a country which bordered not on the Soviet Union but on Turkey and Persia, where Western influence was paramount, would not only put the Soviet Union in an awkward political position but might precipitate war. It was with a view to improving her strategic position in this eventuality that the Soviet Union attempted early in 1959 to detach Persia from Western influence by the offer of a new treaty; and the failure of this attempt provided one more reason why the Soviet Union should abandon her plan of manipulating Arab affairs as a whole and adopt a much more cautious and defensive policy.

Relations with Individual States

Since 1959 the Soviet Government has concentrated on developing good relations with individual States. In this it has made considerable progress with the Arab States and more recently with Turkey and Persia, and it has been aided by the partial relaxation of its hitherto rigid doctrinaire principles. As regards Communist ideology and socialism, the Soviet attitude has become much more realistic. While the Soviet Government must continue to deplore any display of anti-Communist sentiment and association with the West on the part of the Arab States, its attitude was not to be irrevocably affected by these considerations. At any rate for the present, it is what Middle Eastern governments *do* that matters, not what kind of ideology makes them do it. Provided a government's attitude towards the Soviet Union is friendly, and preferably, although not necessarily, hostile to the West, the Soviet Government is not particular about the character and opinions of its leadership.

The Soviet Union's more moderate and realistic policy towards the Middle East undoubtedly contributed towards the Sino-Soviet rift; but in general it can be said to have paid good dividends. Between 1962 and

1965 Soviet relations with all the Arab States showed a marked improvement, and there has been much less Soviet criticism of their 'bourgeois' governments. The U.A.R.'s Arab Socialist Union, which was the subject of much hostile comment in 1962, is now favourably described, and the existing political regime is said to be 'underpinned by a wider social base'. Soviet relations with Iraq, which had been bad after the overthrow of Kasim's regime in February 1963, began to improve at the end of that year. In June 1964 an Iraqi military delegation went to Moscow, and throughout 1964 Soviet comment on Iraqi policies was generally favourable, an exception being the Kurdish question to which reference will be made later. After talks in Moscow in August 1963, the Soviet and Jordanian Governments agreed to establish diplomatic relations and in June 1964 a delegation of the Jordanian Communist Party visited Moscow. After years of hostile criticism Soviet commentators began in 1964 to take a favourable view of Jordan's economic plans. In 1963 diplomatic relations were also established with Kuwait, and although these have not yet been established with Saudi Arabia, President Mikoyan sent congratulations to King Faisal on his succession to the throne in November 1964, since when there has been favourable mention of the King's reforms. The Yemen being the only country where the Soviet Union has found herself in active competition with the Chinese, she has made every effort to accommodate herself to the government of the day. Soviet comment on the achievements of the Revolutionary Government have been cautious, and the subject of Egypt's involvement has generally been avoided. As part of the Soviet Government's general policy of lowering the temperature everywhere in the Middle East, a settlement of the conflict with the Yemen monarchists would presumably meet with Soviet approval.

Although the Soviet attitude towards the larger Arab States is at present much less uncompromising than ever before and is even prepared to tolerate their continuing to deal with the West, the Persian Gulf States apart from Kuwait are still criticized as being the pawns of British strategy and of Western oil companies. Whereas elsewhere peace and stability are the principal aims of Soviet policy, the militant attitude of the workers at Bahrain is commended, and Omani resistance to the Sultan of Muscat is represented as an epic of national struggle against imperialism. Nevertheless, there has not so far been any sign of active Soviet intervention in the Gulf.

The Soviet Government has evidently abandoned any plan of posing as the champion of Arab unity and probably thinks that such unity is still remote, but it has now ceased criticizing it in principle. The turning-point came with the conference of Arab Heads of State in Cairo in January 1964, of which *Pravda's* correspondent in Cairo said that it was 'the most representative conference of Arab leaders in history'.

Before considering the present Soviet attitude towards the non-Arab States of the Middle East, a brief reference must be made to the Kurdish question. In some quarters it is believed that the Soviet Union supports the idea of the creation of an independent Kurdistan embracing the considerable Kurdish communities in Iraq, Turkey, and Persia and the smaller ones in the Soviet Union and Syria. The creation of such a State could be made to tally with Marxist and Leninist principles, and the Soviet Union has no doubt considered its possibilities in the past. But there is no evidence whatever that she is thinking on these lines at present. All she does is to declare her support for the Kurds in their struggle for freedom within the countries where they live. In the words of the principal Soviet expert on Kurdish affairs Kurdojev, presumably himself a Kurd, 'the democratic elements among the Kurdish people know well that the only way to the solution of the Kurdish question is by the unity of the Kurdish workers with the progressive forces of the Persian, Turkish, and Iraqi people and the formation of one front of struggle for freedom and democracy.'¹ The Soviet Union supports nationalist movements on which she thinks she can derive some practical advantage from them, and it is difficult to see what advantage could be gained from the creation of an entirely new and probably unruly State so close to Transcaucasia where the Soviet Union has already enough national problems on her hands. It should incidentally be remembered that the total number of Kurds living in the Soviet Union does not exceed 60,000 living in scattered communities in Transcaucasia and Turkmenistan.

It is commonly supposed that the Soviet Government is committed to taking the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel in particular regards the Soviet Union as implacably hostile to her. It is true that Israel has been classed as an aggressor nation largely because of her association with the United States. But on only one issue—that of the Jordan water—

has the Soviet Union openly supported the Arab case, and she has generally avoided taking sides in a dispute which, so she claims, does not concern her. The fact that China appears to have declared full support for the Arab States in the dispute has not so far inclined Soviet policy in the same direction.

The Soviet attitude towards Persia which had been on the whole cool and critical since 1947 took an abrupt turn for the worse after the failure of the treaty negotiations in the spring of 1959. All aspects of Persia's internal and external policy were attacked without restraint or discrimination. Towards the end of 1959 the view was expressed in some quarters that the West that the Soviet Union was planning a return to direct action in North Persia. In fact, however, the Soviet Government soon began its search for an excuse to re-establish normal relations and this was provided by the Persian assurance of September 1962 that there would be

¹ 'The Kurds', an article in *Narody Proedney Azii* (Moscow, 1957).

foreign rocket-bases on Persian territory. There followed agreements on trade, frontiers, transit traffic, and economic co-operation as well as exchanges of visits, notably President Brezhnev's to Persia in 1963 and the Shah's to the U.S.S.R. in June 1965. Persian agrarian reforms which had been violently attacked in 1962 were described in 1963 as 'a step forward'. Anti-government riots in June 1963 by opponents of the reforms were condemned in the Soviet press and the Soviet Government found itself in the unprecedented position of supporting the Persian Government in the name of resistance to reaction. The same *volte face* was observable in the new Soviet attitude towards Persian education and foreign policy, although alleged changes in the latter were attributed to pressure by the 'progressives' and the National Front.

Turkey falls only marginally within the scope of the present article, but it may be remarked that Soviet relations with her show the same trend as those with Persia. The 'Turkish revolution' of 1960 was the signal for a serious Soviet attempt to improve relations which are now better than at any time since 1945. The current Soviet attitude towards socialist trends in Turkey is similar to that towards Arab socialism: although un-Marxist in character, the so-called 'revolutionary current' (*devrimci cereyan*) is found to be working against capitalism and therefore deserving of qualified Soviet approval.

During the past fifteen years it has been possible to get a fairly accurate idea of the course of Soviet thinking on the Middle East from a careful examination of Soviet writing, all of which, whether on the academic or propaganda level, is subject to strict political and ideological control. At present nothing can be found in this writing to indicate anything other than concern for peace among Middle East States as well as for stability within them, to the extent at least that this is compatible with 'class struggle'. If this assessment is correct, it could be regarded as the natural consequence of realization that direct action and subversion have not in the past paid good dividends and are unlikely to do so either at present or in the immediate future. The new course set at the 20th Party Congress of 1956 corresponded with such a realization and nothing has happened since to suggest that the Soviet Government contemplates a return to its earlier methods and tactics. But since 1956 an entirely new factor has entered the Middle East in the shape of China.

Chinese policy

Relations between the Chinese People's Republic and the countries of the Middle East really date from the Bandung Conference of 1955. Previously there had not only been no exchange of diplomatic missions but the attitude of most of the Middle East States had been opposed to Chinese Asian policies. In 1952, Persia, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, and Israel had voted against China over Korea in the United Nations while

- Egypt, Syria, and Yemen had abstained. Bandung changed the attitude of the Arab States towards China: a trade agreement between Egypt and China was signed in August 1955; and in 1956 diplomatic relations were established with Syria and Yemen and large Chinese cultural missions were sent to both countries. The Chinese approach to the Middle East was at first practical and the image which the Chinese sought to present was the popular one of an emerging Asian Power opposed by the colonial Powers.

Until 1958 ideological differences between the C.P.R. and the U.S.S.R. over the Middle East were not apparent, and in January 1957 the two Governments issued a joint statement declaring support for the Middle East States against Western interference or aggression. The first difference arose over the Lebanese crisis of May 1958 and the subsequent U.S. and British action in Lebanon and Jordan. China advocated a more militant line and was angry at being left out of the Soviet proposal for a four Power meeting.

After the Iraqi *coup d'état* of July 1958, China set up a heavily staffed embassy in Baghdad and soon began to criticize Moscow's advocacy of the collaboration of the Iraqi Communists with the national bourgeoisie. In 1959 the Iraqi Communists began to get out of Moscow's control as the Communist excesses in Kirkuk in July were said to have been instigated by China. Moscow's attempts to exercise a restraining influence on Middle Eastern Communist Parties and apparent Soviet condonation of the persecution of Communists in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq may have driven some of them, and particularly the Syrian Khalid Bakdash, into the Chinese camp; but only temporarily. On the whole, the Middle Eastern Communists have remained loyal to Moscow; but there was a tendency for those of Egypt and Lebanon to veer towards China after Khrushchev's fall. Earlier, Chou En-lai's visit to Cairo in December 1963 had been coolly received in comparison with Khrushchev's visit the following May; but Chou's subsequent visit in April 1965 created a much more favourable impression.

China's diplomatic representation in the Middle East has so far been limited to the U.A.R., Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and her activities have consequently been confined to these countries. The Chinese impact on Turkey and Persia appears so far to be negligible. Positive action has virtually been restricted to Yemen, apart from the Chinese part—which has never been fully confirmed—in the disturbances in Kirkuk in July 1959. But China has made a strong bid for the favours of the Arab countries as a whole by her forthright declaration of support for the Arab case against Israel. After Bandung and even as late as Chou En-lai's visit to Cairo and North Africa in 1963, this support was promised in general terms which did not go much beyond Soviet undertakings. But during Chou's 1965 visit he was much more explicit. In March, just before this visit, a dele-

ization of the Palestine Liberation Organization headed by Ahmad al-Shuqayri had had a warm reception in Peking, of which a glowing account was given at the Palestine National Congress held in Cairo in May 1965. Strong military emphasis was given to the visits both of the PLO delegation and of a Syrian delegation headed by the Foreign Minister which also took place in March. Statements during these visits about support for the Arab States against Israel which were made in the Peking press by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and by the Chinese Islamic Association (of which no counterpart exists in the U.S.S.R.) and the establishment in Peking of a permanent mission of the PLO went far beyond anything so far said or done by the Soviet Union in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However much or little all this may mean in terms of hard fact, the emotional appeal which it has had for Arabs is considerable.

Immediate aim

The immediate aim of China's policy in the Middle East can best be described as that of reducing her own isolation and of challenging the Soviet position. She has throughout urged the Middle East States to take a stronger line in opposing Western imperialism and has criticized the Soviet Union for her lack of militancy. But China has not herself taken any action in promoting a stronger line and is not yet in a position to do so. The tactics of her specific approach to Middle East States and peoples have not so far differed greatly from those of the Soviet Union, except in the matter of Israel and in the attempt to establish a bond of union between the Muslims of the Middle East and those of China through the Chinese Islamic association. But the Middle East also plays an important part in China's long-term global strategy recently defined by Marshal Lin Biao as 'the encirclement of the cities [i.e. Western Europe and North America] by rural areas' (i.e. Asia, Africa, and Latin America). It is in the latter areas, in the Chinese view, that the revolutionary movement is growing although now opposed by the Soviet Union in collaboration with the United States.

It is difficult to dissociate China's policy in the Middle East from her policy towards Africa, or rather towards the Afro-Asian peoples as a whole. It is, indeed, China's bid to set herself up as chief champion of those peoples that has aroused the maximum Soviet displeasure and disquiet. A plain expression of these sentiments appeared in an article by G. Mirskiy in *Izvestiya* of 16 July 1963, and there is no reason to suppose that they have since diminished. The Soviet Union sees China as trying to take charge of the national liberation movement and to set the coloured peoples of the world against the white. Mirskiy wrote of 'the Chinese comrades who, practically claiming that they are the leading Marxists in the world . . . are consciously or unconsciously impressing on the [Afro-

'Asian] peoples the idea that they are "chosen people" and that they are superior to the white race. . . For Marxist class and proletarian logic they substitute bourgeois nationalist logic, extolling the "unity" of certain races and nations as a counterbalance to proletarian solidarity.'

Soviet fears of Chinese intentions certainly seem to be well founded, but it is too early to say to what extent any of the Afro-Asian peoples is likely to prefer Chinese to Soviet mentorship.

A clash of interests ?

It is not easy to find a precedent for the kind of clash which seems to be impending between Soviet and Chinese interests in the Middle East. There have of course been other clashes there between Great Powers—between France and Britain; between Britain and Russia in Turkey and Persia; and generally between the West and the Soviet Union. The last-named clash developed mainly after 1945 and was concerned with the strategic advantage which paramount influence would give to one side over the other. The West feared that as a result of subversion or direct action or a combination of both the Middle East might 'go Communist' and thus deprive the West of its oil and of its markets for Western trade. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, regarded the Western presence in the Middle East, with its real or hypothetical military bases, as a constant threat to the vulnerable Soviet Muslim borderlands. Both sides had, and still have, advantages and disadvantages which break about even. Western methods of government, business, and modern progress are well understood and fairly firmly established and Western languages are widely used. Until recently the West disposed of much greater military and economic resources. On the other hand, the West, and particularly Britain, has a 'black record' of 'imperialism', that is to say, of military occupation and exploitation. The Soviet Union has the military advantage of proximity. As regards the Arab States, the Soviet Union has no 'black record', not having come from over the sea, the Russians have never been regarded as 'imperialists'. At one time the creation of economically prosperous Soviet Muslim republics adjoining the Middle East in Transcaucasia and Central Asia seemed to offer another potential advantage to the Soviet Union, in the sense that they could form a kind of cultural and ideological bridge into the countries of the Middle East. In effect, however, the Soviet Union has never been able to exploit this potential advantage mainly because she has not so far reposed sufficient trust in her own Muslims. Nevertheless, the Muslim republics provide the Middle East with a practical demonstration of the efficacy of Soviet methods in raising living standards among Muslim peoples in comparable climatic conditions.

It has been said that the internal condition of China and her attitude towards the outside world are similar to those of the Soviet Union thirty-

five years ago. It could probably be added that China today stands in somewhat the same relation to the Soviet position in Asia as the Soviet Union did to the Western position in the late 1920s. Owing to various factors including Middle Eastern nationalism, Soviet ineptitude and miscalculation, and Western resistance, Soviet penetration did not offer any serious challenge to the Western position until nearly thirty years later.

The year of the 20th Party Congress, when the Soviet Union apparently decided to abandon the instruments of subversion and direct action, also saw the recognition of the Chinese People's Republic by Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen. In 1959, after the Soviet Union had shaken herself free from the hazards of too close an association with pan-Arab nationalism, she saw herself confronted with a serious Chinese challenge to her position not only in the Middle East but in the whole Afro-Asian world. It is noteworthy that China was able to offer such a challenge a mere ten years after the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949.

At first sight, it would seem that China, with her much lower military and economic potential, her still poverty-stricken internal economy, and her much less advantageous geographical position, could hardly be a formidable rival to Soviet influence in the Middle East. But the Russians appear to think otherwise, and to understand their point of view it is necessary to consider the Middle East as extending beyond the Persian and Afghan frontiers through the Muslim Soviet Republics to the predominantly Muslim part of western China now known as the Sinkiang-Uigur Autonomous Region. The population on both sides of the Sino-Soviet frontier in Central Asia is ethnically and culturally to a large extent homogeneous. For the last two centuries Russian prestige has probably stood higher among this population than Chinese prestige. But now, with China's greatly increased power, this might change—at all events the Russians cannot afford to ignore the possibility that it might change. They are particularly apprehensive lest Communism in the hands of an Asian Power like China might prove to be a much more effective instrument among the coloured peoples of the world than it could ever be in the hands of a predominantly white Power like the Soviet Union. In the 1920s attempts were made by Soviet Muslim Communists to organize a 'colonial international' which would be informed by a new kind of Communism more suited to the Muslim world than Marxism. These attempts were easily frustrated by the Soviet Government since they had no outside support. The Soviet Union unquestionably credits the Chinese with a desire to organize similar attempts both outside and inside the Soviet Union and this would explain her eagerness to be allowed to participate in the Bandung and other Afro-Asian congresses, which she regards as potential breeding-grounds of anti-Soviet intrigue.

Chinese propaganda seeks to represent Soviet policy in the Middle East and elsewhere as moving towards an alliance with the West directed

against the Afro-Asian peoples as a whole. By this means China hopes to prejudice the States of the Middle East in favour of her own 'ultra-revolutionary' policies. But although fear of a *rapprochement* between Russia and the West is traditional in Turkey and Persia and might be extended to the Arab countries, the Middle East is unlikely to prefer China's mentorship until she can provide convincing proof of the strength of her military and economic potential as compared with that of the Soviet Union or of the West; and until there is evidence, which is so far lacking, that, as a result of China's attitude, the Soviet Union is in fact moving towards an accommodation of her Middle Eastern policy with that of the West.

Recent trends in Czechoslovakia

I. Economic reforms. II. Slovak nationalism

H. HANAK

LAST year, with great display, Czechoslovakia celebrated the twentieth anniversary of her liberation by Soviet troops. May 9, 1945 has a double significance: it was the end of German domination and also the starting-point on the road to Communism. As expected, the help given by the Western Powers, in particular by the United States, in the liberation was totally ignored. It is also significant that this was a Czech rather than a Czechoslovak anniversary; the Slovaks had their own celebrations in 1964 to mark their national uprising against the Germans.

On this anniversary the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was in self-congratulatory mood. Antonín Novotný, who has been President of the Republic since 1957 and First Secretary of the Party since 1953, drew up 'a heroic balance sheet', as *Rudé Právo* (*Red Right*), the main organ of the Party, put it.¹ The liberation by the Red Army, he said, had created the basis for the establishment of socialism. In the three years before February 1948 the Party had 'in a quite masterly fashion' exposed the forces of internal reaction, and in the following twelve years it had succeeded in creating a socialist State. Czechoslovakia was the first country after the Soviet Union, to enter the stage of socialism. In 1960 a new Constitution was inaugurated, the country took the name of the Czechoslovak

¹ *Rudé Právo*, 9 May 1965.

Mr Hanak is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of London

Socialist Republic, and in the State coat of arms the crown on the lion's head was replaced by a red star, as befitted a good socialist lion. Furthermore, Czechoslovaks were promised that within fifteen years the gradual transformation to Communism would begin. An article in *Rudé Právo* of 14 August 1962, in preparation for the 12th Party Congress, claimed that the construction of a Communist society would be inaugurated by the 13th Congress; it has recently been announced that this 13th Party Congress is to meet in May this year.

Economic revolution

The Party and Government also congratulated themselves on the economic revolution that they had brought about. In the years 1953 to 1963, wrote the monthly *Plánované Hospodářství* (*The Planned Economy*) in July 1965,¹ industrial output had risen on average by 8.2 per cent per annum. Novotný, taking the years 1950 to 1960, managed to prove in his speech of 8 May that it had risen by 11 per cent. The average wage (excluding the workers in the agricultural collectives but including those in State farms) had risen by 70 per cent in the years 1948 to 1963. The Party had been ruthless and thorough in the collectivization of the land, he said; 'without the socialization of the village there would be no socialism.' Although he could not completely gloss over the record of failure, he turned his main attention to successes. In spite of the exodus of manpower from the land, he claimed that agricultural production had increased by more than a third since 1948 (when it was well below the pre-war figure). Above all, collectivization had been speedy and peaceful.

The Party, according to Novotný, was equally proud of the metamorphosis of Slovakia from an agricultural to an industrial society. That the Slovaks were a nation separate from the Czechs had already been recognized by the first Government of liberated Czechoslovakia in the programme it proclaimed in Košice, in eastern Slovakia, in April 1945. The Party had supported the aspirations of the Slovaks at that time, but their pretensions to autonomy made for difficulties after 1948. Partly to allay this particularism the Prague authorities had engineered an industrial revolution, and from 1948 to 1964 the Slovak share of industrial production had increased from 13 to 20 per cent.

Throughout the spring of 1965 Czechoslovaks were drowned in a flood of statistics to prove that they were better fed, better housed, better clothed than ever before, and this in spite of the fact that on the whole prices have risen. They were also rashly assured that in the next Five-Year plan due to come into effect initially on 1 January 1966 this miraculous advance would continue. To some extent the Party was encouraged to see this rosy view because the economy had not done as badly in 1964

¹ The statistical information in this article comes mainly from this issue and from the *Statistical Year Book of the C.S.S.R.*, 1964.

as was expected. Though agricultural production increased by a very modest 0·6 per cent instead of 6·5 per cent as planned, industrial production increased by 4·1 per cent instead of 3·6 per cent.³ This improvement was maintained during the first six months of 1965 with gross industrial production up by 8·7 per cent above the same period in 1964.⁴

Even before the war, Czechoslovakia, as a highly developed industrial country, had been an important exporter of capital goods; in the protected markets of the 1930s these could be sold with fewer restraints than manufactured consumer goods. After the war this trend was greatly expanded and accelerated. The value of such exports as glass, ceramic enamelware, textiles, and paper had decreased considerably; Czechoslovakia was forced to import food and raw materials in ever-increasing volume and to pay for these by exporting machinery and industrial equipment. By 1963 these exports amounted to 47·8 per cent of her total exports. Such a concentration has had several disadvantages: it deprived domestic industry of equipment needed to renovate its obsolete or worn-out plant and thus reduced the competitiveness of other, potentially more advantageous, exports; and secondly the net contribution of these capital exports to the general balance of payments was much less than their gross contribution because so much of the raw materials for their manufacture had to be imported. 'By the 1960s,' as Professor Šik, director of the Institute of Economics and a member of the Central Committee of the Party, put it, 'the economy . . . began to lose its dynamic quality.'⁵

Economic drawbacks

Czechoslovak economists have been prepared to admit that the economic achievements have had to be dearly paid for. It was necessary to transform the highly complex industrial system as quickly as possible, and this had to be done under the conditions of a cold war which 'could easily change into a hot war'. Thus 'quantity was given precedence over quality'. Uneconomic sources of raw material were exploited. Everything was sacrificed to heavy industry. At the same time, the country produced far too wide a range of goods and many of them, especially in the fields of chemicals, electronics, and machine building, could not compare with those of other developed countries. Up to 1960, however, impressive growth rates were registered, perhaps because of the enlarged labour force; not only was labour transferred from agriculture to industry but the application of higher work norms, meaning a reduction in wages, forced additional family members, particularly women, to join the labour force.

Inefficient management was another economic drawback. Since 1948, workers' cadres have been promoted to management and to responsible positions in the economy, replacing efficient but politically unreliable

³ *Rudé Právo*, 20 January 1965.

⁴ *ibid.*, 31 July 1965.

⁵ *World Marxist Review*, March 1965.

ments. It is impossible to estimate the damage done by inexperienced, inefficient, and ignorant men in charge of important sectors of the national economy. As part of the new economic reforms which are now to be introduced, it is hoped to train a class of administrators who will be both able and loyal. The youth paper *Mladá Fronta* (*The Young Front*) wrote on November 1964 that only 12·3 per cent of managers had a university education, while 31·4 per cent of them had only an elementary education. Even those who were politically reliable were the victims of suspicion and sometimes of persecution. They had to work under impossible conditions. One of the eleven stories of Ladislav Mňačko's book, *Opožděné Reportáže* (*Delayed Reports*), which captures so well the bustling scene of industrial revolution, deal with this chronic suspicion of managers, engineers, and biologists. He speaks of an engineer who was responsible for the construction of the three largest dams in Slovakia. At each opening ceremony he was neither invited to attend nor mentioned. 'It does not matter,' Mňačko comments, 'He is still young. Perhaps the deputy to the Minister imagined that he would be encouraging the cult of personality if he remembered his name. . . In our country in the past, it has not been the custom to keep secret the names of those who built great things. . . We now who built the National Theatre and the first railway in our country. . . extract from the past various and sometimes doubtful names: in the present, however, they are to be suppressed.' The story is an illustration, Mňačko maintains, of the attitude to the technical intelligentsia - 'especially its courageous and adventurous part'.

While industrial growth has been sluggish in the last few years, agriculture has been in a state of endemic crisis for a long time. Collectivization and industrial requirements have driven more than 960,000 people to other sectors of the economy;* moreover, it is the youngest and most energetic who have sought other employment. Even in comparison with other Communist States, Czechoslovak agriculture is not progressing as fast as that of the German Democratic Republic, for instance. The large consumption of food has to be supplemented by imports; but even so, the Government was unable to prevent serious food shortages in both 1962 and 1963.

It would seem not without significance that, although Czechoslovak economists have put forward plans for revitalizing the economy, there are no plans for agriculture. The April 1965 issue of *Politická Ekonomie* (*Political Economy*), which is devoted to the new economic reforms, does not mention agriculture.

* From Novotný's speech of 8 May 1965. *Plánované Hospodářství*, May 1965, 14 of about 2 million. The *Statistical Year Books* of 1957 and 1964 give the number 'permanently employed in agriculture' in 1937 as 3,340,000 and in 1963 1,277,000. Since 1937 Czechoslovakia has lost the agricultural population of the Carpathian Ruthenia and also more than 3 million Germans, many of whom were employed on the land.

Trade with other Communist countries

Since three-quarters of Czechoslovak trade is carried on with other Communist countries, interruptions and difficulties have serious consequences. Her East European partners in Comecon have sometimes repudiated their obligations, and their imports of capital goods fell off drastically during the 1950s. This has not normally been true of the Soviet Union, however; one observer, Professor J. M. Montias, has even maintained that the steady outlet for Czechoslovak machinery products provided by the Soviet Union is not unrelated to what he calls 'the pliability and receptiveness of the Czech Communist leaders to Moscow's leadership in the bloc'. Precise information on difficulties with the rest of Comecon is not easy to obtain. There is no such reticence, however, with regard to the falling-off of the China trade. It had evidently been hoped that China would become a major trading partner, second only to the Soviet Union, and in the years 1961 to 1965 it was expected that exports to China would treble. In fact, in the years 1960 to 1962 exports to China fell from Kcs.787 m. to 86 m., and imports from 672 m. to 184 m. The collapse of the China trade was serious indeed. 'In the last period,' wrote *Plánné Hospodářství* in November 1963, 'great changes took place in the structure of our foreign trade which have had markedly unfavourable effects on the whole of the national economy.' In 1960 Czechoslovakia imported from China 79 per cent of her rice, 48 per cent of her tin, 52 per cent of her mercury, 17 per cent of her tobacco, 35 per cent of her meat, and 22 per cent of her poultry. In 1961 there was a sharp decline of both imports from and exports to China, though imports of iron and sulphur actually increased.

The present attempts to extend trading relations with non-Communist countries—the efforts to woo Britain and France are especially notable in this context—are obviously related to the growing unreliability of Czechoslovakia's customary trading partners. The Soviet Union has been able to act as a substitute for the loss of trade with China, and it is perhaps the reason for a more recent modest increase in the volume of that trade. Whilst in 1963 Czechoslovak exports to China declined to Kcs.67 m., the value of imports increased to 209 m.; indeed, Czechoslovakia imported more sulphur, asbestos, iron, tobacco, and meat from China in 1963 than in 1962⁷, and in April 1965 a new trade agreement was signed calling for an unspecified expansion of trade. On 5 October 1965 a trade agreement was also concluded with the Soviet Union which provided for an exchange of goods, between 1966 and 1970, one and a half times as great as in the previous five-year period.⁸ No reference was made

⁷ *Statistical Year Book of the C.S.S.R., 1964*.

⁸ These figures are from *Statistical Year Book of the C.S.S.R., 1964*, and from an article in *Plánné Hospodářství*, November 1963. There are slight discrepancies in these two sources.

⁹ *Rude Práva*, 6 October 1965.

this agreement to Soviet grain deliveries, but in a speech in December¹⁰ Novotný reported that the Soviet Union was delivering 1,300,000 tons of grain. A further 800,000 tons will have to be bought in Canada, however, and this will further deplete Czechoslovakia's strained resources of foreign currency.

Trade with the under-developed countries

The Czechoslovaks are convinced that in their trade with the under-developed countries they are being sacrificed to the political interests of the Soviet Union. Frantisek Hamouz, the Minister of Foreign Trade, admitted in *Rudé Právo* of 4 March 1964 that trade with the under-developed world had trebled in the ten years from 1953. In 1963, machinery and industrial installations accounted for 52 per cent of Czech exports to these countries. Credits have also been granted to the tune of 300 million roubles,¹¹ and even Novotný has had to admit that some of these will never be repaid. Cuba, for example, is an expensive partner. In return for machinery, Czechoslovakia has been forced to accept sugar, in spite of the fact that she exports sugar herself. One of the current jokes refers to Castro's visit to Moscow in January 1964. He asked Khrushchev for the supply of machinery. Khrushchev agreed and said: 'On your way back stop in Prague. The warehousekeeper there, a man called Novotný, will give you all you want.' Czechoslovaks also resent the fact that they too must carry the 'white man's burden'. The numerous African, Asian, and Latin American students who study in Czechoslovakia are a constant reminder of this grievance; a university has been established for these students, the University of 17 November, a sister institution to the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.

New economic plans

By 1963, after serious disruptions in transportation and the supply of electricity and power during the severe winter, the inherent weaknesses of the economy had developed into a full-blown economic crisis. National income declined in 1963 by 3·7 per cent, industrial output by 0·7 per cent, and investments by 11·9 per cent.¹² The third Five-Year Plan had had to be abandoned in August 1962. A Seven-Year Plan to run to 1970 was drafted but never implemented. Instead, annual interim plans have been imposed while the fourth Five-Year Plan, to begin in January 1966, was prepared.

Leading Czechoslovak economists soon diagnosed the ailments of the system: rigid directive planning. While formerly there had been the 'cult of the Plan', we are now witnessing what might be called the cult of a free socialist market. Eugen Löbl, head of the Slovak branch of the National

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 5 December 1963.

¹¹ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 29 January 1963.

¹² *Hospodářské Noviny (Economic Journal)*, 2 March 1964.

Bank and a victim (now reinstated) of the 1952 Slánský trial, compared the existing system of economic management to the Ford Company as described in Peter Drucker's *The Practice of Management*. In an article entitled 'Not by bread alone' in *Kulturný Život* (*Cultural Life*), the most outspoken Slovak publication, he wrote, on 16 January 1965: 'Ford [Henry Ford I] conducted his enterprise quite deliberately as the property of a single person and he took all the important decisions. It was really the dictatorship of a single man, who had at hand a perfect system and his own secret police with which he controlled his employees. He fired without pity everyone who had a mind of his own or who did not carry out his instructions to the last letter. So he gradually lost all his men . . . [He] created about himself an atmosphere of suspicion and resistance. Those willing to subject themselves to his will stood high in his favour, but those strong personalities capable of independent decision were dismissed.' The argument could not have been stated more plainly.

From the end of 1963 a number of economists, most prominent among them Ota Šik, demanded a change of the system in the direction of a socialist market economy. They were soon successful. A draft of the proposals was published in *Rudé Právo* on 17 October 1964 and adopted by the Central Committee in January 1965. *Rudé Právo* maintained that the advantages of socialism can come to fruition only when there is a harmonious relation between material rewards and moral-political stimulation. The new system does not mean an end to planning. The difference is that enterprises are now to become the linch-pins of the system and as such are to be given independence and exposed to the movements of the market; they have also been amalgamated so that there are now only 102 of them. Production is to serve two masters: the Plan and the customer. Wages are to become more flexible and are to be based partly on profit. The banks are to be given back some of their old glory and are to supply credits at an interest rate which varies between 6 and 8 per cent. Prices are also to be governed by costs of production, but this liberalization is not to be introduced till 1968. And enterprises are even to be allowed to establish direct trading relations with foreign customers.

The reforms, if actually carried out, will be revolutionary. The economists have suddenly discovered the virtues of competition just as the writers, as we shall see later, have discovered the importance of the individual. Apparently the system is to be introduced in industry and building as from 1 January 1966 concurrently with the fourth Five-Year Plan. Judging by some newspaper reports both in the West and Czechoslovakia, it seems that some enterprises have already begun to work experimentally under the new system.¹¹ It may be readily admitted

¹¹ *Rudé Právo* of 10 October 1965 stated that 264 industrial, constructional, and trading enterprises were working experimentally under the new system.

at the new system will be an improvement on the old, but it may well cure all evils. When a measure of decentralization was tried in 1958, the interests of the enterprises took first place, with the result that in one case, instead of a chemical plant being built, thirty-six winter stadia were built up.¹⁴

The Party is no doubt aware of the serious political implications of the new plans. It would suffer a diminution of its power under a system in which the managers run the economy. The reformers have indeed pointed to resistance within the Party; Šik has mentioned ideological prejudices which have had to be overcome.¹⁵ For these reasons it may be doubted whether the reforms will be introduced in their entirety. In any case, the process must be measured cautiously and one must not expect sudden transformations. However, the very fact that the Party was willing to listen to the economists is already a great step forward. One improvement almost certainly result from the new system. The production of goods which no one wants or which are of poor quality will certainly be less.

In preparation for the new economic plans the Government was reshuffled last November. A number of new Ministries and State Commissions were created, the most important being the Commission for Finance, Prices, and Wages, under Bohumil Sucharda, who was at one time acting director of the International Monetary Fund in Washington. Coments that the reshuffle brings into the governmental apparatus young men (mainly in their forties or early fifties) and experts. Both Novotný and Prime Minister Lenárt made statements explaining the new system.¹⁶ The Government's function, they said, was to be confined mainly to overall economic planning, in which it would be helped by the State Planning Commission which would have the vital task of co-ordination. People's Committees (Narodní Výbory), which in addition to their original functions are also the local administrative bodies, have now also been given local responsibility for overseeing the new economic system, outlined in the theses for the 13th Party Congress in May.¹⁷

It might appear that the Government itself is now being relegated to a kind of limbo of inactivity. Yet both Novotný and Lenárt have made it clear that 'the Government must enforce its authority and activity, must realize the political and economic aims of the development of our country, must completely safeguard the execution of the decisions of the Central Committee of our Communist Party, and must protect, under all circumstances, the interests of the whole of society against incorrect sectoral, local, and subjective interests'. Probably neither Novotný nor Lenárt has any clear idea as to how the new system will work and what

¹⁴ Novotný told *The Times*, 12 June 1963.

¹⁵ *Nová Mysl* (*New Thought*), October 1964.

¹⁶ *Ráde Právo*, 4 and 11 November 1965.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, 23 December 1965.

departmental clashes may be expected. In the last resort there is always the Party in the background to discipline the recalcitrant.

Slovak nationalism

In recent years, however, the Party has been under pressure not only from the economists but also from the intelligentsia as a whole. At on the literary-political front, it is the Slovaks who have provided the shock-troops. After their brief experience of independence in Hitler's New Order, the Slovaks could no longer be treated as a mere branch of the Czechoslovak nation. In 1945 Slovakia was given her own parliamentary institutions, the Slovak National Council and its Council of Ministers known as the Board of Commissioners. The Communists have tried to kill Slovak nationalism both by purges and by kindness. Slovakia has been covered by a network of factories, hydro-electric plants, oil refineries, and the largest steel plant in Central Europe (in Košice). The number of people employed in industry has increased from 100,000 to 465,000 in twenty-five years. This great leap forward has not been confined to industry. Education too, especially technical education, has been greatly expanded. In the year 1961 (the latest figures available), nearly 50,000 Slovaks were receiving university education.¹⁹

Perhaps only those blinded by dogma could have believed that such an economic and social levelling up would also result in a political one, especially since the hold of the Church on the faithful in Slovakia has not been seriously broken. But Prague acted in any case as if unification was near. In the Constitution of 1960 the powers of the Slovak National Council and of the Board of Commissioners were curtailed, and in certain respects Bratislava became merely the headquarters of the Western Slovak region. In 1964, however, Prague was forced to retreat on the institutional front; both the Council and the Commissioners were given back some of their lost power. And it is no secret that many Slovaks see in the new economic reforms an opportunity to extract more independence from the Prague Government. Certainly last November they seem to have obtained more privileges for themselves. Jan Marko, a forty-six year-old engineer, became Minister without Portfolio, that is, in effect Minister for Slovakia. At the same time, the Chairman of the Slovak National Council, Michal Chudík, who may be regarded as a Slovak Premier, became one of the deputy Presidents of the Prague Parliament. Moreover, on 11 November, for the first time, Parliament reviewed the work of the Slovak National Council. Chudík, in his report,²⁰ stated that he regarded federalistic tendencies as harmful both to the Socialist State

¹⁹ Radoslav Selucký in *Czechoslovak Economic Papers*, No. 3, 1964.

²⁰ Out of a total population of 13,745,577 on 1 March 1961, the population of Slovakia was 4,174,046.

²¹ *Pravda* (Bratislava), 12 November 1965.

d to the Slovak nation. But he demanded for the Slovak National Council an exclusive legislative function, greater powers over the economy, and greater control over local government. It is perhaps dangerous to read too much into Čhudík's speech but it does show the force of Slovak nationalism.

the symbol of Clementis

Politically the Slovaks have had a very tangible grievance. The drive against 'bourgeois nationalism' has been seen as a Czech attack on Slovak nationality. They also had a symbol, the Slovak Vlado Clementis, who was Foreign Minister from March 1948 until 1950 and was executed in 1952, the year in which the Party staged its biggest purge trial; it seems a fact that Clementis had been arrested on the orders of Rudolf Slánský, 1st Secretary of the Party and the star victim of the 1952 trial.

For Clementis the Slovak nation has a universally admired hero. His memoirs were published last year and also his moving last letters to his wife and family, written immediately before his execution. His eloquent words have no intention of ever allowing the Party or the Czechs to forget the crime of his execution. As early as 1962 the rehabilitation of Clementis was openly demanded. So also was that of men like Gustav Husák, a former Chairman of the Board of Commissioners, and the poet and former Commissioner of Education, Ladislav Novomeský, who had been arrested in 1951 and sentenced in 1954 to long terms of imprisonment for bourgeois nationalism. But it was hardly possible to carry out the rehabilitation of the Slovak victims of the purges without a rehabilitation of Slánský and the Czech victims, especially as Slánský had taken a prominent part in the Slovak uprising of 1944. The rising itself has played a role in these political moves. For many years its importance had been faded down, but more recently historians and participants in the rising like Husák and Novomeský have demanded a revision of previous views. In June 1964 Slovak historians held a conference on the rising; and twentieth anniversary of the rising, in August 1964, attended by both Khrushchev and Novotný, was a Czech and Communist homage to this bold Slovak effort to wipe out the humiliation of Slovak fascism.²¹

The past had had to be faced earlier, however, after the second wave of Stalinization following the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. As early as 1956 attempts had been made to revise the Czech trials, but the Party had insisted on their justice;²² a Party Commission was appointed under Rudolf Barák, the then Minister of the Interior, to revise the trials, but its report was never published. By 1962 pressures could no longer be resisted. By that time revisionism had become the ideological

²¹ On this occasion Novotný presented a commemorative medal to Husák, but revealing that orders were given not to show the episode on television.

²² *Kulak Praha* 6, 13 June 1956.

key-point of Sino-Soviet differences; and it was clear that Novotný could not follow Khrushchev's line in the affairs of world Communism without also copying some of his internal actions. At the 12th Czechoslovak Party Congress in December 1962, Novotný admitted that most of the sentences imposed in the purge trials had been unjust and that more than thirty people had been rehabilitated. But rehabilitation was a slow process. In August 1963 the juridical rehabilitation of the remainder of the purge victims took place. But this still did not wipe away their guilt in the eyes of the Party. The Slovaks, however, were in a stronger position. In February 1964, after 'a re-examination of the conclusions of the Ninth Slovak Party Congress [1950] concerning the struggle against bourgeois nationalism' which had taken place in the Central Committee in December of the previous year, it was admitted that 'the criticism of the so-called bourgeois nationalist faction in the leadership of the Communist Party of Slovakia was unjustified'. Clementis, Husák, Novomeský, and Karol Smidke, a former Chairman of the Slovak National Council, were rehabilitated, in the sense that the Party admitted that they had been merely scapegoats for mistakes made by the whole leadership of the Slovak Communist Party. Some of the former purge victims, both Czech and Slovak, have recently been awarded decorations and State prizes for both literary and political work; perhaps the most ironic is the Klement Gottwald prize for literature awarded to Novomeský.

Part III of this article, on the Writers' campaign of criticism, will appear in the March issue of The World Today.

Notes of the month

Commonwealth trade

A MEETING of Commonwealth Trade Ministers in London this June will be the first to be held since 1962. Its purpose is not very clear. The official explanation is that at the last Prime Ministers' Conference in London a year ago Mr Wilson argued forcefully the need to look into the possibilities of encouraging intra-Commonwealth trade. This was referred to the Trade Ministers, and meetings of trade officials in London in November and May have merely prepared for this long-standing appointment. This explains, but does not altogether justify. For the officials' meetings have shown once again – though in the friendliest possible way – that there is no common basis of reciprocating self-interest on which any important agreement on Commonwealth trade policy could be firmly based.

The papers circulated and discussed among the officials have illustrated the divergence of interest in trade matters. Most of the Commonwealth countries are poor, under-developed, and dependent on exports of primary products. They would very much like the 'long-term contracts and commodity agreements providing guaranteed markets for Commonwealth primary produce at stable prices' which the Labour Party's manifesto so rashly promised in 1964. But the responsibility of grace has brought home to Mr Wilson's Cabinet the difficulty and high cost for Britain of carrying out even a part of such a promise. Even the British are now busy abandoning the *surprise* idea; British governments have never been keen on it. Only special circumstances extended the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (by which roughly double the world price is currently paid for sugar) beyond the post-war period, and it has never been copied. It must be clear by now to the Commonwealth Trade Ministers that no Labour Government could contemplate carrying out its promise, unless it could persuade the other industrialized countries of America and Europe to do the same.

This suggests one of the reasons for carrying on with plans for a conference which no one expects to produce anything spectacular. It is to bring Britain into greater activity on behalf of the primary producers in UNCTAD and other international meetings concerned with commodity agreements, price stabilization, and compensatory financing. It looks as though Australia has played a key role in this ploy. Pointing to the 85 per cent of her exports which are primary products, she has claimed the right to speak for others poorer and more vulnerable to market fluctuations.

As to Mr Wilson's own pet scheme for a Buy-Commonwealth agreement, under which public authorities throughout the Commonwealth would automatically award contracts to Commonwealth (in most cases British) contractors, unless rival foreign bids were more than 5-10 per cent cheaper, this has met with a reverberating silence. Any government of a new Commonwealth country that agreed to this could far too easily be attacked by its opponents for backsliding into the colonial strait-jacket. It would also in many cases mean foregoing attractive offers both of credit and of technical advice and assistance from a wide variety of non-British sources—sources which are eager to help and with whom it is naturally much easier to talk and negotiate on equal terms. In short, Mr Wilson's efforts to arrest the relative decline of the Commonwealth as a market for British exports have been no more successful than Mr Macmillan's.

A second reason for holding the conference just the same may well be the wish of Commonwealth governments to insist, at Ministerial level, that they should be closely consulted (as in 1962) if and when Britain should contemplate reopening negotiations with the European Economic Community. There must be widespread questioning of the precise significance of the recent thaw in British Ministers' cross-Channel speeches. Yet Mr Wilson's own words of encouragement to Europe made it a precondition of Britain's entry into Europe that Commonwealth trade interests should be safeguarded. This is the sort of blanket guarantee which it may be hard to carry out in practice, however. Things have changed since 1962. Even then it was clear that there were some Commonwealth trade interests (such as Indian manufactures) for which the Six were prepared to make special arrangements. Others, meanwhile, have sought their own solutions with the Six or in other directions. Some anxious candidates for special treatment—Caribbean bananas and sugar, for example—remain. It would be very useful if the Trade Ministers could quietly initiate some unhurried (and unpublicized) official discussions of these problems, so that next time the real issues involved in British entry will not be clouded by dickerings over carpets and kangaroos' tails.

A more significant Commonwealth milestone than the trade meeting is the planned visit of the Australian Prime Minister to London in July. Australian protests helped to put the British Budget restrictions on new direct investment in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ireland on a 'voluntary' basis; but the move, though accepted as necessary, still rankles. This is the first time that British economic policy has seemed to discriminate against the old white Commonwealth, for which, on the whole it has done more than it has for Africans and Asians. Quite soon instead of Britain, Japan will be Australia's chief customer, and the United States her chief supplier. The decline in Commonwealth trade causes much less uneasiness than the weaknesses of the sterling system and the prospect that British entry into Europe would convert the pr

sent temporary and voluntary restrictions on capital transfers into a permanent discriminatory arrangement diverting British capital from the Commonwealth to Europe. Australia is the largest holder of sterling reserves in London and Mr Holt has reason to be far more concerned this time about the monetary consequences of British membership of the EEC than about the commercial. Though the subject—so long as Britain languishes in payments deficits—is a delicate one, there are many in Britain and in Europe who share his concern.

SUSAN STRANGE

McNamara versus Congress

ON 17 May, the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives launched another of the periodic Congressional attacks upon Defence Secretary McNamara. The substantive charges related to familiar controversies: manned bombers versus missiles, the closing of military bases (always a sensitive issue in an election year), and the production of nuclear-powered ships for the Navy. He had also '... not only overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff on crucial weapons decisions but also sought to mislead Congress as to what the Joint Chiefs had recommended'. This, too, was a variation on a familiar theme; but the tone of the criticism was sharper than usual. The Committee implied that he was 'a Caesar', and quoted Wilde's epithet that he '... knows the price of everything and the value of nothing'.

At the heart of this latest episode in the traditional struggle on defence between Congress and Administration is McNamara's five-year effort to reorganize U.S. defences on a Department-wide rather than a Service basis. He has been largely successful in tackling two of the problems that faced his predecessors: traditional military conservatism on the part of long-serving officers, and over-enthusiasm for every new idea from others. Both groups have long had strong Congressional support; the latter group can also say 'We told you so,' whenever an idea rejected or slowed down by McNamara later proves to be worth while. His continual postponing of production of the Air Force super-bomber, the B-70, and the closing of surplus bases are two of his significant decisions. He has also managed to revamp the organization of reserve forces, and so far has resisted a call by the military to build and deploy Ballistic Missile Defences against the Soviet Union. He has also introduced a large measure of common procurement of weapons to be used by more than one Service, symbolized by the F-111 programme.

Inevitably, some of his efforts have fallen short and some of his decisions are open to well-founded criticism. For example, there have been difficulties in supplying U.S. forces in Vietnam (though less so than in

¹ *New York Times*, International Edition, 18 May 1966.

² See 'The Politics of U.S. Defence' by the present writer, in *The World Today*, March and April 1963.

most wars), and there is a serious question whether U.S. forces have yet developed sufficient flexibility to deal with the kind of challenges that America is now facing. McNamara may have erred on the side of being too cost-conscious. His method is partly at fault. He may, at times, have placed too much reliance on statistical tools as opposed to military judgment. After all, 'effectiveness' is a factor that is far more subjective than 'cost', and depends upon a host of assumptions that cannot be quantified in any precise manner.

But the present attacks stem also from his failure to observe all the diplomatic courtesies when dealing with Congress. With each new effort to impose order on the defence establishment, he has built up resentment and political opposition. Now, with assaults from all directions—assaults which are endemic in the conduct of any war—these are being deployed against him. It would be unfortunate if the campaign were to succeed. At least in comparison with the beginning of his tenure, U.S. military power is now less subject to poor management, more responsive to the flexible needs of foreign policy, and better able to meet present and future requirements. Most importantly, America is now better prepared to fight limited wars for limited objectives, as a continuation of the trend begun by President Truman in the Korean War. None of this could have been achieved without strong decisive leadership and a challenge to long-established interests.

Beneath the surface, there are three basic problems. First, to ensure that military judgments are given proper weight, along with other more easily quantified factors. Secondly, an effective way needs to be devised for Congress to participate actively in the making of defence decisions within the actual forums where these complex, partly bargained, decisions are made—that is, within the Executive Branch. It would then become less of an after-the-fact critic and more of a constructive force. Finally, political considerations are becoming increasingly important in framing defence policy, not only in the conduct of warfare, as in Vietnam, but also with regard to America's web of peacetime alliances. The adverse political impact on the Western Alliance of the handling of the decision to cancel *Skybolt*, of the Nassau conference, and of the McNamara 'flexible and controlled response' doctrine indicates the extent to which there is need for non-military factors to be given greater consideration. Any man with the managerial abilities needed to direct the sprawling Defence Department may lack the more reflective qualities of the diplomat-politician. Basically, the failing is one of organization as between the Defence and State Departments, not the failing of any particular Defence Secretary.

Whatever the answers to these problems, it is clear that the solution is not, as the Armed Services Committee suggested, for the Defence Department to be 'non-led by a mediocrity'. ROBERT E. HUNTER

Recent developments in NATO

PHILIP WINDSOR

In a recent plea for greater understanding of France,¹ General Norstad argued that President de Gaulle was not the only 'bad boy' in the Atlantic Alliance; in 1964 it had been Britain and in 1961 and 1962 the United States. There must be something wrong with the structure of an alliance that produces such different bad boys in such a short length of time, and this is commonly acknowledged: even while seeking to create a 14-nation cordon of solidarity against France, the U.S. Government is attempting to elaborate a series of fairly fundamental reforms for the whole structure of NATO. But General Norstad's speech, and the terms he used, imply more than this. They imply that it is in some manner illegitimate for countries, that belong to a common alliance but yet have different geographical positions and degrees of power, to have different interests. And this implication reflects the first of two powerful and ultimately damaging legends, which in their very observance have brought NATO to its present disarray. This is the legend of alliance 'cohesion'. Whether explicit or implicit, it has informed much unofficial thinking and many official pronouncements about the future of the Alliance and has inevitably produced exaggerated reactions. The legend runs roughly as follows: the Atlantic area is already a 'security community' whose members share the same fundamental interests; it is the basis for a still more integrated Atlantic community which embodies the civilization of the Western world, and whose economic and political integration is only a matter of time and goodwill. The existence and acknowledgement of different interests is, in these circumstances, tantamount to a display of bad faith.

This is clearly an overstatement; none the less the dynamics of NATO's development have depended on a set of assumptions such as these. But the mechanics of NATO's development have been determined by the opposite legend: that of the sovereign equality of all the member States. The mass of ineffective committees, which from the very beginning have attempted to co-ordinate the national policies of member countries over a wide range of political and economic as well as military matters, and whose membership is based on national rather than functional represen-

¹ Before the Senate sub-committee on national security. See *The Times*, 7 May 1966.

Mr Windsor is Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics.

tation, have only reflected the difficulties of implementing the general agreements which the NATO Governments in their annual conferences have sometimes been able to reach. In fact, the 'equality' of the member nations has not only always been impracticable; it is denied in the basic structure of the Alliance. Not only has the overwhelming power of the United States ensured her a predominant voice in decision-making (and in recent years an increasingly arbitrary one, at least as it was heard in Europe) but Britain and France have from the beginning enjoyed special positions, which ensured them, intermittently at least, a high degree of influence. The other major Power in the Alliance, West Germany, was, in contrast, only allowed to join by being relegated to a particular and inferior position at the outset. It is argued today that France is wrecking NATO by claiming special treatment and that French claims and proposals cannot be discussed bi-laterally, either between France and the United States or between France and Germany; but this argument ignores the fact that all the principal members of NATO have special positions, and that the Alliance has been kept going for years on the basis of a series of bi-lateral arrangements, usually of detail, sometimes of major policy. The most blatant of all bi-lateral decisions, which, once taken, was presented to the other allies as a non-negotiable, take-it-or-leave-it package, was the Nassau agreement of 1962. The French *démarches* of recent weeks, whatever the attitude that lies behind them, have their precedents.

The final result of the clash of these two legends has been that NATO is being more effectively organized, more closely integrated than ever before, just at the time when it seems to be on the point of breaking up. The confusions of the myth of sovereign equality have provoked a determined and many-sided assault on the inadequate planning and mechanics of the Organization. But this in itself has led to further dissatisfaction on the part of those who were opposed to the concept of Atlantic 'cohesion', and the tensions have now reached breaking-point. It is ironic, but not unexplainable, that France should withdraw from the organization of the Alliance, in an attempt to convert it into a looser coalition of sovereign States, just at the time when the Organization itself is developing a realistic alternative to the cumbersome and inadequate processes of the Annual Review. Instead of adapting its planning and objectives to what its member States might be expected to produce a year ahead, NATO is beginning to establish the basis of a five-year plan, under rolling review, which will take into account the economic policies and political priorities of the nations concerned, and marry the resultant force-goals and equipment expected into a coherent logistic and strategic system. Similarly, the preparatory work for the Special Committee, which Mr McNamara proposed last year to allow the European allies a greater voice in nuclear planning, indicates that many of the difficulties and dissatisfactions aris-

ing from their relationship to the gigantic power of the United States are capable of resolution, at least for a time.

But how relevant are these remedies to the present ills of the Alliance? And is it not a little surprising that, through the McNamara Committee and other possibilities which it appears to be considering, the U.S. Government should attempt to cure the present crisis by bringing other countries than the 'big three' into military decision-making and crisis-management, when it is precisely one of these three that is threatening to withdraw? That it should, in effect, be reassuring Germany when it is the French Government that is dissatisfied? Does this mean that the United States attaches so much importance to Germany and so little to France that she is prepared to antagonize and isolate France still further? Does it simply mean that she despairs of treating with President de Gaulle (for which there might be some justification) and expects France to fall into line when he disappears (for which there might not) as long as the line is clearly drawn? Or does it mean that American action is based on an out-of-date analysis of the situation? It would seem that while the first two possibilities might be accurate on a psychological level, it is the third which has in fact determined current American policy and that of the other Alliance countries which agree with the United States.

What then is the context of the present crisis, why is the American analysis out of date, in what perspectives must the situation be seen? If the two contradictory legends are misleading, how did NATO develop to the point of crisis? If this is rather like asking when the world became sinful, it might none the less be useful to trace some of the developments which lie behind recent events.

Background of the 1950s

It is generally assumed that NATO is the most radical, the most integrated peacetime alliance in the history of the world. That is not altogether true. In some respects it was less of a new departure than the Brussels Treaty that preceded it. But it was an alliance that was particularly intended to foster the cause of European unity, and to provide the wall of military security behind which the European nations could organize a common recovery programme and their eventual economic and even political integration. And there seems to be little doubt that, at the beginning, the Alliance was seen as a long-term reinsurance against long-term and apparently growing dangers, not as a crash programme for European security. The military power of the United States was the basis for the recovery of European power. In other words, Europe was expected to grow progressively less dependent on the United States — and while the major emphasis in Alliance planning still lay on the provision of large conventional forces, this was a realistic expectation. But what has happened since then, stated in the most general terms, is that, while the

danger of Soviet *aggression* has vanished in the eyes of all but the most purblind cold warriors, and the European nations have in consequence become less dependent on the immediate goodwill and guarantee of the United States, the growth of Soviet *power*, and the technological scope and scale of the arms race in which the two super-Powers were engaged for so many years, have made the Europeans in the long term more dependent than ever. The European nations did recover, but only to find that the less they appeared to need the American alliance, the more dependent on it they became in fact. This was realized most sharply in Britain and France, and not at first in Germany, which felt much more vulnerable; but even in Germany a growing sense of integration with American military power only underlined a growing conflict of ultimate purpose. In this sense, the present crisis in NATO has been building up since the mid-1950s.

In the early 1950s, when the major emphasis in European defence was on the provision of ground forces, France was an important and influential Power—precisely when she was at her weakest in economic and political terms, and before she had embarked on a nuclear programme. But as French manpower in Europe was withdrawn, as tactical nuclear weapons were adopted as the main instrument of European defence, and as Germany became a member of NATO, American predominance increased, and French influence declined. It was also during this period that Britain became an independent nuclear Power: in the British case, this led to closer collaboration with the United States (though collaboration was not a synonym for influence) but it was equally feared that the precedent could prove dangerous elsewhere in Europe.

At the same time a parallel development was going on. While it was true that Germany's accession to NATO finally sealed the *status quo* in Europe, it was also true that from 1955 the American Government began to lay the basis of a *detente* with the Soviet Union—just because the two Powers had, in effect, acknowledged the *status quo*. With interruptions, this process has become clearer ever since, though the main interruption, the Berlin crisis, looks more like an attempt to force the Western Powers to recognize the *status quo* in name as well as in fact than an attempt to change it. The net effect of Germany's accession and growing integration into NATO, in which the prospect of tactical nuclear weapons played an important part, was to consecrate the *status quo* as the basis of any possible *detente*. At the same time, the existence of tactical nuclear weapons made it almost impossible to contemplate any change in the *status quo* for the sake of enlarging the *detente*. Yet the *detente* has been meaningless to West Germany while it rested on the permanent division of the country, and in consequence there has been a growing divergence between the German and the American outlook on the future of East-West relations. And when, at about the time that Kennedy became President, the United

States began to reconsider the value of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, partly because of the Berlin crisis, Germany, also partly because of the Berlin crisis, became so alarmed for her own security that she demanded more and more nuclear guarantees, closer and closer nuclear integration with the United States - and emerged as the leading European opponent of American strategic policy as well as of American policy towards the Soviet Union.

The Berlin crisis in fact polarized existing fears and disagreements within NATO. On the one hand, there was the European, and particularly German, fear that American vulnerability to Soviet power would cause the United States to weaken in her resolve or even in her declaratory policy, *plus* the European, and particularly Gaullist, fear that, if the United States did not so weaken, the Europeans would be driven to still greater dependence. On the other hand, there was the Anglo-American fear that Germany's 'irrational' sense of insecurity could wreck the possibility of a 'sensible' arrangement over Berlin or any other measures to reduce tension in Europe, *plus* the American fear that European nuclear self-assertiveness could both prevent the implementation of a carefully calculated strategic policy, which was precisely designed to ensure an adequate defence for Europe in an age of American vulnerability, and stand in the way of any future understandings with the Soviet Union. Calculations based on this reasoning led to the conclusion on the part of the Americans that it was essential (a) to break up the Franco-German alliance, and (b) to give the Germans some guarantee of helping to plan their own security anyway; and the best way to achieve these objectives seemed to be to offer Germany some voice in nuclear control, and a symbolic share of nuclear weaponry.

Change of European views

This is still fundamentally the context of American and 'Atlantic' prescriptions for the cure of NATO, and in this analysis de Gaulle is no more than an obstruction. But the context of European views has changed considerably since 1961 and 1962.

In the first place, the 'Gaullist' view has developed further. From creating a Franco-German alliance during the Berlin crisis and formalizing it after the Nassau agreement, with a view to dominating the future orientation of the European community, French policy has veered to an attempt to hold up the development of the European community altogether. While she has already implicitly admitted that she cannot do this for ever, France is clearly determined to prevent the emergence of the Europe which President Kennedy hoped to foster. Indeed, it is possible that, having once blocked Britain's entry into the Common Market, in case this assisted the development of an Atlantic-European Community, France might now wish to encourage it as the best counterweight to an

TT
12
1
An integrated community which the United States would dominate. The hostility to European integration, which has been a continuous and growing feature of French policy for many years now, derives not only from de Gaulle's own mystique of the nation-State, but also from the fact that from the very beginning of his term of office, Kennedy made his determination plain to transform the European community into an Atlantic community whose capital would be Washington. This still appears to be the sense of American policy towards Europe as it is seen in Paris, and the current attempt to concert the whole of NATO against France merely reinforces this view.

Now, while American policy towards Europe coincided with the centralization of strategic control - not only at the 'controlled response' level of hostility to European deterrents, but also at the 'flexible response' level at which Kennedy made it clear that SACEUR could in essence only act on orders from the White House—it was appropriate to counter Gaullism by offers of nuclear sharing. But no such hardware solution is appropriate now. In the first place, strategic considerations have been markedly downgraded in the foreign policy of the United States. In the second place, the hypothetical dangers which the Kennedy-McNamara strategic policy was designed to meet have been acknowledged to be hypothetical (few people now believe that the strategic deadlock has encouraged or will encourage Soviet aggression at the tactical level) and the Europeans, including the Germans, are notably less anxious about their own security than they were four years ago. And in the third place, and as a result of these first two considerations, a symbolic integration at the control-of-hardware level is not enough to hurry the pace of European or Atlantic integration. It is irrelevant to the disputes within the EEC, and its most effective, and most disastrous, result would be to replace the organic growth of European co-operation by an artificial agreement to agree in an area which could hardly be better designed to embitter the disputes among the Europeans themselves, or to ensure Soviet-American misunderstanding and intransigence in arms-control negotiations which affect other parts of the world.

The second area in which European perspectives have changed over the last few years unites the 'Left wing' and the 'Gaullists' across a wide range of European countries. Its effects have been muted hitherto, but might soon become much more marked, particularly in Britain. This development can perhaps best be described as a sense that, while the United States is the guarantor of security and stability inside Europe, she is a threat to international security outside Europe. This is not a new feeling: American intervention in the Middle East and Far East has long enabled the Left wing in most countries to find a basis for hostility to the Power to which they owed their own security. But it has become much more powerful since the Cuba crisis, and is shared by a much larger

section of opinion than the traditional Left wing. De Gaulle is only an example of the Europeans who supported American policy in Cuba, but who are profoundly pessimistic about subsequent American action, and some of whom see a link between Cuba, Santo Domingo, and the extension of the war in Vietnam. To put it at its mildest, there is a growing differentiation between the appreciation of the American role in Europe and that of America elsewhere, and a growing sense that the 'Atlantic Community' does not exist: that the European countries merely share certain areas of common concern with the United States. Coupled with this lack of conviction about American purpose elsewhere in the world is at least a readiness to be convinced that the situation in Europe as a whole is changing fast, and that new opportunities exist for a degree of understanding with the Eastern countries, which the creation of a tighter Atlantic organization could damage irreparably. This is mirrored not only in de Gaulle's projected visit to Moscow, but also in the remarkable changes of opinion in West Germany during this year about the propriety of contacts with East Germany, and in the very fact that the 'policy of movement', which was designed to isolate East Germany by promoting relations with other countries in Eastern Europe, has only encouraged these changes of opinion. To argue in this way does not imply that Germany is nearing the verge of another Rapallo, or that she would ever be ready to make a choice between NATO and reunification.

But even de Gaulle is not walking out of the Atlantic Alliance: he is trying to change its nature, and there is no guarantee that the kind of integration proposed through such measures as the McNamara Committee would insulate other Governments from his influence. Faced with a choice between the two problematic concepts of a fully fledged Atlantic Community and a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, most European Governments would probably feel baffled by both and want neither. But faced with a choice between a loose Western coalition, along with a series of loose relationships in Eastern Europe, and a tight Western Community, in which the United States would probably conduct relations with the Soviet Union over the heads of the Europeans, it is not likely that they would go on preferring the second.

To summarize: recent developments in NATO do not give much ground for supposing that the problem is one of influence at the crisis-management level, or that it can be resolved by the sort of security and consultation guarantees that are proposed on the ground of this analysis. Not only has the basis in external threat almost vanished, but the hardware plus crisis-management solution presupposes a fundamental identity of interest between the United States and Europe and among the major European Powers that can no longer be taken for granted. Influence is, after all, only a means to an end, not an end in itself, and the ends in this case are not necessarily compatible. The threat is coming to

appear more incredible than the guarantee, and further guarantees of the guarantee will do nothing to frame a common approach either to the problems of Western European integration or to those of East-West relations. The problem is whether the Alliance can or should attempt to provide more than a residual guarantee against a resurgence of the threat; and, if its purpose is in the process of transformation, to judge first how far it can have a common purpose.

U.N. voting: tyranny of the majority?

SYDNEY D. BAILEY

A MAJORITY in any assembly is tempted to use its power not only to get its way but also to bend the rules to its own advantage. Soviet spokesmen have often referred to the 'automatic majority' which the United States is said to have enjoyed in the U.N. General Assembly, and they have asserted that this majority was sometimes used to short-circuit the Charter or the Rules of Procedure so as to make things easier for the West.

An example of this, in the Soviet view, was the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950, which conferred responsibilities on the General Assembly should the Security Council be deadlocked by the veto. The Soviet Union maintains that this purported to amend the Charter without going through the regular amending process.

Whatever may have been true in the past, however, the situation now is that the West is more usually the victim rather than the initiator of procedural manoeuvres. This was true, for example, in April when the President of the Security Council, Mr Kenta of Mali, delayed for forty-eight hours convening a meeting to consider a British proposal for action under Chapter VII in connexion with Rhodesia. These tactics were contrary to the tradition of the Council which, according to the Charter, Article 28(1), 'shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously'. The Council's Rules of Procedure state that the President 'shall' (not 'may') call a meeting at the request of any member of the Council. The President normally consults the members about the timing of a meeting and sets the time to meet the wishes of the majority. There has, more-

Mr Bailey is author of *A Short Political Guide to the United Nations* (London, Pall Mall Press, 1962), *The Secretariat of the United Nations*, and *The General Assembly of the United Nations* (London, Stevens, 1962 and 1966).

over, been a disposition, as the President of the Council (Poland) once put it, 'to give the benefit of the doubt . . . to the member who considers the matter as urgent, rather than to the member, or members, who consider it not urgent'.¹

The difficulty concerning the calling of a meeting on Rhodesia had been foreshadowed by three particular problems which had arisen during the last session of the General Assembly and which had rightly caused disquiet. The first problem concerned proposals to delete unpopular speeches from the official U.N. records. The matter arose initially early in November when the Fifth Committee was discussing the budget estimates. During the course of the debate, the South African representative referred to the work of the U.N. Office of Public Information and suggested that it should engage in 'positive informational activities' but not in 'propaganda'. The representative of Nigeria intervened on a point of order to the effect that the remarks of the South African representative were not relevant to the matter under discussion, and the chairman of the Committee, rather surprisingly, ruled to that effect.

That was not the end of the incident, however. When the Committee met the next morning, the Indian representative proposed that the South African statement should be expunged from the record, and this proposal was supported by Tanzania and Nigeria. The South African delegate objected strenuously, and Ireland held that it was contrary to established practice and would constitute an unfortunate precedent. There was no further debate, and the Committee approved the Indian proposal by 39 votes to 16 (with 16 abstentions and 46 delegations absent or not participating in the vote).²

Later in the session, another attempt was made to have remarks expunged from the record. The plenary Assembly was considering a draft resolution on Cyprus recommended by the First Committee. The representative of Saudi Arabia went to the rostrum to place on record his view that the First Committee had not followed the rules in dealing with the Cyprus item; what had occurred was, in his view (and, indeed, in the view of other delegates), 'illegal, unconstitutional, unparliamentary and a rejection of fair play and the sense of equity'. The representative of Cameroun formally proposed that the Saudi Arabian speech be deleted from the records, though he was later persuaded to withdraw the proposal.³ The Assembly then proceeded to adopt the resolution on Cyprus by 47 votes to 5, with 54 abstentions and 11 members absent or not participating in the vote. This was the notorious resolution which was adopted by the Assembly with substantial African backing but without the support of Turkey, or any of the five permanent members of the Security

¹ Security Council Official Records, 1st year, 2nd series, 57th meeting (29 August 1946), p. 140.

² U.N. Doc. A/C.5/SR 1080, p. 2.

³ U.N. Doc. A/PV 1402, pp. 12-25.

Council, or any of the States supplying military or police contingents to the U.N. Force in Cyprus.

It is, of course, possible to dissent vehemently from the views of the South African, the Saudi Arabian, or any other Government, and yet hold that the official records of the United Nations should reflect accurately what has been said. In 1961, a similar attempt had been made to remove from the records a South African speech, but after a disagreeable debate the Assembly decided by an overwhelming majority to leave the speech in the official records but to 'censure' the South African representative for making a statement which was 'offensive, fictitious and erroneous'.⁴

The second example of the misuse of procedure comprised attempts to prevent free debate by the arbitrary use of the closure. Various forms of closure are permitted by the Rules of Procedure, but there has been a general reluctance to stifle debate except in the case of deliberate filibustering.

The worst instance of the use of the closure during the last session of the Assembly occurred in December when the Special Political Committee was discussing a British-sponsored item concerned with the peaceful settlement of disputes. On the morning of 16 December, the Assembly met in plenary meeting to hear the British Prime Minister and for a number of other items of business. The Assembly's Committees were due to convene immediately thereafter. The Special Political Committee duly met and heard four speeches; then, without warning, Ghana proposed that the 'peaceful settlement' item be deferred for a year. This proposal was supported by a number of African and Communist delegates, and adopted by 48 votes to 27 (8 abstentions, 34 delegations absent or not participating in the vote).⁵ At the time the vote was taken, more than twenty delegates were still awaiting their turn to speak.

While it is unfortunate that this British initiative should have foundered, at any rate temporarily, the long-term consequences are less serious than those arising from attempts to ignore that Article of the Charter which stipulates that certain matters require a two-thirds majority for decision and other matters only a simple majority.

There has often been confusion about this because of a difference between the procedures of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. In the Security Council, a distinction is made between 'procedural' and 'all other' matters, and decisions on the former cannot be vetoed (Article 27(2) and (3) of the Charter). The distinction in the General Assembly is not between procedural and other matters, but between 'important questions', of which examples are given in the Charter, and 'other'

⁴ G. A. O. R., 16th Session, 1033rd plenary meeting (11 Oct. 1961), paras. 151-186; 1034th plenary meeting (11 Oct. 1961), paras. 1-90.

⁵ U. N. Docs. A/SPC/SR 491, pp. 7-11; A/SPC/SR 492, pp. 2-15.

questions (Article 18(2) and (3)). Important questions in plenary meetings of the Assembly are decided by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, other questions by a simple majority. In Committees of the Assembly, a simple majority is sufficient for a decision.

A simple majority in the plenary Assembly can also determine 'additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority'. The Assembly has not yet made a specific determination regarding such additional categories, though Special Rule F provides that decisions relating to reports and petitions on South West Africa are regarded as 'important questions' within the meaning of Article 18(2).

The Charter does not specify which decisions of the Security Council are to be regarded as procedural and which are not, with the result that there have been difficulties over whether the veto can properly be used in connection with the preliminary question whether a particular draft resolution is or is not a matter of procedure (the so-called 'double veto'). Until recently the equivalent question had rarely arisen in the Assembly, partly at least because the Charter specifies a number of questions which are 'important' and which therefore require a two-thirds vote for decision in plenary meeting: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security; elections to the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council; decisions regarding U.N. membership; questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system; and budgetary questions.

The situation in the plenary Assembly is therefore as follows. All decisions on matters referred to in the previous paragraph require a two-thirds majority. A two-thirds majority would also be needed for decisions relating to any 'additional categories of questions' which the Assembly can decide require such a majority, though any decision to apply the 'two-thirds rule' would be taken by only a simple majority. In addition, three Rules of Procedure (Rules 15, 19, and 83) specifically provide that a two-thirds majority is needed for certain decisions. In all other cases, the issue is straightforward: is the question 'important' or not? If it is, the 'two-thirds rule' applies; if it is not, a simple majority is sufficient. In practice, the Assembly has regarded a simple majority as sufficient for decisions relating to the organization and conduct of its own business, except in those three cases where the Rules of Procedure specify a two-thirds majority.

This is complicated enough, but a further difficulty arises from the fact that whether an issue is 'important' or not may depend, or may appear to depend, on how it is formulated and presented. The approval or rejection of the credentials of representatives might be regarded as nothing more than an internal matter relating to the organization and conduct of the work of the Assembly, and therefore to be decided by a simple majority. On the other hand, a specific proposal to reject the credentials of the

Chinese Nationalists and to recognize the credentials issued by the People's Republic of China might be regarded as an 'important' matter within the meaning of the Charter, and therefore requiring a two-thirds majority.

During the period 1956-60, when the United States opposed any U.N. discussion of Chinese representation, the Assembly did in fact decide by only a simple majority 'not to consider' proposals to exclude representatives of Nationalist China or to seat representatives of the People's Republic of China.⁶ In 1961 and 1965, however, when the question of Chinese representation had been inscribed on the agenda, the Assembly decided, also by a simple majority, that any proposal to *change* the representation of China was an 'important' question and would therefore require a two-thirds majority.⁷ The United Kingdom was the only U.N. member in 1965 to vote both that the question was 'important' and in favour of the representation of the People's Republic of China.

One's mind boggles at the prospect that the Assembly might eventually, by a simple majority, decide that any proposal to leave the representation of China unchanged would be 'important', therefore requiring a two-thirds majority!

The 'simple majority' decisions regarding Chinese representation in the period 1956-60 were, however, exceptional. Prior to the twentieth session of the General Assembly, over 2,000 resolutions had been adopted by the Assembly, of which only twenty were by a simple majority.⁸ All

⁶ G.A. resolutions 1106(XV), 1133(XV), 1240(XVI), 1351(XVI), and 1493(XVI).

⁷ G.A. resolutions 1668(XVII) and 2023 (XX).

⁸ General Assembly resolutions adopted by a simple majority vote, 1946-65 (1st to 19th regular Sessions, 1st to 4th Special Sessions, 1st to 4th Emergency Special Sessions).

Session	Res. No.	Subject
1	17	Amendments to the Provisional Rules of Procedure.
1	490	Request of the World Federation of Trade Unions for a closer connection with the Economic and Social Council.
2	183	Place of meeting of the third regular session of the General Assembly.
3	247	Proposal for the adoption of Spanish as one of the working languages of the General Assembly.
4	497	Place of meeting of the sixth regular session of the General Assembly.
5	499	Place of meeting of the sixth regular session of the General Assembly.
6	320A	Financing of economic development of under-developed countries.
6	543	Preparation of two Draft International Covenants on Human Rights.
6	528	Reservations to multilateral conventions.
7	630	Convention on the International Right of Correction.
8	742	Factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a Territory is or is not a Territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.
8	748	Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 72(c) of the Charter in respect of Puerto Rico.

the others were adopted either unanimously or by at least a two-thirds majority. Last December, however, there were several blatant attempts to ignore the requirements of Article 18 of the Charter.

On 16 December, the same day as the British item on peaceful settlement had been smothered, the plenary Assembly was considering a draft resolution on colonial territories; two paragraphs of the draft, referring to military bases of colonial Powers, had been previously approved in the Fourth Committee. Paragraph-by-paragraph votes were requested in the plenary, and the first of the two paragraphs received 48 votes in favour and 33 against. The President declared that, as it had failed to secure a two-thirds majority, it had not been adopted. The U.S.S.R. challenged this statement, but the President insisted that the paragraph related to the maintenance of peace and was, therefore, an 'important' matter. Following a number of unsuccessful attempts to have the meeting suspended or adjourned, the Soviet challenge to the President's ruling was put to the vote and defeated. The Assembly then failed to give a two-thirds majority to the second of the paragraphs dealing with military bases.⁹

The next morning, the Assembly met to consider reports and draft resolutions relating to South West Africa and Oman. Assembly procedures regarding South West Africa are governed by six Special Rules, which are themselves based on Advisory Opinions of the World Court. As noted above, one of the Special Rules provides that decisions on

10	957	Procedure for review of United Nations Administrative Tribunal judgements: amendments to the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal.
11	1108	Representation of China in the United Nations.
12	1135	Representation of China in the United Nations.
12	1181	Question of defining aggression.
11	1239	Representation of China in the United Nations.
13	1333	Verbatim record of the debate on the report of the Good Offices Committee on South West Africa.
14	1351	Representation of China in the United Nations.
15	1493	Representation of China in the United Nations.

General Assembly resolutions regarding which amendments or parts were adopted by a simple majority vote, 1946-65 (1st to 19th regular Sessions, 1st to 4th Special Sessions, 1st to 4th Emergency Special Sessions).

Session	Res. No.	Subject
11	1040	Convention on the Nationality of Married Women.
11	1240	Establishment of the Special Fund.
13	1323	Questions relating to the promotion of international trade and to assistance in the development of the less developed countries.
13	1330	Effects of the European Economic Community on the development of certain Non-Self-Governing Territories.
15	1573	Question of Algeria.
17	1763	Draft Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages.

⁹ U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1398, pp. 51-65.

'questions relating to reports and petitions' concerning South West Africa shall be regarded as 'important'.

After the report of the Fourth Committee had been presented, the Liberian representative intervened on a point of order to ask that the draft resolutions on South West Africa be adopted by simple majorities 'since the Assembly is the master of its own procedure'. This led to a debate about the applicability of the Special Rule, and in the end it was decided to defer the item on South West Africa and take up the draft resolution on Oman.¹⁰ Iraq had already proposed that this draft resolution should be adopted by a simple majority and, after further debate, this was approved by 63 votes to 37 (12 abstentions, 5 absent or not participating in the vote).¹¹ The draft resolution on Oman was then approved. At the next meeting, the Liberian representative withdrew her proposal regarding the majority required for the draft resolutions on South West Africa,¹² but this was only a lull before the storm. Before the meeting was over, a group of Afro-Asian States plus Yugoslavia had introduced an anti-colonial resolution which included the following operative paragraph: 'Requests the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones'. The representative of Mali, on behalf of the sponsors, proposed that the resolution be adopted by a simple majority.¹³

Ambassador Goldberg at once intervened to submit a procedural motion to the effect that the Afro-Asian-Yugoslav draft 'makes recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security' and accordingly a two-thirds majority would be needed.¹⁴ That was on the Friday evening.

The Assembly met again later that night, twice on the Saturday, and on the Monday morning, but it was not until the Monday afternoon (the penultimate day of the session) that a weary Assembly returned to Ambassador Goldberg's procedural proposal. After a lengthy debate, the proposal of Mali was put to the vote and approved by 59 votes to 45 (4 abstentions, 9 absent or not participating in the vote).¹⁵ The main resolution was then put to the vote and, although the paragraph referring to military bases did not receive a two-thirds majority, the resolution as a whole was adopted.¹⁶

The remarkable thing about the debates on whether to dispense with the two-thirds rule was that little serious attempt was made to state any legal arguments for doing so. In the case of the South West African resolutions, where a Special Rule of Procedure adopted in 1954 had specifically provided for decisions by a two-thirds majority, the Liberian representative supported her case for a simple majority merely by claiming

¹⁰ U.N. Doc. A/PV.1399, pp. 6-16.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹² U.N. Doc. A/PV.1400, pp. 7-10.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁴ U.N. Doc. A/L.478.

¹⁵ U.N. Doc. A/PV.1405, pp. 73-5.

¹⁶ (I.A. resolution 2166(XX))

that the Assembly is master of its own procedure. This is at best a half-truth, though it has acquired a certain sanctity by constant repetition, and the idea has regrettably found its way into an Annex to the Assembly's Rules of Procedure (Annex 1, para. 39). The fact is that the Assembly is bound by the Charter, and can dispense with its own Rules of Procedure only by amending them in the proper way or by unanimous consent, and even then the Charter must be honoured.¹⁷

In his book on American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville deals at some length with what he calls 'the tyranny of the majority'. The danger of arbitrary and unlimited majority rule, he argues, is that minorities feel they have no alternative but to resort to violence, and anarchy results. The United Nations is a tentative step away from anarchy in international relations and towards a system of law and justice, and it is the States which lack the traditional means of power which have much to gain from a United Nations which can ask States to respect what international law there is because it abides by the rules itself. It is not in the true interests of States to dispense with the rules simply because they sometimes, and in the short term, seem to be inconvenient.

Recent developments regarding Assembly procedure have added to the importance of choosing presiding officers of skill, impartiality, and integrity. The Rules require a system of equitable geographical distribution, but this is only one criterion; experience and personal competence are also mandatory. It is also essential that members of delegations should be familiar with the procedure and practice of the Assembly, so that they can deal promptly and confidently with all proposals (whether deliberate or unwitting) to subvert the Rules. Moreover, every Committee of the Assembly should at all times have the services of an expert adviser from the Secretariat, as urged by the Assembly's Special Committee on Methods and Procedures seventeen years ago.¹⁸

None of these devices, however, can of themselves ensure compliance with the Rules. The Charter requirement of a two-thirds majority in the Assembly for 'important' questions is intended to encourage moderation in the drafting of resolutions, and moderation is an important element in securing compliance. Most of the Assembly's resolutions are only recommendations or expressions of opinion. If the tendencies of the last session of the Assembly were to continue or increase, the certain result would be that recommendations would be ignored, the Assembly devalued, and the authority of the United Nations undermined. This is a consummation devoutly to be resisted.

¹⁷ See my *The General Assembly of the United Nations*, 2nd edn., 1967, pp. 112, 117-18, 322.

¹⁸ G.A.O.R., 4th Session, Supplement No. 12A (A 4.22) para. 10.

Egypt 1966: the assessment of a revolution

An interpretative essay

P. J. VATIKIOTIS

The military oligarchy which came to power in Egypt in July 1952 quickly established itself after a brief two-year internal struggle. Over the next eight years it managed not only to rid itself of serious competitors such as the political parties and groups which had been prominent under the monarchy, but also to create a new political élite consisting of ex-soldiers, economists, planners, technocrats and managers, and other professional groups. By a series of radical economic and social measures – agrarian reform and the nationalization of trade, industry, and commerce – it overthrew the previous political order. Its control of the armed forces and communications media placed immense power at its disposal and permitted it to embark upon a national programme of drastic reform. Yet, the relative success of the radical economic reform policy has not been paralleled in the areas of political change. This disparity is intriguing enough in itself to justify an exploratory interpretative assessment of the Egyptian regime.

Two factors indigenous to the Egyptian situation were crucial to the regime's apparent success: to the ease with which it imposed its control over the country, and to its safe experimentation with radical domestic policies and its embarkation upon riskier foreign policies. First, many of the socio-economic conditions required to support radical change had already been created by a sustained evolution over the preceding 75–100 years. Administrative reforms begun by Muhammad Ali Pasha early in the nineteenth century for the creation of a modern State were carried further by the British occupation from 1882 to 1923. When independence came in 1923 Egypt was no longer a conventionally traditional Muslim polity, but one which possessed a relatively advanced bureaucratic structure and a sophisticated and largely Westernized legal order. Its political hierarchy may have remained traditional during most of the

Professor Vatikiotis is Professor of Politics and Chairman of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University; he was formerly Professor of Government and Chairman, Committee on Near Eastern Studies, Indiana University.

time, but a legal-rational State structure had already become a reality of political life some time before July 1952. Moreover, the breakdown of traditional Islamic society in the country had been taking place for at least a century. Thus the socio-economic basis for political change existed in Egypt before the coming of the military—the Free Officers—to power. The relative success of the military regime in imposing and stabilizing its control and in acquiring wide acceptance and support has been due in part to this long social and political evolution since 1820. It has also been due to the homogeneity of the population, and the cultural—even social—affinity between the elites of the new Establishment on the one hand, and larger sectors of the rural and urban public on the other.

The relevant question to ask now is: What new structures and organizations have been produced by the recent changes so forcefully induced by the military oligarchy? If the role of the military since 1952 has been one of modernizing Egyptian society in terms of economic and political development, has this task been largely borne by an exceptional charismatic leader? Or has the latter successfully elicited a response both from new groups in society and from the wider public, which indicates that they are willing and able to share in the responsibilities of this task? An examination of these questions, albeit a cursory one, can shed light on the extent to which the new rulers have been able, first, successfully to mobilize the public behind their programme and policy, and second, to devise a new institutional structure for orderly change within a stable polity. Such an examination can also indicate whether political change has been effected strictly by a bureaucratic establishment—by a central administration, that is—without the active participation of wider sectors of the population.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the regime of President Nasser has displaced the old Establishment, the previously privileged land-owning, financial, and industrial entrepreneurial, and generally traditional, ruling groups. The important question for the future stability and political evolution of the country is: What has replaced them? What new groups have emerged in the service of the State? And does their role and function in the new order reflect a revolutionary political change? Since the autumn of 1962, the Government's interest in and preoccupation with the devising of a new formula for a political organization and structure (the Arab Socialist Union) and the difficulties this has presented are evidence that the revolution is going through its most difficult phase.

The recent political transformation of Egypt has not been accomplished through any extraordinary qualification on the part of the military oligarchy, or because of any intensive revolutionary training of its members. In fact, few would argue that any of them had undergone any apprenticeship as the militant cadre of a revolution. Nor did the Free

- ¹ Officers,¹ for instance, constitute an ideologically cohesive group, actively seeking to lead a revolution before they seized power. Once in power, however, there were certain factors peculiar to Egypt which favoured the success of their movement.

Immediately before 1952 the Free Officers had neither access to, nor control over, an elaborate organization committed to a revolution against the *status quo*. On the contrary, there were other better organized and more powerful groups hostile to the *ancien régime*, the most prominent among them being the Muslim Brethren. Yet, because for almost a century the State system in Egypt had evolved into a highly centralized modern administrative structure, the Free Officers, seizing power as they did at a time when all other groups were either in disarray or hesitant to act, were in a position to impose their control over both the armed forces and a sprawling bureaucratic establishment.² Moreover, as young nationalists, they readily identified themselves with a generation of the disaffected lower, poorer urban and rural classes. For all practical purposes, the mass of the population had always viewed the political system as a remote monolith, an evil to be shunned; politics – the activity of bargaining for influence and power – occurred, as far as the masses were concerned, among a very small minority at the top. There was no elaborate, or widespread, system of contact between individual and Government within which the former had any real and decisive role.

The new Establishment

When the end of British influence in Egypt was heralded by the signing of the Evacuation Agreement in June 1954, the military oligarchy was in a position to introduce economic and other measures which were to eliminate both the foreign and the few native industrial, financial, and commercial entrepreneurs. With its absolute control of the Government it was able to undermine and dismantle the traditional political system – in terms of political parties and organized groups – and subsequently to produce a new élite instrumental to its programme and loyal (not to say subservient) to its ascendancy.

Thus the essentially administrative-bureaucratic nature of the Egyptian State remained intact. What the political change introduced by the new regime did was to set up a new hierarchy within it, useful to the regime's proposed policies of industrialization, socialism, Arab nationalism, and so on. This was not accomplished by any formally expressed or set elective and competitive processes, but significantly by direct recruitment and co-option. In this way, a new and relatively pros-

¹ As I have shown in my book *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1961).

² The emphasis here on the administrative convenience is not intended to eschew the easier access of the military to the use of organized force.

perous Establishment of soldiers, technocrats, and bureaucrats was created to serve the State apparatus. Its members are recruited from various social strata and are no longer confined to the old landed-property 'aristocracy'; to this extent the revolution has widened participation in the conduct of affairs. None the less, this Establishment functions as part of a clear administrative hierarchy, culminating in the office of the President. The military stratum is at the top followed by the economists and planners essential to a State-planned economy. The latter are assisted by technical experts and managers, whose role seems crucial in a society that desires rapid industrialization. Communications experts (journalists, radio and television specialists) are also members of this Establishment because of their widespread influence in a polity whose rulers wish to use propaganda to mobilize the public behind a revolutionary programme. Administrative officers of the bureaucracy are also members, inasmuch as they are needed to supervise the daily routine of a State whose Government has expanded its functions to embrace a wide spectrum of public business. (The State in this instance is the largest industrial, commercial, and financial entrepreneur, the largest employer, and the largest social services agency.) On the periphery of this Establishment stand the professional classes (lawyers, doctors, teachers) and the intellectuals; the latter especially are often used to popularize the regime's policies and spread them to the masses.

It is interesting that all these constituent groups of the new Establishment are bureaucratic structures. Even the professionals and intellectuals who, until recently, enjoyed the lowest political prestige of any group in the hierarchy are bureaucratized to the extent that they are organized in syndicates supervised by the Government and integrated into the one State political organization existing since 1962, the Arab Socialist Union.

A homogeneous population; a centralized and experienced Administration; a fairly efficient transport and communications system built assiduously since the 1850s; and a relatively advanced (Westernized) financial and industrial sector (the result of sustained activity since 1917): all these have contributed to the comparative ease and success with which an originally military oligarchy has been able to impose its control and effect radical change. Moreover, the new regime has had two further major factors working in its favour. First, by 1955, it had no active or significant opponents within the country, whether in the form of a mercantile bourgeoisie or a native agrarian 'aristocracy'. Furthermore, as makers of the revolution, the military oligarchy, together with the élites which constitute the new Establishment, soon came to be considered as the most legitimate of rulers. Second, the military was just as bureaucratic in its attitudes and structure as other groups. And this situation was attuned to the Egyptian notion of the State as primarily an administra-

tive entity. Whatever modernization, in terms of radical socio-economic reform and political change, the regime has been able to achieve has been possible largely by virtue of this essentially administrative character of the State. This also permitted its leader to recruit and co-opt at will into the political élite only those persons who were, first, loyal to him personally, and, second, most useful and safely instrumental to his plans. On a wider public scale, the legitimization and maintenance of the regime's policy have been pursued by the intensive use of mass media in an effort to mobilize mass support. But this task also has been largely the responsibility of the bureaucracy. (In this instance, as I have shown recently in *Islam and International Relations*,¹ the 'ulama, the teachers of the religious law and the purveyors of tradition, have been bureaucratized further in the service of the State and its policies.)

Increased power of the State

All this would indicate that the political change instigated by the military regime has resulted in the increased power of the State. In the socio-economic field it has become overwhelming. The basic justification for this situation has been the promise of attaining a highly developed industrial society. But another justification has been claimed, namely, the creation of a socialist, democratic political system. It is in relation to these two proclaimed goals that the Egyptian revolution today finds itself at a decisive stage.

Economic development is now considered as primarily a function of State activity. The State is viewed as a dynamic agency for economic advancement, in short, for the material betterment of its citizens. As such, therefore, the initiation and implementation of State economic plans are largely the responsibility of the bureaucracy. The new economic managers invest only their skills in enterprises largely owned and operated by the State; unlike the old entrepreneurs, they do not risk any financial investment.

Moreover, many of the economic policies of the regime since 1952 have favoured certain lower- and middle-income rural groups in the country, at great expense to the State. Agrarian reform and other related measures have gradually produced a sizeable group of owner-farmers who cultivate between 1 and 5 acres of land each. The former large landowners, who were connected with an incipient, though influential, financial-industrial group in the cities, have been practically eliminated. Yet many members of the new Establishment still belong, or are related, to the new constellation of rural groups owning between, say, 15 and 100 acres. On the other hand, the groups most adversely affected by recent economic and political changes are, in addition to the old landowning financier-

¹ Edited by J. Proctor Harris (New York and London, Praeger and Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 120-57.

industrialists, the native merchants, insurance, and other service entrepreneurs.

If the need to industrialize is to be met effectively, a shift in State policy to the advantage of a growing urban industrial or manufacturing population may become necessary. This, in turn, may create serious socio-economic and political problems. For example, a growing disparity in attitudes and standards of living between rural and urban groups will develop. Then, given such limitations upon, and difficulties in, economic development as the alarming rate of population increase and the scarcity of land and natural resources, massive unemployment and underemployment may further complicate the matter of allocation of resources, and thus militate against the State's political programme. A recognition on the part of large sections of both the rural and urban populations of these limitations and difficulties may frustrate their expectation of rewards and consequently undermine the State's efforts to mobilize popular support. Whether the Government should make greater concessions to satisfy the vastly expanded administrative, technocratic, and managerial élites is now a political question of some urgency. Implied here is the need for further rewards to retain their loyalty and support. After all, these élites are the 'modern' cadres of the State apparatus; and there are, under the circumstances, few rewards for them — indeed few, if any, alternative spheres of activity — outside the State structures.

In the political sphere, the creation of new organizations, somewhat independent of the administrative superstructure, that will provide the basis of a stable political order within which citizens can actively participate has proved the most vexing problem of all for the new regime. How to regularize change without undermining authority remains an unresolved question. Up to now public political activity which seeks an alternative to the present order can only be clandestine; for whenever it is unearthed it is suppressed (as witness the Muslim Brethren arrests last summer, and the arrest of Communists last December). Political activity, on the other hand, which seeks to limit the power of the present ruling élite, or to render it institutionally accountable, or which aims at extracting further concessions and benefits from it, is not officially permitted. This is not to say that groups in the new Establishment do not indulge in such activity, especially within the accepted traditional forms of pressure, bargaining, and personal relations. Generally, however, it appears that the only currently legal way in which any demands can be made upon government lies in yet another traditional method: the submission of requests for the redress of grievances. And this is done largely through the bureaucracy. But even this traditional solicitation of authority for relief is not permitted to occur in a formally organized way; that is to say, voluntary associational political life is not permitted.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Government has found it ex-

extremely difficult to organize mass support for its programme, or, more specifically, to devise a State mass political organization. Voluntarism in politics cannot normally be produced by decree, especially when the State permits only one policy from which there can be no deviation and with which there can be no disagreement. When all political activity is essentially administrative, in a hierarchy dominated by the military as the most privileged and influential political group, it is difficult to elicit voluntary participation from other groups, particularly from the ones with fair, or superior, educational qualifications. What this situation does encourage among the most aspiring ranks of the various elite groups in the establishment is an obsessive concern with the workings of the administrative labyrinth, especially if these point the way to advancement.

Search for a mass political organization

The centralization of power in Egypt is not a surprising phenomenon, for, as stated earlier, it has a long history.⁴ The accession to power of a radical officer group, who aimed at the establishment of a new revolutionary order, tended to increase the centralization of both political and economic power. Such a revolution for the modernization of Egyptian society was incompatible with notions of diffused power. Yet the persistent inability of the regime to organize the masses into an effective political force is reflected in, and documented by, the consecutive failures of the Liberation Rally (abolished in 1956) and its successor, the National Union (dissolved in 1961 upon the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic). The organization of the Arab Socialist Union, formulated and announced in President Nasser's National Charter (May 1962), represents the latest attempt in the continuous, but frustrating, search for a mass political structure.

One difficulty in this connection is that the revolution has stressed action in the economic and technological fields of national development. Action on any human level is more readily associated with executive power, and this, in turn, is usually associated with a single person, not with deliberative bodies. Revolutionary action in the economic, social, and political development of a country makes the chief executive a modernizer. In Egypt he is both a political leader and a bureaucratic overlord, who rules and governs with the assistance of a new elite, consisting of an alliance not to say a convenient association between politically (for the moment at least) unequal partners: soldiers and technocrats. Moreover, reform in Egypt has been traditionally associated with

⁴ What follows is adapted from a paper on the transformation of the structure of power in Egypt since 1952, presented to the Conference on Modern Egypt held at the School of Oriental and African Studies in April 1965. See 'Some Political Consequences of the 1952 Revolution in Egypt: a study of *stratification*', in P. M. Holt, ed., *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London, O.U.P., forthcoming 1966).

personal power—with a powerful ruler. The present ruler possesses a vision of a national future that is resplendently modern and powerful. This is the essence of his revolutionary movement. Its ideology may not be couched in the articulate and uncompromising terms of a dogma, but the leader and his elite contend that they reflect a popular will oriented towards such a future. It is in the name, and for the sake, of this future that the leader, together with the privileged military stratum of his administrative hierarchy, is able to exercise immense power to suppress all adversaries in order to act for its realization. In this context, the leader is also the supreme patriot. In seeking to resuscitate and strengthen his nation and State, he is both making demands upon his followers and protecting them.

The Arab Socialist Union does not differ drastically from its predecessor, the National Union, in so far as its pyramidal structure and organization from the village and the basic units to those on the district, provincial, or governorate levels is concerned. There are however two innovations. One, which introduces occupational or functional representation, consists of a provision that 50 per cent of the seats in all elected ASU structures at all levels be filled by 'farmers and workers' as these two categories are defined in the National Charter. The other is a provision for elected ASU units in factories, business firms, ministries, professional syndicates, and State-controlled industrial enterprises. The latter provision is a logical outcome of the vast nationalization policy and industrialization programme undertaken since 1957.

The ASU is designed to meet the ideological promise that there shall be popular participation at both the local and national levels of the revolution. It must represent the interests of all 'popular forces' as these have been identified in the Charter. Their participation, moreover, must be in a single State mass organization in order to avoid social conflict, which, according to the regime, resulted from political party activity when parties represented social classes. The revolution must prevent the re-emergence of political groups in Egypt by mobilizing the 'popular forces' in the ASU.

Although not designated a party, even the ASU is, up to the present, organized in a hierarchical framework. Its president is the President of the Republic. He has directly appointed the members of its current Higher Executive Committee from among his vice-presidents and Free Officer colleagues. The membership of its General Secretariat comprises army officers, technicians, intellectuals, and other experts.

From the deliberations between the President, his Executive Committee, and the General Secretariat, it is clear that the effective mobilization of the 'popular forces' into a single State mass organization remains a difficult undertaking. It involves a series of crucial questions: What is the best means of committing the public to an enthusiastic participation in

the regime's policies, ranging from socialism at home to Arabism abroad? How can an organization devised and controlled by the State elicit the active support of the public for planned industrialization and other expensive policies at home and abroad? What is even more difficult—perhaps impossible—is the attempt to generate *enthusiasm* for *conformity* to an administratively decreed policy. What the people are being offered in fact is a mass State organization in which they can participate to the limited extent of criticizing technical matters of administration, planning, and bureaucratic efficiency. They cannot, however, under this scheme oppose the regime or question its structure of power. In short, it offers participation without creative initiative in matters of State policy; initiative remains the exclusive function, if not prerogative, of the leader of the revolution, i.e. the President, assisted by his administrative hierarchy in both the Government (e.g. the Cabinet) and the executive bodies of the ASU.

The ASU scheme does not envisage the creation of a political party; at least, President Nasser is vehemently opposed to such a notion. Rather it seeks to create a militant body—a core or cadre of Egyptians at all levels of society, who are committed to the regime's programme. These unreservedly loyal elements within the ASU would give the organization direction and control. To ensure their loyalty, however, these individuals are recruited from, or designated by, the Administration. As they are ultimately controlled by the regime, they, in turn, can ensure that no elements within the ASU structures—especially in trade unions, co-operatives, syndicates—organize themselves as political groups or cliques that might conceivably turn unfaithful or disloyal to the revolution.

It is clear, at least for the moment, that what hampers the effective political organization of the masses is the essentially bureaucratic nature of the ASU. It is the creation of an administrative act. But the major difficulty the regime faces in devising a more lasting political structure is a more fundamental one. It arises partly from the nature of its authority and rule. As I have opined elsewhere,² President Nasser came to power at the head of a military *coup* that has been phenomenally successful both in imposing its control and in instituting radical change. He has perhaps inaugurated a revolution. He was not, however, the leader, or theoretical ideologue, of a revolutionary party. Nor, with the exception of a few extremists on the Right and even fewer on the Left, were any of his junta colleagues in this category. In the country at large, such revolutionary militants as were to be found in the small and hopelessly fragmented Communist Party were immediately rejected and incarcerated by the regime. Despite their recent rehabilitation they remain essentially unacceptable political partners. Judging from the recurrence last year of

² See *Nor. South* (23 December 1965), p. 9.

repressive measures against some of them and against the Muslim Brethren, it is unlikely that the regime will readily or very soon delegate real powers to any of the institutional structures envisaged in the proclaimed political system.

The proper institutionalization of political activity on a wider public scale has so far eluded the new leaders of Egypt. While they seem to recognize that in the long run only such activity can adequately provide for effective and permanent change, they are still reluctant to create public bodies, outside the administrative structure, with a real measure of political initiative and influence. Theoretically at least, without these the revolution runs two risks. On the one hand, it may consume itself without resolving the central question of a principle of authority which allows peaceful change and also maintains the continuity of the system. On the other, it may degenerate, or stagnate, into a *status quo* that is upheld and enforced in the traditional manner of a bureaucratic State. While economic development is feasible -- and, in the case of Egypt, many of my economist colleagues argue, is possible -- only as a monopolistic function of the State, the creation of stable political institutions is not. One of the reasons perhaps why there has been virtually no intellectual or other serious contribution to rethinking of the social and political problems that have faced Egypt since 1952 on the part of such groups as the professions, the intellectuals, and others outside the administrative élite (despite the existence of the National Assembly) is the fact that these have been largely ignored. In many instances they have been suspect in the eyes of the Administration. Surely, given the relatively long tradition of a modern State in Egypt, they, too, have something to offer.

Finally, a controversy of a more practical nature is currently contributing to the crisis the revolution is facing: between those in the Establishment who argue for a concentration of effort upon domestic policies, on the one hand, and those who consider a continuation of extended Egyptian revolutionary commitment abroad as a top priority, on the other. This controversy has recently been popularly referred to as one between the 'Egypt first' and the 'Arab nationalism first' groups. The outcome of this controversy could well affect the course of the evolution for at least another decade.

The politics of colour television

MICHAEL PARROTT

WHICH colour transmission system should be adopted in Europe? That is the question that European broadcasting interests have been debating for over five years, and at the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) talks opening at Oslo on 22 June they will be making a last attempt to reach a solution. Britain, Germany, France, and Russia are all determined to start colour services by the autumn of 1967, and this can be achieved only if they decide on a system now.

In theory the issue is still open to discussion and negotiation. But although the delegates may pay lip-service to the possibilities of a last-minute agreement, there is now virtually no more room for manoeuvre. Last July the Germans provisionally decided to go ahead with their own PAL system (Phase Alternation Line), and in March this year the British dropped their support of the American NTSC system and provisionally adopted the German one. There has never been the slightest chance that the French would give up their own formula, SECAM (Séquentiel Couleur à Mémoire), and in April the Germans declared that they would not abandon their own system either. As for the Russians, German PAL would almost certainly be politically unacceptable to them.

Some hope of compromise still remained so long as Moscow retained an interest in its own NIR system, otherwise known as SECAM 4. Incorporating elements of both the PAL and SECAM systems, this fourth runner met with considerable interest in France, Germany, and Britain. Its acceptance, however, would only have delayed the introduction of colour in Europe, and in April the Russians announced that they would after all, be adopting the French system. The Russian decision came as a particular disappointment to the British, who have been patiently waiting for Europe to reach agreement before starting their own service. Still suffering from their disastrous decision to go ahead with the 405-line standard, while Europe adopted 625 lines, the British have been especially anxious to avoid the same complications developing in the field of colour.

The desirability of a common European transmission system is no difficult to appreciate. Not only are there many areas in Europe which lie within easy range of the transmitters of neighbouring countries, but there is also a growing interest in the exchange of programmes from

Mr Parrott was until recently on the staff of *The Financial Times*.

country to country, whether by relay lines or satellites. If Europe were to adopt differing systems, the smaller countries might be forced to manufacture costly dual receivers and programme exchanges could be achieved only with the aid of special transcoding equipment, which would inevitably reduce picture quality. By adopting the same system, Europe could collaborate in the improvement of transmission equipment and methods. And since decisions made in Europe will also influence many countries

Asia, Africa, and Latin America, a much larger market would be opened up to European manufacturers. By enabling them to develop larger production lines, the cost of receivers and equipment could be considerably reduced.

Although Britain was the first country to introduce a black and white television service, it was in the United States that colour was born. After an abortive start with a sequential system developed by the Columbia Broadcasting System, the National Television System Committee recommended in 1953 the adoption of a compatible simultaneous system introduced by the Radio Corporation of America, and it is this system, 'TSC', that has been used ever since. The most important feature of TSC is that it enables non-colour television sets to receive monochrome pictures from colour transmissions and colour receivers to accept standard black and white transmissions. As any changeover to colour must involve a period in which black and white receivers exist side by side with colour ones, this feature, called compatibility, was considered an essential requirement of any subsequent system.

The introduction of NTSC could hardly have been more disappointing. Not only did it suffer from considerable teething troubles, but the public was not prepared to pay up to £300 for the necessary colour receivers; and so long as demand remained small, the manufacturers were able to make their prices more attractive. Indeed it has only been in the last two years that colour has really got off the ground. Last year over a million colour receivers were sold and all the major networks were offering colour programmes. It was this cold reception of colour which made the Europeans so wary of starting their own services, but an equally important factor was the relatively under-developed state of the black and white receiver market. Manufacturers were in no hurry to launch colour when they had not even achieved saturation level in black and white sales. Even in Britain, where this level was attained in 1963, the introduction of a third channel on 625 lines, BBC-2, was expected to bring another wave of sales.

Until 1960 there was no serious rival to the NTSC system. After intensive testing of the American equipment, the BBC was ready to begin colour service as early as 1957, and by 1960 it was seeking permission to start transmissions the following year. But at the time the Pilkington Committee was considering whether Britain should maintain her 405-line

standard or switch to 625, and the Government felt that colour should wait. When Pilkington recommended a switch to 625 in 1962, the French and the Germans had already developed their respective systems and the Government was forced to postpone all colour plans until some European decision had been made.

Although feeling ran high in the subsequent debate, there was in fact remarkably little to choose between the major rivals. About 95 per cent of the components in receivers and transmission equipment would have been the same, whatever system was adopted, and to the average viewer there was hardly any difference in colour picture or performance.

The argument centred around the methods used in transmitting the colour signals. Under the American system the colour information (red, blue, and green) is compressed into two components and transmitted simultaneously; the colour is, therefore, produced continuously. NTSC uses amplitude modulation and is sensitive to transmission distortion. The West German PAL system, a variant of NTSC, tries to overcome the American system's susceptibility to phase errors and other distortions by averaging out these errors. This is done by reversing the phase of one line of the two-colour information signals between every alternate line period. Both colours are transmitted simultaneously. There are two variations of PAL receiver; in Simple PAL this averaging is done by the eye, while in the De Luxe version a Delay Line is used to achieve the averaging process.

The French SECAM system differs fundamentally from both NTSC and PAL in that colour information is transmitted sequentially and is frequency modulated. The receiver has to be equipped with a memory device to delay part of the colour signals, so as to make the full range of colours available. The Russian system, NIR, is similar to SECAM in that colour information is sent only on alternate lines, but similar to PAL in the form of its signals. NIR would be much easier to transcode to NTSC or PAL than would SECAM, but, whereas PAL need not necessarily be fitted with a Delay Line, this is an obligatory element of the Russian system.

In 1962 neither PAL nor SECAM was sufficiently developed to enable the European countries to make a choice between the three systems. In November of that year, therefore, an *ad hoc* committee of the European Broadcasting Union was formed to carry out elaborate tests on the three rivals. It is largely upon these that their respective claims have been based.

The main advantage of the American system is that it works. It has already been operating in the United States for over twelve years. And now that Japan has adopted the system and Canada is shortly to do so, world-wide unity can be maintained only if Europe decides to follow suit. Its main disadvantage is its sensitivity. Its performance in mountainous areas is poor, transmissions over long distances can be badly

affected by phase distortion, and recording is difficult unless expensive equipment is used. On the other hand, the receivers are simple, easy to maintain, and cheap, though the fitting of hue and saturation controls makes them complicated for the viewer. The Americans claim that they have now overcome the problems of transmitting over long distances, and they believe that NTSC offers a better colour and black and white picture, especially over flat terrain, whereas SECAM suffers a marked fall in quality in areas of fringe reception. Above all, they point to the advantages of an easy exchange of programmes between the United States and other NTSC countries.

The French system was invented to solve the difficulties of transmission encountered under NTSC. Being a more rugged system, it is considered more suitable for countries which possess low-quality transmission lines and less modern equipment. It also enables technicians to record on semi-portable video-tape machines. Receivers are slightly more complicated and costly, but no controls are needed for the adjustment of the picture. Although the French claim that the SECAM colour picture is comparable to that of NTSC, they will admit that the black and white rendering is somewhat inferior. In mountainous areas it suffers from less interference than NTSC, but in flatter country it shows marked deterioration in fringe areas. And since it operates on frequency modulation, transcoding from SECAM to PAL or NTSC is particularly difficult, unless transmission is extremely precise.

PAL is a compromise between the two systems. Transmission is almost as easy as with SECAM, though some extra equipment is needed for recording. Its performance in mountainous areas is superior to both SECAM and NTSC and its colour picture is good. Being an amplitude-modulated system, transcoding from PAL to NTSC is relatively easy. Apart from its rather poor black and white image, the main disadvantage of PAL is its complexity. The PAL De Luxe receiver, which is equipped with a Delay Line, is more intricate and costly to produce, though controls are reduced to one saturation knob. But to the British the great attraction of PAL lies in the choice available between PAL De Luxe and simple PAL. Most European supporters of PAL will undoubtedly adopt the De Luxe version, as it is the Delay Line which secures its good performance in mountainous areas. But the British are not beset with these problems and it is extremely likely that after the initial introduction of the costlier De Luxe sets, the receiver industry will switch to Simple PAL. It is claimed that this version can perform as well as De Luxe PAL, provided the terrain is flat and the standard of transmission high.

A choice between these three systems might have been relatively easy had the Europeans been in agreement on what kind of system was most suitable to Europe. Each country, not unnaturally, supported that system which satisfied its own technical needs. And it was not long before com-

mercial and political considerations were brought into play. Enormous sums of money were soon being spent on promoting the rival systems, and this tough salesmanship has been backed by diplomatic pressure from the Governments themselves.

The first serious attempt at finding agreement came in February 1964 at the CCIR conference in London. After maintaining an uncommitted attitude throughout most of 1963, the BBC was keen to start a service for the following year. Coming out strongly in favour of NTSC, it made a determined bid to win over the European delegates. But by this time SECAM had gained a considerable following and the American system was thought to have definite weaknesses. The conference ended in deadlock. After the London talks Britain nearly decided to go it alone. The BBC was keen to adopt NTSC and the Government at first seemed favourable, but under pressure from the ITA (commercial TV) and BREMA (the receiver industry) it was decided to wait another year before making a final decision.

Attention then turned to Moscow. At first the Russians seemed interested in the American system, and the supporters of NTSC were confident that this would be enough to win them the rest of Europe. But after numerous demonstrations of both SECAM and NTSC, the Russians seemed impressed by the French argument that NTSC was too sensitive a system for their particular needs. In January 1965 the pressure increased as the French gave a demonstration in Moscow and followed it up with a visit from their Minister of Information, M. Peyrefitte. The Americans also ran some successful tests the same month, and in February the Russians assured the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr George Thomson, that they had not yet made any decision.

In spite of vigorous attempts by the French to win the British over to SECAM, opinion in Britain remained firmly in favour of NTSC and there was considerable confidence that it would be adopted at the March CCIR conference in Vienna. Yet two days before the conference opened, the French achieved a startling victory. Under the terms of a technical agreement signed in Paris, France and Russia agreed to collaborate in the development of the French SECAM system. At one blow France had won over the whole of Eastern Europe, and NTSC became a lost cause. With East Germany declaring for SECAM, it was even hoped that the West Germans would decide to fall in line.

In fact, the Franco-Russian agreement only helped to strengthen support for the German PAL system. Already several countries had been impressed by PAL demonstrations, efficiently staged by the Telefunken company, but now the German system gained a special appeal. As a mixture of NTSC and SECAM, it offered some hope of a compromise.

As soon as it became clear that NTSC would never secure general agreement, Scandinavia and Italy switched their support towards the

German system. Only Britain and Holland maintained their NTSC stand, but even they made clear their preference for PAL over SECAM. This was the meaning of a last-minute grouping of PAL and NTSC supporters in favour of the principle of quadrature-amplitude modulation, the common element of both systems.

When the Vienna conference ended, 22 countries had unofficially voted for SECAM, 17 for PAL-NTSC. The French had hoped that a simple majority would suffice for agreement, but more significant was the fact that, of the six most advanced European countries, four had come out against the French system. A decision was once again delayed.

Exasperated by their reverse at Vienna, and realizing that there was now no hope of NTSC being accepted as a European system, the British came to the conclusion that two systems in Europe would be preferable to three. Gradually opinion swung towards PAL, first from BREMA, then from ITA, and in November from the BBC. Finally, in March this year the British Government announced that PAL would be the system which the BBC would be adopting for its colour service in autumn 1967.

Meanwhile, the British press was full of rumours that the Russians were no longer satisfied with SECAM. In November it was revealed that they were working on their own formula, NIR, and France, Britain, Germany, and Switzerland immediately began testing it. The Russian system was a promising one, but unfortunately it was still very much in the development stage. In France the engineers were thought to be interested, but the receiver industry was against any further delays. In talks with the Russians in January and March the French made it clear that they were not in favour of developing the Russian formula, and in April the Russians announced that they had abandoned their own system and would be supporting SECAM at the Oslo talks. There was no chance of developing NIR in time for the Oslo meeting, and they wanted to push ahead so that colour could be introduced in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution.

The supporters of PAL and NTSC have frequently accused the French of playing politics in the promotion of SECAM, and the Franco-Russian agreement is cited as an example. The French, on the other hand, point to the steady pressure of American commercial interests in Britain and Germany, and claim that SECAM has not been more widely adopted largely because of anti-French feeling. As the allegiances of the two camps follow a marked political pattern, it is worth examining the sort of motives that may have influenced the attitudes of various countries.

In Britain the main concern has been to start a colour service as soon as possible, and it is for this reason that the well-tryed American system is remained a consistent favourite. Also considerable importance has been attached to the exchange of programmes with the United States, in view of the common language. The BBC has become accustomed to

NTSC and remains convinced of its superiority over all its rivals. Likewise, the receiver industry has spent considerable sums on research into NTSC and could start production at a moment's notice. No doubt it also benefits from its close links with companies in the United States.

The commercial television companies, on the other hand, have always been readier to accept a postponement. Their main fear is that the BBC will be allowed to transmit colour before they can. But there is also considerable interest in SECAM and PAL for two reasons. Faced with the complexity of network switching at their smaller studios, they have a strong interest in keeping transmission simple and cheap. And since some companies record as much as 80 per cent of their output, they are keen to keep recording as easy as possible.

Both the broadcasting authorities and the receiver industry would like the largest possible export market, the one for their films, the other for components and transmission equipment. PAL seemed likely to win the greatest support, was extremely similar to the American system, and offered the manufacturers the choice between a De Luxe set with a Delay Line and a cheaper one without. For all these reasons the German system became the eventual British choice.

The Russian decision to adopt SECAM was as understandable as the original British preference for NTSC. Confronted with the need to transmit colour over long distances with poor quality relay lines, the Russians would have been faced with a substantial investment outlay had they selected NTSC, even after its more recent improvements. But an equally important factor in the Russian decision was the French offer to provide generous technical and financial aid in the construction of plants to produce tubes and receivers. There is no evidence that the Russians were opposed to the American system on political grounds, though it hardly helped RCA when the U.S. Government embargoed the sales of its modern video-tape recorders. But in the Russian attitude towards the German PAL system it is generally recognized that politics have played an important role.

Originally West Germany maintained a very open attitude towards the rival systems. Although receiver manufacturers were probably more favourably impressed by the American system, the Government was still anxious to find some European solution. The cooling of relations between Bonn and Paris and the increasing success of PAL soon made hope of collaboration between Germany and France out of the question. What did, however, worry the German Government was the prospect of a colour curtain between East and West Germany, and it is now planning a series of SECAM transmitters along the border so that PAL programmes can be beamed across to the East Zone.

Although France has been accused of chauvinism in her steadfast adherence to the SECAM system, her reluctance to abandon all the advan-

ages of her technical researches is understandable. A country equipped with transmission lines of rather poor quality, she has strong grounds for preferring a more rugged system, and since sales of black and white receivers are still relatively low, she can well afford to wait until colour transmission systems are improved.

In the case of the smaller countries, political relationships and geographical position are as important as straight technical judgments. Although Russia undoubtedly consulted all her East European allies, once SECAM was selected there was little question of their adopting another one. Similarly, the former French colonies were hardly likely to take a different stand from that of France.

Scandinavia was originally in favour of NTSC, as it was the most developed system available, but as soon as Germany seemed likely to adopt PAL, Denmark was bound to follow suit. Norway and Switzerland were impressed by PAL's performance in mountainous areas, while Italy and Holland moved towards PAL as soon as NTSC was out of the running. On the other side of Europe, Spain and Portugal will almost certainly adopt the French system.

Countries with special problems are East Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. Politically East Germany is faced with a difficult choice. Although part of the Soviet bloc, she is still anxious to maintain her ties with West Germany. When a similar problem posed itself in 1958, the East Germans went back on their intention to adopt the Russian black and white system on 8 megacycles and adopted the West German 7-megacycle standard. This April the East Germans announced their intention of adopting the SECAM system, but with the present improvement of relations between the two Germanies another change of mind is still possible.

In Belgium the problem is a technical one. Already the country is divided between an 819 and a 625 system, so that the Walloons can enjoy French transmissions and the Flemings Dutch ones. If Germany and France go their separate ways, Belgium must either ignore these foreign transmissions, accept another division of the country, or build costly dual receivers. Luxembourg, a supporter of SECAM, and Switzerland, a backer of PAL, will also face this difficult choice.

If, as now seems likely, Europe fails to reach agreement at Oslo, it will be these countries which will be the unfortunate victims, together with similarly placed States in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. But among the larger countries there is a growing feeling that agreement is not so important after all. Transcoding methods are still inefficient, but engineers are confident that the exchange of colour programmes from one system to another, though more difficult than conversion from the U.S. 525 to 405 lines, will certainly be more simple than that from 60 frames to 50 frames, and both these operations are already necessary in the

exchange of black and white programmes between Britain and the United States. And even commercially the difficulties seem to have been exaggerated. It is true that the exports of video tape and colour film are likely to be affected if the world is divided into three different systems, but the components of receivers and transmission equipment are so similar that there should be no difficulty in supplying countries which have adopted other systems.

In short, it is doubtful whether failure at Oslo will make very much difference to the future of colour in Europe. The intense wrangling over the last few years has shown one thing, however. If the Europeans cannot decide amicably on even a technical problem, what hopes are there of their finding agreement on more important issues?

Independence for Guyana

B. A. N. COLLINS

GUYANA, the newest applicant for Commonwealth membership, has had a difficult and disputed passage to self-rule. Indeed, up to the middle of last year the British Government still declined to fix a date for the independence promised in principle since 1960. Evidently the Secretary for the Colonies had reason to fear that the promised 'independence talks', like the two previous London meetings in 1962 and 1963, would serve only to exacerbate the differences between British Guiana's warring political factions and the racial groupings from which they draw support. However, in the House of Commons on 27 May 1965, in reply to a question from a Conservative spokesman, who at the same time praised the performance of British Guiana's Government under the Socialist Premier Forbes Burnham, the Colonial Secretary stated that a Conference would take place as early as practicable, and on 15 July he announced that it was to begin on 2 November.¹

How did this November Conference agree - without even the usual diversion of a threatened walk-out by one or other of the participating delegations - on a new Constitution, and on an independence date, 26 May 1966? Why, on 29 April last, during the second reading of the Guyana Independence Bill, with traditional speeches of approval from

¹ H.C. Deb., Vol. 713, cols. 813-14, and Vol. 716, cols. 763-6.

Dr Collins is Lecturer in the Department of Government, University of the West Indies.

both sides of the House of Commons, did sceptical Government back-benchers (some of whom had been in the forefront of movements for colonial freedom) voice their opposition? An attempt to answer these questions should help illustrate some internal aspects of Guyana today, where a too-long-drawn-out period of decolonization has come at last to an end, but where so many of the problems that delayed freedom still await resolution.

As a colony British Guiana had had more than her full share of difficulties—demographic, economic, even strategic - and her past troubles have become known the world over. The border disputes with Venezuela and Surinam foreshadow future difficulties. But, in a sense, one of the particular factors which delayed 'freedom' was the fear which the prospect of independence under Dr Cheddi Jagan's rule brought to persons in the colony and in influential capitals abroad. The problem was 'who shall rule' a disunited nation, torn by racial rivalries (particularly the Indian - Negro division), as well as by ideological differences between pro-Jagan supporters of Marxist internationalism and those of Mr Burnham's socialist nationalism, the latter finding themselves today in an expedient alliance with the conservatives in Mr D'Aguiar's United Force Party. Seeking an answer to this has caused division and bitterness for the last ten years. There had been greater unity in 1963. Then the People's Progressive Party, like the Congress Party of India ten years earlier, was an omnibus collection of races and classes united against colonialism. But the dismissal of the party from office by the Churchill Government for its alleged Communist policies and connections - and later the general concession of the principle of independence helped change the nature of Guianese political movements. The main purpose of political activity thereafter was to determine which of the sons of the soil should inherit British status, power, and place when B.G. became Guyana. After the Jagan-Burnham 'split' of 1955, the People's Progressive Party and Mr Burnham's People's National Congress in large part became, respectively, political expressions of Indian and African group aspirations, despite each leader's abjuration of racism. Henceforth the parties were locked in communal strife - which reached its worst in 1964 - for the opportunity to preside over the transfer of power, or at least to prevent the other from refashioning the society and economy after its own image of Guyana's best future. There was even talk of partition into an F.I.S.T. (Indian) Guyana and a West.

The political dispute has never been resolved satisfactorily at the polls. Indeed, the electoral system remained the principal cause of contention. The example of British Guiana reminds us that, except perhaps in a fairly homogeneous society, an electoral system which greatly distorts the results of actual voting might be bitterly opposed by the parties which see in it little chance of gaining a full majority of seats in Parliament. Thus

ever since the 1961 elections, Mr Burnham's PNC and Mr D'Aguiar's UF criticized the traditional first-past-the-post system which gave them together 42 per cent of the seats, though they obtained 57 per cent of the votes. The system of proportional representation imposed (after the express authorization to decide given by the three leaders) by the Secretary for the Colonies in 1963 was not of course to the liking of Dr Jagan, for though in the December 1964 elections he increased his share of votes to 46 per cent, Burnham and D'Aguiar were together able to obtain 26 seats in the 53-man legislature, and thus form a coalition Government.

The percentage of the registered electorate who voted, 96.9 per cent, is easily the highest recorded in a British territory. Not even Australia where the vote is compulsory, has reported such a feverishly high figure. The voting, it seems, recorded the genuine fears of racial oppression or misrule which each party felt at the prospect of independence under the others. In fact, when the D'Aguiar party offered its support to Mr Burnham, it did not do so to endorse his socialist policies, but as a desperate effort to get the PPP out of power. One aspect of Mr Burnham's refusal to consider the alternative of joining with Dr Jagan was a *de facto* exclusion of the greater part of the Indian population from a direct share in the new Government.

Another was that for the first time since 1953 an elected government entirely unsympathetic to Communism was in power. Before granting independence Britain required assurances that Mr Burnham's Government could govern in the national interest, and allay fears of communal strife. Mr Burnham was to be given time to show that his coalition could indeed govern efficiently and impartially; the new Opposition likewise had time to prove that the unlikely coalition must fail.

It does not detract from Mr Burnham's achievements in office to say that, after the turbulent years from 1961 to 1964, any government that maintained good order and halted economic decline was bound, by contrast, to look very good to Whitehall. Indeed, his Government's performance held out reasons to hope that, unshackled by colonialism and aided by the local enthusiasms which 'freedom' is expected to generate, the ruling coalition would continue to do as well or better after full independence. That the Burnham Government had restored social peace to B.G. a bipartisan House of Commons delegation, which visited the country last September, was pleased to record. True, his efforts of reconciliation may not have won him many voters from among the Indian sugar-cane workers and rice farmers for whom Dr Jagan had wrested a place in the sun. Yet all could note that Mr Burnham was in a position to carry out pro-Indian policies that Dr Jagan would have found politically hazardous. Thus, to meet allegations about consequences of racial imbalance Mr Burnham invited the respected International Commission of Jurists to prepare a report, with recommendations, on racial problems in

the B.G. public services. The report vindicated the procedures of recruitment by merit, revealed that for a largely rural people the Indian population was indeed better represented than most people had realized, particularly in the professional classes in the public services, and that the ratio was rapidly changing in their favour. The very disproportionate number of African policemen was another matter, however, and Mr Burnham accepted the ICJ's proposal that for the next five years 75 per cent of police recruits should be Indian. He was also pleased to note the recommendation that, after independence, a peace-keeping force, a role played by British troops still there, remain as 'a shield against civil disturbances' until an adequate integrated local security force could be trained.

The other contentious issue between Government and Opposition remained the release of prisoners, the majority detained under emergency regulations by the British Governor since the violence of 1964. The Jagan party made appeal to civil rights groups abroad and awoke the concern of many private organizations, as well as of some Labour M.P.s, over these 'political prisoners'. The British Government took the view that, though this was in any case an internal matter, the detainees were in fact persons suspected of acts of sabotage, or of planning such acts. Dr Ptolemy Reid, the able Minister of Home Affairs, has steadfastly argued that the Government must be guided by the advice of its security officers, who have pointed out that such detainees must be held without trial because witnesses of terrorism were afraid to testify. Everyone in Guyana knows of the case of Ackbar Alli, a released detainee who turned against the PPP and was later assassinated by unknown gunmen. Some of the dozen or so persons in detention on Independence Day include young men returned from Cuba or from behind the Iron Curtain, who are alleged to have been trained in guerrilla tactics. To hold them prisoner, however, has required the maintenance of a state of emergency for the whole country, pending the enactment of a more selective detention law. In British Guiana a state of emergency seemed necessary to secure a relaxation of tensions.

Dr Jagan's partisans, once the most precipitate of nationalists, refused to discuss a draft Independence Constitution as long as the emergency remained in force. So when Mr Burnham pressed the British Government to set a date for independence, he needed all the Conservative Party support he could muster, for only Labour's slender majority at the time prevented a handful of Members from securing postponement of the talks. Paradoxically, the Tories, more than Labour, seem to wish to end quickly this remnant of British imperialism. Perhaps they are more willing to let the new nation accept its destiny within the U.S. sphere of influence. Its ideological reputation (Dr Jagan was an internationally known Marxist figure long before Fidel Castro, whom he admires, was

heard of) and its strategic importance as a 'beach-head' for pro- or anti-Communist influence in Latin America can make it a potential trouble zone or an expensive client. Only the Americans, some seem to feel, can afford to shoulder this continual burden. If Britain denied independence any longer, Mr Burnham warned, he would refuse to continue as Premier. Britain would then either have to impose indirect rule, or accept the consequences, local and international, of Dr Jagan's return to power, or even face the embarrassment of having to put down by force an attempt at 'UDI' in British Guiana, while adopting a different policy in Rhodesia. The London Conference therefore began on 2 November. Dr Jagan and his party refused to attend. There was therefore much less likelihood of the Conference breaking down, as had happened twice earlier, over the electoral system, voting at eighteen, and elections before independence. After two and a half weeks the Secretary for the Colonies announced an agreement on a Constitution, a date for independence, and Britain's promise to sponsor Guyana's application for membership in the Commonwealth.

In a sense, his decision to boycott the Conference, obliged as it was to fix an independence date, may have proved to be to Dr Jagan's immediate advantage. It put on the British Government the responsibility of defending the interests of the voiceless and unrepresented—a classical Colonial Office role—and therefore of insisting on more safeguard against majority rule than most new governments would wish to have to accept. Mr Burnham, who had in the end to accept considerable limitations on the Prime Minister's powers, must have regretted that Dr Jagan not always the best advocate of his own cause, was not present to face the U/F/PNC combination. As it turned out, the U/F took an 'opposition view' at the Conference, compelling enough concessions to make the Constitution one of the more conservative documents of its type.

Based on a draft prepared by the colony's Attorney-General, the Constitution is remarkable chiefly for the unusual means it employs to maintain the conventional practices of British parliamentary democracy. Thus the now standard articles of the Bill of Rights—guaranteeing freedoms to all Guyanese and by extension to all racial groups, irrespective of place of origin, colour, creed, sex, or political opinion—are made justiciable by the Courts. The Government may of course, like any other, 'detain malefactors when democratic institutions are threatened by subversion' but review of their cases by a judicial tribunal is now automatic and compulsory. The Constitution permits the continuance of justifiable discrimination—in the recruitment of policemen, and in the treatment of the Amerindians, the largely primitive descendants of the territory's first inhabitants. To treat the Amerindians equally with other Guyanese would be to perpetuate their backwardness. The Constitution makes it mandatory for the Prime Minister to appoint a Minister for Amerindian

Affairs. The long years of their neglect while under the direct responsibility of Britain should now end with their attaining full citizenship in their own Guyana.

The Constitution formally creates the position of Leader of the Opposition—an official position Dr Jagan had spurned earlier—in recognition of political reality, and obliges the Prime Minister to consult him on a number of key appointments, particularly for the Judicial and Public Services Commissions. Thus impartiality is to be sought by a form of bipartisanship. Mr Burnham also agreed to abide by the convention that the Prime Minister should always consult with the leader of the other party in the coalition over a wide field of matters. Only the realization that this would tend to confirm suspicions of a rift in the coalition dissuaded Mr D'Aguiar from insisting that the right of the minority partner to be consulted whenever the Leader of the Opposition had to be should be given Constitutional expression. The Constitution also creates an Ombudsman, who is concerned with aspects of maladministration, particularly complaints of racial discrimination in the public services or statutory bodies. By these and other explicit measures the Constitution seeks, as much as any constitution can, by guiding and shaping the Government's practices, to compel it to behave in keeping with the unwritten traditions of British parliamentarism.

The Constitution compels Guyana to wait at least until the end of the normal term of the present National Assembly before turning itself into a republic of the parliamentary type, after three months' notice is given to the Crown. Why not a republic at once? Dr Jagan was not on hand to support Mr Burnham's preference for a republic, and, as many now realize, allegiance to the Queen may afford greater acceptance to her Governor-General and Ministers in Guyana. The warm welcome accorded the Queen when she visited Georgetown last February—in spite of a PPP boycott and Dr Jagan's ostentatious arrival in Moscow—certainly reassured those who wish to preserve a monarchy, and convinced others that the royal connection was at least expedient for the short run. Perhaps this also explains the choice, for the present, of the Governor, South-African-born Sir Richard Luyt, to represent the first Head of State. This postpones the problem of finding a Governor-General who would not be anathema to one section of the nation, since, as Mr Burnham pointed out in 1962, a non-political person in B.G. is almost a prehistoric animal.

That Dr Jagan would boycott the independence celebrations was predictable, especially since he has consistently avoided most ceremonial occasions when his diminished status as a leader of a party out of office was being publicly displayed. His reasons for being sceptical anyway about independence were clearly indicated in his article in the December issue of *Thunder*, his party's paper. "The British Labour Government

'merely carried out the orders of Washington,' he wrote. 'It has transferred power, not as it should to the people of Guyana, but to the U.S. puppets. The very nature of this transfer of power means nominal independence. The trappings of political power have been transferred but economic and cultural domination will still remain. The Anglo-American imperialism will make sure of this by their economic and military aid.' Dr Jagan is consistent in resisting efforts of advisers inside and outside his party to have him modify his basic analysis of political realities in his own country or for that matter, in other ex-colonial countries.

The Independence Report¹ ended with a solemn declaration of intent for which there can be no constitutional formulation, but the execution of which the Constitution exists to help promote: 'That there should be an end now to the communal divisions by which Guyana had for too long been plagued and that with the coming of Independence all Guyanese should put aside for ever all prejudice and bitterness and should strive together as one nation for the peace and prosperity that are the right of free men.' Many British Labour Party members still seem unconvinced that a coalition without the participation of elected members representing all major segments of this polyethnic society can hope to achieve this solemn purpose.

Bringing peace and prosperity will not of course be easy in the present political atmosphere of Guyana. The extension of the period of emergence beyond 26 May is a reminder that the Government feels that the possibility of violence persists. Habits of disrespect for constituted authority had been fostered for years, indeed from the days of the old PPP. Maintaining order is never an easy matter in new States, once the respected imperial Power has withdrawn. Some people fear that certain ideologues in the PPP, frustrated at seeing their progress to power through parliamentary democracy thwarted by the new electoral system, might adopt not only the inflammatory rhetoric but also the revolutionary plan of a campaign for the 'struggles for national liberation' discussed at the tri-continental Congress held in Havana last January. What else is to be made, they ask, of Dr Jagan's May-Day promise that his party 'will not shrink from the struggle to win genuine independence for Guyana, and through this independence, socialism'? On the other hand, this fear may incline the Government to attempt 'anti-Communist' measures (with U.S. support) which might precipitate violent self-defence. As in many new States, the role of the army can be crucial. The Guyana Defence Force, which will include a highly mobile battalion, organized more for dealing with civil disorder than with foreign invasion, is commanded at present by an English officer; the matter of the choice of his local successor is a particularly critical one.

Besides maintaining order and countering separatist threats by the

¹ *Report of the British Guyana Independence Conference 1965*, Cmd. 2849.

ultimate sanction of force, the ruling coalition must promote prosperity as well, not only to prevent competition for economic advantage from leading to more racial tension but because economic successes are in a way the criteria by which it expects to be judged by the electorate. Here again the problems are enduring. The coalition Government has been plagued in 1966 by a rash of strikes, the majority not at all politically inspired, for which the best explanation seems to be workers' impatience to obtain a better share of such economic gains as are beginning to be seen. The Government has indeed been pursuing development schemes which are labour-intensive, pumping over £4 m. into the economy in 1965 largely to create employment. But though the effect has been to provide 10,000 jobs (said to be three times as many as in the two previous years), 21 per cent of the rapidly growing labour force remains unemployed. This makes the matter of political patronage in the disposition of jobs one of serious controversy. Hopes are being held out that the Caribbean Free Trade Area, which Mr Burnham is promoting and which may eventually include non-British territories, will ultimately bring economic advantages. In the short run, substantial help is hoped for from U.N. agencies and from such countries as the United States, Canada, and West Germany which can afford to be generous and which undoubtedly would be anxious to see that this coalition continues to succeed.

Prosperity is seen, however, as coming principally from the efforts of Guyanese themselves. Indeed, the 1966 Budget debate held during the month before independence was remarkable for the sober realism shown by participants from both sides of the Assembly. Mr D'Aguiar (the joint Deputy Premier with Dr Ptolemy Reid of the PNC), who is the Minister of Finance, admitted that general reserves remained low, a situation he inherited from the previous Government, and that taxation was already high (the proportion of Government revenue to Gross Domestic Product was 23.6 per cent compared with 19.5 per cent in neighbouring Trinidad). Nevertheless, he thought that sound financial policies at home could earn Guyana the reputation of a 'good debtor', enabled thus to choose among favourable lenders. Besides, her economic potential in lands, forests, and minerals, if afforded the opportunity to be developed, could make Guyana one of the richest territories in the Caribbean. Much would therefore depend on the success of the Development Plan for 1966-72, which the Government had drawn up with the help of a distinguished team of Western economists.

The Plan's main features include improved social and educational services, a massive road-building programme to open up the country's hinterland for development, extensive surveys to discover and exploit hydro-electric and forest potential, and the preparation of new lands for settlement. These public policies are to be accompanied by development works in the private sector, particularly in mineral exploitation. The Plan,

which is far from utopian (one aim being to reduce unemployment to 10 per cent), anticipates at least £11 m. from local savings which M D'Aguiar expects to raise in a local security market that has responded rather well to the return of confidence. It also requires £51 m. from abroad, an amount which should be forthcoming from governmental and private sources. It may be in their best economic and political interest for friendly foreign governments to be generous in grants or loans, avoiding where possible crippling debt charges. Much will depend on the private sector, for which the coalition seeks to create a climate more favourable to productive activity and attractive to investment than has been offered in the past. A policy of inviting private investment requires the maintenance of political and social stability. This is why, perhaps, Mr Burnham was so ready to clutch at assurances of co-operation made by Dr Jagan in the Budget debate. When Dr Jagan urged that the Government and Opposition seek a broad consensus, Mr Burnham replied that his Government is always willing to have 'meaningful discussions' on matters of policy, such as development.

One cannot tell if Dr Jagan's suddenly co-operative approach indeed represents a realistic appreciation that, with independence, appeals to outside persons — be they British Labour backbenchers or the U.S. Committee on Colonialism — will have to cease, and that henceforth he must come to terms with Mr Burnham. Certainly Mr Burnham knows that prospects of peace and prosperity are not good if his Government cannot convince a mistrustful and potentially recalcitrant half of the population that he is acting in the best interests of the whole nation. He must be as accommodating as is consonant with effective government. Necessity may be the mother of British-style compromise.

For such conciliatory policies the provisions of the Constitution are expected to be fitting instruments, since the emphasis placed on constitutionalism by Guyanese political leaders so far is an augury that they consider acceptance of the fundamental law and regard for due legal process as being, in the Attorney-General's phrase, 'the touchstone of social and political organization'. The Guyana Independence Act not only terminated what in retrospect is termed 'foreign domination' of the Guyanese. It also provided for freedom thereafter from autocratic rule, tempering strong executive power with such statutory limitations as stringent checks on declarations of emergency. If applied, or permitted to be applied, in its proper spirit, the benignant influence of the Constitution can help develop national integration by ensuring that the consideration and execution of governmental policy benefit all segments of the population. Indeed, in this England-sized territory on the continent of South America the principles of parliamentary democracy, which Britain taught the races she brought thither or found there may receive their severest testing and, one hopes, their best vindication.

Notes of the month

Britain, the U.N., and South Arabia

THE future of South Arabia has in the past two months largely been obscured by diatribes from Cairo radio and disputes in the House of Commons. The task of the British Government—a date having been stated for independence and a decision announced in the 1966 British Defence Review on the evacuation of the military base—is to hand over effective control of a disputatious Arab territory to as representative a government as possible at the minimum cost in blood and cash.¹ The British Government's immediate problem is to decide to what extent it can seek and accept the good offices of the United Nations in this task.

The U.N. General Assembly's resolutions on South Arabia, passed in November 1965, apart from calling for a date for independence and evacuation of the British base (two points which have, to most minds, been satisfied), demand the lifting of the state of emergency (declared in December 1963) and free return of all exiles and also the holding of general elections throughout the territory on the basis of adult suffrage under U.N. supervision. The present, Federal, Government of South Arabia has accepted these resolutions and Britain, although not specifically accepting them, has welcomed their acceptance by the Federal Government. The U.N. Special Committee on Colonialism has now called for the appointment of a U.N. Mission for South Arabia and the Secretary-General on 20 June announced his acceptance of this call. That the Special Committee (Britain and Uruguay not attending) should have been meeting in Cairo, at the headquarters of the Arab League, and that the Secretary-General's special representative should be an Arab national may not endear the U.N.'s decisions to Britain but, given British participation in the world body, these decisions must be noted.

In the official British view, South Arabia is effectively administered by the Federal Government and British obligations to that Government have been discharged—if not to everyone's satisfaction—by the promise of both military and general budgetary aid for the immediate future. However, in the eyes of the Arab States and, for the majority, in the eyes of the U.N. Member-States, Britain is still responsible for the territory. The U.N. is willing to discuss the situation with Britain but not, so it seems, with the existing Government of South Arabia. Britain's task is

¹ For the history of earlier negotiations see the present writer's 'The future of south Arabia', in *The World Today*, April 1965.

therefore complicated by the need for a decision on whether she should accept responsibility for the territory and hence negotiate with the U.N. or continue to support the Federal Government as the rightful Government of South Arabia as at present constituted. The Federal Government has called for a conference in August this year of all South Arabians to consider, as a basis for independence, the Hone-Bell Constitutional proposals.²

The South Arabian opposition is unwilling to accept the present South Arabian Government either as representative or as 'legal' and, in keeping with the U.N. resolutions, demands that free elections must be held before independence. To arrange such elections there must, to the opposition's thinking, be first, a U.N. presence and second, direct negotiations between the U.N. and Britain, without the Federal Government as, in terminology, a mediator. This opposition, personified in the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY), has continuing support from the United Arab Republic, and a headquarters at Ta'izz, Yemen, and although it has not yet formed a government in exile it has the approval of most Arab and several other nations. Its stand and its support are typified by the joint communiqué issued in Algiers on 9 June after the visit of FLOSY delegation. Algeria's ruling party, the FLN, confirmed its recognition of FLOSY 'comme seul représentant valable du grand peuple du Sud-Yémen et précise que c'est avec lui directement que Grande-Bretagne devra engager les négociations sur l'indépendance et souveraineté de cette partie très chère du Grand Monde Arabe'.

Not every Arab government would go so far in its support of FLOSY and its claim of responsibility for various terrorist attacks in Aden is hardly sufficient to merit its acceptance as representative of 'nationalist' South Arabian opinion. Indeed, judged by the standing of its leaders even within the multi-party political life of Aden Colony, its claim to be the sole speaker for 'non-feudalist' South Arabians seems extremely doubtful. This can be tested only in a free general election such as the U.N. resolutions demand and all but those of a pro-consular outlook would welcome in order to achieve a reasonably representative government for the future independent State.

The holding of elections on the basis of any suffrage other than that provided by existing electoral rolls would, as was pointed out in the Hone-Bell proposals, be difficult, but it should not be impossible before the date set for independence - 1968 at the latest - both to prepare rolls on the basis of adult suffrage and to set up machinery for the vote. These preparations could, given the goodwill of both the British and the Federal Governments, be made by an international Commission similar to the set up in Sudan in 1953 for the same purpose. There is no major difference

² Sir Ralph Hone and Sir Gawain Bell, *Constitutional Proposals for South Arabia 1966* (London, published by the Federation of South Arabia, 1966).

between the Federal Government and the opposition represented by FLOSY, at least judged by their public statements, on the question of who should vote, but only on whether the elections should be before or after independence. The British Government is likely to favour holding elections before 1968 if only to ensure that South Arabia emerges as an independent State with the appearance of stability. The old argument in Aden over who, among the population of Yemeni origin, is qualified to vote seems for the moment to be capable of solution.

There is an important precondition for elections contained in the U.N. resolutions, and that is that the state of emergency should first be lifted and all exiles allowed to return home. British forces are engaged both in keeping down terrorism mostly in Aden itself and in policing the Yemen border and areas of tribal dissidence. To lift the state of emergency and welcome home those very South Arabians who claim responsibility for terrorism would not be easy at the moment and could be done only when FLOSY itself undertakes to call for an end to terrorism or, without this call, terrorist attacks are seen to have stopped. Britain cannot suddenly throw over responsibility for security and, despite the willingness of some of the Federal Ministers to accept this responsibility internally, the Federal forces could not readily cope with the present situation. The agreement on defence aid announced in the House of Commons on 13 June will allow for the immediate expansion of the Federal Regular Army from its present five battalions and their equipment with some armour and artillery and eventually with aircraft, but there is only just over two years before independence and it will take all of this time for the Federal Regular Army to train its new recruits and adapt to its new weapons.

Britain now has the chance to escape from these complications by taking the calculated risk that acceptance of a U.N. presence, involving a conference of political leaders at present in South Arabia and abroad and effective U.N. supervision of an election, could end terrorism or at least reduce it to the extent where Britain could disengage her forces from internal security work. To do so would be to accept far more than mere U.N. observers, and calculation of the risk must now depend largely on the ability of the U.N. Secretary-General's special representative on South Arabia, Sayed Omar Adeel, to convince the British Government that it can disengage in these circumstances. It is a risk, but there is no apparent alternative if Britain is to be out of South Arabia by 1968.

The new State of South Arabia — which will, it is hoped, include those parts of the protectorate still outside the present Federation — is envisaged as independent. Any question of links with Yemen is to be discussed and decided after independence is achieved. FLOSY, whose very name suggests that South Arabia is but a natural extension of Yemen, whose headquarters is at Tacz, and whose leaders date the effective

'nationalist struggle' from the 1962 revolution in Yemen, has avoided any clear statement on its intentions. If FLOSY, through free elections, gets into a position of power in the new State, its leaders are unlikely to give up the independence they have won and would seek only the link with neighbouring Arab States provided by membership of the Arab League. If, however, FLOSY – or any other substantial body of 'nationalists' – finds itself excluded from power in an independent State dominated by traditional rulers, it would no doubt seek to create through continued terrorism and tribal dissidence the circumstances in which a 'revolutionary government' would call on the United Arab Republic for armed intervention to support it. President Nasser is not withdrawing his troops from Yemen and they will, it seems sure, still be there to answer a call in 1968. It is, of course, just because of this danger that the present Federal rulers have consistently sought a defence agreement with Britain and are now reported to be making soundings for a guarantee from the United States of the future South Arabia's territorial integrity.

PETER KILNER

The Chilean copper industry

DEVELOPMENTS in the last eighteen months have radically changed the balance of power in the Chilean copper industry (and in Chile's political scene), and the decisions which have been taken could ultimately have profound effect on the world copper situation. The fundamental development is that, after prolonged and sharp Congressional discussion, President Eduardo Frei in mid-April obtained final approval for his Bill to 'Chileanize' the industry. The measures call for an increase in copper production between 1964 and 1970 of 569,000 tons annually to bring the final figure to 1,190,000 tons a year, a rise in the amount of ores locally refined from 210,000 tons a year in 1964 to 655,000 tons in 1970, and substantial participation by the State in the direction of and the profit from the industry. The major part of this increase will be accounted for by the activities of the three largest copper companies in the country: Anaconda, Braden Copper (a subsidiary of the Kennecott Company) and the Cerro Corporation, all up to now controlled from the United States. Henceforward the Chilean State is to take a majority shareholding in the large El Teniente mining operation of Braden, a substantial minority share in Anaconda's exploration subsidiary, which is to explore deposits, called La Exotica, at present buried under the tailings of Chuquibambilla, Anaconda's large open-cast working, and another substantial minority share in the Compañía Minera Andina, an offshoot of Cerro which is to develop a medium-sized mine, Rio Blanco.

The measures necessitate a degree of investment which is large by any standards. The total needed over the period till 1970 is some \$430 m. of U.S. investment, approximately \$200 m. being put into the El Teniente operation, with an investment of some \$100 m. to \$130 m. envisaged for

the medium and smaller mines. In all these schemes the State is encouraging the companies to bring in money by offering appreciable tax concessions. The Government is itself obliged to make a total contribution of \$160 m., roughly half of this being share capital to provide for the extension of the El Teniente workings.

The copper plans, from the time they were first formulated and published as part of Frei's presidential platform for the elections of September 1964, drew the wrath of the Right wing, suspicious of any adulteration of the free-enterprise system by Christian Democratic notions of co-partnership between State and private industry. On several occasions the Conservative and Liberal Parties (now fused into the National Party) and the Radicals joined hands with the Left wing to block the passage of the copper law. This was particularly effective in the Senate, where the Christian Democrats are still in a minority. The Left wing, the Communists and Socialists grouped in coalition in the *Frente de Acción Popular* (FRAP), was content to see the Government making slow progress with a Bill which it considered an unsatisfactory half-way house on the road to the complete nationalization of the industry and a sell-out to the copper companies but which it also considered would, if passed, bring Frei and his party no little popular recognition.

The Socialists in the first months of this year went a good deal further than the Communists in their opposition. While Luis Corvalán, the Communist leader, came back from Moscow, where his party has regularly and perhaps often slavishly looked for guidance, with the news that he would support certain items of 'progressive' Christian Democratic policy, the Socialists expressed their intransigence towards a 'petty bourgeois' government by backing a strike by the workers of Braden which lasted 88 days and cost many millions of pounds in lost production before it was finally concluded at the beginning of April. The strike, aided by the FRAP-controlled *Central Única de Trabajadores*, indirectly brought about the deaths of six people when in mid-March a detachment of the police force opened fire on a group of workers entrenched in the union headquarters of the Anaconda mine at El Salvador, who had staged a strike in sympathy with their comrades at El Teniente.

This event, far from attracting public sympathy to the miners' demands and protests, appears to have exasperated public patience with a group of workers who are among the most highly paid in the country. Together with a good deal of clever Government propaganda, the El Salvador tragedy tended to convince the public that, whatever the original and perhaps just demands of the El Teniente miners might be, the strike was being prolonged for political ends by the Socialists. Since the stoppage, which, incidentally, the Chuquibambilla workers did not join, and despite threats of further industrial action against the Government by FRAP, there have been no more strikes.

In the first fortnight of April the Opposition used a different weapon. Criticism was voiced of the Administration's tardiness in raising Chilean copper prices at a time when world demand for the metal was growing as a result of the Central African disturbances and the worsening Vietnamese conflict. This weapon was blunted in mid-April when the State copper organization, the *Corporación del Cobre*, raised the officially controlled selling price of the metal from 42 U.S. cents a pound to 62 cents, thus setting off a series of price rises by the Zambian and Katangese companies and by some Canadian firms.

At the time of the rise it was stated officially that the Chilean Government regarded this price level as extraordinarily high and unlikely to last. The funds accruing from the bonanza were therefore earmarked by Sergio Molina, the Finance Minister, for extraordinary needs; among these, the Minister was not slow to point out, was the shortfall in Government revenue resulting from tax losses brought about by the El Teniente stoppage. Though this statement has not been rescinded there is a growing feeling in the *Corporación del Cobre* that the high prices may indeed continue and that the effort to maintain copper as a serious rival to low priced aluminium and plastics in many common uses is a vain one.

Meanwhile, the Chilean authorities, having reached a new *modus vivendi* with locally operating companies, seem to be trying to pass on their ideas to other copper producers. A version of the OPEC organization could be the outcome of these contacts, the most notable of which was the presence in Zambia in April just before the price rise of the *Corporación's* representative, Gregorio Amunátegui, an official close to the Vice-President of the Corporation, Javier Lagarrigue. The visit appears to have had wider objects than that popularly attributed to it of seeking Zambian agreement for the possible high price. Amunátegui offered some small amount of technical assistance to the Zambia Government, not so much in the realm of mining engineering, where Chile herself is still short of qualified personnel, but rather in mining legislation, taxation, and commercial practice. This year should see a increased flow of experts and trainees between the two countries.

At the same time, Chile has offered her assistance to the Peruvian authorities in their copper problems and in particular with regard to the case of the U.S.-owned Southern Peruvian Copper Corporation over the exploitation of the deposits of Toquepala. Though there have been informal conversations with individual Peruvian parliamentarians, President Belaunde's Government has, at the time of writing, not taken up the offer with any noticeable enthusiasm. The *Corporación* is also seeking to strengthen what have up to now been informal and indirect links with the Congolese authorities responsible for the Katanga deposits.

HUGH O'SHAUGHNESSY

The Chinese puzzle

Cultural revolution and the dismissal of P'eng Chen

JOHN GITTINGS

WESTERN analysts of the current Chinese political scene should tread with extreme caution. No less an authority than the *People's Daily* recently found time, amidst its own troubles, to poke fun at the Pekingists. China's 'stormy cultural revolution', it said in an editorial on 1 June, has thrown reactionary world opinion into confusion:

At one moment, they indulge in wishful thinking saying that our great cultural revolution has shown that there are hopes of a 'peaceful evolution' on the part of China's younger generation. A moment later, they become pessimistic, saying that all this has shown that Communist rule remains very stable. Then again, they seem to be fearfully puzzled, saying that it will never be possible to find genuine 'China hands' who can promptly pass accurate judgment on what is taking place in China.

The present writer freely admits to fearful puzzlement. The current situation in China is capable of a number of conflicting interpretations, each of which makes sense up to a point. But their very profusion raises doubts as to whether any single one is wholly accurate. Furthermore, such interpretations often suffer from two serious defects. First, they stress the *personalities* involved in a presumed 'struggle for power', while attaching insufficient weight to the basic *issues*. Second, they concentrate upon the present situation, rather than upon its historical context. This article will attempt to approach the problem in terms of these two important factors - the issues involved and their historical context.

Historical background

Ever since the 10th Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in September 1962, the leadership has devoted much of its attention to the struggle against 'revisionism' at home as well as abroad. It has emphasized the continuing importance of the 'class struggle', the danger of a 'counter-revolutionary come-back', and the need to ensure

Mr Gittings is Research Specialist in Chinese studies at Chatham House; author of *The Role of the Chinese Army* (London, O.U.P. for R.I.A., forthcoming.)

that 'revolutionary successors' can be found to lead China on the right path in generations to come. Towards these ends the Socialist Education Movement was launched in 1963. This concern to preserve revolutionary purity in every aspect of Chinese life may be taken to grotesque and absurd lengths, but it does reflect the existence of a genuine and major problem. This is the problem of how to ensure that the driving force of revolutionary zeal can be maintained almost twenty years after the revolution, in a modernizing society whose direct experience of the days of pre-liberation is becoming increasingly faint. The problem is encountered in the army, in industry, in agriculture, in the arts, and in social attitudes generally. It is the conflict between 'revolutionization' and 'professionalization', between politics and technique, between ideology and pragmatism. It can be found in China's foreign as well as in her domestic policy.

Intellectuals have been a prominent target for attack and criticism in the past few years, for a number of good reasons. They edit papers, make films, publish articles, write plays. They are the mainstay of the mass media upon which the leadership's ability to communicate to the mass depends. They are indispensable but unreliable; the majority come from bourgeois stock, and are or were members of the democratic party which occupied a middle position between the Kuomintang and the Communists before 1949. Ever since Mao Tse-tung's famous speech on the relation between literary and revolutionary work in May 1942,¹ the intellectuals have been a recurrent object for rectification. Perhaps the most famous instance was the rectification campaign which followed the blossoming of the 'Hundred Flowers' in 1957, though there was a further period of relaxation – a sort of 'anti-Hundred Flowers' – in 1961 when the Great Leap Forward had ground to a halt.

In the second half of 1964, however, another rectification campaign got under way with a series of attacks launched against prominent philosophers, theoreticians, publicists, novelists, and film or play writers. These attacks upon prominent intellectuals had two distinctive features. First, those involved were frequently Party members of some reputation and standing, who might be considered to be established 'authorities'. Secondly, they were charged with having, objectively speaking, aided and abetted the cause of modern revisionism by the activities. But in spite of this political note, they were not accused of 'anti-Party' activities, and the attacks upon them were kept within bounds. One should also distinguish between the singling out of individual intellectuals for political purposes, as in these cases, and the debates about specific problems in the relationship of literature and history to Marxism-Leninism, which are conducted in specialized journals with less heat and publicity. For instance, there was a learned

¹ Mao Tse-tung, 'Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art', *Select Works*, Vol. 3 (Peking, 1965), pp. 69-98.

discussion in 1963 on whether certain aspects of feudal and bourgeois morality could be 'inherited' by a socialist society. The question involves a major point of principle in the analysis of the class nature of imperial China from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint. This particular discussion was touched off by two essays 'On Morality' and 'Again on Morality', written by Wu Han, Deputy Mayor of Peking and a historian specializing in Ming history.¹

The present situation originated in November 1965 when yet another attack was launched in similar manner upon a prominent intellectual. At first it seemed to fall into the familiar pattern; there was no indication that within five months it would escalate into a political crisis of major proportions involving the dismissal of P'eng Chen, Politburo member, mayor of Peking, and one of the most influential Chinese leaders. The question therefore which needs to be answered is how and why did this process of escalation take place? Was it fortuitous or was it deliberately planned in advance? An examination of the chronology of the events since last November may help to give the answer.

The intellectual under attack was, interestingly enough, Wu Han. His works were no longer the subject of mild academic debate but of sharp political criticism. One can divide subsequent events into three distinct and significant phases. The first phase lasted from mid-November 1965 to the end of January 1966. On 10 November the Shanghai paper *Wen-hui Pao* attacked Wu Han for his opera play *Dismissal of Hai Jui*, which had been completed, published, and staged in 1961. He was accused of having 'used the tactics of making veiled criticism of contemporary people with ancient people'. Hai Jui (a Chinese official in the late Ming dynasty) had been presented by Wu Han as a 'hero' and a 'good character' in defiance of historical reality. Wu Han in his play emphasized the fact that Hai Jui had demanded 'the return of land' to the peasants. Thus, argued the *Wen-hui Pao*, was clearly a veiled criticism of the people's communes at a time (1961) when they were running into difficulties.

Although this was a serious accusation, the debate was not one-sided. A number of articles were published in December-January 1965-6 which defended Wu Han or criticized him in more moderate terms. Wu Han himself published a self-criticism which, in spite of its apologetic tone, put up a vigorous and well-argued defence of his central theme. The debate was largely conducted at a literary level; it was still, to some extent, a continuation of the 1963 debate over the nature of feudal morality and whether it could be 'inherited'.

Another peculiar feature of this early phase of the attack on Wu Han was the behaviour of the Peking press. The original attack had been published in Shanghai on 10 November. It was republished on the 29th by

¹ See *People's Daily*, 24 December 1963, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, *Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP)* 3136.

the *Army Newspaper* and by the *People's Daily* on the 30th. This was the first example of the way—which later became familiar—in which the official Party paper followed (reluctantly?) the lead of the army paper. Furthermore, the *People's Daily* attached an editorial note to the article which carefully avoided taking sides for or against Wu Han, whereas the *Army Newspaper* had unequivocally described Wu Han's play as 'poisonous weed'.² We also know from later revelations that the new papers controlled by the Peking Party administration—*Peking Daily*, *Peking Evening News*, and the theoretical journal *Front-Line*—also tried cautiously, publishing only mild criticism of Wu Han. What is more, those responsible for these papers had complained to the Shanghai *Wen-hui Pao* for starting the ball rolling. 'What is your background in publishing Yao Wen-yuan's article? Why have you not notified us in advance? Where is your Party character?'³ Teng T'ao, the Party Secretary of the Peking committee in charge of cultural and educational work, even criticized the *Army Newspaper* for describing Wu Han's play as 'poisonous weed'. 'The reason,' he explained, '... is that the Army is conducting an educational campaign within the armed forces, and the military people are not allowed to express their own ideas.'⁴

Before passing on to the second phase of the attack on Wu Han, one should note that on 26 November Mao Tse-tung made his last reported public appearance before disappearing altogether for six months. Jui-ch'ing, the army Chief of Staff, who has not since been heard of, was last referred to in the Chinese press in November. Peng Chieh, however, was still very active. He addressed the important Art Political Work Conference in January, and his last mention did not occur until 22 March.

The second phase lasted from February to the middle of April. During this time, there were only a few attacks on Wu Han himself, mostly in the provincial press. Instead, two other dramatists were attacked by the *People's Daily*, T'ien Han, the chairman of the Union of Chinese Dramatists, and Hsia Yen, a former deputy Minister of Culture. Significantly, it was the *People's Daily* and not the *Army Newspaper* which launched these attacks. Furthermore, since the conclusion of this phase and the resumption of attacks on Wu Han, only passing references have been made to T'ien Han and Hsia Yen. These two facts may suggest that Wu Han's supporters were attempting to divert the fire from him.

² For the article reprinted from *Wen-hui Pao* in *People's Daily*, 30 November 1965, and for a variety of opinions published on *The Dismissal of Hsu Tzu*, and Wu Han's self-criticism, see U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, *Curr. Background* (CH) 753.

³ *Red Flag*, 15 May 1966, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3, 7 May 1966 (FF) 2166.

⁴ See Cheng Ch'um, 'We will forever and resolutely listen to Chairman Mao's rebuttal of the slander made by Teng T'ao at a meeting against the People's Liberation Army,' *Army Newspaper*, 13 May 1966 (FF) 2163.

It seems clear in retrospect that the debate continued during this time behind the scenes at the highest Party level, and that more recent developments merely reflect decisions which were reached then, probably in the Party Central Committee. The third phase was initiated with the resumption of attacks on Wu Han on 10 April. On the 14th Shih Hsiang-shan, deputy Minister of Culture, delivered a report on the 'socialist cultural revolution' to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. On the same day, Kuo Mo-jo, the Party's most loyal intellectual and a close friend of Mao, made his famous self-criticism before the Congress, confessing that everything he himself had written was of no value in the light of present-day standards and that it should all be burnt. This confession appears to have been made 'pour encourager les autres'.⁶

This final phase is in a class of its own. First, the campaign is clearly characterized as a class struggle against 'anti-Party' elements. The tone was set in—as might be expected—the *Army Newspaper*, in an editorial of 18 April, which stated that

Ever since the founding of new China, an anti-Party line has existed in literary and art circles, a black anti-socialist thread that runs counter to Mao Tse-tung's thinking.

This was followed by another editorial on 4 May which described the 'polemics on the cultural front' as 'an extremely sharp class struggle', against certain people who 'are generally authorities and enjoy a certain reputation'.⁷ Secondly, the crimes of which Wu Han and others were now accused were much more serious than previously suggested. They were now under fire for activities in support of the 'Right opportunists' in 1959, i.e. those connected with the opposition to the Great Leap Forward and specifically with the Minister of Defence, Marshal P'eng Teh-hoai, who was dismissed from office in September of that year. Thirdly, the 'struggle' was now entirely one-sided. Articles were no longer published in defence of those under attack. Fourthly, the primary object of the struggle was clearly the Peking Party administration under P'eng Chen, First Secretary of the Peking Municipal CCP committee. Those under fire included Wu Han, Teng T'ao, Li Ch'i (director of the committee's Propaganda Department), and Liao Mo-sha (formerly director of the committee's United Front Work Department). They were charged with having jointly written and arranged for the publication of literary articles in the Peking press from 1959 onwards, which used subtle historical analogies in order to criticize Party policy and 'prepare public opinion for the restoration of capitalism'.

P'eng Chen was officially replaced on 3 June as Peking Party Secretary

⁶ For Kuo Mo-jo's self-criticism, see *People's Daily*, 5 May 1966 (FF 2154). Kuo was later reported to have told Japanese visitors that 'no one in China had ever imagined that he would withdraw because of his self-criticism. Rather, he would work with fresh spirit' (*The Times*, 17 May 1966).

⁷ See FF 2141 and 2155.

by Li Hsiieh-feng, Secretary of the Party's North China bureau. He is his second-in-command, Wu Teh, proceeded to 'reorganize' the city Party Committee.⁸ The same fate awaited the Party Committee of Peking University, whose President, Lu Ping, was also dismissed for 'bourgeois revisionist' activities. The editorial boards of both the *Peking Daily* and the *Peking Evening News* were dismissed. Publication of the third offending paper, *Front-Line*, was suspended.

Finally, the struggle against Wu Han and his colleagues has been elevated to the status of a nation-wide rectification campaign against those, especially in literary and cultural circles, who are tainted with bourgeois revisionism. This process began in early April, when provincial Party Committees met throughout China 'to discuss questions concerning the study of Chairman Mao's works by leading cadres', 'to weed out deviationists.'⁹ Mass meetings have since been held to denounce Teng T'ao and others, and to pledge loyalty to the thought of Chairman Mao. Since the dismissal of P'eng Chen, a number of provincial officials have been denounced by name. These include two editors of the official Party papers in Yunnan and Kweichow provinces and a deputy governor of Shantung who was responsible for culture and education.

A final chronological note. The first attack by name on Teng T'ao at Liao Mo-sha, and the first hint that unnamed 'freaks and monsters' (i.e. P'eng Chen) still awaited exposure, was made in the *Army Newspaper* on 8 May, in an article which warned that a 'life-and-death struggle' still had to be waged in China between socialism and capitalism.¹⁰ On 11 May Chairman Mao finally reappeared in public, at a banquet for the Albanian delegation led by Mehmet Shehu.

The issues involved

How, then, are we to solve this extremely complicated Chinese puzzle? While one doubts whether it is susceptible to solution on the evidence presently available to us, the following points may usefully be made.

The basic issue is, to borrow a phrase, a moral issue. It is the issue 'whether our country will or will not change colour. It affects the destiny and the future of our Party and country and of the world revolution. It is of the utmost importance that this struggle should not be taken lightly. Intellectual dissent, as in the past, is the specific object of this struggle both because of the reputation of the written and spoken word, and because it provides a sophisticated and many-sided framework in which to

⁸ The appointment of Wu Teh (formerly Party Secretary of Kirin province) as Peking Second Secretary implies the dismissal of Liu Jen, the previous occupant of this office. Liu Jen was also commander of the Peking military garrison.

⁹ See report of meeting by Kiangsi CCP committee, addressed by Lu Ting-wei, New China News Agency, 5 April, and similar provincial meetings, in *FE* 214.

¹⁰ See *FL* 2148.

¹¹ *Red Flag*, 11 June 1966 (*FE* 2185).

arguments can be thrashed out. (It also enables the Party to avoid direct discussion of some specific aspects of the debate, e.g. in foreign and economic policy.) Moreover, there has always been a strong anti-intellectual streak in the Party, which one suspects is now being indulged to the full.

This basic issue of the struggle between 'revolution' and 'revisionism' assumes the specific policy issues which are no doubt discussed in detail. These will include Vietnam, relations with the Soviet Union, and recent Chinese setbacks (e.g. Ghana and Indonesia) in foreign policy, as well as the third Five-Year Plan (of which details still await publication), the handling of the people's communes, and allocations for industry, in domestic policy. There is some evidence that in the second phase of the campaign against Wu Han, when the press was silent while the Party deliberated, some of these issues were also being decided. It was during this phase that two very significant sets of editorials were published which set the ideological framework for the victory of 'revolution' against 'revisionism'. From 4 February to 5 April 1966 the *Army Newspaper* published seven long editorials, which were broadcast and reprinted throughout China, stressing the importance of 'putting politics in command' in every aspect of daily life, and praising 'the thought of Mao Tse-tung' as 'the peak of contemporary Marxism-Leninism'. 'The message of these editorials was, in effect, that no dilution of Mao's revolutionary philosophy could be tolerated.'¹² Meanwhile, the *People's Daily* published a number of key editorials on foreign policy, the last of which appeared, like the last in the *Army Newspaper* series, in the first week of April, on the eve of the exposure of the Peking anti-Party group. These editorials explained that 'twists and turns' were bound to arise in the course of revolutionary advance. 'This was a dialectical inevitability, which explained the temporary 'set-backs' which the cause of revolution had suffered in some parts of the world. Whenever such set-backs occurred, one could expect the 'modern revisionists' to try to 'peddle their foul proposition for the abolition of revolution'.¹³ But they were mistaken. Although the world scene was very complicated, there was 'a fundamental trend in the nature of kaleidoscopic events'. 'This trend was the continual and inevitable progress of the revolutionary movements of the world towards victory.'¹⁴

Who is behind the campaign? It has been speculated that we are now witnessing a 'power struggle' within the Chinese leadership, while Mao Tse-tung himself is dying or enfeebled. But the evidence suggests, although Mao's health may be deteriorating, he is actively concerned with the waging of the 'socialist cultural revolution'. In an editorial on 6 June, which seems to be intended to provide a definitive analysis of recent events, the *Army Newspaper* has revealed that 'Chairman Mao

¹² See SCMP 3641, 3644, 3645, 3652, 3667, and FE 2135.

¹³ 7 March 1966, FE 2107. ¹⁴ 4 April 1966, FE 2131.

at a C'CP Central Committee meeting in September 1965 pointed out that it is necessary to criticise the bourgeois reactionary thinking', and that this was the starting-point of the present 'cultural revolution'. Furthermore, this latest revolution is presented as a successor to previous campaigns against bourgeois intellectuals, each of which was launched by Chairman Mao. The same editorial states quite explicitly that the present campaign is taking place 'under the direct leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee of the Communist Party'.

This evidence alone is not conclusive. But it seems unlikely that such a campaign could have been launched, and prosecuted to a successful conclusion involving the dismissal of a member of the Politburo, without the blessing and authority of Mao himself. The characteristics of the campaign are peculiarly Maoist, dating back, as we have seen, to his Yenching talk in 1942. What is happening now is essentially a rectification campaign upon similar lines to previous ones. Mao's protracted absence from the scene may even be explained by his having retired from Peking to give personal direction to the campaign. Mao's attention appears to have wandered from domestic affairs (during the Great Leap) to foreign affairs (the Sino-Soviet split), and there is an attractive hypothesis that he may now have turned again to the home front. It would be entirely keeping with Mao's personality for him to wish to devote his last years sharpening the contradictions of the class struggle in China, confident that in the perspective of time this was both inevitable and desirable.

The *Army Newspaper* has set the pace throughout the campaign. The Military Affairs Committee under Marshal Lin Biao, Minister of Defence, is now credited jointly with Mao and the Central Committee as the inspirer of the campaign. This is not surprising. Since P'eng Teh-huai's dismissal in 1959, political control over the army has been restored to a point where in 1964 the entire nation was exhorted to 'learn from the PLA'. Army model heroes have been widely publicized as paragons of Party virtue. The army has been made the testbed for the policy of 'politics in command'. Although there have been renewed signs of dissent in the army since 1964, in general it probably still represents the most loyal and well-organized force in China today. It would be logical for the newspaper and its prestige to be used in support of a rectification campaign.

Who are the opposition? It would be a mistake to assume, just because one has now been exposed, that an 'anti-Party group' ever existed in Peking in the sense of a group organized to challenge the established leadership. Wu Han, Teng T'ao, and others are charged with conspiracy taking advantage of the setbacks of the Great Leap to write veiled attacks upon the Party. No doubt they did co-operate in attempting to publish some mild criticism in the spirit of the 'Hundred Flowers'. But they did

¹⁵ *FE* 2183.

at a time when such activities were tacitly encouraged, during the 'mini-Hundred Flowers' of the post-Great Leap period. There was no need for conspiracy. Many other intellectuals in China could now be hauled over the coals for articles written in more permissive years. What the Wu Han case reveals is that this atmosphere of dissent was much more widespread, and lasted much longer, than we have suspected.

Those now described as 'anti-Party' were not against the Party; but they were apparently against extremism and for a more moderate approach. According to a hostile summary of their views in *Red Flag*, they were in favour of 'opening wide' (i.e. the spirit of the Hundred Flowers). They advocated 'construction before destruction'. They wanted to check the growth of 'Left scholar-tyrants' (i.e. anti-intellectual Party cadres). They attempted to carry out 'purely academic discussion', on the assumption that 'in the face of truth everybody is equal'.¹⁶

Such men were not powerful in the conventional sense. But they were influential, just as the Petöfi Club, with whom they are now compared in the Chinese press, was influential in Hungary in 1956. They were, therefore, dangerous, because of their influence and because of the respect which is still attached in China to the voice of the scholar. The present campaign and those of the past two years seem to be designed to destroy precisely this attitude of respect.

Is there a power struggle? It has been suggested that the entire campaign against Wu Han was a subtle ploy to eliminate his patron P'eng Chen. This seems implausible. The campaign, as we have seen, must be looked at in the context of an overall pattern of attempts to reform bourgeois intellectual thought. Besides, P'eng could have saved himself by throwing Wu Han to the wolves. Instead, he appears to have come to the defence of his subordinates, and this may be his real crime. Some remarks made by an unidentified critic of the campaign, now published in the *Army Newspaper*, could well be attributed to P'eng. This critic describes the anti-Party group as 'a scholars' rebellion which cannot produce any result in three years', and as 'a few disturbances in the sea that could never cause any big waves to capsize a boat'. The *Army Newspaper* comments on this view:

If we are only concerned with construction, production, culture and education, or how to deal with the Chiang Kai-shek gang or U.S. imperialism and ignore the possibility of bourgeois restoration and internal subversion, or if we carelessly allow the ambitious schemes of the bourgeoisie to succeed — we shall stand arraigned as criminals before the judgment of history.¹⁷

This comment might aptly be directed at P'eng. No one can seriously regard him as bourgeois, liberal, or revisionist. On the contrary, P'eng has been a leading spokesman in the polemics against the Soviet Union,

¹⁶ *Red Flag*, 11 June 1966 (FE 2185).

¹⁷ FE 2183.

and had a notorious reputation in the early 1950s for his part in the movement against 'counter-revolutionaries'. But one can well imagine an overconfident P'eng, carelessly allowing his Party intellectuals to go too far and then furiously defending them regardless of the consequences.

Although the affair does not seem to have started as a power struggle, questions of power must surely have arisen once it was clear that P'eng was involved. Here one must fall back on pure guesswork. One would expect T'eng Hsiao-p'ing, Secretary of the Party and of comparable position to P'eng, to wish his rival out of the way. One would also expect Liu Shao-ch'i to adopt the orthodox position, although he has recently been out of the news. Chou En-lai has been nominated by some as a wisher as another target of the campaign. Nothing is impossible, but one should recall that Chou is a past master at the art of staying in power while all around him have lost it. Finally Lo Jui-ch'ing has like P'eng a well-deserved reputation for toughness (he is ex-head of security police and ex-Minister of Public Security, and was brought in as Chief of Police to tighten control over the army in 1959). But he may object to the use of the army paper as a vehicle of the attack, or he may have succumbed to the 'professional views' of some of his colleagues on the army general staff. On the other hand, whatever has happened to Lo may have no connection with present events. One is disinclined to speculate too far on the questions of power conflict. We know so little about the interior network of Party leadership relationships, and it is easy to over-simplify.

Where will it all end? Previous rectification campaigns have always stopped at a certain point, and have been followed by periods of relaxation. A lot must now depend upon whether some breathing space will be allowed again in the future. If this present campaign is pushed too far it could become counter-productive. There must be many officials who think that it has already gone too far, and who see in the removal of P'eng a precedent which might be invoked against them at some future date. Party cohesion in China so far has depended upon the maintenance of a broad consensus within its leadership. If the 'class struggle' is prosecuted without quarter, this consensus will begin to break up and will also encourage factionalism for reasons which may have little to do with the issues involved in the rectification campaign. Such campaigns operate upon the assumption that the cathartic shock which they inflict upon the body politic is necessary and of major therapeutic value. If this assumption is valid only if the wound is then allowed to heal. If, on the other hand, the campaign for revolutionary purity is carried on relentlessly and to extreme lengths, it could lead to serious political dislocation. There is an analogy here with the Great Leap Forward—also a brainchild of Chairman Mao, which, for reasons both within and outside the country, led to major economic dislocation. The 'socialist cultural revolution', possibly Mao's last dialectical fling, could also get out of hand.

SPD at Dortmund: Ulbricht sets the pace

DAVID CHILDS

ABSENT though he was, the most important influence at the Social Democratic Party's conference at Dortmund last month was Herr Walter Ulbricht, East German Head of State and First Secretary of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). He was important in the sense that Willy Brandt's Social Democrats spent a good deal of their time discussing themes which he had chosen. This is the first time this has happened since the SPD and the SED went their separate ways just over twenty years ago; throughout these years, the SPD has rejected out of hand all the many proposals that have come from East Berlin. How did this new situation come about? To discover this we must recall recent SPD history.

After losing three successive elections with increasing margins the SPD decided in 1959 that it needed a 'new look' – a new look which was intended to make the party more attractive to voters outside its traditional camp. The essential ingredients were: emphasis that the SPD was a *Volkspartei* or a party of the whole people rather than merely a party of the industrial working class (which it had anyway ceased to be even before 1914); recognition that there was more than one inspiration for Social Democracy, a religious inspiration as well as just a rationalist or Marxist one (this had already been recognized after the war and certainly by 1951); rejection of the notion that an ultimate utopian stage of society could be arrived at; and recognition that 'Der Sozialismus wird stets eine Aufgabe bleiben', that socialism will always be in need of fulfilment; rejection of so-called *Vollsozialisierung* and recognition of the virtues of private ownership; acceptance of all the military and political pacts binding the Federal Republic to NATO and the 'Common Market'. In practice the SPD had retreated to these positions before 1959 but in that year they were enshrined in the new Godesberg Party Programme.

One might have expected the SPD with its long, Marxist, intellectual past to have worked out some new synthesis, some new creative thinking within the framework of Socialism, like the Catholic Marxists or the 'New Left' in several West European countries. But their 'rethinking' was largely capitulation to the two powerful and largely conservative Churches of West Germany, to the strong anti-Communism and anti-Slav feeling of the country, and to the 'affluent society' based on the

Dr Childs is author of *From Schumacher to Brandt: The Story of German Socialism 1917-67* (London, Pergamon Press, 1966). Next October he takes up an appointment as Lecturer in German politics at Nottingham University.

Wirtschaftswunder. It was also, last but not least, the result of the *emancipement* of Social Democracy.

Obviously, the result of this development was greatly to reduce — this it was meant to do — the gap between the thinking of the Government parties and that of the Opposition. It also reduced the possibilities of manoeuvre at election time. But it did not eliminate these possibilities. For instance, the Godesberg Programme still called for a nuclear-free zone in Europe and stated: 'The Federal Republic of Germany will neither produce nor use atomic weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.' Further, on the religious question, although the Programme expressed the SPD's readiness to co-operate with the Churches in a 'partnership', it repeated earlier warnings about the misuse of religion for political or anti-democratic purposes. As for nationalization, it was totally excluded from the Programme. The SPD has, however, come long way since Bad Godesberg.

It was in 1960, after the collapse of the Summit Conference, that the SPD leadership — Brandt, Erler, Wehner — started to edge their way closer to the Christian Democratic position. Speaking to a rally celebrating the East German rising of 17 June 1953, Herr Brandt appealed to West German politicians to put aside their differences and form a common front on national questions. On 30 June Herbert Wehner, Vice-Chairman and party 'strong man', made the same appeal. Naturally the SPD opponents wished to know, as did its own rank and file, whether the party now accepted nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr. At its federal conference in the same year the demands for an answer became insistent. Under what the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 22 November called 'strong pressure from the membership', the party's *Vorstand* or executive rejected atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr but called for 'effect equipment and armaments' for the Republic's forces. At the conference Erich Ollenhauer, still the Chairman at that time but of declining importance, made a somewhat contradictory speech advocating, on the one hand, a common front of West Germans on foreign policy and strengthening of NATO, and, on the other, a European security system talks with the Soviet Union, and the rejection of atomic weapons by West Germany. The last point, according to *Die Welt* (23 November), brought strong applause from the delegates but none from Brandt, Schmidt, the party's up-and-coming defence expert, and Wehner.

The contradiction revealed in Herr Ollenhauer's speech was also reflected in the SPD's so-called *Regierungsprogramm* (Government Programme) with which it faced the electorate in 1961. The Programme announced by Herr Brandt, the party's Chancellor candidate, emphasized that the Federal Republic's position side by side with the NATO Powers was irreversible (*unerrückbar*). Brandt also turned down a 'two-State theory' for Germany, promised there would be no negotiat-

behind the backs of the expellees and refugees, demanded that what he termed the obsolescent weapons of the Bundeswehr be replaced by modern ones, and welcomed the development of the 'Six' while calling for even greater European unity to embrace Britain as well. Thus Herr Brandt, despite certain differences of emphasis, advocated the same platform as that of the Federal Government. Yet in this same Programme Brandt and the SPD accused the CDU of making reunification more difficult by its policy of Western integration and rearmament. They also called for better relations with Germany's Eastern neighbours, a policy to which the Government also paid lip-service, and for more help for the developing nations (again the CDU agreed to this in principle). Much of the SPD's *Regierungsprogramm* was taken up with such controversial reforms as free TV for the aged, clean air, clean water, less noise, more holidays, better recreational facilities, better pensions, and cheap loans for the young newly-weds. The programme did not convince a majority of the electorate and, although the SPD together with the Free Democrats improved their position, the Christian Democrats stayed in power.

Possibly drawing the wrong conclusions from the election result the SPD still hastened along the same road. Although the long-standing moderate Max Brauer, for many years Mayor of Hamburg, caused a stir at the Karlsruhe party conference in 1964 by opposing the *Vorstand* on the issue of the MLF - he rejected it - the leadership got its way. Only ten delegates voted against the executive's support for the MLF and sixteen abstained. Admittedly, the leaders had given them a strong warning about opposing their policy just before a federal election. Herr Brauer was voted off the *Vorstand* and therefore also lost his position in the Presidium which is elected by and from the *Vorstand*. In 1964, the SPD seemed to be accepting a nationalist ticket lock, stock, and barrel. It had always opposed the 1945 Oder-Neisse frontier with Poland, but since Schumacher's death in 1952 had been generally less militant about this question than the Government parties. The Karlsruhe conference, however, was held against the backdrop of a huge map of the Germany of 1937. Moreover, in the presence of Bundeswehr officers, the delegates heard Helmut Schmidt, himself a captain of the reserve and former Wehrmacht officer, praise his wartime comrades and demand reform of the command structure of the armed forces, which *Der Spiegel* (30 November) seemed to think would give the officers greater freedom from civilian control.

On a number of other issues too, the Social Democratic leadership showed its determination to continue its policy of 'if you can't beat them, join them', *vis-à-vis* the CDU-FDP coalition Government. The most outstanding of these in 1964 was the question of the federal Presidency. The Brandt-Erler-Wehner faction decided that, as a Social Democratic candidate could not win, the party ought to back the incumbent Heinrich

Lübke, as he was sympathetic to a grand coalition of CDU-SPD. He also claimed that opposition to him would lead to the more party-political CDU member Heinrich Krone being elected. Argument followed. The Social Democrats split three ways: for Lübke, for an independent SPD candidate, and for the leading Free Democrat and ex-Minister Ewald Bucher. Surprisingly perhaps, in view of the tradition of coalition and moderation in the *Land* Governments, a number of regional politicians, Max Brauer, Wilhelm Kaisen of Bremen, Heinz Kühn of North Rhine-Westphalia, and Helmut Schmidt, at this time Hamburg Senator of the Interior, joined certain Leftists, led by Peter Blachstein, deputy for Hamburg, and others in demanding an independent candidate. *Der Spiegel* (17 June 1964) lamented, 'The SPD leadership is no longer holding the front against the CDU, but only against its own party.' However, at the Berlin meeting of the Federal Assembly (which is made up of all the members of the Bundesrat and the Bundestag, the Upper and Lower Houses of the Federal Parliament) the majority of Social Democratic representatives followed their leaders' call and voted for Lübke.

By the time the federal election of 1965 came round the ruling Christian Democratic Party had reached a very low ebb. It had already divided on the issue of who should succeed Dr Adenauer, on the future of former Defence Minister Franz-Josef Strauss, the leader of the more Gaullist CSU, the party's Bavarian wing, and on the question of Federal Germany's relationship to America and to France. In addition, the Christians had nothing new to offer the electorate. As usual they stressed the encouragement that Communism would gain from a change of government and the danger to prosperity which, they claimed, would follow a change, and, especially in Catholic areas, they played on religious prejudice. As usual too they exploited crude nationalist emotion by displaying portraits of Herr Brandt in Norwegian uniform stemming from the time when he was military press attaché to the Norwegian military mission in Berlin. They also attacked him for his activities as a journalist during the Spanish civil war. The SPD for its part deliberately refrain from offering a clear alternative, relying exclusively on image-building and on improved organization. As a result the bewildered electors were offered a choice between 'Our Security' (CDU), 'Security For All' (FDP), and 'Sure is Sure' (SPD).

At the start of the campaign the public-opinion polls put the two main parties neck and neck, but in the event the SPD was again defeated. Briefly, 86.9 per cent of the electorate voted, a slightly lower turnout than in 1961. The CDU-CSU got nearly 15.4 million votes or 47.6 per cent of the total, compared with 45.3 per cent in 1961 (and 50.2 in 1957). The SPD's vote was 12.7 million or 39.3 per cent, compared with 31 per cent in 1961 (31.8 in 1957). The FDP's share declined from 12 to 9.5 per cent (7.7 in 1957).

Despite the total disarray of the Christian Democrats,¹ Brandt's men were forced once again to remain on the Opposition benches in Bonn. What next, then, for the SPD? Herr Brandt personally was shaken by the result and naturally bitter about the fact that he had been hounded for his anti-Nazi past. He announced his intention of not standing again as Chancellor candidate. In *Die Zeit* (29 October) Brandt's press officer, Egon Bahr, pointed out: 'The entire campaign only made sense if one believed that a great number of people rejected emigrants, regarded the [Nazi] Legion Condor as having fought on the right side in the Spanish civil war, and regarded Hitler's war as a war of the German people.' As this policy was concerned, however, the Social Democratic leadership pronounced themselves satisfied with their bipartisan, non-Socialist approach to West Germany's problems.

As was only to be expected, not all Social Democrats shared their leaders' views. It was in Herr Brandt's own party in Berlin that criticism of party policy was first voiced. Harry Ristock, an influential member of the West Berlin SPD, and some of his supporters opened fire on the leadership immediately after the election and called, among other things, for a radical change in the party's and Bonn's Eastern policy with new initiatives on German reunification including the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. This group took care not to attack Brandt himself, putting the blame rather on his associates in Bonn, Fritz Eiler and Herbert Wehner. A little later the Bremen Young Socialists started to kick out the traces and called for the resignation of the leader of the Bremen party, Richard Boljahn. In December came the news that Alex Moeller, the moderate leader of the Social Democrats in Baden-Wurtemberg, had resigned from the Presidium of the party under the pressure of criticism from his local SPD organization. Even some of the SPD's Right wing began to have second thoughts about the tactic of merely trying to build up an image and a sound organization around the personalities of a 'Chancellor candidate' and his team of experts rather than working hard for an alternative policy. Ulrich Lohmar, for instance, was one of these. He drew attention to the fact that organization was not enough. The CDU had won elections with weaker organization. Joachim Steffen, the youngish chairman of the Schleswig-Holstein SPD, also joined in and attacked the concept of elections being merely 'a competition for market research experts'. Both he and a business trust set up by Bavaria's 'Red Baron', Waldemar von Knoeringen, a former Vice-Chairman of the SPD, called for the revitalization of internal party democracy.

Undoubtedly the most sensational single intervention in this debate

¹ *Die Zeit* (22 October) commented: 'Most of the voters had only a vague idea of these differences of opinion. Who knew that when he gave his vote to a Christian Democrat supporter of Schröder, he voted against the Party chairman [Adenauer]?'

was a bitter, anonymous criticism of Herbert Wehner which appeared in the Hamburg weekly *Die Zeit* (11 March 1966). Although a far anti-Communist, Wehner had been under attack for years from the because of his (Weimar) Communist past. Now someone purporting to be a Social Democrat attacked him for the same thing, claiming also that Wehner had turned the SPD's structure into a Bolshevik-type organization devoid of any internal democracy. Although many Social Democrats did not like the form of the attack against Wehner, they certainly agreed that the SPD had become an almost totalitarian party organization and discipline. It must be stated, however, that to the extent that this is true Wehner alone is not responsible. The anonymous critic had forgotten that, long before Wehner's day, the SPD taught Bolsheviks a thing or two about organization. Under both Schun and Ollenhauer, and others before them, the *Apparat* knew how to stage conferences and silence opposition. Herbert Wehner merely continued on the process of 'rationalization' and expulsion which was inseparable from the atmosphere of the cold war in Germany.

Perhaps another blow against the party leadership was the failure of Helmut Schmidt to gain election as chairman of the Hartz SPD. Schmidt, now second only to Fritz Erler among Social Democrat members of the Bundestag, has long been closely associated with Wehner and Brandt, though he too is reported to be having second thoughts. The SPD leadership also had to face the fact last month that the independent yet Social Democratic-orientated *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*, the West German TUC, decided to ignore the party, the West German President's advice and once again announced its opposition to the proposed emergency powers' legislation, which is designed to replace Allied reserve powers by West German law for dealing with an internal or warlike crisis, but which is criticized by highly respected people as threatening democracy.

It was in this atmosphere of in-fighting and suspicion that Willy Brandt decided to intervene. In an open letter to the delegates to the forthcoming party conference at Dortmund, he drew attention to the fact that the SPD's policies of compromise had not brought it to power. He stressed the importance of the German problem, saying that the CDU's policy had led into a cul-de-sac and that reunification could be achieved by recognizing East Germany and the Oder-Neisse frontier. He called for the setting up of a *Gremium* or body made up of representatives from the main parties, youth organizations, trade unions, women's organizations, and farmers' federations in both parts of Germany to engage in an open discussion, and urged that for this purpose representatives of the SED and the SPD should meet as soon as possible to make necessary arrangements. This letter was handed over to the SPD on 7 February. On 11 February the East German press published it.

The SPD published its reply in the West German press immediately after a meeting of the *Vorstand* on 18 March. Its main contention was that the parties represented in the Parliaments of West and East Germany should be given the chance to state their views on the German question openly at joint meetings in both parts of Germany. It castigated Ulbricht for the order to shoot unauthorized crossers of the Berlin Wall and said that the SED would be judged by its method of publishing this reply. To the astonishment of many the SED did publish its rival's reply in full in *Neues Deutschland* on 26 March. It appeared together with the Unity Party's second letter to the SPD. In this second letter Ulbricht proposed a meeting of the SED in Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz) at which representatives of the SPD should be invited to speak, and a meeting of the SPD in Essen at which SED representatives would be the guests. In its second answer the SPD accepted this idea in principle, but made the counter-proposal of Hanover instead of Essen. This the Socialist Unity Party accepted. The date of the first meeting is 14 July. The details have still to be agreed, and negotiations could yet break down on the question of ensuring some kind of diplomatic immunity for the East German speakers, some of whom have been arrested when they have appeared in the Federal Republic on earlier occasions.

No one doubts therefore that the Social Democratic leadership were under pressure when the party met on 1 June for its conference at Dortmund. And unlike the delegates at other SPD conferences since the one at Bad Godesberg, the delegates at Dortmund were prepared to make their dissatisfaction vocal. The speeches of the SPD leaders must, therefore, be measured against this. Apart from the problem of German unity and the SPD's lack of 'profile' as a genuine alternative to the CDU, the delegates were worried about the party's support for the proposed emergency powers' legislation, about the extension of co-determination in industry (*Mitbestimmung*), and about the lack of democracy within the SPD.

The two Vice-Chairmen Fritz Eiler and Herbert Wehner were not prepared to make concessions to popular feeling. They vigorously defended the party's recent policies in which they had had a large say. Herr Brandt and Helmut Schmidt played it differently. Both of them made concessions on the question of the Oder-Neisse line, raised by a number of delegates. Herr Schmidt admitted that no foreign nation wanted a revision of the Oder-Neisse frontier, but he avoided advocating its recognition. Herr Brandt was equally vague. On the question of nuclear weapons both seemed now to be reversing the party's earlier stand, which was in favour, for instance, of German participation in an M.E.C. Schmidt called upon the Chancellor, Dr Erhard, to offer West German renunciation of her share of a multilateral nuclear force but to insist that the Federal Republic should take part in the 'total planning'

and 'crisis management' of nuclear affairs. Herr Schmidt also rejected idea, raised by delegates and by the SED, of any return to the SP earlier 'German Plan' of 1959. Herr Brandt, as part of his contribution to the German problem, called for the setting up of a *Deutscher Rat* (German Council) on which all Bundestag parties would be represented; it would try to build up contacts between the two parts of Germany. As we have seen, the SED had proposed a similar body but one drawn from both parts of Germany. The CDU was quick to reject Brandt's suggestion, pointing out that there were similar West German bodies already in existence. When questioned, Herr Brandt refused to elaborate on his scheme and *Die Welt* (3 June) summed it up with the headline, 'Deutscher Rat - An Evasion'. Looking at it from the background of the SED-SPD exchange, it does appear more as a device for placating delegates at party conference than as a serious political suggestion.

What about this exchange? Why did Ulbricht propose it and why did the SPD accept? There have been indications over the last few years that Herr Ulbricht is not quite the man he is thought to be in the West. *Der Spiegel* of 9 May commented, 'Once again [he] has proved that opponents wrongly underestimate him. He is no doctrinaire Left-winger, but a man of the Communist centre.' The proposal for joint SPD-SED meetings is a reflection of this position in the 'Communist centre'. In any case, it fits into the SED's campaign to gain recognition from the D.D.R. Herr Ulbricht, unlike Dr Erhard, does not claim to represent the whole of Germany. He merely wants recognition of his Government's jurisdiction between Lube and Oder. Any exchange with West Germany which helps to enhance his Government's prestige is therefore welcome. And if talks between the two parties help to promote a relaxation of tension so much the better, for this, Ulbricht believes, will help the SED to consolidate its position. By proposing such meetings, the German Head of State can present himself as a German patriot and champion of working-class unity; last April was the twentieth anniversary of the setting up of the SED by Communists and Social Democrats in the Soviet Zone.

As for Herr Brandt, in recent years he personally has been somewhat more realistic on German affairs than Wehner or Erler and it seems likely to have been he who pressed for acceptance of joint East-West talks. As we have seen, acceptance is a popular concession to widespread criticism of the SPD leadership. From the point of view of his political profile, Brandt can claim to be doing more for German reunification than Chancellor Erhard. Cautiously, one can say Brandt has already benefited from this; *Die Zeit* of 10 June took seriously the results of an opinion survey conducted by a pro-SPD research organization showing a majority of West Germans in favour of East-West meetings. Herr Brandt has made a very impressive come-back at Dortmund, being re-elected pa-

Chairman with an increased majority (though, in this regard, fear of the comfort to the Communists by voting against him might have been a consideration). His colleagues, Wehner and Erler, also re-elected, did not do quite so well. Brandt may now stand for a third time as Chancellor candidate in 1969.

If the Karl-Marx-Stadt and Hanover meetings do come off, both Brandt and Brandt seem likely to gain something and risk little. From Kennedy's and the world's point of view the meetings should be welcome. They are not likely to change the situation in any spectacular way but they may help to ease tension and prepare the way for more human contacts at less official levels.

Japan's place in the world

R. P. DORE

It is not so long ago that discussions of contemporary Japan used commonly to begin with a reminder that Japan is no longer a quaint oriental country, a land of sacred mountains and paper houses, rickshaws, tea ceremonies, and a diligent peasantry subsisting on two bowls of rice a day. Today, perhaps, a *carrot* has to be entered in the opposite sense. For all the 100 m.p.h. train services and the shipyards launching 160,000-ton tankers in 140 days; for all the urban growth, reducing the farm population from 40 per cent to a quarter of the total in the space of a decade; for all the diffusion of education and consumer durables, native Japanese ways and customs are still very much alive. A good deal of the traditional culture, especially the aesthetic and material culture, was of aristocratic origin and so has retained its high prestige. The *kimono* has an income elasticity of demand no less high than the camera. High incomes over the last ten years have doubled the consumption of *sake* rice wine as well as of drinking that of beer. The teaching of flower-arrangement is now big business. The once-dying art of *sumō* has been revived to become the nation's most popular sport since its delicacies and *grotesqueries* were brought to every home by the television camera.

The Japanese-ness of *sumō* wrestling admits of no dispute. The Japanese-ness of Japan's modern novels and films, of the style and assumptions of Japanese political argument, of the formation of public

Professor Dore is Professor of Sociology, with special reference to the Far East, at the University of London; author of *City Life in Japan* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) and *Land Reform in Japan* (London, O.U.P. for R.I.F.A., 1959).

opinion in newspaper and television debate and in the pages of the we political monthlies is less easy to define. It is none the less importa two senses. Firstly, the assumptions and concepts with which the J. ese do their thinking about the world are not necessarily the same as Secondly, there is enough that is uniquely Japanese in everyday lif culture to give the Japanese a very strong sense of racial and cu separateness *vis à vis* the outside world—stronger than that of any industrial nation, and stronger, perhaps, even than that of India, a middle- and upper-class culture derives so much more exclusively European sources. Add to this the fact that the world as viewed Tokyo really is rather different to any objective observer from the as viewed from any European capital and it becomes obvious why a deal of imagination is required to understand the bases of Jap. foreign policy.

There can be no sharper contrast than between the dynamic r. economic change in Japan and the lack of change in the political sp The constellation of forces, even the major political issues, remain the same today as they were ten years ago. But this contrast is just a trast and not a paradox. It is because they have, if not secured, at presided over the rapid economic development of the last decade th. Liberal Democrats retain the support which assures them two-thir the Diet seats. The party and its views are not easy to characterize a loose coalition of factions which share a certain general outlook as as having a more obvious shared interest in sitting in the seats of p That outlook is conservative in its nostalgia for the discipline and pa ism of pre-war days and in its desire to revive some of the Japanese c tional traditions which produced them. Like most conservative pa the Liberal Democrats favour free enterprise, but less as a matter of than because of the sympathy they naturally feel for the busines who so generously support them. Since it is not a matter of faith, are not averse to economic planning and other forms of State inte tion; for nearly a century Japanese business has largely profited fre association with the State. Likewise, they do not fear the welfare In the Confucian tradition benevolent paternalism has always bee duty of 'the rulers'.

Most of the other third of the Diet seats are held by the Socialist I a Marxist party which still officially believes that its purpose shou to seek a total transformation in society replacing capitalism by socia A sizeable section of the party has been seeking to modify its doc purity and devise policies of a revisionist kind, with more appeal t electorate, but the transformation has proved difficult. From its pr experience of police repression the party inherited a tradition tha revisionist compromise with the world constituted cowardice. Seco its permanent minority position has naturally led it to present itself

an alternative government than, more negatively, as the last bulwark against reaction. Thirdly, the logical tendency of its political philosophy towards sympathy with the Communist world, and hence antipathy towards America, has made it the natural heir to the nationalist, and racialist, Asia-for-the-Asians sentiment which before the war was monopolized by the army. This has given an extra edge of moral outrage to the militancy of its opposition to American foreign policy and to Japan's alliance with America. The possibilities of consensual politics are correspondingly diminished.

Of the minor parties none seems immediately likely to make a significant impact on policy. The Social Democrats are admitted, even by the official, to be in a sorry state. The Communist Party retains the loyalty of its devoted core—it remains, in fact, the party with the largest paid-up membership—and it lost only minor dissident factions in the process of going up with Peking in the Sino-Soviet dispute. But it remains too uncompromisingly sectarian a party to have any prospect of gathering the widespread electoral support of, say, its Italian or French counterparts. The newcomer to politics—the *Kōmeitō*, or Clean Government Party—remains something of an unknown quantity. It has clearly demonstrated its ability to mobilize the votes of the *Sōka Gakkai*, the religious movement of which it is the political wing. In the national constituency for the House of Councillors election in July 1965—the form of election which enables it to mobilize all its votes without wastage—it polled 11 per cent of the total votes. It remains to be seen how effective this level of support can be in securing seats in the Lower House with its local constituency system. It is equally problematical how it would use political influence if it got it. Beyond making the *Sōka Gakkai* the national religion of Japan, the party has at present no clear policy and is probably precluded from being one by the very diversity of the social and economic situations of its members. Its doctrines impose no clear prescriptions for the organization of life on this earth and its members represent no coherent sectional interest.

National pride

If the continuing power of the Liberal Democratic Party may be attributed to its economic success, this is not to say that the Government is popular. Mr Yoshida, who retired in 1954, was probably the last Prime Minister to receive anything like admiration from a sizeable section of the nation. His successors have been tolerated, approved, sometimes even liked, but they have failed to arouse enthusiasm. The reason for this is that the Japanese tend to expect more of their Government than the successful management of domestic affairs. To a greater extent than most peoples they expect it to give them reasons for being proud to be Japanese *vis-à-vis* foreign nations.

This is not so much a matter of *samurai* honour or of oriental 'pride' but more proximately a consequence of the way Japanese have become accustomed, over the last century, to view the world and their place in it. The whole thrust of Japanese policy – domestic as well as external – has been to 'catch up', to achieve for Japan a position of equality with the Great Powers of the world. The public has been constantly reminded of this not only in the newspapers and in the speeches of its leaders but more systematically in the textbooks prescribed (until 1945) for use in primary schools. The consequence has been that what one might call a 'status-striving' view of world affairs (as opposed to, say, an 'internationalist' view or a 'friends and enemies' view of world affairs) has become almost a national reflex.

Japan started too late in the game to make a success of her first attempt to achieve Great Power status by the method of military imperialism. After 1945 General MacArthur offered a new hope that Japan could 'take a place of honour in the comity of nations' by showing how democratic she could become. (Indeed, the easy acceptance of many of the reforms of the Occupation period, apart from their obvious appeal to the underprivileged groups whom they benefited, owed not a little to the inner conviction which this represented.)

Today Japan has regained that place of honour. All the external conditions of acceptance have been granted, her admission to OECD in 1966 marking her final surmounting of the last hurdle to full membership in the international community. And yet there is a widespread feeling in an important sense the Japanese have not arrived, that they have really made their mark in the world. There is certainly plenty of evidence in the press of a widespread preoccupation with Japan's international standing. The extent to which, in 1963 and 1964, the whole of Japanese life seemed to revolve around the national endeavour to put on the most spectacular Olympic Games ever held; the recent exhibition of foreign geography textbooks showing 'distorted images of Japan' (*geisha*, *geishas*, wooden pullows, etc.) held in the outside world;¹ the fact that the Japanese physicist's award of half a Nobel Prize was rated by a pan-Asian journalists as the second biggest news of 1965;² the fact that the article in the New Year issue of the foremost intellectual weekly, *Shinbun*, was entitled 'National Strength and Self-Confidence – Bases of National Pride'³ – all these may be read as evidences of this

¹ See *Japan Times Weekly*, 7 January 1966.

² *Ibid.*, 1 January 1966.

³ The closing paragraph of the article is worth quoting as an illustration of the interplay between personal experience and the national collective self-image: 'There is no more pitiful sight than a Japanese on an aircraft leaving Tokyo port for his first flight abroad. There might be a lady with children in the seat but he will be so preoccupied with behaving correctly that the last thing he is capable of is being helpful and considerate. He is as tense as a soldier who landed in enemy territory. I know of no more telling and more depressing evidence of the lack of self-confidence of Japanese men, or at least of a large number

occupation. Only the closest reader of the Western press will have been aware of the fact that for January and February of 1966 the Japanese delegate was Chairman of the Security Council, and that before he vacated his Chairmanship he attempted a small initiative on the Vietnam issue which was rejected by the Soviet Union. In Japan reports on the development of his *démarche* made top headlines, and the reports were less concerned with the Vietnam issue in itself than with the question whether Mr Matsui was acquitting himself well.

The desire to see Japan accorded due recognition is a factor in Japanese foreign policy to be reckoned with. It is, of course, far from being the dominant one. But it represents the dimension of foreign-policy motives which remains the greatest possibility for future change, in as much as it is in this sphere that Japanese aspirations are clearly least satisfied by present Government policies.

Before discussing the direction change might take, it is worth looking at the other motives of Japanese policy. They may roughly be discussed under three heads: military security, economic advantage, and what one might call achieving a congruence of alliance and sentiment – achieving, that is to say, a position in world affairs which aligns one with peoples for whom one has a fellow feeling and does not require any sharp confrontation with those whom one feels to be 'one's own kind', or even one's 'kith and kin'.

Military security

Military security is not seen by most Japanese as a pressing problem. It is not a widely held view that China is in a mood of aggressive expansionism. Neither the annexation of Tibet nor the Indian border incidents are thought of as evidence for such a view. Equally China's support of revolutionary movements in South East Asia is not seen as a direct threat to a stable industrial society such as Japan, nor even necessarily as a threat to Japan's interests in that area. (A Communist Indonesia might be a more reliable and profitable trading partner than an Indonesia in chaos.) Equally, although Japan maintains only arm's-length relationships with Russia, the possibility of Russian military attack is never discussed. The Russian refusal to relinquish the two Southern Kurile islands makes the possibility of a formal peace treaty as remote as ever, but this does not prevent the opening of a joint Japanese-Russian air route across Siberia, the discussion of plans for Japanese participation in Siberian development, or the regular conclusion of fishery agreements which have been negotiated, in fact, in a more amicable atmosphere than has recently

them. And these are the same people who, once safely returned to Japan, will blossom forth with loud confident statements about Japan's great national strength. The behaviour of these people is, alas, perhaps the truest indicator of what, at present, Japan's real strength in fact is.

been possible in the comparable negotiations with the United States.

Consequently, there are many Japanese who doubt the value of the Japanese-American security treaty, the arrangement first negotiated in 1951 and revised in 1960, whereby Japan provides the United States with military bases while America guarantees Japan's security. One measure Japanese attitudes to the treaty as follows. Some—perhaps a substantial proportion of the ruling party—believe that, even if under no immediate threat, Japan does need protection from the long-term threat of China's growing strength, and that the treaty provides it. Some—probably a smaller proportion of the ruling party—see it as necessary a desirable co-operation with America's battle against Communism which is in Japan's interest although she is not directly threatened. Thirdly, some look on the treaty and the grant of bases as the price for economic advantages and for American support of Japan's position in international organizations and, as such, justified. Fourthly, some consider that none of the supposed economic or military advantages justify the cost to Japan's independence and even, some would argue, to her security. The last view is shared by a considerable number of Japanese was clear enough from the demonstrations and riots which attended the renewal of the treaty in 1960, and the collapse of the Kishi Government which resulted. On a recent visit to Japan the editor of *Foreign Affairs* was shocked to discover that many, 'perhaps the majority', look on the treaty as being 'not so much a protection as a provocation'.⁴ The treaty does specify that military operations will be conducted from Japanese bases only 'after consultation' with the Japanese Government. But many Japanese recall the lengthy negotiations over this clause and the adamant refusal of the American negotiators to change 'after consultation' with 'with the consent of'. Consequently many believe that if the United States were to blunder into a war with China, Japan would inevitably find herself engaged—and engaged in the front line—in a war not of her choosing. The apprehension frequently expressed in Japan concerning America's Vietnam policy largely stems from these considerations. In a public-opinion poll on 5 August 1965, 94 per cent of the sample had heard of the war in Vietnam, 57 per cent thought there was a danger of it growing into a major conflict, and 60 per cent thought that if it did Japan might be involved.⁵

What are the possibilities, then, that Japan will play in Asia the role that France is playing in Europe? In so far as rearmament, and nuclear rearmament at that, is an essential part of the Gaullist pattern of disentanglement, the possibility of Japan choosing this path seems at present remote. The pacifist sentiment which followed Japan's devastating defeat and the years of very real suffering which followed is still strong

⁴ Philip W. Quigg, 'Japan in neutral', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1966.

⁵ *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 4, p. 465.

to prevent the fading of memories that sentiment is enshrined in the constitution itself. Article 9 not only renounces war or the threat of war or means of settling disputes, but goes on to declare that Japan will never maintain military forces. Military forces have in fact existed since General Arthur ordered their creation during the Korean war, and they now number some 150,000 soldiers with some 30,000 each in the navy and air force. They are called the Self-Defence Forces and a good deal of ingenious legal sophistry has been employed to demonstrate that the Constitution does not forbid their existence. A few conservatives still force-argue that the Constitution should be amended to make an honest allowance of these forces,⁶ but no government has yet felt strong enough to tackle the issue, and the army remains a rather shy, illegitimate one. Training is still a profession of low prestige despite the fact that the officers to take laymen for short toughening and spiritual discipline courses, graduation from which some taxi companies have made a condition of employment.⁷ The military image improves, perhaps, with every natural disaster and every daring rescue from a typhoon-stricken village, but there are few traces of incipient militarism visible in Japan today, and it seems that the search for international recognition might take a military form. Last year a primary-school history textbook was withdrawn because it contained a picture of General Tōjō, and when one of the few young military men in politics stood as candidate in the House of Representatives election in July 1965 he came fifty-ninth in the national list of candidates and failed to get elected despite the support of all the veterans' organizations.

If a general anti-war feeling is strong in Japan, a specific anti-nuclear feeling is even stronger. As victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, and because countrymen were killed on fishing ships by fallout from the Bikini test, the Japanese have a special sensitivity in matters nuclear, so much so that the case that the rest-and-recreation visits of certain American submarines in Japanese ports, which would otherwise have been normally allowed for under the security treaty, had to be postponed for eighteen months because of the public outcry over the fact that the submarines in question had nuclear engines. The Opposition fought the issue to the bitter end because they considered, and probably rightly, that the aim of U.S. aid to the Japanese army was to raise the threshold of the Japanese nuclear phobia in the hope that it might eventually come within the bounds of political possibility to bring nuclear weapons on to Japanese soil.

⁶ See S. Kishi, 'Political Movements in Japan', in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1965. It can be, however, that this article, by the brother of the Prime Minister, was often less to express a point of view than to reassure Americans that there still was a right-thinking Japanese, keen to ensure that Japan contributes her share to the common cause.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 19 April 1965.

The Opposition lost that particular battle and only a small group dispirited demonstrators now greets every visit by the nuclear-engineered submarines. Nevertheless, it will be a long time before the nuclear armament of Japan becomes a practical possibility. So much rhetoric has been invested in the expression of horror at the immorality of nuclear war, not only from the Left but from all parts of the Japanese political spectrum, that the Government finds itself firmly fixed in positions from which it will be difficult to retreat. It was noticeable that the first Chinese bombs set off no public discussion in Japan of the kind which took place in India. One or two kites were tentatively flown by Government officials, suggesting that Japan too might eventually need nuclear armament, but the reaction to these has drawn the Government into further categorical statements. On 19 February 1966, for instance, the Foreign Minister, in a statement intended to clear up confusion which had arisen from the introduction of the previously unfamiliar term 'nuclear umbrella' into Japanese politics, said: 'If the words were used to imply that Japan might become a base for nuclear weapons or that if there should one day be a multilateral nuclear force as is contemplated for NATO, Japan might participate, then I can say that there are no such plans at present and we have no intention of taking part in any in the future.' The day before, he had reiterated Japan's support of a non-proliferation policy, provided that the nuclear Powers themselves made some concession as counterpart to the sacrifice to be made by the non-nuclear, remarking incidentally, that in missile technology Japan now probably ranked fourth in the world, and that if she were minded to go into the nuclear business she could do it with some effectiveness.

Economic advantage

The security situation is by no means unrelated to the second factor in Japan's foreign policy—considerations of economic advantage. Because the pressure for rearmament on the part of the armed forces, some industrialists, and the minority who are nostalgic for pre-war greatness receives no widespread popular support, defence expenditures, though growing in absolute figures, have represented a small and declining share of the national resources. In 1964 defence took between 8 and 9 per cent of the national budget and about 1.3 per cent of GNP compared with 13 per cent and 2 per cent respectively in 1955. Thus it has been possible for the benefits of rapid economic growth to be passed on to the consumer. To most Americans this declining weight of military expenditure is a source of irritation, but to charges that the country with the world's fifth largest GNP should do more to 'defend freedom', the Japanese can reply that in *per capita* terms Japan still ranks twenty-first.

Japan's present foreign policy is linked to her economic advantage in a different sense. In recent years over a third of her imports have com-

and nearly a third of her exports have gone to, the United States. It might be that without the strong support of the State Department from the American Government, the lobbies within the United States which seek to impose tariffs and quota restrictions on Japanese exports would be far more successful, to Japan's great disadvantage. Equally, it is thought that American support for Japan in GATT, OECD, the UN, and the other organizations of economic importance is something which all do without.

Against this view it used vociferously to be argued by the Japanese Government that, in associating so closely with the United States and Taiwan, Japan was losing an enormous volume of potential trade with what used to be her biggest market, namely China. There is some obvious truth in this. In 1965 contracts for the export of ships and a plastics plant to China had to be cancelled at the last minute because, in deference to protests from Taiwan, the Japanese Government refused Export Bank guarantees. However, this argument carries less weight than it used to. This is partly because China has shown in recent years a willingness to accept the Japanese formula of separating politics from trade. The volume of goods exchanged has gradually grown despite the absence of diplomatic relations. In 1964 the total of two-way trade reached \$310 m. – greater, for the first time, than the volume of trade with Taiwan (\$270 m.). In 1965 the final figures are expected to show a 30 per cent increase. Secondly, it has become obvious that even if closer political ties with China acted as a stimulus to trade, there is a limit to the extent to which it can grow, one imposed by China's lack of goods to export. At present the major export items are pig-iron, soya, maize, and salt, none of them offering important prospects of expansion, either because of Japan's limited demand or because of China's own competing requirements.

Sentiments and alliances

How far does Japan's present foreign policy satisfy the third requirement, in producing what I have called a congruence of alignment and sentiments? Here one is on dangerous ground. In opinion surveys 50 to 60 per cent of almost any sample will choose America or Americans as their favourite country or people, while an almost equally large number will choose Russia as their most disliked country (a role in which only 12 to 15 per cent will cast the United States).² Only the doctrinaire Left, the Communist Party, and a section of the Socialist Party hold sympathies directly contrary to these and believe that Japan should make common cause with her real friends, 'the forces of peace', and declare her hostility to U.S. imperialism.

More important as a source of potential change is the fact that even among those who are basically well disposed towards the United States

² See Hayashi Chikio *et al.*, *Zusetsu Nihonjin no kokuminsei* (Tokyo, 1965).

'there are many who have doubts about the alliance if it requires them to show hostility towards China. The reasons for this are well known. The Japanese and the Chinese, together with the Koreans and to a lesser extent the Vietnamese, look alike; in many ways they think and feel alike; they have similar modes of argument, similar patterns of government, slogan-making derived from the same Confucian tradition of exhortation to government. These are all bases for a feeling on the part of many, in Japan at least, Japanese that the Chinese are their kind of people in a way that Americans can never be. The sense of kinship is not the same as a sense of friendship — a middle-class Japanese can dislike the Chinese as he dislikes Japanese Communists and even feel contempt for them as he might feel contempt for Japanese outcast groups — but it does imply the existence of a basis of solidarity which can be activated when other factors tend in the same direction.

Again, the Japanese have very different attitudes towards the Chinese revolution from those current in the United States. The Japanese do not primarily define China as a Communist country, but rather as a country which is going through just such a process of national regeneration, development, and search for a new identity as Japan went through in the nineteenth century. The following passage from the editorial of the mid-left-of-centre *Asahi Journal* (12 December 1965) represents a wide range of Japanese views. The article bore the title 'The "Threat" of China', a comminatory reference to the fact that last December the Japanese Prime Minister for the first time used the word 'threat' apropos of the implications of the Chinese bomb.

'The Chinese revolution presents two challenges to capitalist civilisation. In the first place it has given everybody down to the nicest colour an awareness of, and a sense of pride in, his place in society and in the State. Secondly it has swept away the contempt for manual labour which has so long characterised Chinese traditions. These are no mean challenges when we think, apropos of the first, how many people there are in our modern capitalist mass societies who are the victims of a sense of powerlessness and alienation with no sense, even as cogs, of fitting into a greater machine, and if we consider, apropos of the second, the decline in the West of that puritan tradition which saw the sweat on the toiler's brow as the sign of supreme virtue.

The consequence of this 'special relationship' between Japan and China is that the greater the tension between the United States and China the greater the strain that is imposed on the Japanese-American alliance. (Though it is impossible in this increasing tension to separate the factors of sentiment just discussed from the fear of military involvement referred to earlier.) Japanese reactions to American operations in Vietnam provide a good example. A good many Japanese watching films of the Vietnamese war on one of their seven or eight television channels have seen the war

as a battle between white men armed with big planes, throwing big bombs at under-dog Asians—and people with Mongolian features at that—who squat down to eat rice out of bowls with chopsticks, and might, but for the grace of God, be themselves. For the Japanese Left wing, of course, this is the primary definition of the situation. More significant for policy formulation is the fact that there is a good deal of sympathy for this view even on the Right. The August 1965 public-opinion poll referred to above found that 79 per cent of the sample had heard of American bombing of North Vietnam and 75 per cent thought that it should be stopped. Within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party itself there is a so-called Afro-Asian group which is outspoken in its criticism of the United States, and even the former Prime Minister Yoshida, the architect of the American-Japanese alliance, was reported to have said the following to a reporter in June 1965:

It seems to me that the Americans have no understanding of the history of Vietnam or the way its people think. They have their own preconceived ideas about what ought to be done there and they simply try to impose them. I think that is the reason why Vietnam has been plunged into such chaos. It was the same here during the Occupation. The Americans had their own ideas about what was best for the Japanese and they made no attempt to listen to the opinion of others. Of course, this is only natural when you consider yourself to be a superior race. But it cannot help but arouse resentment.*

His use of the word 'race' is neither accidental nor unimportant.

The Vietnam issue has, in fact, generated a good deal of tension in the alliance which has not been compensated for even by the best Madison Avenue gimmicks such as shipping a Japanese flag on board *Gemini 6* for better presentation to the Japanese Prime Minister. American irritation with Japanese criticism, charges of Communist influence in Japanese press reporting, the recent *Foreign Affairs* article by the journal's editor complaining that the Japanese Government has failed in its duty of educating its people in the realities of world politics are all symptoms of this tension. So too were remarkably frank statements by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan on his return to the United States in which he urged that America should be careful lest, in gaining a Vietnam, she should lose a Japan.¹⁶ So far all America's attempts to obtain a clear commitment of support from the Japanese Government for her Vietnamese policy have produced only somewhat qualified verbal expressions of support and a recent donation of some \$200,000 worth of relief goods for Vietnamese refugees.

The above, then, are some of the factors which, to return to the starting point, will condition the expression of the fourth factor, the desire for

* *Asahi*, morning edition, 9 June 1965.

¹⁶ *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 August 1965.

some viable and stable claim to international prestige. It is fairly certain that rearmament is not seen as an answer. Security questions apart, Japan has no feasible military ambition in Asia, and shows at the moment no interest in buying the prestige of an entry ticket to the nuclear club. The present virtual taboo on the journalistic expression of the view that Japan should go nuclear may reflect a slightly unreal 'Emperor's clothes' sensation. In which case, the determined efforts of a few bold spirits might change the picture overnight. The only signs of such a shift so far, however, have been the arguments put forward by some of the young journalists that Japan should take care to have the industrial facilities to acquire nuclear armaments rapidly if they should ever be required.

The drive for recognition

Whatever road Japan might take towards *la gloire* it is not likely to be de Gaulle's. (Another reason for which is that she has no de Gaulle.) Until 1964 the national endeavour to stage the best Olympic Games succeeded in canalizing the frustrated patriotism of most Japanese, at a time it seemed that the Japanese would be content to rest on their reputation as the country with the fastest growth-rate in the world. But, apart from the recent recession, 'a nation of entrepreneurs and diligent workers' is not much more satisfying as a self-image than 'a nation of shopkeepers' and this too has failed to satisfy.

Consequently there is a biting edge to, and a good deal of emotional force behind, the demand of the Government's critics that Japan should adopt an 'independent foreign policy'. And the Government is understandably sensitive to the implicit charge that its present policy consigns Japan to the abject and inglorious role of a U.S. satellite. One possibility, of course, is that Japan should gain for herself a more commanding position in the American system of Pacific alliances. There is, however, little international prestige to be gained from exercising leadership *vis-à-vis* South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, or Vietnam, quite apart from reservations about American policy discussed above. The extreme reaction shown by the Japanese Foreign Office to a Korean proposal for an Asian anti-Communist Prime Ministers' conference is a fair indication of the absence of any ambitions in this direction.¹¹

Those who demand an 'independent' foreign policy generally mean one of two things, depending on their political position. The Socialists mean that Japan should bid for a position of leadership in the Afro-As-

¹¹ In an embarrassed statement on 2 March, the Foreign Minister explained that diplomatic relations having now been re-established with Korea it was impossible to reject out of hand the Korean Government's invitation to such a conference. He thought it possible that Japan might now take part in the conference since, in response to Japanese objections, the theme of the conference had been changed from anti-Communism as such to the economic development of Asian economies.

by adopting a firm anti-colonialist stand on every issue. More moderates—those represented in the editorial offices of the major newspapers, for instance—mean that Japan should play a more independent role at the United Nations, should not automatically support the American position (and certainly not go to such lengths as to take on herself the burden of sponsoring the resolution which made China's admission an important matter requiring a two-thirds majority), and should seek to acquire a reputation as a high-minded, trouble-shooting mediator with a concern for moral principle and the common interests of mankind.

There was a time, in the immediate aftermath of the Bandung Conference, when the possibilities of obtaining a position of leadership among Afro-Asian countries had an appeal beyond the confines of the Left. The conservative Government itself sent a strong delegation to Bandung. It quickly became apparent, however—and the delicacy of Japan's role in the Suez Canal Users' Association was one of the first, and her position at the Geneva Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 was one of the most decisive, incidents to make this evident—that Japan could not both claim a place among the developed nations and identify her interests with those of the poorer countries. Nor could her statesmen, as erstwhile men of an ex-colonial Power, an ally of the United States, and a present exporter of capital, compete with the Nkrumahs and Soekarnos in the world in denunciation of neo-colonialism—quite apart from the fact that the Japanese political style does not lend itself to this kind of rhetoric. The small extent to which the desire for popularity among the Afro-Asian nations counts as a factor in Japanese foreign policy was revealed in December 1965 by the U.N. debate on sanctions against South Africa, with whom Japan has substantial trading interests. After making a speech in which he declared that Japan's interest in racial equality was second to none, as evidenced by the fact that she was the first to champion the coloured peoples of the world against the white, the Japanese delegate abstained along with the Western European minority.

Some concern was shown about this decision in Japanese press comment, but even more concern was shown about the fact that, as a consequence of her subsequent unpopularity, Japan only just scraped through the election for a two-year term on the Security Council, with only 57 votes out of 112. The prospect of playing a spectacular role in the United Nations is an attractive one to many Japanese—as is evidenced by the attention which the Japanese press gave to the activities of the Japanese Chairman of the Security Council at the beginning of 1966.

These prospects are, however, severely limited, firstly by the fact that Japan's Prime Minister is no Nehru nor is her Foreign Minister a Lester Pearson, and it is likely to be a long time before she produces a statesman who can operate with quite the confident ease or the sensitive negotiating skill required for such a role in what is still the basically Europe-

centred cultural atmosphere of the United Nations. Secondly, Japan's chance to play a forceful role is limited by the fact that she cannot at the moment contribute troops to U.N. peace-keeping operations. In the course of validating its stand on the 'legitimate defence' interpretation of the Constitution's anti-war clause, the Government has reaffirmed its firmest pledges that Japanese troops will not be sent abroad. It is true that the Foreign Office and many members of the Government have indicated a willingness to like to modify this position in order to permit co-operation in U.N. operations. Such a move, however, would lead to intense political controversy, as was apparent from the Socialist reaction to a kite recently flown by the Foreign Minister. To the Japanese Socialists U.N. peace-keeping does not mean the Congo or the Gaza strip; it means Korea, where American forces have been flying the U.N. flag for the last fifteen years. They have promised an all-out struggle against any amendment of the Self-Defence Forces Establishment Law which might, under the pretext of promoting co-operation with the United Nations, open the road for Japanese involvement in another war in Korea, this time started from the South.

Conclusion

The arguments may be summed up as follows. Japan's present position in world affairs satisfies her two major objectives: it provides security and economic advantage. It is not wholly satisfactory to many Japanese because it fails adequately to satisfy the two other secondary desiderata: it imposes a strain on racial and cultural sentiment, and it does not satisfy the nationalistic desire to cut an independent figure in the world. There lies the potential for a change in policy which could come about in two possible ways. The first is through the advent of a Socialist Government. On present showing, such a Government would attach greater importance to what I have called the secondary, as opposed to the major, desiderata of foreign policy, and would be willing to sacrifice economic advantage in a *rapprochement* with China and abrogation of the American alliance. Only a bold man would predict the chances of this happening, but it is not irrelevant to note that when Socialist politicians in public conversation begin a sentence with the words 'when we take power', they usually add 'say in ten years' time'.

The second possible eventuality is a war or the imminent danger of war between the United States and China. This would not only exacerbate strains on sentiment; it would also greatly strengthen the feeling that the alliance is a source of danger rather than of security. This, even without a change of Government, could lead to a drastic realignment of Japan's position in world affairs.

Political aspects of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU

MARCUS WHEELER

SYMBOLIC of the tone of the Congress proceedings was the fact that Leonid Brezhnev, in the course of his opening report of over four hours' duration, appears only once to have aroused laughter in his audience.¹ In a more substantial sense, too, this Congress was, by comparison with its immediate and earlier predecessors, dull and indeterminate. Speculation in the preceding months and weeks had crystallized around four eventualities: that some 'definitive' step would be taken by the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute; that a conference on Vietnam would (despite the failure of Mr Gomulka's January initiative) be appended to the Congress; that a partial rehabilitation of Stalin and Stalinism might be officially undertaken; and that there might be a major change in the CPSU leadership. None of these expectations was in fact fulfilled – at least in open conclave. Nevertheless, isolated noteworthy items featured Brezhnev's political report and the corresponding final Resolution and (so in many delegates' speeches; and the dullness of the Congress taken as a whole is in itself, in the conditions of Soviet politics, of considerable political importance.

The world Communist movement and the Sino-Soviet dispute

Following the debatable success of the consultative meeting of fraternal parties held in Moscow in March 1965, the Russians must have derived satisfaction from securing the attendance of eighty-six Communist or empathizing Parties at the Congress.² Given the Chinese decision to boycott it, it was to be expected that the Albanian, Japanese, and New Zealand parties would do likewise; the absence of the smaller China-orientated Asian parties was hardly surprising,³ while the Indonesian Com-

According to the report in *Pravda*, 30 March. ('The solitary occasion was his observation, 'Even if they climb on the shoulders of their American ally, the West German imperialists will not gain a title in stature, while their fall will only be the more painful.'')

¹ Figure given by Brezhnev in his speech at the closing session (*Pravda*, 9 April).

² Obscurity attaches to the position of the Nepalese CP – the broadcast version, at not the printed text of Brezhnev's speech of welcome, included Nepal in the list of delegations greeted. No Nepalese speech or greeting was recorded.

unist Party was in any case in a state of extreme disarray. Again attendance by the North Vietnamese and North Koreans was an important success for the CPSU, as was the number of 'progressive' or 'revolutionary-democrat' parties or movements represented (at least eleven contrast with three at the 22nd Congress in October 1961).

In the light of the line-up of parties, the Soviet decision to go in an attitude of sorrow rather than of anger *vis-à-vis* the Chirac government reflects increased confidence rather than the reverse. This borne out by the fact that, while continuing to offer bilateral talks, totally ignoring the major Chinese anti-Soviet tirades,⁴ Brezhnev the Congress Resolution formally registered – clearly in an anti-sense – the ideological sin of 'hegemonism'.⁵

The majority of the fraternal delegates followed the Soviet line, echoing Brezhnev or ignoring the dispute whilst ritually endorsing the Soviet formula of 'unity of actions'. Predictably, of the East European leaders Ceausescu displayed the minimum of commitment to the Soviet line, Kadar the maximum (the latter, in almost prophetic vein, assured his hearers that 'an anti-Soviet Communism there has not been, is not and shall not be'). A more realistic assessment of the nature of the movement was given by the chief Yugoslav delegate, Aleksandar Ranković: '... the problems which represent the essence of the clash between the two camps and more patently that ideological motivations are not the cause of the present state of relations among the Communist and Workers' Parties and between the Socialist countries.' Regional problems and tensions were strikingly manifested by the particularly sharp attack on the Chinese, whether by name or by description, of a number of the American parties' delegates.⁶ Of the Arab and Middle East delegates the Lebanese alone showed comparable pro-Soviet fervour.

The vexed question of the convening of a new conference of Communist Parties was covered in the Congress Resolution by the formula that this would be expedient 'when conditions are ripe'. The cautious wording was favoured by the few delegates explicitly opposed to the proposal (those of Argentina, Great Britain, France, Japan, Peru), with the exception of the first-named, who alone propo-

⁴ Especially the *People's Daily/Red Flag* article of 11 November 1965. The 'secret' letter allegedly circulated by the CPSU to East European Parties in February presented a detailed restatement of the Soviet position (see *J* 22 March).

⁵ In the context of 'programmatic' polemics, the progressive downgrading of China in the Soviet slogans for the 1965 Revolution anniversary and Day 1966 is also worthy of note.

⁶ Excluding the Cuban delegate, Armando Hart, who not only refrained from alluding to recent Cuban criticism of China but called for urgent dynamic efforts in the spreading of revolution. However, Hart specifically commended efforts on behalf of Vietnam and implied a snub to the Chinese in calling for 'those who do not understand the necessity of co-ordinating efforts in this direction'.

siding of the conference, if need be, 'without the participation of those states which, for whatever reason, would not want to take part in it'.

Soviet foreign policy

The political report and Congress Resolution contained no hint of any new initiatives or reassessments on Vietnam, Germany and Europe, or disarmament—the three topics currently of greatest concern to the Soviet Government (although the call for an international conference on European security reflected the growing attention paid to this matter during the last year or more). Brezhnev's 'end of term report' on individual countries contained no surprises: of the capitalist countries, for example, the United States received the lowest, France the highest marks (with Italy and Japan receiving commendation on the economic 'wrong side'), while, in the list of favoured 'progressive' Afro-Asian states, Congo (Brazzaville) usurped the place regularly occupied by Cuba until the recent *coup*.

In the context of relations with the capitalist countries generally, Brezhnev threw out a crumb of comfort in saying: 'We are for these relations not only being peaceful but including the widest possible mutually advantageous links in the economic, scientific and cultural spheres.' This was partially offset, however, by the demands made by a number of Soviet speakers (including the Minister of Culture, Madame Furtseva) for a 'stricter' or 'more discriminating' appraisal of foreign proposals for cultural exchanges.

In accordance with the practice of the period since the extension of the Vietnam war peaceful coexistence was now defined as not applying to relations between 'oppressors and oppressed'.

In the sphere of relations with the Third World, the Resolution called, usually, for the expansion of links between the CPSU and 'revolutionary-democratic' parties, while Brezhnev—no doubt with recent events in Indonesia and also earlier developments in Egypt and Algeria in mind—deplored the persecution of local Communists and stressed the importance of their role in the cause of cementing national independence.

Internal affairs

The internal section of the political report (in its non-economic aspects) is in effect a vindication not of the entire inter-Congress period but only the eighteen months since the overthrow of Khrushchev. Speaker after speaker referred to the October 1964 Central Committee Plenum as a 'decisive official watershed in the affairs of the Party and nation and criticized policies associated with Khrushchev'; these, however, were in all cases

For example, lack of balance in heavy industry as between metals and chemicals; excessive desire to convert *kolkhozy* into *sobkhozy*; and an obsession with forced concrete and prefabrication in building.

code-labelled 'subjectivist' or 'voluntarist', not ascribed to the former leader by name.⁸

If the delegates came to bury Khrushchev (albeit in a grave without name), they did not seek to exhume Stalin. Indications⁹ that the leadership had seriously been debating proposals to reappraise the former dictator or certain of his policies were not followed up by any formal statements in this sense. Nevertheless, the first speaker in the debate following the opening reports, Egorychev (First Secretary of Moscow City Party Committee), gave a lead to the more conservative elements when he observed: 'Of late it has become fashionable . . . to seek out elements of what is called "Stalinism" in the political life of the country and use this like a scarecrow to frighten the public, especially the intelligentsia.' Thereafter, the term 'Stalinism' was not employed, but a number of delegates argued as follows: the cult of personality is a thing of the past; continuing anti-cult statements can only be a mask for attacks on the glorious past of Soviet society and on the process of building Communism, and those who make such statements are the instruments of anti-Communist ideology. This argument was directed most specifically against the more liberal intellectuals in speeches alluding to the recantation of Sinyavsky and Daniel.¹⁰

Appeals for 'improvement of ideological work' are a regular theme of CPSU Congresses. In the present case, however, they had more than routine significance in so far as they were coupled with criticism of the neglect of ideology tolerated under Khrushchev's leadership and with a sharper reaction than hitherto to 'imperialist diversions' in the sphere of ideology.¹¹ Measures called for, corresponding to the various aspects of 'ideology' in the Communist understanding, included tighter Party and labour discipline; stricter controls on publishing; the allocation of

⁸ It may have been decided that it would be imprudent to allow further personal attacks of the kind delivered at the March 1965 Plenum (as revealed by the stenographic report but not by Soviet press reports at the time of the meeting).

⁹ Notably: (i) an article in *Pravda* of 30 January by three historians condemning as erroneous use of the term 'period of the cult of personality'; (ii) the outspoken speech by D. G. Sturua at the Georgian CP Congress in March, criticizing *in alia* excessive preoccupation with 'the shady sides of the life of our society during the period when I. V. Stalin was at the head of the Party and Soviet State' (reported in *Zarya Vostoka*, 10 March); (iii) the appeal reliably reported to have been made by twenty-five Soviet intellectuals against any rehabilitation of Stalin (*New York Times*, 21 March).

¹⁰ The most savage and malevolent of these was that of the novelist Sholokhov, possibly an unhappy portent, however, was the virulent attack made by I. Bodvil (Party First Secretary, Moldavian SSR) on Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*.

¹¹ A study of Western ideological propaganda themes by A. Chakovsky, Chief Editor of *Izdatnaya Gazeta*, in *Kommunist* (1966, No. 4), affords interesting indirect testimony to the spread of 'de-ideologization' among younger Soviet citizens.

ge time and effort to Marxist-Leninist indoctrination studies; and the erosion of the social sciences.¹²

Concern was expressed, too, about the attitudes of the young – and of old – to the development of Soviet society and the building of Communism. The former are increasingly – as the gap widens between the war days of the Fatherland War and the present – charged with such faults (in the words of the Congress Resolution) 'a-political attitudes', 'false inclinations', and 'manifestations of a nihilist approach to the facts and achievements of Socialism'. The latter received some sharp rebuffs in their guise as memoirists (the memoirs of Ilya Ehrenburg have, of course, long been a red rag, and at the 23rd Congress a new target was the former Ambassador in London, Maisky, who was singled out for criticism by the Georgian First Secretary, Mzhavanadze).

Two 'hardy annuals' in the realm of ideology in its widest sense which received but scant attention at the 23rd Congress were intra-Soviet national relations and anti-religious work. On the former, a high degree of complacent self-satisfaction was expressed by Republican First Secretaries, with the exception of those of Lithuania (ever a leading target of ardent nationalist subversion) and Moldavia: the latter's melancholy complaint that routine tributes to the growing prosperity of individual republics have failed of late to stress the process of 'coming together' (*schlenie*) of the Soviet nations may betoken anxiety about the loyalty of the Republic in the light of the new independent policies of neighbour-Rumania. The absence of fresh attacks on religion, which in general dictated the more restrained policy pursued by the post-Khrushchev line (particularly since the removal of Hichev from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee), was all the more striking against the background of demands for the intensification of ideological work as a rule.

3 Party and changes in the Party Rules

The one surprise provided by the Congress was the decision to restore the name 'Politburo' (changed to 'Presidium' after the 19th Congress in 1921) and the title of 'General Secretary' in place of 'First Secretary', positioning the first of these changes, Brezhnev asserted that the traditional equation 'more fully reflects the nature of the activities of the highest official organ of our Party', while subsequent supporters of both changes justified them as a reversion to the nomenclature established by Lenin, singling over the special association of the terms with the Stalin period.

This last measure may be a two-edged weapon. During the last two to three limited encouragement has already been given to sociological field studies, official ideologists have expressed anxiety about the possible challenge which use of scientific method and of objective criteria may represent to the supremacy of Marxism-Leninism as queen of the social sciences.

- Taken in conjunction with other organizational changes adopted at the Congress (for example, the abolition of the RSFSR Bureau of the Central Committee, set up in 1956, and the annulment of the provisions inserted into the Rules in 1961 on the systematic replacement of Party officials), the intention is evidently, in part at least, to mark a clear break with the Khrushchev period. Further, the leadership may have been influenced by the belief that their 'image' would be enhanced by deletion of the overly individualist-sounding title 'First Secretary' and the excessively remote, oligarchic 'Presidium'.¹³

As for the state of the Party as a whole, stress was laid at the Congress (as it has been in pronouncements since the fall of Khrushchev) on the need for greater care in recruiting¹⁴ and for increased stability in the tenure of office. In addition, a number of speakers - outstandingly, M. I. Vanadze, who spoke with intense feeling of failures in his own Republic of Georgia - insisted on the need for increased sense of responsibility and devotion to the Party's Rules and ideals on the part both of rank-and-file members and of functionaries. It is not difficult to infer from such statements an admission that, under the blanket of Khrushchev's formula 'the Party of the whole people', the infiltration of opportunists into the Party (and Party posts) may since 1961 have been widespread.

The interpretation of the role of the Party itself in Soviet society has now become again a matter for speculation. For example, in the spirit of the slogan of 'democratization' proclaimed by the Party Programme, a campaign has been conducted since 1964 (and, since the 1965 economic reforms, intensified) against excessive interference by Party organs in the sphere of competence of local administrative and economic organs. Podgorny devoted a large part of his speech to this topic and the Congress Resolution warned Party bodies against 'substitution for and petty tutelage of local government and economic organs'. Following the terminology of numerous recent statements, the two fundamental spheres of Party activity are defined as personnel selection and checking on the implementation of directives.

Elections to Party organs and the leadership

The elections to the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee produced one surprise, the promotion of A. Ya. Pelshe, for many years

¹³ The practice of other Communist Parties varies and is probably not enlightening as to the motivation of the changes (for example, the French and Italians and some others have always maintained the title 'General Secretary', while the Rumanians adopted this designation in place of 'First Secretary' in 1963).

¹⁴ The CPSU now numbers 12,471,079 full and candidate members, an increase of 2,784,074 since the 22nd Congress (figures given by I. V. Kapitonov, Chairman of Congress Credentials Commission). An informative analysis of membership statistics published last year by *Partinaya Zhizn* (1965, No. 10) showed that the annual intake had risen since 1960 to the figure of 740,829 in 1964 (in which year, however, there were no fewer than 68,770 expulsions).

First Secretary in Latvia, to full membership of the Politburo, supplied with Chairmanship (*vice* the veteran Shvernik) of the Party Control Committee. Pelshe, himself aged sixty-six, the first Latvian to reach the highest Party organ and virtually an unknown as a national Party figure, thus at one step acquires seniority to such able and prominent candidate members as P. N. Demichev, D. F. Ustinov, and Yu. V. Andropov. Masherov and Kunaev, First Secretaries of Belorussia and Kazakhstan respectively, were promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo, which thus now contains an unprecedentedly large non-Russian element. The achievement of this pattern may as such have commended itself, but is quite insufficient to explain Pelshe's promotion, which would appear to reflect a failure to agree on the advancement of a younger and abler but politically more controversial figure.¹²

At the closing session of the Congress Brezhnev read out the names of the newly elected Politburo and Secretariat in non-alphabetical order.¹³ Certain of the relative placings do not permit of more than speculation, but two facts clearly emerge: the hypothetical post-Khrushchev 'inner Presidium' consisting of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Mikoyan is now replaced by a 'quadrumvirate' of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and Suslov; and the conservative Suslov, in virtue of this position and of being named second in the order of the Secretariat, clearly ranks second to Brezhnev in the Party hierarchy overall. 'The nice balance in the 'quadrumvirate' between Suslov, the 'centrist' Brezhnev and Podgorny, and the relatively more liberal Kosygin, together with the failure of Shelepin to make any advance'¹⁴ and the very small amount of change in the composition of the new Central Committee,¹⁵ give an impression of stalemate in terms of power relations.

In addition, a remarkable feature of the proceedings was the fact that, of the full members of the outgoing Presidium, none spoke except the *rapporteurs* (Brezhnev and Kosygin) and Podgorny and Shelepin (whose

¹² Evidence that the matter was settled at a relatively late stage may possibly be seen in the fact that Pelshe's successor in his Latvian Party post, A. E. Voss, is, exceptionally, not a member of any of the three constituent bodies of the Central Committee. Pelshe's new post will not, however, be a sinecure. It has been made clear that one of the objects of the splitting, in December 1966, of the former Party-State Control Committee was to upgrade the Party Control Committee.

¹³ *Politburo*: (full members) Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov, Voronov, Kirilenko, Shelepin, Mazurov, Polyansky, Shleyst, Pelshe; (candidate members) Demichev, Grishin, Mzhavanadze, Rashidov, Ustinov, Shcherbatsky, Kunaev, Masherov.

Secretariat: Brezhnev, Suslov, Shelepin, Kirilenko, Demichev, Ustinov, Andropov, Ponomarev, Kapitonov, Kulakov, Rudakov.

¹⁴ It is of interest that neither Shelepin nor the present Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), Semichastny, spoke at the Congress, while Brezhnev devoted only one sentence of his report to a perfunctory tribute to the work of the security organs.

¹⁵ See Table I below.

interventions were made rather in their capacity as Head of State and Ukrainian Party leader respectively). The silence of Voronov, Kirilenko, Mazurov, Polyansky, and Shelepin is difficult to interpret, the more so as these five men could scarcely be considered to constitute a homogeneous interest group.¹⁰

Nevertheless, the general impression created by the Congress proceedings was of a continuing potentially unstable balance of forces in the leadership (with, however, the special and unusual feature that Kosygin appears to occupy *vis-à-vis* the Government apparatus a position of supremacy much firmer than that of Brezhnev or any other leader in relation to the Party organization); of a consequent inability to initiate far-reaching new policies; and of an intention, as a palliative, to tighten control in the spheres of ideology and Party organization.

TABLE I
Central Committee of the CPSU

	1961	1964
Full members of preceding CC re-elected	66	151
Candidate members of preceding CC elected	27	21
Members of Central Revision Commission of preceding CC elected	5	3
New members	77	22
1966 members of pre-1961 CC re-elected (Bubakov, Matkevich, Voroshilov)	—	—
members promoted in November 1964 from Candidates re-elected	—	7
	175	195
Politburo (Presidium) and Secretariat CC CPSU members	26	24
Republic and local Party Secretaries	56	62 ^a
CPSU central apparat officials	3	3
Komsomol officials	1	1
Central, Republican, and local Government officials (excluding Ministry of Defence)	49	57
Ambassadors of U.S.S.R.	13	12
Armed forces (including Ministry of Defence)	14	15
Industrial/agricultural managers	5	5
Workers/peasants	3	4
TU officials	2	2
Intellectuals (including <i>Pravda</i> editor)	9	8
Officials of public bodies (Popova)	1	1
Others (1961: Mukhitdinov, 1966: Shvermk)	1	1
	183†	195

^a 14 Republic Secretaries; 48 Obkrainkom Secretaries

† Includes 8 candidate members promoted in November 1964.

¹⁰ Neither, however, it should be remembered, did the 'group' of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and their ostensible associates in 1957.

The crisis in foreign aid¹

SCOTT REID

THAT exists today in all countries a widespread uneasy feeling among those concerned with the problems of the economic development of poor countries that the world has reached some kind of crisis in the relations between rich and poor countries, an uneasy feeling that, if we cannot together resolve this crisis in a reasonably sensible way within a reasonable time, most of the poor of the world—and two out of three men, women, and children in the world are poor—will be left without much reason to believe in the possibility of a much better life for themselves and for their children. The consequences of this would be profound. The problem of the economic development of poor countries is one of the two great problems of the last third of the twentieth century, the other being the problem of relations between the Western world and China.

There are perhaps five main reasons for the present feeling of crisis. First, the yearly rate of economic growth of the poor countries has been slowing down in the last fifteen years. It was about 5 per cent a year in the first half of the 1950s but by the second half of the 1950s it had slowed to 4½ per cent, and in the first four years of the 1960s to 4 per cent.² Secondly, while the rate of economic growth of poor countries has been slowing down, their rate of population growth has been speeding up. Therefore, the rate of growth in income per person has been shrinking. Thirdly, the amount of financial resources moving from the rich countries to the poor countries has been levelling off. The gross flow now is about the same as it was in 1961. The rich countries have got a great deal richer in the past five years; the combined gross national products of the rich members of the World Bank, expressed in terms of 1963 dollars, have probably gone up

¹ Most of the statistics in this article are taken or deduced from the statistical appendix to my essay on the future of the World Bank. At my request the statisticians in the World Bank divided countries into four groups: very poor, with a per capita GNP of under \$100 a year; poor, \$100 to \$249; middle-income, \$250 to \$749; and rich, \$750 and over. For each country they gave estimates of GNP for 1963 or 1964, population in 1966, and present rate of population growth.

² George D. Woods, 'The Development Decade in the Balance', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1966, p. 207.

Mr Reid is Principal of Glendon College, York University, Toronto. He was Canadian High Commissioner in India from 1952 to 1957; Ambassador to Germany from 1958 to 1962; and Director of the World Bank's operations in South Asia and the Middle East from 1962 to 1965. He is the author of *The Future of the World Bank*, an essay published in September 1965 by the World Bank in Washington.

by about \$250,000 m. a year. The rich countries have not shared any of this vast new wealth with the poor countries. Fourthly, not only has the population of the poor countries been exploding but their international debt has also been exploding. In 1964 the poor countries had to spend four times as much as in 1956 to service their outstanding international debt, to pay amortization charges, interest, and dividends. If present trends continue they will, in about fifteen years' time, be paying the rich countries as much as the rich are lending or investing or giving to them. As George Woods, the President of the World Bank, has put it: 'To go on doing what the capital exporting countries are now doing will, in the not too long run, amount to doing nothing at all.'

The fifth main reason for the feeling of crisis about the problem of assistance to developing countries is that in many rich countries public support of, or even acquiescence in, government aid to poor countries seems to be weakening. Some leaders of public opinion in rich countries are displaying a mounting impatience with what they consider to be the ingratitude of the poor for the favours they have received, or with what they consider to be their inefficiency and corruption or the way they waste their resources on fighting and preparations for fighting. Other leaders in rich countries consider that their own expenditures on fighting and preparations for fighting are far more important than finding money to promote the economic development of poor countries. Others in rich countries seem to believe that the struggle against poverty in poor countries is virtually hopeless and that there is little use in pouring good money after bad.

The President of the World Bank, in his article in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1966, has painted a sombre picture of what is likely to happen if these present trends persist. The World Bank, he said, has 80 under-developed member countries with a total population of about 1,500 million. In 40 of these with a total population of about 750 million, real income *per capita* is rising by only 1 per cent a year or less; the average *per capita* income of this lagging group is \$120 a year. At a 1 per cent growth rate, income levels will hardly reach \$170 a year by the year 2000 in terms of dollars with the purchasing power of today's dollars. In some of the countries income levels will be much lower. On the other hand, if *per capita* income in the United States continues to grow at the current rate, it will rise from its present level of \$3,000 a year to \$4,500 a year by the year 2000. One way of putting this is to say that the gap between these 40 poor nations and the United States will have increased from under \$3,000 in 1965 to about \$4,300 in the year 2000. The gap between the poorest and the richest would have widened by about 50 per cent.

If this situation were to exist in the year 2000 it would be intolerable, not so much because the gap between the richest and the poorest in the world was so wide but because the gap between the income of the poorest

at the end of this century and their income today was so narrow. What would be intolerable would be that in a third of a century there had been a little improvement in the conditions of the poor; that the average income of the half-starved people of the poorest countries would have gone up by only \$4 a month in a world where the wealthy out of their increasing wealth could have afforded to give vast sums to help the poor speed up their economic development, and where rich and poor and middle-income countries out of their increasing wisdom and experience should have been able to create an effective partnership in economic development.

What can we do to ensure that this kind of intolerable situation does not exist at the end of this century?

Grounds for hope

I suggest that the first thing we must do is to try to restore hope in the possibility of success in the international struggle against poverty in poor countries. Without hope we cannot persist in this struggle. I submit that far from the struggle being hopeless, there is more ground for hope today than there was ten years or so ago that, if the partnership of rich countries, middle-income countries, poor countries, and international institutions presses forward vigorously with sensible, generous, tough, imaginative, sustained, co-ordinated programmes and policies of international economic development, it can succeed. One of the chief grounds for hope is that the population explosion is no longer uncontrollable. For the first time in the history of the world a technique of population control has been devised which is suitable for very poor countries. Thus the Indian Government intends, through a massive campaign to popularize the intra-uterine loop, to bring the Indian birth-rate down from the present 40 per thousand to 25 per thousand within the next ten years. This would mean 10 million fewer births in India in the one year 1975 than would have occurred if the present birth-rate had remained unchanged. The Indian population would still be increasing in 1975 but not at an explosive rate. And if India had been able to do this by 1975, other countries could also have begun to bring their rates of growth of population down to moderate levels. The population explosion would no longer terrify us into paralysis.

A second ground for hope is, as the President of the World Bank expressed it in his address to the annual meeting of the Bank in September 1965, that many of the poor countries are now far ahead of where they were ten years ago 'in the ability to formulate and carry out development policy, in the number of institutions able to conceive and administer measures for economic progress, in the number of individuals able to direct private and public enterprise'. The result of this is that the poor countries are now able to use effectively much more foreign capital, both private and public.

In poor countries and in rich countries, in international institutions, in universities, in institutes of economic research, there is now more knowledge and understanding of the problems of economic growth than there was ten years ago. Economic growth is still an enigma but it is a little less enigmatic. International institutions under the devoted leadership of men like Paul Hoffman, David Owen, Philippe de Seynes, Raul Prebisch, Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, and George Woods—to name only a few—have gained experience in mobilizing knowledge, wisdom, opinion, and resources. The United Nations Development Programme has speeded up the tempo of its technical-assistance activities. It has widened and deepened its pre-investment studies which have been so helpful in facilitating investment by the World Bank, regional banks, and private investors. UNCTAD and its subsidiary machinery now provide exceptional opportunities for the rich and the poor countries of the world to look together at those world-wide problems which are the concern of all countries and which can be resolved only by the joint endeavours of all countries. The World Bank is becoming capable of bearing heavier burdens, of taking an increasingly active role in encouraging and helping poor countries to make the best use of all their resources, in persuading rich countries to provide more aid, aid for better projects, aid on better terms, in administering and co-ordinating aid.

More and more leaders of public opinion in rich countries have become convinced of the unwisdom of aid-giving nations trying to influence the political behaviour of a poor country by promises of aid or by threats to withhold aid. Perhaps soon there will be general acceptance of the doctrine that, though aid is part of the grand strategy of foreign policy, its use as an instrument of short-term national policy should be outlawed. Aid is too serious a business to be entrusted to tacticians in Foreign Offices—or in the offices of Prime Ministers or Presidents.

An increasing number of people concerned with national foreign-aid programmes have become aware of the necessity of constant vigilance if the tying of aid to goods and services produced in the giving country is not to shrink greatly the real value of the aid to the receiving country. The estimate of the Indian representative to the World Bank is that \$100 worth of tied aid is worth only \$70 of untied aid. In order to avoid this kind of evaporation of aid, enlightened aid-giving agencies are learning how to resist pressures to give their aid in the form of goods and services which are available in the giving country only at prices well above world prices instead of in the form of goods and services available in the giving country at world prices or not far above. They are learning how to make this point clear to governments and taxpayers, to point out, for example, the two ways by which a giving country can use tied aid to build much needed secondary schools in a poor country. The aid giver could provide prefabricated school buildings. Or it could provide the poor country

with raw materials required for its industrial development. The poor country would sell these materials to local industry and use the local currency it receives from these sales to pay for the cost of building secondary schools using mainly local materials, traditional methods of construction, and underemployed local labour. The real cost of the schools built in this way might be only half the real cost of imported prefabricated schools. In that case the real value of the aid would be twice as great.

We know that, if aid is to be decisive, the rich countries must pour into the poor countries a much greater flow of materials and skills. They must provide more of their aid on easy terms. They must open their markets much wider to the goods of the poor countries. They must have patience for a long pull, patience not for a decade of development but for a generation of development, patience not till 1970 but till 1999.

Amount of aid required

What order of magnitude of aid is required? The net official flow of long-term capital from the rich members of the World Bank to the poor members is now about \$6,000 m. a year, or less than six-tenths of 1 per cent of the combined gross national products of these rich countries. I have no hesitation in saying that the flow should be increased immediately by at least 50 per cent, that is, to \$9,000 m. or \$10,000 m. a year. This is the minimum figure suggested by the conservative economists of the conservative, tough-minded World Bank. The President, in his article in *Foreign Affairs*, said: 'A preliminary study made by the World Bank staff, utilizing available data and their own experienced judgment, suggests that the developing countries could put to constructive use, over the next five years, some \$3 to \$4 billion more each year than is currently being made available to them.'

Most of this additional aid should, in my opinion, be provided without interest or at a low interest rate. At least \$500 m. of the additional aid should be given by governments to the International Development Association, the agency of the World Bank which grants soft loans for hard projects in deserving poor countries. IDA now receives \$250 m. a year from governments; it should receive at least \$750 m. a year.

We must not delude ourselves that this kind of increase in aid from \$6,000 m. a year to \$9,000 m. or \$10,000 m. will be sufficient for long. My own guess is that we should think in terms of a tripling of net aid over the next ten years. Our target for 1976 from the rich members of the World Bank should therefore be about \$20,000 m. a year at 1963 value, which would probably be about 1 per cent of the combined gross national products of the rich members of the World Bank. World Bank experts have estimated the combined gross national products in 1963 as \$1,038,000 m. In 1976 at a 5 per cent annual growth rate this would have increased to about \$1,950,000 m. in terms of 1963 dollars.

I hope that in ten years' time about 90 per cent of this net flow of about \$20,000 m. a year from the rich to the poor countries of the World Bank will be administered or at least co-ordinated by the World Bank. And, as I have said in my essay on the future of the World Bank, I hope that by 1970 governments will have agreed to add to international liquidity each year by an appropriately sized contribution to IDA of credit created by the International Monetary Fund, and that by the mid-1970s this Fund contribution plus substantially increased contributions from governments will provide IDA with resources of \$1,500 m. to \$2,000 m. a year.

Need for partnership

I am convinced that if the international war against poverty is to have a reasonable chance of success the rich nations of the world must mount a massive effort over a long period. I am equally convinced that there is not the slightest chance of this, unless the poor countries and the international aid agencies do much more than they are now doing to help the leaders of these rich countries find a way around the domestic political obstacles to mounting this kind of effort. The partnership against poverty must be strengthened. We must return to the grand design of the founders of the United Nations, whereby the Economic and Social Council was to be the leader of a galaxy of U.N. specialized agencies, which were to help the nations of the world undertake a world-wide, co-ordinated, massive, and sustained offensive against the economic and social causes of international tension and war.

Each partner - whether it be a nation or an international agency must make it easier for the other partners to fulfil their obligations under the partnership. The international agencies must co-operate ever more closely. The poor countries must make it easier for the rich countries to give them much more aid and aid on much more generous terms. The international agencies must sharpen their tools of economic analysis and perfect their techniques of development diplomacy so that they can give better advice to poor countries and give it in the way most likely to result in acceptance. And - a point which I shall develop later - the rich countries must make it easier for poor countries to accept much more aid and much more good advice.

Poor countries must, by an exercise of sympathetic imagination, come to realize better than they do today the practical political difficulties which face the politicians in rich countries who want to do more for the partnership against the poverty of the poor countries. They must be more willing to do things sensible in themselves which would make it easier for these politicians to find a way around their political difficulties. They must make it easier for the leaders of rich countries to convince their legislatures and their peoples that the countries which they are aiding are not wasting the resources that are given them and that they are not

wasting their own domestic resources. They must realize that the rich countries are not likely to increase greatly the quantity and the quality of their aid unless they can feel reasonably certain that those they are aiding are moving at a reasonable pace to improve their economic, financial, and development policies, programmes, and performance.

The more clearly this can be demonstrated to the legislatures and peoples of rich aid-giving countries, the easier it is for governments and legislatures in the rich countries to resist domestic pressures to transfer part of their aid from the fight against poverty abroad to the fight against pockets of poverty at home. The easier it is for them to open up their markets to the exports of the poor countries, and to make the other hard choices which face the aid giver. The easier it is for them to increase their aid and to give the aid on easier terms.

This does not mean that poor countries should be required to submit to a whole series of inquisitions by individual national governments into their domestic economic affairs. This would be intolerable. There must be outside expert investigations into the domestic economic affairs of poor countries if the quantity and quality of outside aid to them is to reach the right levels. Of that I am convinced. But I am likewise convinced that the investigations must be made not by national governments but by impartial expert international agencies which can win and maintain the confidence of both the givers and the receivers of aid, and in which both can feel that they are equal partners.

Role of the World Bank

Each of the U.N. agencies has its special task to perform. Here I want to say something about the special task which the World Bank could become capable of assuming on behalf of the two-thirds of the world outside Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. It seems to me clear that if a country wants massive aid over a long period from the rich members of the World Bank it must accept the political reality that its chances of getting that aid will be greatly increased if it requests the World Bank to make searching investigations into its economic policies, programmes, projects, and performance and if these investigations are followed by reasonable improvements in its policies, programmes, projects, and performance. This will also increase the chances that the aid will be well used and that the country's whole programme of economic development will be improved and its rate of economic growth speeded up. Poor countries need wise unpalatable advice on what they should do to speed up their economic development. They need to take this advice. The experience of the World Bank has indicated that it is easier for an international institution rather than a national government to give such advice and for poor countries to take the advice of an international agency rather than that of a national government.

But though it may be easier, it is not easy. The rich countries and the World Bank must constantly strive to find ways to make it less difficult. The more confidence the poor countries have in the World Bank, the easier it will be for them to accept its advice even if it is unpalatable. In order to increase this confidence the Bank must not only be, but also be seen to be, a truly international partnership, in which all the partners large or small, rich or poor, North American or South American, European, Asian, African, or Australian, socialist or capitalist, consider that the Bank is their bank. The staff of the Bank must become more international. In particular it must contain more senior officers from poor countries. The Bank must break away completely from its early ideological hostility to lending to or investing in publicly owned development finance companies and publicly owned industrial companies. The Bank needs a larger staff of first-class experts. It needs to do more to promote small-sized industry in poor countries. It needs more and better experts and more knowledge of the problems of economic growth so that it can make better analyses both of the economic and development policies, programmes, and performance of the poor countries and of the comparative real economic costs and benefits of alternative individual projects of development in poor countries.

In order to get better analyses we need to sharpen the present blunt tools of economic analysis. That is why I have been urging that the World Bank and its sister institution, the International Monetary Fund, should set up in Washington a great autonomous international institute for research into the problems of the economic development of poor countries. Such an institute would carry further the valuable work which has been done by such organizations as the Society for International Development and the Overseas Development Institute. Its task, like that of these organizations, would be to help to break down the barriers between the theorists of economic development in rich and poor countries and the practitioners in rich and poor countries and in international development agencies. The margins of error in the basic statistics about the poor countries would be narrowed. Economic theory would be enriched by practice. Practice would be improved by theory. Economic advice to poor countries from outside agencies would be more authoritative, more helpful.

One of the first tasks of the new institute might well be to establish for each of the principal aid-receiving countries a provisional estimate of the opportunity cost of capital in that country, for, as the London *Economist* pointed out on 6 November 1965, 'whether the opportunity cost of capital is calculated at 8 or 12 per cent will often sway the bitterest technical argument on roads versus railways or conventional versus nuclear power.' The work of such an institute would thus in time result in greater agreement than exists today on the techniques which should be followed

in comparing, for example, the benefits to a certain poor country or building a \$50 m. nuclear power plant or of spending that sum on more imports of fertilizer and on the construction of fertilizer plants as part of a crash agricultural programme which would bring fertilizer, new seeds, water, and insecticides to the farmer at prices and on credit terms advantageous to him.

Even today, however, there is sufficient agreement on the techniques of economic analysis to warrant much greater use by aid-giving and aid-receiving countries of the World Bank's expertise in assessing the comparative merits of alternative projects of economic development. I therefore suggest that, before a member of the World Bank agrees with a poor country to help finance a big project of economic development, the two countries should jointly ask the World Bank to make an assessment at their expense of the economic merits of the project, using the most sophisticated techniques of analysis which are available. The World Bank has in the past been reluctant, mainly because of shortage of skilled staff, to accept the responsibility of assessing projects other than those which it may finance itself. But the World Bank is accustomed to twisting the arms of aid givers and aid receivers. It would do it no harm to have its own arms twisted occasionally by the aid givers and the aid receivers.

If, before aid givers and aid receivers were to commit themselves to a big project, they were to secure such an assessment by the World Bank, they would protect themselves against pressures from special interests with special objectives: pressures from salesmen for fertilizers, salesmen for pesticides, salesmen for nuclear power plants, for example; pressures from single-minded enthusiasts for fertilizers, pesticides, and nuclear power plants, for example. There would be less danger that pressures in the giving country from the exporters concerned added to pressures in the receiving country from the advocates of prestige projects would lead to a waste of the scarce resources available. Such waste on a large scale has taken place in the last fifteen years, notably by the building of steel plants in under-developed countries. In some poor countries such as India, steel plants, if efficiently managed, will yield high real rates of economic return. They can be good investments. They will speed up the whole process of economic growth. But there are at least half a dozen poor countries whose pace of economic advance has been slowed down in the past fifteen years because they built steel plants instead of investing their limited resources in projects of higher economic priority. A great Western European statesman was talking to me some years ago about the economic development programme of a poor country whose President had just been visiting him. He said: 'This country has a very sensible development programme.' He paused: 'No steel plant.' His simplification was the simplification of a political realist. For that country at that time to have included a steel plant in its development programme would

have been to demonstrate that it was not serious in its efforts to raise the standards of living of its people.

Agreement by aid givers and aid receivers on a joint approach to the World Bank with a request for an expert assessment of a big project of economic development before they commit themselves to it would protect the taxpayers of giving countries against their aid not doing as much good as it should to the economic development of poor countries. Most important of all, the precedents established in making the best use of international aid would help the leaders of the poor countries to make a wiser use of all their resources for development, whether these resources are derived from foreign aid or domestic resources, from private foreign investors, from taxes, from the profits of publicly owned enterprises, or from domestic savings. And it is only if they make a wise use of all their resources that the poor countries can lift themselves out of their poverty.

There is another and very different way by which the leaders of poor countries can be helped to make a wiser use of all their resources for development. Their task of persuading their legislatures and peoples to support policies which are likely to result in the wisest possible use of all their resources will be assisted if the leaders of rich aid-giving countries and the international officials concerned with international economic aid make clear in public and in private that they comprehend the magnitude of the difference between the contributions required from rich countries and from poor countries if the international campaign against poverty is to succeed. They must make clear that they understand that while rich countries must, out of their wealth, give much more aid to poor countries, poor countries must, out of their poverty, make appalling sacrifices. This is one of the most important ways by which rich countries and international civil servants can strengthen the partnership against world poverty.

A particular responsibility rests on the political leaders of rich countries. It is essential that they make clear that they realize the weight of the tragic burden borne by the political leaders of the poor countries, who know that, if their country is to lift itself out of its poverty, they must hold down increases in consumption by the poor; they must put off doing much to reduce inequalities and inequities among regions and among groups within regions; they must sacrifice today's goods for tomorrow's hopes. Out of their poverty, out of their very scarce resources of materials and skills, the poor countries, if they are to succeed, have to squeeze a greater proportion for economic development. They have to be willing to postpone indefinitely the prestige projects, such as big dams, steel plants, nuclear power plants, international airlines, or new capital cities, if these yield a low real rate of economic return. They have to concentrate on projects which have a quick and a high yield, most of them, at least for the time being, in agriculture. Most of them have to curb their popu-

ation growth. They have to be willing to change many of their traditional patterns of life and thought which constitute impediments to rapid economic growth. They have to be willing to participate to the full in outside expert investigations into their domestic economic affairs and to consider sympathetically the conclusions of those investigations. They have to accord to the appropriate international agency three basic rights: the right to be informed, the right to warn, and the right to encourage. This can be bitter medicine for proud poor countries and it is only proud countries which are worth helping.

As for the outside experts who participate in investigations and in dialogues on development with poor countries, much is required of them, for the giving of advice is a delicate and a hazardous occupation. The giver of advice can usefully remind himself of four things. First, that human judgment is fallible. Second, that luck or providence or the unpredictable plays a large role in economic development. Third, that while it is a good thing for poor people to have more to eat and to wear, better places to live in, more and better nurses, doctors, and teachers, and less illness, it is a better thing for them to have these boons without sacrificing some ancient values of their society which can give them a feeling of belonging to a group, a sense of dignity, and the possibility of serenity. The fourth thing which a giver of advice to a poor country can usefully remind himself of is that, even if final truth has been revealed to him, he is not Moses laying down the law from Mount Sinai. He is a partner speaking to a free and equal partner. For him success is measured not by the wisdom of the advice he gives but by how much of his wise advice is accepted. His task is one of persuasion. When he intervenes with advice his intervention should be in the least abrasive, the least corrosive way possible'.³

During the three years I was with the World Bank, I became deeply involved in discussions with poor countries about loans and studies and consultants and advice. During those years I found myself thinking of a statement by the great Indian poet and philosopher, Rabindranath Tagore. He was contending that in India in the past the use of wealth had been subject to what he called 'the strong pressure of social will'. 'The donor,' he wrote, 'had to give with humility'⁴; the Sanskrit saying *Sraddhaya deyang*, 'give with reverence', is significant. Those of us in the rich countries who are called upon to give advice and money to the poor countries can usefully meditate on this saying.

³ Mr Abe Fortas, now Mr Justice Fortas, referring to intervention by the Supreme Court of the United States in the criminal proceedings of a state in the argument before the Court in the Gideon Case in 1963. Anthony Lewis, *Gideon's Trumpet* (New York, 1964), p. 172.

⁴ Postscript to 'Letters from Russia', published in the book, *Russian Chutis*, 1931.

Changes in Communist advice to developing countries

L. SIRC

THE political independence which has been achieved by many countries since the second World War was widely expected to bring with it all-round economic development. Failure in this regard raises many questions. The main one to be answered in the context of the present article concerns the reasons for economic backwardness and to this the Marxist-Leninist answer is quite straightforward. The Soviet author Solodnikov wrote in 1961 without any qualification: 'The economic backwardness of underdeveloped countries . . . was brought about by colonialism.'¹ Four years later, another Soviet writer, Panov, maintained that, in spite of all the intervening changes 'the enormous differences in the levels of development are a consequence of long colonial rule.'² Such explanations were unduly simple for the more sophisticated Communist economist, the late Oscar Lange, who drew the attention of an Egyptian audience in 1961 to the features of traditional society in which 'the methods of economic activity were determined by tradition' and 'an economic mentality existed which was not conducive to innovation, or to improvement of the technology of production.'³

His was an isolated voice, however. Orthodox Communist theory explains backwardness in terms of foreign political rule and economic exploitation; it does not take into account the possibility that the culture and attitude of mind of the population might have had some influence on economic life. Such a relationship must be rejected by conventional historical materialists, because for them culture and mental attitudes must always depend on economic conditions and not vice versa. They hold that the present gap between the developed and the underdeveloped coun-

¹ V. G. Solodnikov, *Burzhuaznye teorii i problemy razvitiya slaborazvitykh stran* (*Bourgeois theories and the problems of the development of underdeveloped countries*) (Moscow, Higher Party School, 1961).

² V. Panov, 'Mezhdunarodnye gosudarstvenno-monopolisticheskiye obединeniya i neokolonializm' ('International State-monopolistic associations and neo-colonialism'), *Voprosy ekonomiki*, (October 1965, p. 114.

³ *Economic development, planning and international cooperation* (Cairo, Central Bank of Egypt, 1961), p. 5.

Mr Sirc is Lecturer in the Department of Political Economy, Glasgow University. He wishes to thank Professor A. D. Campbell, of Queen's College, Dundee, for his comments on the first version of this article.

has come about not because of the advances made by the Western countries (plus Japan) but because of the economic deterioration of the underdeveloped countries. Or if they do take Western advance into account, they explain it in terms of primitive accumulation by means of colonial exploitation instead of in terms of the industrial revolution and radical psychological changes which had taken place in Western society at an earlier stage. Any observer who draws attention to cultural psychological differences is dubbed a 'racialist',⁴ however careful he is to point out that it is stages in social and psychological development which are in question and not inherent qualities.

Three preconditions for development

1) domestic capital accumulation

Because of their refusal to accept the social, cultural, and psychological foundations of economic development, Communist writers tend to propound somewhat 'mechanistic' views on development requirements. When political independence was not followed in the ex-colonial territories by an immediate speed-up in economic advance, the Marxist-Leninist conclusion was that liberation from colonialism did not mean automatic liberation from colonial exploitation. 'Having lost their direct political control, the former metropolitan Powers and other developed capitalist States were forced to direct their efforts towards retaining and strengthening their economic position in developing countries, mainly means of indirect control over their national economies. Such is the essence of neo-colonialist policy.'⁵ On this conclusion was based the theory that economic progress could not be assured without the following three preconditions: (i) a sufficient domestic capital accumulation for expanding production; (ii) concentration on the internal market; (iii) priority for the development of key or basic branches of the economy.⁶ The advice given by Soviet experts has until very recently been wholeheartedly along these lines.

For instance, the economists Rymalov and Tyagunenko⁷ take the view that underdeveloped countries should aim at an annual rate of growth in industrial production of the order of 10-15 per cent. 'In order to increase rate of economic development, they should, first of all, rapidly widen

⁴ Thus Solodnikov, *op. cit.*, p. 53, attacks C. B. Randall, the author of *The Communist Challenge to American Business*, on this account and adds: 'This racialist theory is widespread in the West.'

⁵ Panov, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁶ These 'preconditions' were enumerated by Janez Stanovnik in his article on the struggle of two opposed tendencies in the economics of underdeveloped countries, in the Yugoslav journal *Nafa Straninst*, March 1961. The author is Professor of Economics at the University of Ljubljana.

⁷ V. Rymalov and V. Tyagunenko, *Slabozavistye Strany v mirovom kapitalisticheskom khozyaystve* (Underdeveloped countries in the world capitalist economy) Moscow, 1961), p. 108 ff.

the domestic market, and ensure a substantial increase in the amount of investment.' They maintain that this cannot be achieved without radical social-economic changes, such as 'sharp limitation of exploitation by imperialist monopolies, democratic land reforms, progressive taxation and considerable reduction in non-productive expenditure'. The first three of these are self-explanatory. The last term apparently means cutting down 'middlemen operations' (in Communist practice these refer to the entire service sector), because the two authors calculate that a limitation in this field should make it possible 'to double the present rate of investment'. There seems to be no recognition of the possibility clearly stated by the American economist Paul Baran,* of a reduction in non-productive expenditure bringing about a reduction in consumption.

Solodnikov also insists on an increase in investment, and claims that India does not invest 15 per cent of her national income because more than 25 per cent of the national income is consumed by the non-productive classes of the population. In his opinion, the internal market could be speedily expanded by 'the immediate liquidation of feudal relationships in the village'. This view entirely ignores the experience of the agrarian revolution inside the U.S.S.R.

(II) Limitation of trade with Western countries

The second precondition was stated in its extreme form by Panov in *Voprosy ekonomiki* of March 1963, when he wrote: 'As long as the young States do not extricate themselves from the world capitalist economy, the danger of neo-colonialism will remain.' In other words, underdeveloped countries should limit to a minimum their trade relations with Western industrial countries, because foreign trade means exploitation. This Prokhorov in *Voprosy ekonomiki*, November 1962: 'Foreign trade is an important source of enrichment for industrially developed countries and for their monopolies because of the non-equivalent exchange with economically less developed countries.'

The theory of comparative costs and its modern development is called by Solodnikov the 'imperialist' or 'class theory of the division of labour'

* Paul H. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1957). Professor Baran's book is an only slightly refurbished exposition of the Marxist-Leninist theory of growth. Solodnikov, *op. cit.*, p. 47, commended Baran and his book for having 'unmasked the assertions by bourgeois economists that underdeveloped countries allegedly do not possess their own means for economic development'. Isolated Soviet economists also began complaining in the 1960s that the 'mobilisation of resources is accomplished basically at the expense of the working classes whose standard of living has hardly risen since the winning of political independence'. Professor Dinerstein quoted this in his *Soviet Doctrine on Developing Countries: Some Divergent Views* (Rand Corporation, 1963), from an article by J. Mirsky and V. Tyagunenko in *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No. 11, 1961, and remarked: 'This complaint reflects a more general disillusionment. It was Marx who emphasised that the bourgeoisie accumulated capital by exploiting labour: yet the Soviet Union has followed this example.'

In his chapter on the 'new international division of labour', he states: 'The fundamental point of the theory of "comparative cost" does not stand up to criticism as regards the establishment of international values. As is well known, the development of world markets brings about the establishment of international values around which the prices at which commodities are sold on the world market fluctuate. Under capitalism, and particularly under imperialism, international values lead to non-equivalent exchange when those countries having production costs which are lower than the international value sell their commodities at a price higher than their national value, while less developed countries, having a labour productivity below the average, sell their commodities at a price lower than their national value.' This statement is based on Marx's assertion that 'the more advanced country sells its commodities over and above their value although they are cheaper than the commodities of its competitors . . . the country, having more advantageous conditions, obtains, through exchange, more labour for a smaller quantity of labour, although this difference, this surplus, as always in the exchange between labour and capital, is appropriated by a certain class.' This may be acceptable if one believes in the labour theory of value; but even then it should not be forgotten that, according to Marx, value is equal to the socially necessary quantity of 'simple' labour incorporated. Labour in developed countries is certainly not simple and it does not therefore make sense to compare its quantity with the quantity of 'simple' or 'simpler' labour in underdeveloped countries. Marxist-Leninists sense that there is something wrong with this theory of non-equivalent exchange, and accordingly like to bring in, as does Solodnikov, 'high monopolistic prices of industrial goods' and 'low monopolistic prices for raw materials and food'.

Trade between countries with labour-intensive production and countries with capital-intensive production has always been held to be exploitation of the first by the second and consequently neo-colonialism, unless the industrial countries sell their products at prices below the world level and buy their imports at prices above it. In fact, however, there is now talk about a 'new international division of labour' which would 'correspond to the interests of the participating countries'. This would lead to equality between different countries and to their mutual advantage, to equivalent exchanges, to the free choice of partners and commodities, to the consideration of the interests of participating countries, and to the spirit of goodwill and friendship. This argument is put forward by Prokhorov in an article in *Voprosy ekonomiki*, November 1965.² It is not clear what changes he thinks should be effected in international trading arrangements in order to fulfil these requirements, but since he also

² 'Mirovaya sistema socializma i osvobodivshiesya strany' ('The world social system and the liberated countries'), *Voprosy ekonomiki*, November 1965.

demands that industrial installations in the newly independent countries should 'be based on the latest techniques', the condition presuming that underdeveloped countries should not perform the technological 'inferior' activities and the advanced countries the technological 'superior' ones.¹⁰ This is also implied by Solodnikov, who complains that the present international division of labour is a consequence of the existing 'level of labour productivity and production costs and also of historical circumstances'. He is certainly right, but the crux of the matter is that changes in 'labour productivity' and 'historical circumstances' cannot be effected overnight by revolution or any other political act, as he and his ideological friends appear to believe.

Even if developed countries give something for nothing, this does not excuse them from charges of exploitation and neo-colonialism. According to Prokhorov 'capitalist countries, first and foremost the United States, strive to strengthen and expand their military-strategic and economic position in Asia, Africa, and Latin America under the banner of "aid" to young countries . . . [Western "aid" includes] budget subsidies, an important part of which is used for police measures.'¹¹ In his article of March 1963 quoted above, Panov wrote: 'Under the banner of "aid" the imperialists try to retain their old positions in these countries and to acquire new ones, they try to win over the national bourgeoisie, to impose military and despotic regimes on them, to plant subservient puppets in their governments. . . In the service of monopolies the State "aid" given by imperialist States to former colonies also pursues economic aims by encouraging foreign capital to penetrate into the key branches of the national economy and foreign commodities to appear in the markets of underdeveloped countries. . . The amount of credits and subsidies which does get into the national economies of underdeveloped countries is so distributed as to serve the purposes of foreign monopolies. A large part is used for building airfields, roads, and communication services, in which the neo-colonialists are directly interested, since development of communications works in with their military aims and also facilitates the export of raw materials from distant regions,' etc. In his more recent article of October 1965 he describes the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and its subsidiaries, the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation, GATT, and the European Development Fund as agents of international monopolies which take a direct and active part in the implementation of neo-colonialist policy. One of their main aims, 'although not the only one', he says, is 'economic and political supervision of the development of liberated countries'. They create conditions for the introduction of

¹⁰ 'This was expressly stated by Professor Stanovnik in the *Yugoslav Review of International Affairs*, 20 March 1963.

¹¹ *Voprosy ekonomiki*, November 1965, pp. 82 and 87.

sign capital into the ...
pose all kinds of agreements and also 'aid'. Thus under the guise of
'and 'advice', the national sovereignty of developing countries is
led.

Panov has no doubt that the contacts between underdeveloped and
communist countries are based on full equality and mutually advan-
tious economic relations and that the 'financial aid' given to them by
Soviet Union and the people's democracies is extended under the best
possible conditions: in the form of long-term credits at low interest rates.
He does not mention that a large part of Western aid takes the form of
straightforward grants. Prokhorov also makes the point that the 'high
sincerity and selflessness of the aid given by the U.S.S.R. and other
countries of the Socialist commonwealth . . . forces the ruling circles of
imperialist States to take certain measures, *inter alia*, to increase the
extension of "aid", to make the conditions of loans and credits more
favorable, and to relax the limitations on the use of resources, etc.'¹¹
Fortunately it does appear that in some instances the advent of Soviet
aid has forced Western aid agencies to drop their insistence on a detailed
analysis of the economic usefulness of projects and to shift to projects that
attract public attention.¹²

iii) Emphasis on heavy industry

The third precondition for development is stated by Solodnikov, who
attacks Nurkse's theory of 'balanced growth' and quotes Lenin to sub-
stantiate his thesis that 'investments produce maximum effect when they
safeguard the predominant development of heavy industry', in particular
machine building and other branches producing the means of pro-
duction'. Prokhorov also emphasizes that the socialist countries help to
develop not only consumer-goods industries, but also producer-goods
installations, predominantly metallurgical works, power stations,
machine-building factories, and the like. At the same time, Panov in his
article of October 1965 attacks the 'international State-monopoly asso-
ciations' for concentrating on the 'infrastructure' of fundamental trans-
port and communications services. These, he says, serve the interests of
foreign monopoly capital' and neglect not only 'industry, especially
heavy industry', but also agriculture, although 'the food problem is not
less acute for the large majority of these countries'. This stress on agriculture
is a new feature in Soviet development doctrine, but Panov goes on to say

Prokhorov, *op. cit.*, 1965, p. 89. In this assessment the Yugoslavs tend to
agree with the Russians. Thus President Tito stated, *Yugoslav Communist*, 21 May
1965: 'Of course, this understanding and selfless aid can come only from socialist
progressive countries. . . . Professor Stanovnik has pointed out that only after
1945 and began did the Western countries begin to admit the shortcomings of
their aid.'

Joseph S. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid*, abridged ed. (London, Bogley
Black, 1960), p. 21. Cf. also Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

that such behaviour on the part of the World Bank is due to its concern that the least developing countries might 'turn from agrarian raw-material annexes for imperialist States into potential competitors'.

Evidence of new thinking

The three preconditions for development are not the sum total of Communist advice to developing countries. They are also told to nationalize foreign property, to organize and strengthen the State sector, to embark on economic planning, and to collectivize agriculture. In short, to go the whole way to full-blown Communism on the 1917 model. But there is now a move to indicate acceptance of an intermediate stage. To support this tactical move a new theory of the 'national democratic State' has been evolved:¹⁴ the idea is to persuade governments in the States, which are not dominated by the Communist Party but by the national bourgeoisie, to introduce 'non-capitalist changes' and thus to pass the capitalist stage of development on their way towards a fully fledged people's democracy under Communist rule. In spite of the traditional inevitability of the Marxist scheme of social development, it is now considered that 'the transition to socialism bypassing capitalism is not an exception but the law of historical development'.¹⁵ Thus a short-cut to socialism can be taken via 'national democracy'. Communist support can be given to this up to the point when the national bourgeoisie stops fighting imperialism, which it does when the fight 'endangers its own existence as an exploiting class'.¹⁶ This support of the national bourgeoisie is one of the theoretical points most in dispute between the Russians and the Chinese.

The present article is not concerned with the political aspects of this problem; it seeks only to establish that certain measures have been, or are, recommended to underdeveloped countries by the Communists, and that until very recently these methods closely reflected the development pattern followed by the Communists themselves up to the mid-1950s. This pattern has now, however, become a matter of controversy in the Communist countries, and the present writer is of the opinion that the 1964 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development was a turning-point in this respect.¹⁷ It is more difficult to assess to what extent these issues

¹⁴ See, e.g., B. Ponomarev, in *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1961, and the symposium in *Kommunist*, No. 13, 1962. Professor Dinerstein, *op. cit.*, wrote about the 'anti-imperialist' countries giving advice on development: 'It is also possible that the competition Soviet-American effort is not giving either side a significant political advantage, but it is effective primarily in bringing benefits to the emergent nations. If this is true, and remains so, the Soviet policy will have failed because its goal is the ultimate extension of communism rather than the development of viable non-communist states.'

¹⁵ L. Zevin, 'Vneshneekonomicheskie problemy nekapitalisticheskogo razvitiya osvobodivshikhsya stran' ('Foreign-economic problems of non-capitalist development in liberated countries'), *Voprosy ekonomiki*, March 1966, p. 84.

¹⁶ Solodnikov, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁷ The Yugoslavs went furthest. While presiding over the Third Committee of

were influenced by the change in the Soviet leadership in the same year.

At the end of the 1950s, because of Eastern Europe's great dependence on trade, the Soviet leaders were led to embrace the idea of a 'socialist division of labour', although it is not clear according to what principle this division is supposed to be carried through. It would seem, however, that the need to explain such a division of labour has forced Soviet economists to question the concept of equivalency. Thus Bogomolov wrote in *Voprosy ekonomiki*, November 1963: 'The equality of countries trading together, their mutual gain, does not depend on whether the quantity of national labour contained in the commodities exchanged is equal or not. The economic gain, i.e. the economic effect, is determined by the difference between the cost of one's own production of a given article and the cost of the production of the commodity by the export of which one can obtain the same article.' This sounds very close to 'comparative advantage', and Marx is quoted to support this statement. In fact the Soviet Union has always traded at world market prices, but Soviet economists are quick to point out that 'she cannot and should not be made responsible for the spontaneous working of the capitalist market...'¹⁸

The first reaction in the Soviet Union to the U.N. 'Trade and Development Conference' was rather surprising. The 'socialist countries' were severely criticized at the Conference for the way they conducted their trade with the developing countries.¹⁹ The Prebisch report to the Conference was essentially a plea for more trade, but Solodnikov still cites Prebisch as a 'bourgeois' witness to the fact that there can be no 'effective development without protectionism'. Commenting on the Conference, Cheprakov wrote in *Voprosy ekonomiki*, October 1964, that 'the time of economic autarky has passed without return', but that it was 'unscientific and anti-Marxist to consider any tendency to interdependence as progressive and any tendency to separatism as regressive'; it all depended on 'the role which interdependence or separatism played in the struggle between the socialist and capitalist systems. The developing countries must participate in one of the two existing great economic blocs, and Cheprakov maintained that the aim of international monopolist capital was to preserve 'the third world' as its periphery, to put a brake on its development, to conserve the entire backward structure of the young national states, or, if nothing else could be done, to direct them on the capitalist path. Since they could not develop on their own, any decision on the part

At the Conference, Professor Stanovnik completed his book *Development Countries in the World Economy* (Slovene, Ljubljana, 1964), in which he shipped 'cultural changes which will liberate the society from uneconomic prejudices' among a new list of 'preconditions', and omitted concentration on 'the internal market' and on key branches of the economy'.

¹⁸ V. Cheprakov, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, October 1964.

¹⁹ See Report of the Second Committee, E. Conf. 46 132, p. 25 and p. 28.

of the developing countries to refrain from joining the socialist system inevitably meant their increased subservience within the world capitalist system, which in turn made the speedy development and independence of their national economies impossible.

Another Soviet author²⁰ wrote in 1964 that no development was possible unless 'the present relations between imperialist States and underdeveloped countries are liquidated, in particular the non-equivalent exchange in international trade. . .'. However, Zevin in his article of March 1966 condemned such 'statements by a series of authors on the need for developing countries to break economic relations with capitalist countries as an obligatory precondition for a non-capitalist transition. Could this change of heart be a consequence of the less ideological, more emotional and more businesslike approach of Brezhnev and Kossygin? Zevin went on to say that a break 'without a previously prepared and economically well-founded alternative would be pregnant with dangerous consequences'. The demands for it were 'a result of the underestimation of the possibility of the world revolutionary movement' and would delay the introduction of the non-capitalist path 'by, at least, 10 to 20 years'.

Prokhorov and Zevin are in favour of international trade on the basis of some kind of comparative advantage: 'For young States, participation in the international socialist division of labour means first and foremost that they can use their own advantageous conditions for the production of a series of commodities which the Socialist countries do not produce at all, or do not produce in sufficient quantities, or the production of which demands large labour cost.' Nobody would quarrel with Prokhorov's expectation that the role of newly independent countries will keep changing as their industrialization progresses, or his thesis that socialist countries must not renounce the advantages of the 'universal division of labour because this would lead to 'unjustifiable losses of social labour and the slowing down of rates of development'. Zevin even ventures to say that the 'monocultural nature' of some economies 'cannot be immediately overcome'; it should be taken into account that 'in certain cases, when the climate is suitable, it is necessary to retain even in the future a rational specialisation on the part of developing countries in the form of production which is at present monocultural'. His example is Cuba, where 'the growth of the economy based on sugar cane' makes internal capital accumulation considerably easier because it assures 'relatively high productivity of social labour and efficiency of production'.

In contrast with the earlier stress on the need for emerging countries to rely on their own potentialities for their development, it is now said that 'with rare exceptions such measures cannot be implemented by the force

²⁰ A. Sharkov in the review of R. A. Ulanovsky, *Neokolonializm SSSR i Slabo-Razvitye Strany Azii* (Neokolonialism of the U.S.S.R. and the Underdeveloped Countries of Asia) (Moscow, 1963), *Voprosy ekonomiki*, November 1964.

of the liberated countries themselves. The accumulation in many countries cannot assure high rates of economic growth'.²² In Zevin's words, 'external factors play an extremely important role in the economic life of these countries, and most probably this influence will increase in the next few years.' Therefore one should not take a one-sided view; it is recognized that 'foreign capital strives for maximum profits but meets with an ever more determined resistance from the liberated countries and must, therefore, make concessions and co-operate in the development of the national economies, even though this is against the whole logic of its existence'. A 'colossal' role in the resistance to foreign exploitation is played by economic relations with the socialist countries, 'although these are comparatively limited'.

Reverting to the third precondition for development, it is interesting to note that the American author Dinerstein detected as long ago as the beginning of the 1960s some instances where Soviet economists expressed doubts on developing 'heavy industry *per se*'. But they all still pride themselves on the fact that a large number of the Soviet-built factories in underdeveloped countries belong to the heavy-industry sector and thus constitute 'the basis for the development of productive forces of these countries'.²³ They seem, however, to accept the possibility of importing producer's goods instead of producing them at home at any cost. The principle of 'predominant' investment in heavy industry is certainly ascribed at present in the Soviet Union itself. Even Professor Dragilev of Moscow, who propounded rather conservative development theories at his seminars in Britain in the spring of 1966, grudgingly admitted, when challenged, that the Communists have never held the predominant development of heavy industry to be the best policy 'everywhere and at all times', although it has been and continues to be valid as a principle.

The erosion of this principle would entail the dismantling of the original Communist system of planning, which essentially consisted in 'consciously' setting targets in opposition to market indicators principally profits so as to concentrate on heavy industry. This system was attacked by the late Academician Nemchinov, and opposition continues from men like Arzumanyan and Trapeznikov.²⁴ The far-reaching managerial reforms which have been introduced throughout the entire Soviet economy in the last few years put realism in place of dogma, and restore the supremacy of economic laws as against arbitrary political and administrative decisions. Such fundamental changes are bound to be reflected in the tone of Soviet advice to developing countries, and should bring it much more into line with Western economic thinking.

²¹ Prokhorov, *op. cit.*, 1965, p. 89.

²² Zevin, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

²³ Prokhorov, *op. cit.*, 1965, p. 88.

²⁴ See 'Kosygin, Liberman, and the pace of Soviet industrial reform' by Michael Kaser, in *The World Today*, September 1965.

Kenya's 'little general election'

GEORGE BENNETT

KENYA, which became a one-party State 'by consent' in 1964, a year after her independence, has now become a two-party State by disagreement, with both sides feeling, and expressing, that there is something wrong about this. Perhaps fortunately for Kenya, her one-party system had not been consolidated by legislation. The quarrels in the Cabinet and in the Kenya African National Union (KANU) could be thrashed out by being taken to the people. Yet there was much about the resulting 'little general election' of June this year which gave the appearance of its being in part but another round in the long battle between Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga.

These two Luo from western Kenya first became prominent in the mid-1950s, in the absence of the older Kenya African Union (KAU) leaders detained with Kenyatta in the Mau Mau Emergency. They represented differing forces. First to be known in the West was Mboya, a trade-union leader who could so suavely impress Westerners, and particularly Americans, that they gave him money for his trade-union activities and for an 'air-lift' of young Kenyans to study in America. Less known and far less well understood was Odinga, the first *Kor* (chief) or President of the tribal Luo Union. He was always careful to be respectful to Luo customs and to the Luo elders, and so built his strength in Central Nyanza, the heartland of the Luo people, as a conservative leader. But he proved able to speak also to the young radicals, and thus captured the African District Association that was formed in 1956.¹ Odinga had become, as he continues to the present, the supreme example of the local boss-men whose emergence was encouraged by the policy of the colonial administration, which would, from 1955 to 1960, allow African political expression through district organizations only. In marked distinction, Mboya's strength has lain in Nairobi; there he stood as 'the workers' candidate' in 1957, appealing then and later as a non-tribal figure - in fact many have questioned whether he could win a seat in his home area of South Nyanza. In the 1961 general election KANU appeared faction-

¹ B. A. Ogot, 'British Administration in the Central Nyanza District of Kenya, 1900-60', in *Journal of African History*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (1963), pp. 270-3.

Mr Bennett is Senior Lecturer in Commonwealth History and Fellow of Linacre College, Oxford; author of *Kenya: A Political History* (London, O.U.P., 1963) and other works.

even between the two.

Old war was being fought inside KANU. Odinga, to counter Mboya's Western funds, had gone East; after visiting Moscow and Peking he, too, could send students abroad and could wield large campaign funds.

There were, however, some in KANU who were committed to neither man. Spoken of as 'the KANU moderates', they were approached after the 1961 election by colonial officials to join a coalition government with the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) under Ronald Ngala; only one, however, was prepared to quit KANU. When Kenyatta was released in August 1961 he found a deeply divided KANU as well as the division between KANU and KADU. The rifts in KANU became worse in 1962 until the Kamba broke away under their leader Paul Ngei.¹ However, after the assumption of power by Kenyatta's KANU Government in June 1963, first Ngei's African People's Party (APP) and then, in November 1964, Ngala's KADU saw that they must join the winning side. Perhaps they had learned, through bitter experience, what one of the KANU moderates had expressed to the present writer in the week following the 1961 election. He rejected the civil servants' blandishments to join a KADU Government because he was looking to the longer future; he felt that it was a pity that his tribe might lose development money if he sat in opposition to the new Government, but that it was more important for his tribe's future that he should stay with the ultimate victors.

In forming the first KANU Government, Kenyatta balanced the various tribal interests, and the differing factions within KANU. He brought into office some who had been tried and sentenced with him in 1953. Prominent among these last was Achieng Oneko, a Luo who became Minister for Information and Broadcasting. He soon obtained full control over the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation which, nationalized as the Voice of Kenya, began to draw increasingly for news on Tass and relayed more and more material on the world revolution from Cuba to Peking. In deportations of Western newsmen and in restrictions on the press, critics saw the hand of the two Luo – Oneko and Odinga, who was Home Minister. When Kenya became a Republic in December 1964 there was one unexpected event in the festivities: President Kenyatta opened a school of African socialism, the Lumumba Institute, built with Russian money and designed to train KANU officials. Curiously, Mboya, the party's secretary-general, was not included among the governors of the Institute; they were all men who had been tried with Kenyatta or who

¹ G. Bennett and C. G. Rosberg, *The Kenyatta Election* (London, O.U.P., 1961).

² G. Bennett, 'Political realities in Kenya', in *The World Today*, July 1963, and C. Sanger and J. Nottingham, 'The Kenya General Election of 1963', in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. II, No. 1 (1964).

were of KANU's 'Left'. This group already had an organ in the fortnightly *Pan-Africa*, which under its first editor, the Australian Douglas Rogers, followed the Ghana line that 'scientific socialism' had answers for Kenya's problems. In public speeches one main proponent of such ideas was Bildad Kaggia, an M.P. from Fort Hall, the central part of Kikuyuland, who had also been sentenced with Kenyatta.⁴

The Mau Mau period had, however, produced divisions in Kikuyu society: between 'the freedom fighters' and 'the loyalists', between the landless and those who had done well out of land consolidation. This latter policy of the colonial Government, while comparatively successful in Kiambu and Nyeri, had produced much discontent in Fort Hall. We demanded there that it should be redone, there arose the cry of 'land for the landless'. Kaggia took this up. There seemed to be a natural alliance between him and Odinga, for in Central Nyanza also had land consolidation failed - in this case because of the opposition of the politicians; but the districts were full of discontents and had not developed as fast as their neighbours. Moreover, Odinga had become the trusted ally of the freedom fighters and the inevitable opponent of the 'moderates' because of his fervent support of the call for Kenyatta's release.

Kenyatta's loyalty to old KAU associates in forming his Government was as natural as his suspicion of the 'moderates'. But those who knew Kenyatta in England during his long exile from 1931 to 1946 knew him as a moderate, and, after their earlier fears of him, Kenya's European settlers were to discover that this was indeed his true face. He believed as he began to say in public speeches, that there was as great a danger of 'imperialism' from the East as from the West, something Odinga, Oneko, and Kaggia would not accept. Hence Kenyatta came increasingly to support Mboya, his Minister of Economic Planning, who knew that he could obtain most aid from the West.

During 1965 and 1966 Mboya was to show that the 'freeze-out' which he had suffered over the Lumumba Institute was a tactic which he could employ with yet more effect against Odinga. The existence of the Institute with its Russian instructors aroused increasing fears of Communism among the 'moderates'. These men, after the entry of the like-minded KADU men into KANU, became in 1965 the predominant group in the party. Some of them, meeting at the Corner Bar in Nairobi in March, agreed to support Ronald Ngala as the future successor of Kenyatta, a role Odinga believed was his as Vice-President. News of the Corner Bar meeting leaked to Oneko, and the battle was on between the KANU groups. It developed in April amid rumours that Odinga was seeking, and obtaining, arms from Eastern sources for a seizure of power. In May Chinese arms, travelling from Dar es Salaam to Uganda, entered south-

⁴ For Kaggia's background see M. Slater, *The Trial of Jomo Kenyatta* (London, Secker and Warburg, 1955).

western navy--

The convoy was stopped, since it was clear that the security authorities could not believe that its proximate passage through Central Nyanza was innocent. The publication of a Government White Paper, *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, provoked further argument. The product of Mboya's Planning Ministry, it took a pragmatic attitude on the question of nationalization and rejected Marx's ideas as irrelevant to twentieth-century Kenya. While the White Paper had the full authority of the Government, it received a unanimous vote of approval in the National Assembly only after a lengthy debate in which the advocates of 'scientific socialism', including Mboya's own assistant Minister,⁵ questioned its ideological basis. When Lumumba Institute students supported them by demanding complete nationalization, the 'moderates' in the House of Representatives replied by passing a motion calling on the Ministry of Education to take over the Institute, and it was subsequently closed. July saw the removal of Odinga from his first position of authority; after failing to postpone the elections for the officers of KANU's parliamentary group, he was not re-elected as vice-chairman, being defeated by Ngala by 75 votes to 6.

Mboya and the 'moderates' had thus triumphed in the one organ of KANU that was then functioning. KANU had always been poorly organized,⁶ but in 1965 Kenya seemed to be a no-party State. In fact, many people wondered whether there was any need for KANU when the Cabinet duplicated its Governing Council, and Parliament its national executive. The central organs of the party never met and its bureaucracy had withered.⁷ The national headquarters' telephones were disconnected for non-payment of bills, and KANU's organizing secretary admitted in January 1966 that the party had debts of £20,000. It had, like parties in some other African States, failed to find a function after winning independence and forming the Government. Power descended from Nairobi through civil servants, provincial and district commissioners, as in colonial days, though they were now, of course, Africans. Perhaps fittingly in an acephalous traditional society, KANU's branches continued to operate, though mainly as places of debate between local factions.

In February 1966 the moment of crisis between KANU's wings arrived. Battle was sparked in a curious way. Douglas Rogers, who had gone from editing *Pan-Africa* to become editor of the Nkrumahist monthly, *Africa and the World*, published in London, attacked, in its February number, a speech which Gichuru, Kenya's Finance Minister,

⁵ Okelo-Odongo, a Luo from Central Nyanza.

⁶ With the possible exception of the six months preceding the 1963 general election.

⁷ The last meeting of the Governing Council had been in 1962, of the national executive in 1963, and of the party secretariat in February 1964.

Minister for Home Affairs and a former KADU leader, replied by denouncing both Rogers and his journal from Kenya. Then on 15 February Mboya introduced in Parliament a motion of confidence in the Government. Odinga walked out, saying he had, as leader of government business, been given no notice of this, but the Speaker allowed the motion on Mboya's assurance that it had the President's authority. In the subsequent debate Oneko called for a general election as the only way of reaching a settlement between the factions.

The new party

However, before this could happen, the battle had to be ended within the party itself. A party conference, the first to be held since October 1962, was called by Mboya for the second week-end in March, to consider a new party constitution. Forty-nine M.P.s, Odinga's supporters, asked Kenyatta for a postponement on the ground that there should first be fair and proper elections in the branches. Ninety-nine other M.P.s, whose statement Ngala released to the press, approved of the conference meeting immediately and called for Odinga's resignation as Kenya's Vice-President. There were, as Oneko said in Parliament, 'two parties within one party'. Odinga complained that the conference had been convened without reference to him as KANU's deputy-president—which was perhaps not surprising, since Mboya's draft constitution proposed the replacement of his office by eight vice-presidents, one for each province. KANU's parliamentary group approved the draft by 85 votes to 30, and immediately after the conference delegates had endorsed this, elections for the new offices were held. Odinga acknowledged his defeat by walking out after Mboya had been re-elected secretary-general by 326 votes to 82 for Muliro, the former deputy leader of KADU. For the Central Province vice-presidency Gichuru defeated Kaggia by 37 votes to 11. KANU was now clearly controlled by the 'moderates', by former KADU men and by supporters of Mboya. The 'dissidents', claiming support from twenty branches which had sent rival delegates who had been refused admission to the conference, went off to meet elsewhere. Kenyatta had challenged them at the conference to declare themselves.

Next day, Monday, 14 March, M. A. Ongalo, a Mombasa municipal councillor, and J. M. Oyangi, an old KANU youth leader, applied to the Registrar of Societies to register a new party: the Kenya People's Union (KPU). Who was behind it? Ngei immediately denied involvement and Muliro, famed of old for opposing a single-party structure, called for unity under Kenyatta. Ongalo claimed the support of thirty M.P.s but it was a month before he could demonstrate this. On 14 April Odinga at

* Douglas Rogers, 'Kenya: Is the Price of Unity too High?', in *Africa and the World*, February 1966.

being subjected to his retiring statement he attacked those who were the 'helpers', namely the donors of foreign aid, and claimed that there was an 'invisible government' controlling Kenya. A Government statement in reply said of Odinga and Central Nyanza: 'The district which he claims to control is well known for the use of strong-arm methods, intimidation, and even violence in dealing with political opponents.' As the statement was believed to be the work of Mboya the chips were laid down. There followed the resignations of two assistant Ministers: Dr Nanyuki, who had stood against Mboya in 1961, and Okelo-Odongo. Odinga and Kaggia were then announced as leader and deputy leader of the KPU and twenty-six other M.P.s resigned from KANU. Finally on 25 April Oneko resigned. In a public statement he attacked the Government's policies: Kenya, he said, was not non-aligned, being 'a capitalist country' with treaty and defence arrangements with Britain. He called for the immediate nationalization of the East African Power and Lighting Company and of the Kenya Bus Company, and claimed that the continuing social inequalities in Kenya were the price being paid for economic aid. His resignation was 'agonizing', he said, for it meant parting with his 'old friend and comrade' Kenyatta.

Kenyatta retorted by summoning a special parliamentary session to pass a Bill compelling those who resigned from the party for which they had been elected to seek re-election. Immediately thirteen of the 'dissidents' sent letters of apology and asked to be received back, but no mercy was shown. An interesting debate ensued about the rights of M.P.s although no mention was made of Burke's views on the subject; the 'dissidents' claimed that there was 'a contract between a Member and his electors . . . for the life of the Parliament to which he was elected', while the Government developed the doctrine of the revocable mandate. There were comments that no re-elections had been enforced when the APP and KADU joined KANU, and that the Bill was being rushed through to prevent further desertions from KANU. More relevant to the coming electoral battle, Kaggia asserted that there were millions of landless Africans and hundreds of unemployed roaming the streets without hope.

Although the 'dissidents' had an ideology of scientific socialism and might look to the East for support -- which was given in the campaign by *Pravda* and Moscow radio -- the foundation of their attack rested on the discontents of people who felt they had gained nothing from independence. Africans controlled the Government but Nairobi's commercial centre remained in the hands of European firms and Asian shopkeepers, and in the highlands large European estates still existed. Could the Government convince the electorate that practical economic considerations had prevented rapid change, that it was necessary to maintain large

estates for production, and that foreign businessmen must have co-dence so that capital and aid would continue to flow into Kenya: Perhaps this issue was fought out in its clearest terms in Kaggia's constituency of Kandara. To his cry of 'free land for the landless', Kenyatta had replied in 1965, telling the Kikuyu of the necessity for hard work; then, as in 1969, he stressed to the highly individualistic Kikuyu the threat of Communism and of the communalization of land. Kenyatta was determined to assert his authority over his own Kikuyu people, and in the Kandara result was vindicated; Kaggia lost not only his seat but his deposit.

Kenyatta's eve-of-poll speech at Kandara was his second in a constituency. His first had been at Nakuru, which Oneko had represented since 1963, and where it was widely recognized that he would find it difficult to get back against a majority of Kikuyu voters. At Nakuru Kenyatta told an audience of 20,000 that he had agreed to the KPU's registration to prevent it from saying that KANU was afraid of it.⁹ In a generally peaceful campaign Nakuru was one of the few places where the police had to intervene with tear-gas. When the result was announced—Mwithaga (KANU), 3,812, A. Oneko (KPU), 2,325—the Kikuyu mislaid a bull (the KPU's emblem) in triumph, but Oneko complained of restrictions that had been placed on his meetings.

Kenyatta did not visit Odinga's territory, Kisumu and Central Nyanza; instead, his two Luo Ministers from South Nyanza, Mboya and Ayi, and the new Minister of Education, Nyagah, went as a team. Mboya appealed to his fellow Luo not to cut themselves off from the national development. Employing the carrot-and-stick technique, he promised the immediate implementation of the Kano plains irrigation project, warned that, unless the people were prepared to work with the Government, 'the Government would not listen to their demands'. Nyagah gave a specific warning to teachers to keep out of politics. The election result confirmed Odinga's control of the district. Its KPU Senator was returned by 55,014 votes to 5,673, his KANU opponent losing his deposit as three of the five KANU candidates for the House of Representatives. Bondo, Odinga defeated (by 16,695 to 1,942 votes) F. W. Odede, Mboya's father-in-law and an earlier Central Nyanza hero.¹⁰ All six Central Nyanza seats fell to the KPU.

Elsewhere the new party gained only three seats. Of these the most significant were the Kamba two in Machakos. The district's KPU Senator J. Nthula, received a majority of almost 12,000, while the other 'independent' candidate, for the House of Representatives, S. M. Kioko, lost in Machakos East. Were these 'freak results', as Mboya called them? In fact the Kamba had never felt at ease in KANU, producing for a while a breakaway APP. Again, there were doubts about Ngei. He had been:

⁹ The KPU was only registered on nomination eve, some six weeks after it applied. ¹⁰ Bennett and Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-63.

Although rumours were spread about his position. Some noted that he did not campaign for KANU. Only on the eve of the poll did he say that the Kamba had been waiting 'to hear from me'; earlier he had met Kamba elders and made it plain that if the people wanted him to resign from KANU and join the KPU he would rather leave politics completely. Clearly, then, there were renewed Kamba discontents with KANU. When the election results were announced Mwendwa, a Kamiba from Kitui and a Minister since 1963, said that 'the Machakos results would be grave', since 'the Government would not agree to give aid to an area which does not support it'.

Ministers were apt to use such threats during and after the campaign. Moreover, the KPU felt that advantage had been taken of its absence from Parliament in June to pass two measures of which it disapproved: a motion for the division of Central Nyanza into at least two administrative districts, and more important, a Public Security Act. Critics pointed to the inclusion in the latter of provisions for preventive detention. Two KANU M.P.s, Shikuku and Mbogoh, spoke against it, while the *Daily Nation* and the fortnightly *Reporter* also expressed opposition. By doing so they demonstrated that Kenya remained a democracy, but it was open to doubt whether she would continue so if the KPU proved vexatious and awkward. When, at the end of June, Odinga returned to the House of Representatives he was welcomed in an exchange of courtesies by Nyamwaya, the new leader of government business; Kenya was thus maintaining the traditions of Westminster.

What of the future? A British reporter¹¹ noted that behind all the Ministers' fine words about KANU having won a great victory the Government was in fact surprised at the amount of support the KPU had obtained. There were reasons for this. 'The Report of the Maize Commission was not the only cause of talk about corruption among politicians: one Minister has long been spoken of as "Mr 10 per cent".'

The discontents arising from unemployment and land hunger still remain. The Government will have to press on with its development plans and prove that its main reliance on Western aid can produce rapid results. On this will depend the future stability of Kenya. Moreover, the low election polls – most being under 40 per cent – revealed that there was no marked enthusiasm for KANU; neither it nor the KPU had succeeded in arousing great support. (Doubtless most alarming for KANU was the Senate seat of Machakos which the KPU won in an 8 per cent poll.) One wonders whether the Kenya masses have become apolitical, or whether this is not the latest comment on the failure of KANU to show that it has some present relevance? There are, indeed, good reasons why Mbogoh should seek to revivify it following the conference of March 1966.

¹¹ *The Daily Telegraph*, 21 June 1966.

Political trends in India

B. SHIVA RAO

ACROSS India's political scene today stretches the shadow of the next general election, the fourth to be held since independence. As a measure of the difficulties encountered by the different political groups in going to the polls, the electorate may be mentioned the rapid growth of the electoral rolls under adult suffrage. The Constituent Assembly, which framed for India's Constitution at the end of the second World War, was elected by the members of the provincial Legislative Assemblies, who owed the representative character to an electorate of no more than 35 million voters in undivided India. The introduction of adult suffrage in the new Constitution brought a fivefold expansion of the electorate to 176 million at the first general election in 1952. The number increased to 193 million in 1957 and to 216 million at the time of the third election, early in 1962. In the poll on the last occasion, 119 million votes were recorded; of these approximately 4 million were rejected on technical grounds for violation of one or more of the rules of procedure, leaving a balance of 115 million effective votes.

In the last three elections, the Congress Party, for easily understandable reasons, was able to secure massive majorities, both at the Centre and in practically all the states.¹ In organization and party funds, the Congress has always been considerably ahead of all the other parties. Its prestige, especially at the time of the first general election, was high as the party which had brought India freedom. There was, moreover, a personal factor which paid handsome dividends: after Gandhi's assassination in 1948, Jawaharlal Nehru became India's acknowledged leader, with personal appeal to the masses of which he made full use in the election campaigns.

A much-debated question today, however, is whether the Congress Party will succeed in obtaining a fresh mandate next year from the electorate. Subsidiary to this is the question of Mrs Gandhi again becoming India's Prime Minister on the basis of her performance during the current year. Since the last general election, evidence has been accumulating of the greatly diminished influence of the Congress; and Mr Nehru's personal prestige suffered a sharp decline after China's aggression in 1962.

¹ In the Lower House of the Federal Parliament (Lok Sabha) with 500 or more seats, the Congress Party has consistently held around 370 seats.

north-east India in October 1962. Apart from the personal factor (which is always of great importance in India), an analysis of the results of the last general election reveals a position of considerable vulnerability for the Congress. It obtained a 73 per cent majority in the Lok Sabha on a poll of 51·5 million votes (about 45 per cent of the total); the Opposition groups, with about 55 per cent of the effective votes cast, had to be content with only 27 per cent of the seats. This analysis proved useful to the latter in a series of by-elections held since the 1962 election. The less important political groups, with no prospect of success for their own candidates, entered into electoral understandings with some of the other groups so as to offer maximum opposition to the Congress candidates. The result was striking in a number of instances: Opposition leaders, defeated in the general election, were successful in the by-elections, winning their seats by comfortable margins.

The Congress Party is, in fact, likely to face a double challenge in the next election. Internally, the party is in sad disarray in a number of states, such as the U.P., Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, Gujerat, and Mysore. Because of personal rivalries and factional feuds, it is no longer certain that nominees of the Congress Party will receive the full support of all the divergent elements in the organization. And secondly, as the date of the campaign approaches, electoral understandings are developing between different political groups in a number of states. Already in Madras such a pact has been established between Mr Rajagopalachari's Swatantra Party (which stands for the removal of economic controls and the free play of private enterprise in industry) and the *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (DMK) (the party for the progress of the Dravida people). The combination will prove a formidable challenge to the Congress, even if it fails to secure a majority in the Madras Legislative Assembly. Spokesmen of the Swatantra Party appear confident that they will oust the Congress from office in Gujerat, Bihar, and Orissa. At the Centre, however, this will be much more difficult for the Opposition groups to achieve in view of the size of the Congress majority there.

The Communist Party will be averse to seeking electoral understandings with other groups, especially with the Swatantra Party and the Jan Sangh, which it regards as reactionary in outlook. It is doubtful whether even the two sections of the party, one pro-Moscow in its affiliation and the other (somewhat less openly) pro-Peking, will be able to overcome their internal differences in a bid for power in states like Kerala and West Bengal. The last election in Kerala in 1965 proved disastrous to the Right wing, resulting in its virtual disappearance from the state. Judging from certain trends noticeable over a period of years, it seems likely that the Right wing, faced with the formidable threat of the more aggressive Left, will move closer to the Congress Party. In recent years a number of so-called 'progressives' (as Right-wing Communists have often preferred to

describe themselves) have joined the Congress Party and even stood as official Congress candidates. The process of infiltration into the Congress has in fact been openly urged by leading Communists; in a front-editorial in the party's official organ *New Age*, shortly after the general election, the editor made no secret of the party's long-term tactics with the significant caption: 'Communist mahout rides Congress elephant! This process will doubtless continue, especially in regions where tactical reasons the Right wing of the Communist Party is reluctant to build up a separate organization.'

The main parties in the field for next year's election will be the Congress (with the possible support of a section of the Communist Party), the Swatantra Party supported in a number of constituencies by groups like the DMK in Madras; the Jana Sangh, predominantly Hindu in outlook and commanding vigorous support in some of the northern states; the Socialists, though their ranks are rent by internal dissensions and feuds; and the Left-wing Communists, who will make a determined effort for mass support in the coming months by means of a series of direct action campaigns in protest against food shortages and rising prices. The mass riots and civil disturbances in Kerala in February were an indication of this. There are smaller groups which deserve mention (because they may play some part in upsetting the calculations of the better-organized parties in certain regions) such as the Muslim League in Kerala, the Forward Bloc in West Bengal, and the Hindu Mahasabha in one or two of the northern states. The number of Independents will probably be smaller in the next election, because of the increasing cost and strain of election campaigns.

It is difficult to be more precise at present about the political prospects since there are a number of unpredictable factors likely to influence the course of events. The legacy of problems which Mrs Indira Gandhi inherited from her predecessors will challenge all her resources and her choice as Prime Minister was influenced primarily by the conviction that she was likely to prove a more successful leader in the coming election campaign than her rival for the office, Mr Morarji Deesai. She possesses courage, a decisive will, and a capacity for wise compromise shown over the issue of Hindi being imposed as the national language. The lack of administrative knowledge and experience, which is her handicap, she may neutralize through the choice of able and competent official advisers.

Six months constitute too short a period in which to assess the worth of Mrs Gandhi's leadership or to pass judgment on her performance. There will be little dispute that in her recent trips to France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union she achieved a measure of success far beyond general expectations. At the same time one cannot overlook the fact that the problems which her Administration

called upon to tackle are almost baffling in their complexity. President Johnson's generous gesture in arranging prompt delivery of enormous quantities of grain meets the real difficulty over food supplies only half-way. A great deal will depend on the capacity of India's Food and Agriculture Ministry to build up an organization that will be prompt, efficient, and just in the all-important matter of distribution. Mrs Gandhi's personal response to the many facets of the food problem has been swift: but for its effective solution the Chief Ministers of the states will have to consider the primary responsibility. The famine in Orissa is a tragic example of administrative inefficiency and short-sightedness. Moreover, the failure of this year's monsoon in large parts of India is a source of additional anxiety for Mrs Gandhi's Government. The food problem, unfortunately, has not been viewed in many parts of the country as something beyond party politics. Unfair advantage has been taken, in regions like West Bengal, by Left-wing elements to exploit the needs of the people for party ends, and it is not the Left wing of the Communist Party alone that will fish in troubled waters. Hardly any state's Chief Minister can assert with confidence today that in implementing relief measures and policies he has the whole-hearted support of his party behind him.

Another and equally formidable problem is the implementation of the Tashkent Declaration. After a promising start, Indo-Pakistan relations have sharply deteriorated, and it is clear that Pakistan will be in no mood to honour the other points in the Declaration so long as India declines to discuss the Kashmir dispute. Mrs Gandhi's sincerity in carrying out the Declaration 'in the letter and the spirit' is beyond question; but she clings somewhat rigidly—as did Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri—to the assertion that Kashmir is an integral part of India and that no question of a plebiscite therefore arises.

In the closing months of Mr Nehru's premiership there was some hope of a breakthrough. Sheikh Abdullah's release from detention after a period of ten years, followed by his visit to President Ayub, seemed to open a new line of thinking on the Indian side. Mr Nehru, with his acknowledged authority, could have taken some risks on the Kashmir issue, but he decided to tackle it too late, when he was in rapidly failing health. On the eve of Sheikh Abdullah's visit to Rawalpindi in May 1964, the present writer urged him to say nothing in criticism of India but to expand the formula accepted by Mr Nehru and President Ayub in November 1962 for 'an equitable and honourable solution of Kashmir and other problems' so as to include the final phrase: 'acceptable to the people of India, Pakistan and Kashmir'. Sheikh Abdullah's response was positive: he expressed his readiness to work patiently for an Indo-Pakistan understanding on all issues including Kashmir, but he had grave fears about Mr Nehru's health.

There is no doubt that over Kashmir neither of Mr Nehru's successors

has been in his strong position or of his opinion. Mrs Gandhi, in particular, with a general election in the offing, needs to be extra cautious in any moves she may make—whether over Kashmir or Nagaland. There are powerful elements watchful within the Congress Party (not to mention the Opposition groups) which will strenuously oppose the least concession. Pakistan's attack last year and her flirtations with China are powerful arguments which carry general support in India. A Government as vulnerable as is Mrs Gandhi's on issues as food, finance, and foreign aid cannot afford to add to its liabilities by any proposal which may be interpreted as weakness over Kashmir.

The question is whether, between a plebiscite (as demanded by Pakistan) and the Indian view of Kashmir as a closed issue, there is a middle position which holds out, however distantly, the prospect of a reasonable compromise. In the present writer's opinion, a great deal can be attempted along the lines of the Tashkent Declaration to support the general thesis that a vast field exists for fruitful economic, social, and cultural collaboration between the peoples of India and Pakistan. As common ends and interests are discovered, tension might then diminish. Kashmir could gradually be viewed by both sides in a more realistic perspective than that of today. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of such an approach at present, and it is conceivable that in the next few months Pakistan will resort to policies which may tend to harden Indian feelings still further. But even without a response from Pakistan, there are steps which Mrs Gandhi's Government could take towards an ultimate solution of the Kashmir problem. The anti-secession Ordinance of 1971, designed to discourage by severe penalties—imprisonment for up to three years and heavy fines—the demand for independence of areas not included in India, is not, however, a positive step which touches the real features of problems like Kashmir and the hill areas of north-east India.

On 26 February this year, twenty-four eminent lawyers, headed by Mr M. C. Setalvad, a former Attorney-General, and including four former Chief Justices of the Supreme Court, issued a statement questioning the propriety of the Government's continuing to retain its proclamation of emergency (made immediately after the Chinese aggression of 1962). The Defence of India Rules, which accompanied the proclamation, enable the Government to detain persons for indefinite periods without any of the safeguards provided for such detainees under an earlier statute, the Preventive Detention Act. The lawyers' statement followed a judgment by the Supreme Court which questioned in unusually harsh terms the Government's right to suspend for years the fundamental rights of its citizens.¹ Mrs Gandhi, disturbed by these criticisms

¹ The judgment stated: 'It would not, in our view, be an exaggeration to say that, if ours were a police State and we had never heard of democracy and the rule of law, orders passed in such a case would not have been more arbitrary and oppressive than the orders with which we are dealing.'

liament on 1 March that her Government was conscious of the need to ensure that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution did not remain suspended for a day longer than was absolutely necessary; that in this matter she has had little encouragement from the Chief Ministers of states, who are reluctant to abandon the absolute powers they have enjoyed for over three years.

The debate on the Defence of India Rules covers wider issues than that of Kashmir alone, but there is no doubt that the detention of Sheikh Abdullah and many of his associates cannot be justified in the name of an emergency. Their release would provide some assurance that the Government's thinking on Kashmir is not frozen. A plebiscite in Kashmir has not been offered by India; it was the Security Council's suggestion, coupled with a condition that Pakistan has so far failed to fulfil—namely, withdrawal from 'Azad Kashmir', the region she forcibly occupied in 1947. What India did offer—but to the people of Kashmir—was ascertainment of their wishes before a final settlement of the state's future. President Radhakrishnan declared in a public statement at Bangalore on 8 December 1965: 'While we say that it is not for any foreign Power to interfere in its affairs, we recognize that, if there are any troubles or difficulties in Kashmir, it is our duty to settle them to the satisfaction of the people of Kashmir.' A general election under adult suffrage, provided that it is conducted without any executive influence or pressure, could be regarded as the fulfilment of the original offer.

Sheikh Abdullah's complaint that the elections so far held in Kashmir have not been free and fair has never been seriously scrutinized. There are, however, significant details regarding the last election in Kashmir in 1952 furnished by the Indian Election Commissioner, whose jurisdiction was extended for the first time to the state on the eve of the election. The Kashmir Legislative Assembly has at present 75 members, of whom 50 are from Kashmir Valley, 18 from Jammu, 4 from Ladakh, and 3 from the other areas. The Indian Election Commissioner's jurisdiction was only of a general nature, the actual arrangements—such as the appointment of returning and polling officers, the preparation of the electoral roll, etc.—being the sole responsibility of the state Government. According to the official report, a number of returning officers were of poor quality, ignorant of the technicalities and rules of procedure. Of 294 nomination papers filed by would-be candidates, 57 were rejected by these officials on technical grounds. At the time of voting for the 75 seats, there were no contests in 34 constituencies, the Government's candidates being therefore declared successful without a poll. (The figures for the rest of India may be cited in comparison: of 494 seats for the Lok Sabha, only 3 were uncontested, while for all the state Legislative Assemblies—about 2,850—only 13 were uncontested.) One can draw one's conclusions from these figures. Provided that the next election in

Kashmir is really free from all outside influence, it is possible that Sh. Abdullah and his followers may be persuaded to participate as candidates.

All this could happen without violation of India's contention that Kashmir is an integral part of India. If, as is likely, Sheikh Abdul Karim secured a majority in the state legislature, it should be allowed to form a Ministry. Kashmir's foremost need today is a representative Government capable of giving the people a clean and efficient administration. Provided that Mrs. Gandhi will sanction these steps—first release of Sheikh Abdullah and his followers, and then a tighter control over the state's electoral machinery—further development could wait until the general election next year.

Without doubt, a testing time is ahead of the Prime Minister in the months before the election. Should there be a fresh trial of strength in the leadership next year, Mrs. Gandhi will succeed or fail on the basis of her performance this year, and positive achievements will be expected in a period of months. She is faced with many immense problems, and in dealing with them she has to carry with her the top Congress leaders, the Centre and the Chief Ministers of states who worked for her election last January. On the other hand, her acceptance of Western (and especially American) aid is pushing the so-called 'progressives' and the left-wing elements, both in her own party and among the Communists, to a sharp antagonism to her policies. Sniping has in fact begun in a number of Communist journals regarding the communiqué issued from Washington at the end of her talks with President Johnson, and the resumption of full-scale American aid will increase this trend.

Brief reference may be made to two other specific problems. The devaluation of the rupee on 5 June is sorely taxing the resources of Mrs. Gandhi's Government. Though she has so far skilfully met all criticisms, both from within the Congress Party and from Opposition groups, the soundness of the decision will rest, for the common market, on the effectiveness of the Government's measures to prevent a rise in the prices of essential commodities. The announcement on 15 June of the Government's intention to establish a network of co-operative consumers' stores has not prevented a sharp rise in the price of articles such as edible oil, soap, drugs, fruit, and vegetables. It is not only the politicians who have vigorously criticized the Planning Commission for glaring inadequacies during the first three Five-Year Plans in the achievement of its ambitious schemes of economic and social progress. They have powerful support of a former Governor of the Reserve Bank, Mr H. V. K. Iyengar, who attributes the 50 per cent rise in the cost of living in the three years to heavy defence expenditure and unrealistic planning. Many economists of repute hold the view that devaluation is the price which must be paid for the Planning Commission's extravagant schemes.

ing the past fifteen years. Mr C. D. Deshmukh, an ex-Finance Minister and a former Governor of the Reserve Bank, has criticized Mrs Gandhi's Government as lacking in competence and demanded the inclusion of men of talent from outside the ranks of the Congress. Mrs Gandhi is well aware of the implications of a failure to control a general rise in prices, and its serious repercussions on the election prospects of her party.

A second problem causing much anxiety to the Prime Minister arises from a decision to divide the Punjab into two new states, the Punjabi Suba and Hariyana. The decision, in essence a concession to Sikh sentiment, has brought to the surface fresh complications, because of the unwillingness of the leaders of the two embryonic states to accept certain compromises offered by the Prime Minister. Another offshoot of the states' reorganization scheme put into operation ten years ago is the claim of Maharashtra for the transfer of some regions then included in Mysore. A solution acceptable to both states would be a miracle of statesmanship. One of the most distressing features of the present agitation is the frequency of resort to direct action over this and other problems, with the scarcely concealed encouragement of men in responsible positions. This is gravely undermining the general respect for law, as the Attorney-General observed in Bombay at the end of June, reducing it 'almost to vanishing point'.

The 23rd CPSU Congress and the new Soviet Five-Year Plan

RAYMOND HUTCHINGS

THE 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, held in October 1961, adopted the rule that future regular Congresses were to be held at least once every four years. The 23rd should therefore have met at latest in 1965, but in fact was convened on 29 March 1966. The Congress was intentionally held at an opportune time for 'discussing' the draft of the new Soviet Five-Year Plan. Of four earlier Congresses held since the war, two—the 20th (1956) and the 21st ('extraordinary') Congress (1959)—were convened at the outset of long-term plans. On the other hand, the 22nd and 23rd Congresses are not closely comparable from an economic

Dr Hutchings is a Senior Research Fellow in Economic History at the Australian National University.

standpoint;¹ a comparison of the 23rd with the 21st is more revealing. 'Theses' of Khrushchev's report on the 'Control Figures' of the Se Year Plan (1959-65) were published on 14 November 1958 and were cussed extensively in the press; the 21st Congress approved the 'Control Figures' which were published on 8 February 1959. This year the table began later and has been more compressed. An initial Draft 'Directives' for the Five-Year Plan was published on 20 February, the Congress was convened 37 days later, as compared with the 74 which separated publication of Khrushchev's 'Theses' and the convening of the 21st Congress. The 23rd Congress approved the Directives which were published in revised form on 10 April 1966.

First Secretary of the Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, who delivered the opening speech, devoted to economics, science, and culture a slightly larger share of a somewhat shorter oration than Khrushchev gave at the previous Congress. The relevant section was entitled 'The Struggle of the Party for Creating the Material-Technical Basis of Communism' compared with Khrushchev's 'The Entry of the Soviet Union into the Period of Widened Construction of Communism'. One might think 'entry' should follow 'struggle', whereas the chronological sequence of the relevant speeches was the converse. Khrushchev's optimism, exuberant energy, and sense of urgency have been tempered by a stark realism. The present leaders imply that they are not 'running off ahead' as Khrushchev is accused of having done.

One should not overstate the difference. Brezhnev also boasted Soviet achievements in an international context, though without Khrushchev's overweening stridency. But Khrushchev ad-libbed and let some surprises, such as that the urban population had grown unexpectedly fast. These too were absent from Brezhnev's report, which perhaps more balanced but, to the foreign observer, less exciting. It followed by only 5 days of discussion instead of 7½ as in 1961, but A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, had spoken at the Directives on 5 April discussion continued for another 2½ days; together therefore the discussion time was the same at the two Congresses.

The new Plan (the Eighth, but this is not stressed, there having been the Seventh*) will run from 1966 to 1970 inclusive. As its predecessor covers seven years, a direct comparison of percentage increases applicable to terminal years would be misleading; in the tables (p. 360) all growth rates are therefore expressed as an annual (approximate average) rate. However, strictly speaking, the *Plan* has not yet been composed: this was accomplished by the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) in consultation with other governmental and business organizations. The only

¹ The 22nd gave pride of place to political affairs. See 'Communists in the Press', in *The World Today*, December 1961 and January 1962.

² The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60) was superseded by the unnumbered Seven-Year Plan (1959-65).

lished provisions are 'Directives' which, as already stated, are available in two versions. Further immediate comment relates to the revised version.

Comparison with previous Plan

As fewer statistics are provided this time, the opportunity to compare plan and performance of the Seven-Year with the new Plan is rather more limited than was possible in 1959 relative to a previous period. Total industrial output will grow a little more slowly than was forecast or achieved in 1959-65, a larger number of listed branches being scheduled to expand less rapidly than are scheduled to expand more rapidly. The latter group comprises: coal, forging-pressing equipment, and motor vehicles (more rapidly than was either planned or achieved in 1959-65); mineral fertilizers and leather footwear (more rapidly than was achieved, though not more rapidly than was planned); and fish and seafoods (more rapidly than was planned, though not than was achieved). Most strikingly promoted are motor vehicles, whose output will grow three times faster than was planned for 1959-65 and more than six times faster than was actually achieved. Other listed branches will grow either at the same rate or in most cases—more slowly than was either planned or achieved in 1959-65. The deceleration is quite marked in respect of gas, oil, turbines, chemical equipment, furniture, meat, sugar, and whole-milk products.

Most of these slackenings represent a bowing to economic realism. The output of meat cannot recover immediately from the holocaust of swine in 1963, when the head dropped from 53.9 (million) to 27.7. Gas and oil will not grow as fast in 1966-70 as in the previous seven years, and this enables coal to make a partial comeback to popularity. The slowdown in the rate of expanding the output of chemical equipment will be matched by a slower expansion of some chemical products. Kosygin pointed out, however, that this signified no relaxation in chemicals development, only a more realistic approach: earlier proposals in many cases lacked projects, technical plans, equipment, or adequate building capacity, while plant utilization was low owing to design defects. Although chemicals are still emphasized, it is now denied that the development of chemicals ought to be counterposed to that of ferrous metallurgy. Indeed, ferrous metallurgy seems to do quite well, whatever the leadership wants: it fully implemented the Seven-Year Plan, despite Khrushchev's gibe at 'metal-eaters', and is planning almost the same growth rate in 1966-70.

The rising output of furniture may have bumped up against a ceiling of residential construction, which in the U.S.S.R. is financed partly by the State and partly by individuals. In this latter sphere the Seven-Year Plan was fulfilled unevenly: State residential building by 87 per cent, but private house-building (in the countryside) by only 51 per cent. The new target for building by the State and by co-operatives is slightly above the

annual rate projected for 1959-65, whereas the estimate for private housing building has been brought much closer to what was actually achieved that period.

There is scheduled a marked convergence in planned rates of growth of 'Group A' industrial output (producer goods) and of 'Group B' industrial output (consumer goods): 'Group A' is to expand more slowly than provided in the Seven-Year Plan, but 'Group B' faster. Soviet long-plans have always been more completely fulfilled for producer than for consumer goods, as was markedly the case in 1960-65 when 'Group A' output rose faster than had been planned but 'Group B' more slowly. Only a major shift in emphasis can accomplish the convergence now claimed as an objective.

A great deal will depend here on agricultural performance. Agricultural output is scheduled to expand 2.4 times faster per annum than it actually did in 1958-65. This sounds ambitious, but investment in agriculture (especially from State sources) will increase, and morale must respond to more favourable prices for agricultural deliveries and because of lower prices for items consumed by the rural population. The planned increase of 25 per cent in total output may consequently be reached. However, the Seven-Year Plan proposed that agricultural output should grow faster than 'Group B' output, whereas it is now proposed that 'Group A' output should grow three-quarters faster than agricultural output. This implies a concentration on manufacturing consumer goods which depend largely on agricultural deliveries: notably motor cars, radios, synthetic fabrics. An apparent discrepancy is left between the anticipated performances of agriculture and of food manufacture: whereas the Seven-Year Plan had expected the two to grow at equal rates, the food industry is now expected to grow more than 50 per cent faster than agriculture which suggests a strained situation in supplies of foodstuffs to industry unless foodstuffs imports grow substantially. The problem is highlighted in the target for canned goods, whose output is now planned to rise nearly twice as fast as it actually did in 1959-65.

A comparison of achievements in 1959-65 with the new Plan yields little more detail. Both cars and lorries will be made in much larger numbers, and there is a greater emphasis on producing tractors. The current target is much less ambitious than was actually achieved: in contrast to Khrushchev's emphatic preference for cement and especially for prefabricated concrete parts, the present leadership is placing more reliance on 'traditional' materials such as brick (which has lately been in short supply) and timber. The target output for radios seems at first excessive, but the industry will concentrate on producing transistorised better-designed makes. Refrigerator output will continue to rise by as much as 25 per cent annually.

In 1959-65 the fastest growing Republics as regards industrial output

were to have been Kazakhstan (over 15 per cent, on average, per annum), and Moldavia, Kirghiziya, and Armenia (nearly 12 per cent each). In 1966-70 they will be Tajikistan and Armenia (over 12 per cent), and Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and Moldavia (over 11 per cent). This means a certain shift of emphasis towards the European regions and especially Belorussia, which Republic is now to expand as fast as Kazakhstan instead of, as before, little more than half as fast. The trend conforms to what was actually achieved in 1959-65: Kazakhstan apparently still short of its original objective, whereas Belorussia, Tajikistan, and the three Baltic Republics advanced beyond theirs. In Belorussia a main factor seems to have been recent oil discoveries.

Capital Investment

As with previous Plans, the fulfilment of the present one will depend especially on the orientation, feasibility, and implementation of the plan of capital investment. Unfortunately this section of the directive is much less informative than last time. Capital investment from all sources will comprise 310 milliard (thousand million) rubles, or 47 per cent more than in 1961-5. If investments rise exponentially this represents an annual growth rate of 8 per cent as compared with 8.8 per cent foreshadowed in the Seven-Year Plan. It is certainly not coincidental that the growth rate of industrial output will be 8.8.4 per cent against 8.8 per cent foreshadowed in the Seven-Year Plan. In other words, the new investment is expected to be no less productive in generating additional industrial output. Yet a slightly larger share of total investment will be devoted now to agriculture: 71 milliards out of 310 milliards, or 22.9 per cent, against 21.4-21.7 per cent; although agriculture is expected to expand by 4.6 per cent, instead of 7.9 per cent, annually. Thus the yield of investment in agriculture is expected to be less than was planned in 1959, although it is planned, or hoped, that it will be greater than was actually achieved in 1959-65. The effectiveness of investments in other branches must consequently rise, whereas recently this effectiveness has been falling.

This is the crux, and the authorities are not giving away much of the hand that they intend to play. Out of the 310 milliards, 152 are destined for industry, transport, and communications; 71 for 'productive construction and acquisition of equipment for agriculture'; and about 75 for 'residential, communal, and cultural construction'. If these groupings do not overlap, this leaves about 12 milliards unaccounted for and no more detail is provided. By contrast, in 1959 the announced total of 194-197 milliards was broken down into 13 sub-divisions which, excepting agriculture, cannot be aggregated to match the present larger groupings. The explanation of this reticence may be national security carried to extraordinary lengths—but it seems equally or more likely that the au-

authorities do not wish to commit themselves in public to particular allocations to individual branches, but prefer to retain a wider scope of manoeuvre. This means that by comparison with the Seven-Year Plan the present directives comprise a more flexible framework.

A need for greater flexibility must have been suggested by previous experience and may arise also from doubt as to the feasibility of the targets for raising efficiency and for securing economies in consumption. Labour productivity in industry is scheduled to grow at about the rate proposed for 1959-65, although its growth rate has in fact been slowly declining. Startling objectives are announced to reduce consumption of intermediate products: of ferrous metals in engineering and metalworking by 20-25 per cent; of fuel in industry by 8-10 per cent, including in electric power generation by 11-14 per cent; and of electric power by 6-8 per cent. Mineral losses are to be reduced and by-product materials and fuel more fully utilized. The extent to which these aims can be realized must seriously affect the capital investment programme, and indeed the whole input-output balance.

Under Soviet conditions, allocations for capital investment have been supplied free of charge to State organizations; this has given rise to such evils as deliberate understating of estimated costs, in order to secure one's place in the queue, with the consequential need to bring in supplementary estimates which aggravate the burden on the economy. The decision, announced in October 1965, to introduce financing of capital investment by repayable loans should mitigate this evil, but probably only slowly. Investments are now to be focused on the re-equipment of existing plants and on quicker completion of work that is already under way, but such intentions have often been voiced before. Two innovations are announced: for building organizations the Five-Year Plan is to be composed with an annual division, and building organizations that finish their work ahead of time will be guaranteed the full allocations promised them.

Foreign trade can be stepped up if things go awry, as in 1963 when the wheat harvest failed. Soviet long-term plans make scant mention of foreign trade, partly because this constitutes a comparatively small (although, on occasion, very important) quantity, and partly because it cannot be planned with as much certainty as the internal economy. The directives contain less rhetoric this time, as compared with 1959, about foreign economic relations, but also even less information. One does not learn, for instance, from the directives that Fiat are to build a large automobile factory in the U.S.S.R. The only novelty in this sphere—appearing only in the revised version of the directives—is an emphasis on trade in patents and licences.

The transport provisions are more balanced (or, if one prefers, more conservative) than the corresponding provisions in the Seven-Year Plan.

the rates of growth of passenger air transport, oil transport by pipeline, and road transport will converge strongly instead of the first two being way out in front. Rail transport, though still increasing in absolute scale, will continue to lose ground relative to other forms.

Delegates' speeches at the Congress were not a whit more informative or interesting than usual. None challenged any accepted principle, or advanced any new one. All proclaimed the achievements of their respective regions or departments. Delegates' requests were usually limited to proposals for speedier development of particular fields in which they were specially concerned. In sum, their speeches contained a number of useful suggestions, but few general themes. Many delegates referred to the harmful effects of 'subjectivism' in economic policy - the official term for denigration of Khrushchev's errors.

As these errors are intended to show, the technical management of the economy has become too complicated a matter for amateurs. Not surprisingly, therefore, a number of delegates concentrated on the resource problem of economic development. Those from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Perm *oblast* pressed for an enlarged supply of water for consumption or irrigation. However, the most effective plea for nature conservation was made not by any self-confessed economic specialist but by the writer Mikhail Sholokhov, who condemned industrial pollution of the Volga and Don and described the Azov basin (an important fishing area) as lying 'on the brink of catastrophe'. Such representations seem to have borne some fruit, as the later version of the directives referred to 'ensuring development of the water economy of the country through the complex utilization and protection of water resources'.

Four questions

As the U.S.S.R. claims to have abolished unemployment, delegates should not without an official lead press for fuller utilization of available labour. However, as cues appeared in the project for the directives and even in Kossygin's speech, the presence of unemployed labour in their respective regions was disclosed by delegates from Tajikistan, Moldavia, Moscow *oblast*, the Mari Autonomous Republic, and Uzbekistan, although the chairman of Gosplan pointed out that labour was short in Moscow and Leningrad, and the Krasnoyarsk delegate that labour resources in Siberia were still insufficient. It appears that labour is generally plentiful in the European regions and Urals, and it is therefore proposed to build in these regions mainly enterprises belonging to labour-intensive branches, to increase shift-working, and otherwise to utilize existing productive resources more fully; new enterprises will be built chiefly in middle-sized and small towns (where the surplus labour is apparently concentrated), whereas in large cities only new service enterprises will be built. The background to this situation is the much larger

August 1965
increase in employment in 1959-65 than the Seven-Year Plan had had shadowed and the relatively large increase now proposed (see Table 1). The official prescription contains both popular and unpopular elements: more, and more diversified, work opportunities will be welcome in small communities, whereas increased shift-working if it involves night-work, criticized by Pukhova (see below), will be unpopular.

Congress speakers always include a handful who arrive straight from the lathe or the crowshead. On this occasion the speakers included four—indeed, only four—representatives of the toiling class: N. N. Rusakov, a locksmith-toolmaker; Z. P. Pukhova, a weaver; L. I. Sysoyeva, a millmaid; and V. V. Kholyavko, a steel-smelter. These four had also in common the fact that they all called for harsher measures, which would evidently be enacted, against infringers of labour discipline.

Changes in the Directives

Other recent trends in economic policy may be gleaned from a comparison of the earlier and later versions of the directives. Adjustments doubtless reflect not only delegates' suggestions—which there was scarcely time to take fully into account—but above all re-evaluations during the six-week interim. Practically all federal ('all-Union') statistics of output in 1970 are identical in both versions. Some Republic targets are slightly altered, but, in general, statistics in the two versions are much alike. There is somewhat more difference in qualitative statements, but only certain sections of the directives are altered at all. As section VI 'Capital Construction', which may be regarded as the heart of the Plan is completely unchanged, its overall contours cannot have been substantially altered.

The general introduction (II) adds references to 'wide utilization of electronic computers', 'ensuring development of hydraulic economy' and 'working out and carrying out measures to strengthen protection of nature', and to scientific research and economic accountability. The industrial section (III) is only very slightly modified, mainly in the sense of paying more heed to the latest technical advances; there is more stress on reducing losses in mineral raw materials. The agricultural section (IV) is only slightly modified, in similar directions to section III.

The most important changes figure in section VII, concerning living standards. A definite objective is now set to raise the minimum wage to 60 rubles a month instead of the vague aspiration contained in the earlier version of the directives. Regional additions ('coefficients') are to be made universal in the Far East and Far North, and other privileges for workers in the Far North will be extended. (This reverses Khrushchev's policy of attenuating regional income differentiation.) It is now stated that a five-day week (without reduction in weekly hours) will be introduced, and that there will be further cuts in personal income taxes.

guaranteed monthly wage ...
 ge of corresponding grades of State farm workers, as to be ...
 actually. This will be a remarkable innovation,² and one wonders why
 intention should have been formulated only in the second version of
 directives, and whether the possible implications of necessary price
 port for agricultural products have been fully investigated. Greater
 is inserted about pensions, which will be paid from the age of 50
 certain female workers in industry. Collective farmers will be equated
 h workers and employees as regards pensionable age and the pro-
 are for accumulating pensions. Pensions awarded to collective farmers
 ase of sickness or injury will be improved.

ection VIII, about location, includes a number of mostly very minor
 nges. Several Republics raise slightly their targets for producing
 ted goods. Latvia and the R.S.F.S.R. will make more furniture.
 ously, the R.S.F.S.R. has found it possible to raise substantially its
 get for canned goods, from 4·5-4·7 to 5·4-5·6 milliard 'standard
 s'. There are adjustments (on the whole a small reduction) in areas
 ve brought under irrigation.

conclusions

Speakers contrasted the 'loud phrase-mongering' of the dismissed,
 ough at this Congress unnamed, Khrushchev with the 'calm, business-
 -tone' of the present leaders. The new Plan lays claim to partake of
 ilogous qualities of balance, of doing things without undue haste, and
 doing them properly, with due deference to the counsels of science.
 iewever, the information so far vouchsafed about the Plan is insufficient
 enable it to be evaluated with confidence. Experience suggests that it
 l prove difficult to bring so close together the rates of growth of 'Group
 and 'Group B' outputs; to restrict new construction in the more
 ously settled and accessible regions; or to secure sizeable economies in
 ' consumption of materials or fuel. The capital investment plan is
 ly to be barely adequate, or will very possibly be inadequate, even if
 at projects such as a southwards diversion of rivers to replenish the
 pian Sea continue to be postponed. The agricultural target, though
 uably within reach, remains exacting. At this stage one can say little
 re, except that the new Plan looks more realistic than its predecessor.
 The Plan promises no lightening of the burden on Soviet industry or
 struction, but may go into history as marking a new deal for agricul-
 e - especially as regards farmers' living standards- and a further nule-
 ne in the more benevolent treatment of the Soviet consumer, wage-
 ner, and rural pensioner. The objective of raising consumption by

According to a decree of 18 May, this guaranteed wage was to be introduced
 from 1 July 1966. Bank credits must be granted to those collective farms which
 not implement the measure from their own resources.

about 30 per cent per head is not sensational, but Soviet living standards may in certain respects—though not all—draw near to those of advanced countries in Western Europe. Khrushchev's challenges to the United States—which were only in directions where overtaking was envisaged as feasible—having been forgotten with their author, the Soviet economy can potentially advance towards more rational objectives. But the U.S.S.R. will now at last imitate other countries and produce more motor cars. In this sphere, of course, there can be no imminent challenge to any developed country.

TABLE I
ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH: GENERAL INDICATORS

	1965 Plan relative to 1958 Actual	1965 Actual relative to 1958 Actual	1970 Plan relative to 1965 Actual
Gross Industrial Production	8.8	9.1	8.0-8.4
Producer Goods (Group A)	9.2-9.4	9.6*	8.3-8.7
Consumer Goods (Group B)	7.1-7.4	6.3*	7.4-7.9
National Income	7.1-7.4	6.3†	6.6-7.1
Capital Investment	8.8‡	n.a.	n.a.
Labour Force (State sector)	2.9	4.7	3.7-3.9
Productivity (Industrial)	4.3-4.6	n.a.	4.2-4.9
Real Incomes (urban)§	4.9	n.a.	3.7
Real Incomes (rural)§	at least 4.9	n.a.	6.2-7.0
Retail Trade Turnover	7.1	6.9	at least 7.0
Agricultural Production	7.9	1.9	4.6

* 1965 Actual relative to 1960 Actual.

† Used for consumption and accumulation.

‡ Compared with aggregate over previous period of same length.

n.a. = not available.

§ Per working person.

TABLE II
ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

	1965 Plan relative to 1958 Actual	1965 Actual relative to 1958 Actual	1970 Plan relative to 1965 Actual
Steel	6.7-7.5	7.5	6.3-7.3
Rolled Metal	6.1-7.2	7.4	6.0-7.0
Oil	more than 10.4	11.6	7.3-7.9
Gas	25.8	23.2	11.7-13.2
Coal	2.8-3.0	2.1	2.8-3.2
Electric Power	11.2-11.9	11.8	10.7-10.9
Mineral Fertilizers	about 17.0	14.0	14.6-15.5
Cement	n.a.	11.7	6.6-7.7
Motor Vehicles	6.0-7.9	2.6	17.2-19.6
Meat*	11.5	6.3	4.2-5.2
Fish and Seafoods	6.9	10.2	8.0-9.2
Butter*	6.7	7.4	1.7

* From State resources only.

n.a. = not available.

Note of the month

The postponement of the Arab Summit

As we go to press, Egyptian and Saudi Arabian representatives are meeting in Kuwait to discuss the continuing civil war in the Yemen and the breakdown of the agreement reached between King Feisal and President Nasser last year. The meeting takes place on the initiative of the Kuwait Government, which is still exerting every effort to prevent the break-up of the Arab world into a new civil war between military republics and royalist emirates and sultanates. The threatening schism seemed to have started beyond any conceivable hope of bridging it in the first week of August, after the postponement of the Arab League Summit which was to have met in Algiers on 5 September. Once again, however, the ability to ignore the well-nigh unignorable and to overlook the almost unoverlookable for which inter-Arab politics are notorious seems to have saved the day. The chasm still yawns, but it has not grown any wider.

The crisis began with two violent speeches made by President Nasser, in Cairo on 22 July and in Alexandria on 26 July, in which the Egyptian leader called for the indefinite postponement of the projected Summit conference, on the ground that to confer with 'Arab reaction' on action against Israel, when that 'Arab reaction' was as much tarred with the imperialist brush as Israel herself, was 'shameful'. He coupled this with a direct attack on Saudi Arabia for allowing the establishment of a British base on Saudi soil. The allegation, formally denied both in London and Riyadh, well expressed President Nasser's resentment at the recent Anglo-Saudi arms deal; and, Egyptian intelligence being more renowned for the subtlety of its intrigue than for the accuracy of its information, it is possible that President Nasser himself believed his allegations. Even if he had doubts about them, it is clear that the tendency to build up King Feisal which now dominates British thinking on Arab matters, when taken with the hardening of opinion in Washington on the vital wheat deliveries to Egypt, appears to President Nasser as yet another Western attempt to 'put him down to size'; and the coincidence of the attempt with the tenth anniversary of Suez probably meant more to him than merely a made-to-measure propaganda platform from which to strike back.

President Nasser's call, as might have been expected, received immediate backing from the Governments of Iraq, Syria, and the Yemen. The Government of Dr Abdel Rahman al Bazzaz, since replaced unexpectedly

by Mr Naji Talib, had made an unquestioning commitment to President Nasser a substitute for an independent foreign policy, while it devoted its main efforts to attempting to end the Kurdish war in northern Iraq. This was underlined by the release on 29 June of a twelve-point plan to end the Kurdish war, followed by the visit of Dr al Bazzaz to Cairo for talks with the Egyptian Premier, M. Mohieddin, at the end of July, at which Dr al Bazzaz's Kurdish plans received the latter's official blessing. Iraq's support for Cairo was emphasized by the announcement, at the height of the crisis over postponement of the Summit conference, that 'the Iraqi-Egyptian unified political command' would meet at Prime Ministers' level in Baghdad in September.

The Syrians have been cautiously attempting to better relations with Egypt for some time. But Cairo still suspects the Syrian leadership, and Syro-Iraqi relations remain very poor. Nor can the new Syrian foreign policy against Israel be at all welcome in Cairo, where informed opinion weighs the Syrian armed forces no higher than it did during the troubled period of Egyptian-Syrian union. The present Republican regime in the Yemen stands in a peculiar relationship to President Nasser. Without Egyptian troops, it now seems that it has little hope of winning against the Yemeni hill tribes which still support the Imam; with them, it is gradually losing the support of the towns and the coastal areas which are much more Yemeni nationalist than pan-Arab in sentiment and resent Egyptian direction as much as the Syrians did. On foreign-policy issues, however, what unites all these States is their common suspicion of Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

More belated backing came from the Governments of the Lebanon, Libya, and Morocco. The Lebanese were, of course, simply maintaining their usual position of neutrality in all inter-Arab quarrels. Since their prolonged taste of civil war back in 1958, the Lebanese have re-embraced the creed of neutrality with an enthusiasm which would not disgrace the Swiss, whom they equally resemble in their concentration on business. The Libyan regime is equally inclined to avoid trouble on issues such as these. Strung half-way between the Middle East and the Maghrib, ruled by a semi-religious monarch and sustained by oil revenues, and still involved in base agreements with the United States and Britain, the Libyans have good reason not to want to provoke Cairo against them; most of Cairo radio's anti-Saudi diatribes apply in equal measure, if not more strongly, to Libya than to their actual target.

The Moroccan Government showed distinct signs of being fed up with the whole business. The Moroccan Note accepting the postponement of the conference displayed a certain weariness of tone; this possibly was one factor in persuading Cairo to attempt to suppress it. Moroccan protests, backed by hostile comment in the Moroccan press on the inability of both sides to agree on the Yemen, caused the Note to be published in

Cairo—it had already been broadcast over Rabat radio—with an Egyptian reply welcoming Morocco's proposal for mediatory action by those Arab States which were 'capable of bringing about a rapprochement' between the various parties. Going one better than Cairo, the Jordanian Government has since announced that King Hussein is to visit Fez for talks on the improvement of inter-Arab relations; his arrival there coincided with our going to press.

The new flare-up between Cairo and Riyadh hit the Kuwaitis very hard. Their announcement that they would perforce accept the Egyptian demand for postponement of the Summit meeting came only on 4 August, after the Kuwaiti Cabinet had appealed to President Nasser to reconsider his proposal. Even then the announcement said that they were only prepared to accept a limited postponement, not the indefinite postponement requested by Cairo. It is clear that on balance they inclined towards Riyadh rather than Cairo, though with the utmost reluctance. A Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian agreement on the division of the oil-rich neutral zone, announced on 1 August, underlined the ties between the two States.

Of the remaining Arab States, Tunisia has been boycotting the Arab League for over a year, and President Bourguiba has recently demonstrated his indifference to Arab criticism by a visit to West Germany. The Tunisian press hailed the mixed reception accorded to the Egyptian proposals as an encouraging sign that a 'fresh breeze' was blowing among the Arab States, which would no longer accept the status of Egyptian satellites. The Sudan was caught by the crisis in the middle of a constitutional crisis of her own, and Khartoum was isolated for several days. The new Sudan Cabinet seems inclined to put its main efforts into an attempt to reconcile its Arab North with its African South under a Sudan national flag rather than a pan-Arab flag. But its position remains unclear. As the host country, the Algerian Government had to remain neutral in the controversy; but the indications are that Colonel Boumedienne is unlikely to forgive President Nasser the role he has played in wrecking the Arab Summit conference after the cancellation, again on Egyptian initiative, of the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers last year. It is to be noted that he has cancelled the visit he was about to make to Cairo, on a plea of pressure of business.

There remain the two direct targets of President Nasser's wrath and Cairo press and radio invective, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. President Nasser staged his attack during King Hussein's State visit to London. But there is a good deal to suggest that the real point at issue between them was the Palestine Liberation Organization. Mohammed Halkal, editor of Cairo's *al-Ahram*, who is widely believed to act as Nasser's press outlet, has been talking of 'macabre plots to liquidate' the PLO. Ahmed Shukairy, the PLO leader, had been claiming the right to organize a

~~... army on Jordanian soil under PLO command and~~
King Hussein, understandably reluctant to give free play to a
whom even President Nasser has had his problems, is said to h
momentarily with the idea of resurrecting the aged Mufti of Jer
a counter-rallying-point for the 600,000-odd Palestinians now
Jordan. It is more than likely that the Arab Summit conferen
met, would have been the scene of some pretty plain speaking.
standards, on the subject of controlling M. Shukairy.

Much more important in President Nasser's eyes, however
growth in Saudi power and influence; and far more venom has b
charged against Riyadh than against Amman these last few we
gradual progress of settlement in the Gulf, the *rapprochement* l
Iran and Saudi Arabia, the increasing possibility that Saudi Ara
not Egypt will step into the gap left by British withdrawal threat
irretrievable disaster President Nasser's hopes of Arab empire ut
acqis. Perhaps most alarming has been Riyadh's exploitation of t
of an Islamic Summit. From 2 to 9 August, President Osman of S
a State with its own troubles and isolation, was in Saudi Arabia fi
with King Feisal, talks which from President Osman's first public
ance on 3 August seem to have centred on the convention of an I
Summit conference. Such a conference is a long way yet from con
but the reaction of the propagandists in Cairo, Damascus, and B
was so immediate as to show the alarm which it spreads among tl
ponents of secular revolution in the Arab world. Damascus anc
radios have even attributed the deposition of Sheikh Shakhbut
Dhabi to his refusal to accept a Gulf federation to be linked wit
Arabia in the Islamic alliance with which Britain was alleged to
tempting to screen off the Gulf from the true Arab world.

The Saudi Government has replied by threatening to freeze its
cial and other commitments to all Arab Summit organizations, un
time as the fourth Arab Summit conference meets. King Feisal
ready been holding back on Saudi contributions to the agreed ant
programme, Saudi Arabia having contributed only £7 m. as
Egypt's £17 m. to the PLO, the unified Arab command, and the di
of the Jordan waters. Jiddah radio has countered the attacks from
by lengthy disquisitions on Soviet influence in Egypt, accusing Pr
Nasser of allowing himself to be used as the spearhead of a Soviet
on Middle Eastern oil, to be staged on Britain's withdrawal from
Arabia.

All of this can be seen as an example of the role propaganda play
struggle for power in the Arab world, propaganda being the only
available today that will not provoke Great Power intervention.
real focus is on the Yemen and the presence of Egyptian troops
Yemen -- and the vacuum to be created with the British withdraw

...that Britain cannot see ...
...world. The manoeuvring to seize her place has already begun.
D. C. WATT

ERRATUM

In the article 'Changes in Communist advice to developing countries' in the August 1966 issue of *The World Today*, 'V. G. Solodnikov' should read 'V. G. Solodovnikov'.

Towards the super-Power deadlock

NEVILLE BROWN

POPULAR thinking about deterrence and defence has long been especially influenced by a pair of neat propositions. One is that arms races always lead to war, the other that, sooner or later, an antidote is forthcoming to every new weapon that is produced. The second of these propositions, of course, largely dependent upon the first. Arms races that have led to war have usually done so because one side believes itself to have an advantage in terms of quality or numbers that is definite but temporary.

During the early 1950s the technological rivalry between the United States and the U.S.S.R. seemed to many to be posing a uniquely terrible threat to the survival of mankind. The possible tempo of a global conflict was being increased several hundredfold. Firepower had ceased to be a resource that was so precious that good generals sought to conserve it for the time and place of maximum effect and had become instead one that was grotesquely superabundant. Nuclear science, aeronautics, electronics, and many other disciplines were combining to accelerate the arms race between the two super-Powers that was the mainspring of these grim changes.

By the beginning of the present decade, the prospect was little altered, apparently. The pace of technical innovation had, if anything, increased and the arms race that it was sustaining seemed as unstable as ever. More recently, however, there have been signs that the wind of change is at this level, blowing itself out, and that a strategic stalemate is becoming established between the United States and the U.S.S.R. It is a stalemate that promises to be of indefinite duration.

The historical background

The first American thermonuclear device was exploded in 1952 and the first Russian one in 1953. The following year the Bravo Test was conducted at Bikini and the hydrogen bomb that was then set off liberated over twice as much energy as was released by all the shells and bombs used in the second World War. And then, in 1955, the Americans brought the B-52 *Stratofortress* into service, their first intercontinental bomber of post-war design. Meanwhile, the Red Air Force had started to receive the *Tupolev-20* - the *Bear* as NATO was to call it - and this too was capable

Mr Brown is Lecturer in International Relations at Birmingham University and Defence Correspondent of the *New Statesman*.

an intercontinental round trip without refuelling. Although the *Bear* is smaller and less versatile than the *Stratfortress*, its appearance made a deep impression on American opinion. The Soviet strategic bombing effort against the Nazis had been on a small scale and sporadic, and so it seemed that the U.S.S.R. had made alarming progress in terms of both concept and application. Thence arose the legend of the 'bomber gap', a legend that induced Congress to vote extra air force appropriations in the course of 1956.

But, thanks to the Lockheed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights, soon became clear that the U.S.S.R. had given priority to strategic defence rather than strategic attack. Authoritative estimates suggest that during the 1950s she spent three times as much on anti-aircraft defences as did the U.S. And even today she employs about three times as many soldiers and airmen in this field as do the U.S. and Canada combined. In this emphasis can be seen an anxiety to preserve an illusion of invulnerability both to violent onslaught and to espionage, and this anxiety has also manifested itself in other aspects of the Soviet military posture. For example, a great deal of wealth has been expended on the creation and maintenance of squadrons of aircraft and naval vessels with a view to keeping all seaborne enemies at a safe distance from Soviet shores. The range and lethality of modern weapons are such that this is a futile quest.

Much attention has also been paid, however, to creating and maintaining a strategic bomber arm, but the U.S.S.R. has shown less interest in having air fleets able to hit North America than in having ones equipped to strike at Western Europe. By 1961 she had, instead of the 1,000 intercontinental bombers predicted by U.S. intelligence in 1956, a mere 200, about half being *Bears* and the rest a rather smaller type. But she had also built by then 1,000 *Tupolev-16 Badgers*. These are medium range machines and they have been principally located in the westernmost regions of the U.S.S.R.

Bombers versus missiles

By this time, of course, long-range missiles had also started to feature in the inventories of both the super-Powers. And with their advent fierce debates began about the future of the large bomber. Bombers approach their targets on paths that are lower and less predictable than those of missiles and they carry more varied and sophisticated means of confusing round-based radar. Each one may carry several warheads at a time and may make more than one sortie. But these merits are offset by some important ones that long-range missiles possess. Their maximum speeds are characteristically well over ten times as great as those achieved by strategic bombers and this, plus the small average size of the radar images that they project, means that in some situations they might achieve complete tactical surprise and that in all situations they would be uniquely difficult to

- shoot down in flight. A land-based strategic missile is usually cheaper to procure than a strategic bomber, whether the respective support installations are taken into account or not, and it is invariably much cheaper to maintain. Emplaced missiles are easier to protect against blast and other thermonuclear effects than are stationary bombers. Missiles used to be much less accurate than bombers, but it could now be argued that, thanks to the great progress made in missile guidance and to the fallibility of aircrews under stress conditions, they have become, in general, at least as accurate. Nobody can yet be certain when or whether strategic bombers will disappear from the military establishments of the super-Powers but already their role within them has become a secondary one.

By 1956 American radar located in Turkey had detected the test-firing of a Soviet long-range rocket. *Sputnik I*'s release the following year confirmed official fears that the U.S.S.R. had already become able to hit with rocket fire any region on earth. So once again many American strategic commentators argued that development would be followed by extensive procurement, and the consequent fear of an impending 'missile gap' helped the Democrats to secure their narrow victory in the Presidential election of 1960. Not only in the U.S., however, was *Sputnik* seen as a portent. 'The East Wind,' said Mao Tse-tung, was 'prevailing over the West Wind'. The superiority of the 'anti-imperialist bloc' had 'reached unprecedented heights', said the *People's Daily*, and this had brought about 'a major turning-point' in international affairs. China's impatience with Soviet caution increased sharply during the Lebanon and Formosa crises of 1958. This must have been in part due to her misreading of the course of the arms race.

What actually happened was curiously similar, however, to the sequence in regard to manned bombers. Again the Soviet planners were preoccupied with the significance of Europe either as a potential hostage or as a prime source of aggression. Between 1961 and early 1963 an echelon of 700 fixed and mobile Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles was built up opposite Europe. Yet late in 1962 the U.S.S.R. had only about 75 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, whereas the U.S. had about three times that number, plus about 30 *Jupiter* IRBMs emplaced in Greece and Turkey and about 100 of the *Polaris* type mounted in submarines. The U.S.S.R. also had a few missile-firing submarines, but they were crude affairs by comparison with the *Polaris* boats.

Advent of Minuteman

Nor was the imbalance a purely numerical one. At this level of missile technology an important landmark is the introduction of solid fuels, and this was reached by the U.S. when the *Minuteman* rocket entered service in the spring of 1962. All the earlier intercontinental rockets had been fuelled by liquids, largely because smooth burning rates, which appeared

be necessary for accurate guidance, were easier to secure through a system of pumps and valves. And in all of these models, including all the RBMs the Soviet Union had in 1962, the liquids used were 'unstorable', they could not be held for long outside a deeply refrigerated environment. Therefore the missile tanks had to be loaded immediately prior to firing and this, plus the fact that a great deal of ground equipment was needed for fuel storage and control, made it both costly and difficult to provide each site with much ferro-concrete protection. Furthermore, the Soviet rockets were exceptionally large and clumsy and would have taken all over half an hour to load with fuel; half an hour was all the time any RBM needed to reach the U.S.S.R. from the United States. In 1961, the Americans had begun to reconnoitre the U.S.S.R. by means of artificial satellites and had thus come to possess exact knowledge about Soviet ICBM strength and dispositions. And their capacity to use this knowledge to knock out all Russia's ICBMs on her launching-sites seemed to be assured by their announced plans for the mass-production of *Minuteman*. Speaking at Ann Arbor in Michigan in June 1962, Mr McNamara pointed out that for some time ahead the U.S. would be able, if necessary, to defeat the U.S.S.R. simply by confining attacks to her key military installations. The Soviet attempt to move MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba that autumn can be regarded as having been, at least to some extent, an endeavour to narrow the margins of her strategic inferiority. This endeavour was, of course, abortive, but several of the developments which have taken place since have combined to make the inter-continental balance both much more equal and much more stable. In the course of 1963 the U.S.S.R. brought into service an ICBM which, like the *tan II* which the Americans have introduced to complement the *minuteman* force, is fuelled by 'storable liquids', i.e. fuels that can be held in a rocket for extended periods of time. ICBMs with tanks loaded with such fuels can be fired within a matter of minutes and this could enable them to leave the ground in the interval between the detection of an incoming enemy salvo and its impact. Thus the U.S.S.R. became able to avoid a complete disarming blow, except in the rather improbable eventuality of all of her missile surveillance radars being neutralized beforehand. But this particular solution was one that was not compatible with precise command and control. One danger was that, through having acted in such haste, the U.S.S.R. might respond over mightily to a limited attack. Another was that precipitate action might be taken on the basis of misreading of radar echoes. Some commentators may have exaggerated this danger at the time but their fears were far from baseless. It would appear, however, that, within the last year or so, the Soviet Union has started to add solid-fuelled ICBMs to her strategic inventory. The Victory Parade that was held in Moscow in May 1965 was used to show the world a new ICBM, the size and shape of which were compar-

able to those of *Minuteman*. It is likely that, in all of its three propulsion stages, this model, which NATO now knows as *Savage*, uses either a true solid fuel or else a gelled liquid, which amounts to much the same thing. Such substances allow speeds of reaction that are even faster than those obtained with storable liquids. Furthermore, the missiles and missile emplacements that can be designed around them are remarkably compact and this compactness renders them cheap to produce and easy to harden.

Cost effectiveness

Enough information has been made available in the case of the American *Minuteman* to provide confirmation of both these propositions. Each rocket stands 60 feet high and is some 6 feet wide; it has a marginal production cost of \$500,000 and has a warhead with a yield of approximately one megaton,¹ which costs perhaps another \$1 m. It is emplaced vertically in a very resistant ferro-concrete 'silo', the cover of which is almost flush with the earth's surface; this also costs something like \$1 m. Added to this is the elaborate command and control system which helps to minimize the chances of inadvertent or unauthorized release; this with the current organization of the *Minuteman* force, costs about \$2.5 m. per emplaced missile. A *Minuteman* unit therefore costs about \$5 m. to produce, about a quarter the cost of the liquid-fuelled units which it has largely replaced.

At present the *Minuteman* force is 800 missiles strong. Exactly how much it would cost to double its strength, say, would depend upon how its pattern of deployment was altered in the process. But it is obvious that any such expense would not make deep inroads into an American defence expenditure that already comfortably exceeds \$50,000 m. a year. So the truth has to be acknowledged that some of the strategic weapons now in service are cheap in proportion not only to their lethality but also to the gross national products of the super-Powers, and, indeed, to those of several of the larger and more prosperous of the world's nations. Considerable strains are always imposed by the development of a strategic weapon, but these tend to be caused less by the financial outlay, which is characteristically only two or three thousand million dollars spread across several years, than by the demands made upon many scarce and highly specific skills. And once the hurdle of development has been surmounted, the problem becomes comparatively straightforward. Indeed, one factor which complicates the discussion of arms control at this level is the ease of manufacture of the systems in question. To eliminate, say, an individual *Minuteman* from an actual or proposed inventory would be nothing like as meaningful an act as, to take an example from inter-war arms control experience, the elimination of a battleship. The construction of a battle-

¹ i.e. 1 million tons of TNT equivalent.

ship was a long, costly, and complex process. . . .
none of these statements holds true.

But, although the cheapness and efficiency of solid-fuelled ICBMs in particular compound the difficulties inherent in formal arms control, they create the probability that the arms race between the super-Powers will soon come to an end of its own accord. Reference has already been made to the fact that *Minuteman*, for example, has been set in very strongly built emplacements. Just how strong has not been revealed but it can be taken for granted that each silo can withstand a shock wave that is well in excess of 300 pounds per square inch. No doubt the U.S.S.R. still lags in this field, as she does in many of the more advanced technologies, but it is probable that the gap between the Russians and the Americans is not large and that it will steadily narrow. And even if her ICBM emplacements can only withstand, on the average, a shock wave of, say, 300 p.s.i. they will still possess a considerable measure of immunity against any thermonuclear attack. A megaton warhead would require a standard error as low as half a mile to stand a one-in-three chance of destroying a silo hardened to that extent. Whether American missiles are yet that accurate over intercontinental ranges is doubtful. It is certain that, once the standard error has reached values as low as this, further reductions become extremely difficult, and progressively more difficult, to achieve.

ICBM stability

In order to evaluate the strategic implications of such technical relationships it is necessary to test them against the established doctrines concerning the conduct of strategic nuclear wars. These have generally been built upon the fundamental axiom that any Power can be said to have suffered total defeat when it has both failed to inflict and lost the capacity to inflict 'an unacceptable level of damage' upon its principal adversary. The notion of 'unacceptable damage' is so speculative and subjective that one sometimes feels that any calculation derived from it should be conducted with the aid of an abacus rather than an electronic computer. But the sort of requirement that is generally borne in mind when the theoretical possibility of a total war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is being discussed is the ability to destroy all or almost all of, say, the 60 largest cities on the other side.

A hypothetical, but not unreasonable, example may serve to illustrate the significance of a stipulation of this kind. Suppose it is, in fact, considered essential to the survival of a certain nation that, in the event of its enemy attempting a complete disarming blow, 61 of its rockets will survive to deliver a punitive counter-attack. Suppose also that if an enemy ICBM is aimed at one of its ICBM sites it will stand one chance in three of destroying it. Then, if the nation in question has an ICBM force of, say, 90, its opponent can expect effectively to disarm it - i.e. cut its

* ICBM strength down to just below 61—by the delivery of a salvo containing a mere 90 ICBMs. But if that nation has 200, an offensive of some 600 strong would be needed to achieve the 70 per cent attrition that would then be required to deprive it of any capacity for adequate retaliation. If it has 300, the offensive requirement becomes almost 1,200.

The Soviet ICBM strength is about 325 at the present time. The Americans, on the other hand, now have 1,500 strategic rockets located either within the continental United States or else in ballistic submarines. But this does not mean that the U.S. still retains the ability to inflict total defeat upon the rival super-Power. It is quite possible, in fact, that the U.S.S.R. has already become able to ride out any kind of attack on her strategic installations and then to inflict tens of millions of fatal casualties by way of reply. And even if she could not achieve this now, she will become able to do so in the very near future. Her rival's continuing preponderance in respect of the quantity and quality of the strategic missiles available could be significant in the context of certain types of limited strategic conflicts that might just conceivably occur. But it would not be decisive in the event of total war.

The growing stability of the ICBM balance has been emphasized in view of the likelihood that the U.S.S.R. will continue to rely heavily on land-based ICBMs as opposed to ballistic submarines, simply because the strong Western presence on the oceans of the world will tend to make Soviet ballistic submarines appear unduly vulnerable, whether they ever are so in reality or not.² And so far, of course, the land-based solution has involved an acceptance of immobile sites. But even this is a limitation that may not apply much longer. Another Russian missile that made its debut in May 1965 was the one that NATO has since christened *Scamp*. This can be fired from a tracked launcher and some Western authorities believe it to have a full intercontinental range. Some years ago much discussion took place within the Pentagon about whether *Minuteman* might be made railway mobile; the proposal that it should was turned down but this was on grounds of cost and convenience rather than feasibility. Interest in the concept may yet revive. A nation possessed of a sizeable force of mobile ICBMs would, of course, be totally immune to any nuclear Pearl Harbour.

The claim that the balance between the super-Powers is becoming utterly stable can be sustained in two senses. One is that neither of them can any longer visualize any substantial dividends from striking a heavy initial blow and, as a corollary, neither need fear being taken by surprise. All this means that the risk of a general war being started by inaccurate radar reports or by a gross misreading of the prospective enemy's intentions has become minimal. But what also seems clear is that the ICBM

² For an extended discussion of the status of ballistic submarines, see the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, August 1966.

deadlock that is now becoming common between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will never be broken by any developments that take place in military science. No doubt modernization of the respective ICBM echelons will continue. No doubt, also, their numerical strengths will be adjusted to modernization, to advances in respect of other types of strategic weapons, and to variations in the nature and extent of the guarantees each super-Power gives to non-nuclear nations. But all such adjustments will amount to little more than esoteric variations upon a simple theme. That theme will be stability.

Anti-missiles

Sceptics about this thesis often argue that anti-missiles may prove to be the antidotal instruments that will sustain the arms race for yet another generation. Soviet military commentators, for example, speak and write with enthusiasm about the practicability of anti-missile defence, thereby reinforcing true to their national tradition of overemphasis of the feasibility and relevance of the active defence of the homeland. But anti-missile warfare is a branch of military science in which the technical and economic aids are weighted so heavily against the defence that it must lose unless it starts from a position of commanding advantage in terms of the weight and quality of disposable resources. Various factors make it inevitable that interception of the tiny and compact ICBM warheads be postponed until they have begun the final descent to their objectives. This leaves the defence very little time in which to achieve the high levels of attention without which its whole effort would be futile. Full application of the classic principle of surprise could well be decisive in a pattern of conflict in which there might well be no second chance, and it is the offence that is best placed to exploit this situation. Various techniques have already been evolved to enable it to do so. Among them are the release of decoys and multiple warheads, erratic alterations of course during the final stages of flight, and the exploding of some warheads high above prospective target areas so as to create zones of partial radar blackout through which other warheads might descend. No ground-based anti-missile batteries could ever be expected to achieve anywhere near 100 per cent success against a challenge of this kind, if it was made by a nation as well endowed with the relevant resources or experience as either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.

And even if defence against a heavy and sophisticated ICBM attack were to reveal far better prospects of becoming efficient than in fact it does, it would still be necessary to rule out general deployment on grounds of comparative cost effectiveness. The investment in electronics required, plus the need to protect individually each major target, makes anti-missile defence incredibly expensive. This means that it would always cost either super-Power many times more to install a continental

- network capable of warding off, say, an attack with 500 ICBMs launched by its rival than it would cost the rival to produce, say, another 500 ICBMs and so swamp the network in question. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have brought anti-missile systems to an advanced stage of development and either or both may, perhaps within the next two or three years, depend upon a rather more than token deployment of them, in order to try to obtain a few extra years' immunity from China's proposed strategic force. If either or both do so, they will disturb the evolving ICBM deadlock between themselves, but they will not destroy it. Stability will be maintained, though at higher levels of ICBM procurement and very marginal shifts in the emphases placed on the secondary offensive weapons. But to say this is not to seek to imply indifference to, or sympathy with, proposals for anti-missile deployment. There are wider considerations which, in the opinion of the present writer, would make the adoption of any of these proposals a deplorable folly.

Nuclear proliferation

The imminence of the super-Power deadlock may well mean that we are entering a phase in which the risk of nuclear war is small. Whether this phase proves to be brief or extended will entirely depend, however, upon the rate at which, and the circumstances in which, nuclear weapons are acquired by States that currently lack them. Nuclear proliferation threatens to revive continually, and often in more acute forms, all the hazards of accidental wars, of surprise attacks, of nuclear espionage, of decisive technical breakthroughs by those bent on nuclear aggression or blackmail, that haunted the world throughout the 1950s and beyond. And to these hazards may be added the danger of clandestine use of nuclear warheads as a consequence of their coming into the possession of States which lack adequate political and social cohesion. Some of the nations that remain unable to create their own independent nuclear deterrents may evolve chemical or bacterial ones instead. And all the tensions with which such proliferation would be associated could be much heightened by the terrifying increase in the Malthusian pressure on resources, a prospect that now seems a certainty. The establishment of the ICBM deadlock between the super-Powers should therefore be seen as a breathing-space in which to progress towards multilateral arms control and towards a more rational and just world economic order. Unless this opportunity is quickly recognized and seized, it is hard to see what can avert, or even postpone, the final plunge into barbarism.

U.S. hegemony and the future of Latin America

CELSO FURTADO

WITHIN the group of nations termed the Third World -nations for whom the problems of development come before all others- Latin America occupies a special position, in view of the peculiarity of its relations with the United States. Almost all the underdeveloped African and Asian countries have achieved political independence within the last two decades and are at present led by a generation that emerged during the revolutionary struggle. The consciousness of victories achieved lends optimism to their behaviour and even leads them to overestimate their strength and capabilities in the effort to overcome underdevelopment. In Latin America, on the contrary, there is a general consciousness of living through a period of decline. On the one hand, the phase of 'easy' development, through increasing exports of primary products or through import substitution, has everywhere been exhausted. On the other, the region is becoming aware that the margin of self-determination, in its search for ways of coping with the tendency towards economic stagnation, is being daily reduced as the imperative of U.S. 'security' calls for a growing alienation of sovereignty on the part of national governments. This difference in the historical situation explains, to some extent, the disparity between the psychological attitudes currently observable among the Latin American peoples and the other peoples of the 'Third World'. To the optimism of the latter is opposed the feeling of revolt that prevails among Latin Americans, particularly in the younger generation. Latin American society is currently going through a revolutionary phase, as a consequence of the penetration of modern technology and the emergence of new collective aspirations within the framework of institutions ill-equipped to absorb this new technology or to interpret and satisfy these aspirations.

It is a notorious fact that the relevant political problems of Latin American countries are of direct interest to the authorities responsible for U.S. security, who are in a position to interfere decisively in the work-

Dr Furtado, the distinguished Brazilian economist, was formerly chief of the Development Division of ECLA, head of the Development Programme for N.E. Brazil (SUDENE) and later of the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento, and Minister of Planning in President Goulart's Government. He is now associate Professor in the Law Faculty of the University of Paris. Author of *Formação Econômica do Brasil* (1959) and *Desenvolvimento e Subdesenvolvimento* (1961).

ing out of a solution for these problems. It is only natural, therefore, that Latin Americans should become increasingly preoccupied with the following questions: (a) what exactly is understood by U.S. security? and (b) to what degree are the interests of this security compatible with the Latin American revolution?

U.S. sphere of influence

A new international order is now inevitably evolving as the methods of the cold war become obsolete, though what form it will take is not yet clear. It is perfectly obvious, however, that, without some basic understanding between the principal centres of power, the diplomatic processes envisaged in the United Nations Charter are of little value. The fundamental problem is, therefore, to discover the likely trends of this basic understanding. The Russians, having redefined their security problems in the light of their technological advance, are apparently no longer concerned with maintaining a strictly regimented sphere of influence. On the contrary, they now seem inclined to think that a return to a pluralist international system, necessarily implying the break-up of the Western bloc led by the United States, would increase their relative influence; this pluralism would probably lead to an aggravation of the 'contradictions' between the principal capitalist nations, and this could only operate to the Russian advantage. By progressively 'liberalizing' their sphere of influence, the Russians seem to be working towards the creation of a new international order in which the principle of self-determination will have a not altogether secondary role to play. Behind this lies the idea that, in the long run, capitalism, at least in the form propounded by the United States, is not viable for most of the countries of the Third World. The latter, in changing their social order, are much more likely to move away from American influence. In this way, a 'community of socialist nations' would tend to grow quite naturally and the Soviet Union would assume legitimate leadership as *primus inter pares* in such a community. The United States, on the other hand, conscious that a 'conclusive and world-wide victory over Communism' is no longer possible, seems to be inclined to define the supreme aim of her foreign policy as the defence of the integrity of the 'free world'.¹ This is a difficult aim to achieve, since

¹ In cold-war jargon, the term 'free world' refers more or less vaguely to all the countries outside the Soviet and Chinese orbits of influence. By historical tradition, the Americans have a marked aversion for the concepts of 'empire' and 'imperialism' when used to explain their own policy. Recently an English political analyst attempted to demonstrate that this was an unfounded prejudice, since the Americans 'in the last 20 years, have been carrying out with unparalleled maturity and generosity, their imperial obligations'. (See Henry Fairlie, 'A Cheer for American Imperialism', in the *New York Times Magazine*, 11 July 1965.) I prefer, however, to stick to the concept of a 'sphere of influence' which has been used by someone as well integrated in the North American political establishments as Walter Lippmann.

requires, on the one hand, strict supervision of the perimeter of a sphere of influence extending over a number of continents and, on the other, the development and successful application within that sphere of influence of social techniques capable of preventing significant changes in the social structures of numerous countries at different stages of development.

The attempt by the United States to define her area of influence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union passed its conclusive test at the time of the so-called Cuban rocket crisis in October 1962. This confrontation established that the Soviet Union cannot give unlimited guarantees of defence to a country in the North American sphere of influence which attempts to break away from U.S. hegemony by means of effecting changes in its social structure. American victory in this decisive case consisted in conducting the crisis in such a way that the Soviet Union was faced with the alternatives of having to unleash a thermo-nuclear war or of recognizing the 'right' of the United States to limit the sovereignty of any country within her orbit, even after such a country had succeeded in changing its social structure. In the final analysis, therefore, this means that a country which changes its social structure and, in this way, moves out of the U.S. orbit of influence, can be 'tolerated' but will not be recognized by the dominant power. The doctrine was established that defence of such a 'tolerated' country must always fall within the sphere of so-called 'limited' warfare, the possibility of a thermo-nuclear confrontation being excluded. To establish this doctrine, the United States paid the price of risking a nuclear holocaust; and it is by the price paid that the importance of the victory should be measured. All the indications are that the United States is pursuing a similar aim in the case of Vietnam: namely, to create a situation that, by the very nature of its dynamic, will force the principal contender—in this case China - to acknowledge the limits of its own strength.

Problem of social instability

Once the perimeter of the U.S. sphere of influence has been established and any outside military interference has been neutralized, the problem arises as to whether U.S. hegemony is able to maintain a high degree of social stability within its area of influence. In this respect, we must draw attention to two points: first, that the basic variable which determines the contemporary historic process is provided by technological development; secondly, that the speed with which modern technology must penetrate the underdeveloped world in order to overcome initial resistance and ensure continuity of development inevitably provokes a series of social reactions incompatible with the preservation of most of the pre-existing structures.

In the United States, the nature of this problem is slowly coming to be

understood. For a long time the problem was simply considered an aspect of the cold war: the social instability of the Third World was attributed to the 'Machiavellian' actions of the Soviet Union, and it was held that the only solution to the problem lay in 'containing' the 'aggressive' Power. Referring to the Eisenhower Administration, Professor Morgenthau writes: '... both the thought and actions of our government tend toward the assumption that the Soviet Union is not only the exploiter of world revolution—which is correct—but also its creator—which is a conventional absurdity.'² Later the doctrine emerged, formulated by MIT technicians led by W. W. Rostow, according to which the aims of U.S. foreign policy could more easily be fostered by properly organized 'foreign aid programmes for underdeveloped countries'.³ It was accepted that the development process could be oriented from outside, the U.S. aim being to 'create independent, modern and developing States'.⁴ The whole problem was to help underdeveloped countries to overcome their initial difficulties and attain a point of 'self-supporting development'. Implicit in this theory is the idea that, once the pains preceding 'take-off' have been assuaged, any serious risk of social instability would cease to exist.

This theory, which enjoyed a great vogue at one stage and produced its most brilliant efflorescence in the 'Alliance for Progress', came in for serious criticism in the period that followed. It has been argued that one should not forget that development itself, even when oriented from outside, creates social instability since it 'undermines the cultural structure and religious order'.⁵ This line of thought emphasizes the fact that the aim of U.S. policy, namely, to keep intact its sphere of influence, must never be lost sight of, and that any particular country's development should be considered as a means of attaining this end. 'As a rule,' writes Professor Wolfers, 'the most effective type of aid will be the aid that promises to give the greatest satisfaction to those élite groups who are eager to keep the country out of Communist or Soviet control.' In a recent book, political scientist John S. Pustay, a major in the U.S. Air Force, reminds us that 'the very programs designed to promote socioeconomic development (for example, the Alliance for Progress) will in themselves create tensions and dislocations as the old and indigenous way of life is replaced by a new and alien mode of living. Therefore, the mili-

² Hans Morgenthau, *The Political and Military Strategy of the United States* (1954), reproduced in *Politics in the Twentieth Century* (University of Chicago Press, 1962), Vol. II, p. 21.

³ The ideas of this group are expressed in a study presented to a special Senate Committee in July 1957, *The Objectives of United States Economic Assistance Programs*.

⁴ W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1959), reproduced in W. I. Hahn and J. C. Ness, eds., *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age* (New York, Doubleday, 1960).

⁵ Arnold Wolfers, *Military or Economic Aid: Questions of Priority*. A report to the Presidential Committee for the Study of Military Aid, July 1959, reproduced in *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*, op. cit., p. 386.

during this period of economic crisis. The United States must concern herself with the creation of supranational structures to ensure this stability if she does not want to run the risk of growing defections inside her sphere of influence. Until such supranational structures are created, the United States herself will have to bear the responsibility for providing internal social stability in all countries falling within her orbit. In one of his last speeches in the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson made it clear that 'as long as the international community is not prepared to rescue the victims of clandestine aggression, national force will have to fill the gap'.

'Security' versus 'development'

For the United States, therefore, the basic problem in the second half of the twentieth century is the problem of her 'security', that is to say, the question of the type of world-wide organization that will prevail as a consequence of the current technological revolution, and that must be compatible with the preservation of 'the American way of life' inside U.S. territory and the defence of American economic interests outside. From the Latin American point of view, on the other hand, the great problem is that of 'development', that is to say, the problem of gaining access to the fruits of this technological revolution.

It must be borne in mind that Latin America's political and social institutions were essentially transplanted from Europe and that, from the very beginning, the Latin American national economies existed as a frontier of the European or, at a more recent stage, of the European and North American economies. The characteristics of capitalist industrial development, which proceeded within the framework of powerful national States, provoked from the outset a heavy concentration of the fruits of technical progress; this inevitably created poles of technological advance, giving rise to geographical concentration of income and wealth. Such a process can be observed in the European continent itself, where, up to the second World War, the central, eastern, and southern European countries, despite their integration in the regional economy, had practically no access to the fruits of technological progress at the end of a century of industrial revolution. In Latin America, development induced by the industrial revolution in Europe and the United States was enough to transform part of the economic systems inherited from the colonial epoch, but not enough to create autonomous systems able to generate further growth. Hence, Latin America remained on the 'periphery' of advanced industrial economies at a time when markets for primary products were far from able to generate the dynamism required.

* John S. Pustay, *Counter-insurgency Warfare* (New York, Free Press of Glenview, 1965).

• Attempt at industrialization of an 'import-substitution' type for a time provided an alternative and allowed further changes to be made in the economic structures of some countries. However, the type of industrial organization practicable in certain historical conditions cannot be independent of the type of technology to be adopted. The technology which Latin America has to assimilate in the second half of the twentieth century effects a considerable saving in manpower and is extremely exacting with regard to the size of the market. In the conditions at present prevailing in the region, the rule tends to be monopoly or oligopoly and progressive concentration of income; and this in turn, by conditioning the pattern of demand, directs investment towards certain industries, which are precisely those requiring a high capital coefficient and those most exacting with regard to the size of the market. In Latin America, experience has proved that this substitutive form of industrialization tends to lose its impulse once the phase of 'easy' substitutions has been exhausted, and leads eventually to stagnation.¹

At present, Latin America is faced with the ineluctable necessity of introducing profound changes into its institutional framework in order to lay the foundations for development. These changes will have to be oriented in three directions: (a) in such a way that technological change is prevented from provoking concentration of income and distorting the allocation of productive resources, thus reducing the efficiency of the economic system; (b) in the sense of widening the present and potential size of markets through schemes for regional economic integration; and (c) by influencing the actual orientation of technological development in terms of the specific requirements of the present phase of Latin America's modernization process. Obviously, therefore, development in Latin America cannot simply result from spontaneous market forces. Only the conscious and deliberate action of central decision-making organs can ensure that it is properly worked out. What is currently called the 'Latin American Revolution' is really the recognition of this problem and the attempt - intermittent and desultory as yet - to create a system of political institutions that can guide the social changes needed to make development viable. Since the present ruling classes fail to understand the nature of the problem and are determined to maintain the *status quo*, those in Latin America who are actually struggling for development are, whether consciously or not, playing a 'revolutionary' role.

Let us now see how the problems of U.S. 'security' tie in with those

¹ Of the Latin American countries that have made substantial advances in the 'substitution' type of industrialization, Mexico is the only case which has not yet shown a clear tendency towards stagnation. It must, however, be taken into account that this is the only country in the group which has promoted far-reaching agrarian reform and eliminated the political influence of the feudally based oligarchy. On the other hand, Mexico is notable for the great development of her export of services (tourism), an activity that absorbs considerable manpower.

of Latin American development. Since the Latin American area is the innermost circle of the U.S. zone of influence, it is only natural that the latter country's policy of hegemony should be conducted there in exemplary fashion. From the Latin American point of view, the Cuban rocket crisis must be interpreted as bringing the Monroe Doctrine up to date. According to the new rules, two options are open to the countries of Latin America: political and economic integration under U.S. hegemony, each particular situation being defined within the sphere of influence of the super-Power, or dislocation from this sphere of influence. In the latter event, however, the country in question can only hope to have its sovereignty 'tolerated' according to rules laid down for each individual case by the dominant Power. These rules can be rigid enough to render internal pressures uncontrollable, and they can make survival of the regime (as in the present case of Cuba) a heavy onus on any Powers outside the sphere of influence who become politically involved in the issue. The recent Dominican experience made it clear that the United States is not prepared to tolerate any further defections within the inner circle of her zone of influence. Until the external perimeter of the sphere of influence is more solidly established— and this could be a consequence of solving the Vietnam issue—it can be expected that a rigid line of intolerance will prevail in the Latin American area.

If we admit that the military aspects of the 'security' problem in the region have been solved by implicit Soviet acceptance of a new definition of the Monroe Doctrine, we can infer that the economic aspects will now come to the fore. It is likely, therefore, that the domestic problems of each individual Latin American country, particularly in the economic sphere, will become of increasing interest to the organs responsible for U.S. external security. As the most probable path (other than open 'subversion', which would be dealt with on the military level) that a Latin American country can follow in order to move out of the U.S. sphere of influence is to effect changes in its economic policy, the latter will have to be strictly controlled from outside if stability is to be maintained. At the same time, since one of the prerequisites for averting major changes in economic policy is the preservation of existing power structures, strict vigilance will have to be maintained over the political processes and, in addition, a control mechanism for preventive action must be introduced into individual countries if the enormous cost of international police action is to be avoided.

As soon as U.S. 'security' is defined as implying the maintenance of the social *status quo* in Latin America, it becomes perfectly clear that the autonomy of the countries in the region (assuming that Latin American nations and States are something more than the temporary power structures) to supervise their own development is reduced to very little. This doctrine implies that fundamental decisions must be taken at a higher

level, probably in the political centre of the sphere of influence or in some 'supranational' organ to which effective power may have been delegated by that political centre. We must therefore ask what type of 'development' the United States envisages for Latin America. This question has never been the subject of open discussion in government circles, since Congress has regarded 'economic aid' as a mere complement of 'military aid' which was defined strictly within the orbit of security policy. Recently the problem has been attracting some attention, but chiefly on the technical-administrative level. As Professor Edward Mason observes: 'Recently AID has given increased attention to this problem and has attempted to formulate for some of the principal aid-receiving countries a so-called Long-Range Assistance Strategy which spells out U.S. economic, political, and security interests in the countries in question, the conditions necessary to their attainment, and the relevant instrument of foreign policy.'⁶

U.S. business corporations

Although no unanimous conclusion has been reached on all aspects of this complex problem, there is already an accepted doctrine in the United States in so far as at least one point is concerned: namely, that a decisive role in Latin American development is being undertaken by private American companies and that U.S. 'aid' policy should be conducted principally through them. The report of the Clay Committee was emphatic on this point, and in recent years both Congress and the Administration have shown considerable concern to create conditions for the effective operation of political guarantees and economic incentives to enable private U.S. firms to carry out this important function. 'Guarantee' agreements have been signed with Latin American governments permitting private U.S. companies operating in their territories to enjoy a privileged position in comparison with identical companies operating at home. At the same time, measures such as the Hickenlooper amendment create political 'super-guarantees' for U.S. companies by subjecting local governments to a permanent threat. In the words of Professor Mason: 'It would seem that the government has gone about as far as it can go to promote U.S. private foreign investment in Latin America without outright subsidization.'⁷ In this context, private investment means, whether explicitly or implicitly, investment by the large corporations, since the small American business firm possesses neither the capacity nor the means to operate abroad.

The first problem that arises from the Latin American point of view is to establish what type of political organization is likely to be compatible

⁶ Edward S. Mason, *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy* (New York, Harper & Row for Council on Foreign Relations, 1964), p. 48.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 90.

with a regional economic system controlled chiefly by powerful American corporations. It is easy to infer that the most attractive sectors for these corporations are those producing goods or services in which technological development plays an important role. Without going into other aspects of the problem, we must remember that the large American corporation is a powerful private bureaucracy, exercising public or semi-public functions, whose integration into U.S. political society has up to now remained undefined. Professor Andrew Hacker reminds us that 'Unlike the religious and guild structures of earlier centuries, the large firm of today has no theoretical rationale linking power, purpose, and responsibility'.¹⁰ Hence no way has yet been found of integrating these large corporations, whose functions are becoming increasingly public, into the structure of a pluralistic political society. At the same time, government is becoming increasingly powerless against these great corporations, since even in the United States 'government is weaker than the corporate institutions purportedly subordinate to it. . .'.¹¹ Even Adolph Berle, the leading authority on this subject, who cannot be suspected of animosity towards the large company, draws attention to the fact that the board of directors of a large corporation derives power from no one but itself, 'it is an automatic self-perpetuating oligarchy'.¹² 'The enormous power at present possessed by these large corporations has not the slightest claim to legitimacy. Professor Berle tells us that in the U.S. the doctrine is taking shape that 'where a corporation has the power to affect a great many lives (differing from the little enterprise which can be balanced out by the market) it should be subject to the same restraints under the Constitution that apply to an agency of the federal or state government'.¹³ Called upon to operate in Latin America with a number of privileges, outside the control of U.S. anti-trust legislation, and with U.S. political and military protection, the great American corporation must of necessity become a super-Power in any Latin American country. Since a large proportion of the basic decisions on orientation of investment, location of economic activity, orientation of technology, and the degree of integration of the national economies rests in the hands of these large corporations, it is quite clear that the existing national States will come to play an increasingly secondary role.

Such a regional 'development project', which tends to render obsolete the idea of nationality as the principal political force in Latin America, offers many attractions to important sectors of the local ruling classes, who see in it an ingenious formula for deflating the 'nationalism' which

¹⁰ Andrew Hacker, 'Corporate America', Introduction to *The Corporation Take-Over* (New York, Harper & Row, 1964), p. 2.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 11.

¹² A. A. Berle, 'Economic Power and the Free Society', included in *The Corporation Take-Over*, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 99.

• they hold responsible for most of the current social unrest. If most of the State's substantive functions in controlling the economic and social development process were taken away, then the current political 'ferment' characterizing many Latin American countries would in all probability tend to diminish and government could then function principally on the 'technical' level. We would have attained, by the opposite path, the Saint-Simonian ideal of replacing the government of men by the administration of things.

Leaving aside the question of whether such a situation could be reconciled with the traditions of Latin American culture and merely considering some of the technical aspects of the problem, there is ample reason to believe that such a 'development project' is not viable in current Latin American conditions. The great U.S. corporation seems to be as inadequate an instrument for dealing with Latin American problems as is a powerful mechanized army faced with guerrilla warfare. The large corporation with its advanced technology and high capitalization, particularly when backed by numerous privileges, produces the same effect in an underdeveloped economy as large exotic trees introduced into an unfamiliar region: they drain all the water, dry up the land, and disturb the balance of flora and fauna. In effect, indiscriminate penetration into a fragile economic structure by large corporations, characterized by their high degree of administrative inflexibility and enormous financial power tends to provoke a structural imbalance difficult to correct—for instance a greater differentiation in living standards between groups of the population and a rapid increase of open or disguised unemployment. If control by the national governments is further reduced, allowing the large U.S. corporations to operate with even greater freedom than they now enjoy the tendency to concentration of economic activity is likely to be accentuated, aggravating the existing differences in living standards between social groups and geographical areas, and the final result will be a real or potential increase of social tensions. Since economic decisions of a strategic nature would fall outside the scope of Latin American governments, these tensions would tend to be regarded, on the local political plane, solely from their negative viewpoint; State action would therefore have to be essentially repressive in character.

Economic development in the problematical conditions Latin America is called upon to face at the moment requires, however, the co-operation of large masses of the population and active participation by important sectors of this population. This is why the most difficult tasks are of a political rather than a technical nature. Hard political decisions must be taken and this can be done only if such action is supported by the existing national centres of political power. The principle of nationality is therefore vital for the present phase of Latin American development. Today, more than ever, this concept is extraordinarily functional and

any measure taken to weaken the Latin American States as political centres, able to interpret national aspirations and to rally the people around common ideals, will limit the region's development possibilities. Thus, Latin America's economic integration can be justified only if it is conceived in terms of defining common policy between national States and not as a co-ordinating link between the great foreign enterprises operating in the region.

Conclusions

In conclusion, one can enumerate certain points:

- (i) Under the conditions of nuclear equilibrium obtaining at present between the super-Powers, the exercise of supranational hegemony can be justified only in the light of the interest of the Power wishing to exercise such hegemony.
- (ii) Spheres of influence have no longer any significance for the super-Powers from the point of view of their military security.
- (iii) From the standpoint of the countries of the Third World, spheres of influence are nothing but systems of economic domination, which lessen their freedom of manoeuvre as they seek to adapt their political and social structures to development requirements.
- (iv) U.S. hegemony in Latin America, by underpinning the anachronistic power structure, constitutes a serious obstacle to development for the majority of countries in the region.
- (v) The U.S. Government's programme for development in Latin America, based as it is on the activities of the great American business corporations and on preventive control of 'subversion', is not viable, except as a means of freezing the social *status quo*.
- (vi) The success of development policy in Latin America will depend first of all on the capacity of its promoters to mobilize the great mass of the population in the region. This can be done only from each national political centre and in conformity with national values and ideals.
- (vii) Economic integration will serve the development needs of the region only if it stems from a common policy formulated by really independent national governments and not from the co-ordination of the interests of the great foreign business enterprises operating in Latin America.

Arms sales and arms control in the developing countries

GEOFFREY KEMP

LAST year Britain and France sold about \$700 m. worth of arms to the friends and allies throughout the world including India, Israel, and Saudi Arabia; Russia distributed approximately \$400 m. worth of equipment to the countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean; and the United States, by way of sales and aid programmes, disseminated military equipment to the value of \$2,800 m., of which a considerable proportion went to 'forward defence areas' in the Far East and South East Asia. What factors lie behind the present boom in the international arms trade, and in particular, the increasing supply of military equipment to the conflict areas of the developing world? This problem has on the whole been neglected by students of arms control and disarmament who quite understandably, have been concerned with the issues of nuclear proliferation and the major arms race in Europe and the Far East. However, three recent events have focused attention on the subject. Firstly in his address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Montreal on 18 May, the U.S. Defence Secretary, Mr McNamara, made some interesting comments on the dramatic increase in recent years in the number of conflict situations in the developing areas of the world. He claimed: 'The planet is becoming a more dangerous place to live on — not merely because of a potential nuclear holocaust but also because of the large number of *de facto* conflicts and because the trend of such conflict is growing rather than diminishing.' He argued that poverty was a *prima facie* cause of conflict and that it was wrong to blame Communist activity for all the violence in the developing world. 'It would be a gross oversimplification to regard Communism as the central factor in every conflict throughout the under-developed world. Of the 149 serious internal insurgencies in the past eight years, Communists have been involved in only 58 of them — 38 per cent of the total.'

Secondly, there was the announcement on 21 May that the American Government is to sell Douglas A-4A light-attack bombers to Israel. This sale is designed to redress the delicate balance of power in the Middle East that had been upset by the sales of late-model American, British and Russian jet aircraft to Israel's Arab neighbours — the Lockheed F-105

to Jordan, the English Electric *Lightning* to Saudi Arabia, and the MiG-21¹ to Egypt and Syria.¹ It is understandable that the American Government should feel obliged to offset Russian sales of military equipment to Egypt and Syria, but the sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia that also provide a justification for the Israeli deal were the result of Anglo-American efforts.

The third event concerns the appointment by the British Government of a Head of Defence Sales, Mr Raymond Brown. This appointment has been justified on the ground that Britain 'must secure her rightful share of a valuable commercial market [the arms market]'. If Mr Brown concentrates his efforts in the lucrative West European and North American markets there is likely to be little dissent except, perhaps, from his American and French rivals. But there are indications that he may look further afield, in areas that are not so stable. It has now been admitted that Britain and America agreed to co-operate in the recent arms agreement with Saudi Arabia for the sale of over \$300 m. worth of air defence equipment, because this was part of a larger deal to offset Britain's dollar expenditures on the F-111A bombers. One effect of this agreement has been to accelerate the input of modern weapons into the danger area of the Middle East.

History of last twenty years

To understand the complexities of the international arms trade and its effect on local conflicts in the developing areas, it is worth recalling the history of the past twenty years. Up to 1955 there was a virtual Anglo-American monopoly of the supply of modern military equipment to areas outside the direct East-West confrontation in Europe and the Far East. The Soviet Union was busy rearming her allies in Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea, and the other industrial Powers, West Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, were still recovering from the economic devastation of the second World War. During this first post-war decade, the American Government, fearful of Soviet military intentions, embarked on a massive Military Assistance Programme to its allies. The value of U.S. military aid during this period was approximately \$13,000 m., of which 80 per cent went to NATO countries, South Korea, and Taiwan, and the remainder to the developing areas considered in this article. Britain, though not in a position to give away military equipment on such a lavish scale—she was herself receiving American military aid—did manage to sell approximately \$2,000 m. worth of equipment to Commonwealth members, the Arab countries of the Middle East, and various Latin American States. The situation changed in the mid-1950s for two reasons. In 1955 the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed an arms agreement with Egypt that

¹ None of these aircraft, including the A-4As, has yet arrived in the Middle East.

* was estimated to be worth at least \$300 m. This was quickly followed by Soviet military aid programmes to Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Indonesia, and Guinea. Also France began to emerge as a source of military equipment and by the time of the Suez war, in 1956, the Israeli forces were equipped with French jets and missiles. Between 1955 and 1966 a host of other countries began to sell modern equipment to the developing areas, so that by 1966 no less than five countries were prepared to tender for a jet-trainer order for the Malaysian Government, while three more could have tendered had they wished.

This arms traffic with the developing countries has covered a very wide range of equipment. The most popular items, in monetary terms, have been jet aircraft, medium tanks, and warships. In addition, numerous guided missiles, armoured cars, helicopters, small arms, and transport aircraft have been sold or given to the recipients. To give some indication of the quantities involved, over 1,500 jet combat aircraft, about 2,800 medium tanks, and 31 warships have been sent to the Middle East since 1945. In South Asia (Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan) the figures are 1,000 jets, about 800 tanks, and 33 warships. In areas where conflict situations are less intense, the figures are proportionally smaller. Thus in sub-Saharan Africa, the numbers are: 230 jets, very few tanks, and 9 warships.^a

The quality of jets and tanks has been very high, since most of them have been new on receipt. Egypt, Israel, India, and Pakistan have all received three generations of jet aircraft over the past fifteen years. Most warships have come from the surplus stocks of the American, British, and Soviet navies but this is not to say that they are antiquated, since the life of a warship is two and a half to three times that of an aircraft, and many were extensively refurbished before being handed over. In addition, some new warships have been sold by Britain, Italy, and Sweden to India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Latin American countries. Though no strategic missiles have found their way into the inventories of the developing countries, small missiles of the air-to-air, surface-to-air, and anti-tank variety have been sold or given to a host of countries, including such small Powers as Syria, Kuwait, Cuba, and Chile.

To what extent this impressive array of weaponry reflects the military capabilities and intentions of the recipients is not clear. Some Western observers have played down the appearance of advanced jet aircraft in backward countries, claiming that the degree of technical expertise, training, and experience needed to ensure the efficient operation of such weapons systems is too high to make local air power in these areas a serious threat. This may be true at present, but those responsible for

^a For a more detailed analysis of the quantity and quality of military equipment supplied during this period see *Arms to the Developing Countries* by John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, Adelphi Paper No. 28, to be published by The Institute for Strategic Studies in September 1966.

g-term military planning have argued differently, and one of the justifications for the British purchase of the F-111A bomber was the presence of aircraft such as the MiG-21 in Indonesia. Also the appearance of Soviet *Komar*-class missile patrol-boats in Egypt, Syria, India, and Cuba has a considerable 'nuisance' value that cannot be overestimated, especially as they operate in narrow international waterways—Bab el Mandeb, Suez, and Malacca—that are of great importance to most Western Powers.

This is not to say that the existence of modern sophisticated weapons in conflict areas is inevitably a destabilizing factor. Indeed, present East-West *détente* in Europe would tend to prove the opposite—that stability is best maintained when both sides have an invulnerable advanced strike capacity. Similarly, the fact that the Indo-Pakistan war was fought with modern equipment did not mean that the battles were more prolonged or more vicious. So long as nuclear weapons are not included, it could be argued that the cost of fighting wars with the latest equipment will deter the smaller Powers from embarking on extravagant military ventures.

Supply and demand factors

However, the supply and demand factors that have fixed the quantitative and qualitative level of military equipment in the developing areas have not been determined entirely by military considerations. On the supply side the industrial Powers have had strong economic and political reasons for wishing to sell or give equipment to small Powers. Both America and the Soviet Union have attempted to win the favour of non-aligned Powers by making modern weapons available to them at no cost or in very reasonable terms.

The rationale for American military aid and sales programmes is set in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and in many statements issued by the Department of Defence and the State Department.¹ Military aid is given to non-Communist countries² who request assistance and who cannot afford to purchase military equipment on the open market. The level of the aid has varied from country to country, depending on local political, strategic, and economic factors. In the early 1950s most American aid went to West European countries, Taiwan, and South America, but as the economic and political situation improved in Europe and the Far East, military assistance was re-channelled to various 'forward defence areas' in the Middle East, South Asia, and South East Asia.

¹ See *Information and Guidance on Military Assistance*, 9th ed., 1965 (Hq. USAF.), and speech by Mr Henry Kissinger, Jr, before the Management Session, 'Aircraft design and technology meeting, 17 November 1965, 'US Government Policy and Philosophy on International Sales of Military Aircraft'.

² There have been exceptions to this rule; Yugoslavia has received American fighters and jet aircraft.

* (in particular, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand).⁶ Very little military aid has been given to countries which are not in direct danger of Communist aggression, and there has been a deliberate attempt to restrict the value of assistance to many African and South American countries, since it is American policy 'to exert maximum efforts to achieve universal control of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of armaments'.⁷

American sales policy has been determined on similar lines and there has been a marked reluctance to sell advanced weapons to Middle Eastern and South American countries even though some could afford to purchase them.⁷ On the other hand, sales programmes have been pursued with vigour in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada in an attempt to off-set the considerable foreign-exchange burden that comes from having so many overseas military commitments.⁸

In theory the aims of U.S. policy seem admirable, but military aid has sometimes been given to undemocratic regimes; this in turn has created the impression that America is prepared to assist any government, however corrupt, provided that it is committed to a firm anti-Communist policy. Sometimes, too, military equipment has been used by recipient countries for purposes not envisaged in the Foreign Assistance Act. There was obvious disappointment when Pakistan used her Patton tanks and F-104 fighters against India in 1965.

The objectives of Soviet military aid programmes can only be guessed, but it is reasonable to assume that political motivations have been the prime factor in determining the degree of Soviet aid given to non-Communist countries. It would be naive to suppose that the Soviet Union sees military aid programmes as a direct method of subversion within non-Communist countries. It is more likely that she is anxious to preserve the neutrality of certain areas which might otherwise become part of the Western sphere of influence. This would be especially true for the Middle East, where it is well known that local Communist Parties have little freedom despite massive Soviet military and economic assistance. Since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute, military aid has also been used to counter Chinese influence in many countries including North Vietnam, Cuba, Indonesia, and the emergent African States.

Britain has always been a major producer of armaments and, on the

⁶ In 1953 U.S. military assistance was approximately \$4,210 m., of which over \$3,000 m. went to NATO countries and the Far East; in 1965 the total figure was \$1,200 m., of which only \$500 m. went to NATO and the Far East. Military sales in 1961, on the other hand, were valued at \$1,800 m., in other words more than the total for military aid.

⁷ Foreign Assistance Act, 1961, amended 1965, Part II, Chapter I.

⁸ Unfortunately this policy may be changing. The recent sales to the Middle East have been mentioned and there has also been a sale of 50 A-4B Skyhawks to Argentina.

⁹ In 1961 the figure was \$2,800 m.; by 1964 it had been reduced to \$1,600 m.

whole, commercial considerations have determined the level of arms exports. Since 1945, however, the sale of military equipment has been subject to strict political control and each export order is considered on an *ad hoc* basis by the Board of Trade before an export licence is granted.⁹ On some occasions licences have been refused. For instance, in 1965 Rolls-Royce were not allowed to supply Dart engines to the Dutch Aircraft Company, Fokker, for use with their *Friendship* transport because 100 of these aircraft were on order for Indonesia.¹⁰ A more extreme case is the total arms embargo on South Africa which was ordered by the British Government in November 1964. However, some people still feel that British policy is ambiguous, especially when political and economic considerations diverge.¹¹ Now that the machinery for selling equipment has been reorganized with the appointment of Mr Brown, it would seem a good opportunity to spell out Britain's real objectives in a little more detail.

Some West European countries are pursuing an active role in the search for arms markets in the developing countries. The motives for doing so are, broadly speaking, twofold. There is a strong desire on the part of some countries, especially France, to establish an armaments base independent of America. But in order to make such an industry economically viable, it is essential to export a high percentage of the products. Since the Americans have, at present, a virtual monopoly of the lucrative markets in Europe and North America, the smaller Powers are encouraged to look elsewhere for outlets.

There have been equally strong factors at work to ensure that the demand for military equipment has been high. Dean Rusk once remarked: 'I recall that at the United Nations General Assembly, at a time when all members were voting unanimously for disarmament, 70 members were at that moment asking us [the United States] for military assistance.' It is a fact of life that modern weapons, especially jet aircraft, missiles, and tanks, are regarded as symbols of power, prestige, and independence. It is not surprising that the emergent nations follow the example set by the Great Powers and regard advanced weapons systems as a sign of maturity. But weapons systems that offer the best return for prestige and propaganda are not always the most satisfactory for military needs. There are very few prestige weapons in South Africa or Rhodesia.

In view of the favourable market conditions for the sale of advanced weapons systems to the developing countries, the dangers of allowing the supply and demand levels to continue to rise need to be re-emphasized.

⁹ For details of the mechanics of British sales policy see Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates, session 1958-9, *The Sale of Military Equipment Abroad*.

¹⁰ This policy may be changed as 'confrontation' comes to an end.

¹¹ For a recent example of muddled statements on arms sales policy see House of Commons Debates, 25 June 1966, cols. 918-20.

Recent estimates by the Society of British Aero-Space Constructors and the Committee of Inquiry into the aircraft industry (the Plowden Report) predict that future world demand for military aircraft and missiles will be approximately \$35,000 m. in the next ten years, of which the developing countries, excluding Australia and New Zealand, are expected to account for 23 per cent, or about \$8,000 m.¹² These figures exclude the future demand for warships, tanks, small arms, and artillery. Whatever the ethics of the international arms trade, there is likely to be a lucrative market for the most efficient manufacturers, given no satisfactory arms control arrangements. It can be expected that East European countries will become more interested in these markets for economic reasons. Already the Soviet Union is competing with America, Britain, and France for the Indian arms market and, assuming certain political factors can be overcome, there is no reason to suppose she will not extend this competition in other areas.

Dangers of unrestricted sales

What are the dangers of unrestricted armaments sales at this high level? The enormous expenditure on arms could be justified if the net result was a more stable world in which economic development could proceed uninterrupted by violence. But until the basic reasons for inter- and intra-State conflict are erased, military re-equipment programmes are likely to proceed at an accelerated pace. It has been suggested that if only countries would equip their forces with weapons designed solely for internal security operations or defence against external aggression, the provocative nature of local arms races could be alleviated. The difficulty here is that the Great Powers themselves have constantly rejected 'defensive weapons systems' as a means of preserving their security and have relied, for cost-effectiveness considerations, on offensive systems designed to provide a minimum deterrent against aggression. The Great Powers may well be right to argue that developing countries do not need the sophisticated types of weapons to be found in every army, navy, and air force in Europe and North America, but small Powers interpret this reasoning as a further indication of their inherent second-class relationship with the industrial countries, and, for this reason, have been reluctant to curb their demand for advanced weapons systems, despite the high purchase and maintenance costs involved.

It has been argued that the qualitative pace of the conventional arms race in the Middle East may encourage Israel to pursue a nuclear weapons programme. Her current defence budget is over 11 per cent of the GNP and by any standards this is an enormous economic burden. There are tenable economic arguments why, in the long run, Israel would be wise

¹² This estimate excludes the requirements of the Communist countries, the cost of strategic missiles, and research and development costs.

to develop nuclear capability. The dangers are obvious should this happen. It may be premature to impute some relationship between a conventional arms race and nuclear proliferation, but certainly the more sophisticated conventional weapons become the easier it is for a country to justify and sustain a nuclear programme. Apart from strategic missiles, most nuclear delivery systems tend to be 'converted' conventional weapons systems—bombers, short-range missiles, rockets, and artillery shells. When Israel receives the A-4A bomber she will have the capacity to carry a small nuclear bomb to Cairo or the Aswan Dam. Similarly, when Australia receives the F-111A bomber she will have a tailor-made nuclear delivery system.

At the other end of the scale, the frontier disputes between the Somali Republic and her two neighbours, Ethiopia and Kenya, have resulted in an embryonic arms race that shows all the signs of developing into a more serious affair. The Great Powers are directly involved, since America supplies Ethiopia with military aid, and Russia supplies Somalia.¹³ Also the present activities of Egypt in southern Arabia and elsewhere lend credence to the argument that Ethiopia must develop a more powerful navy in case of trouble in the Red Sea when the British leave Aden in 1968.

The present situation has all the ingredients of a full-blown conflict unless something is done to solve it. It is clear that the continued input of armaments has done nothing whatsoever to stabilize the conflict,¹⁴ or to enhance the prestige of America or Russia among the emerging nations. So far only the preliminary window-dressing equipment has arrived in the area: F-86 fighters in Ethiopia, MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters and T-34 tanks in Somalia. But if past precedent is any criterion, it will not be long before surface-to-air missiles and submarines make their débuts.

Difficulties of arms control

What are the possibilities of reaching some agreement on arms control, given that all attempts so far have failed? Since 1960 two new difficulties have arisen. First, the increasing list of supplier countries means that any agreement would now have to have the approval of countries already competing for arms sales in many critical areas. It has proved impossible to prevent South Africa buying advanced military equipment despite the

¹³ Ethiopia has received more American military aid than all the other countries of Africa together (nearly \$88 m. worth between 1953 and 1965). The Somali Republic received approximately \$30 m. worth of long-term credit from Russia in 1963 plus generous training facilities in the Soviet Union.

¹⁴ To judge by the reception given to the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Yakov Malik, during his recent (May 1966) visit to Ethiopia and Kenya, it would seem to have had the reverse effect. Both Haile Selassie and President Kenyatta evidently showed their disapproval of Russian policies in no uncertain terms. But it would be wrong to blame everything on the Russians; America was busy refurbishing the Ethiopian armed forces long before Somalia became independent.

'United Nations' arms embargo and universal disapproval of her domestic policies. France and, to some extent, Italy have ignored the embargo and are at present furnishing South Africa with ideal weapons for controlling internal insurgencies—light jet aircraft, air-to-surface missiles, helicopters, armoured cars, and transport aircraft. If it is impossible to prevent arms reaching South Africa, it is surely going to be more difficult to envisage any cut-off of supplies to countries whose domestic and foreign policies are approved of by either of the Power blocs.

Secondly, the growth of indigenous armaments industries in the developing countries themselves will tend to depreciate the value of external arms control measures. India and Egypt have each created fairly advanced armaments industries and are co-operating in the production of a jet engine, the E-300. Both have successfully flown their own supersonic jet fighters and have gained a considerable amount of experience in the technical problems of construction and maintenance. In other fields, Egypt has built her own rockets and India is building tanks under licence. South Africa, anxious to develop self-sufficiency in weapons procurement, has a programme of aircraft construction under way and will soon have the capability to build her own combat aircraft. Australia has a shipbuilding industry and extensive aircraft-construction plants, and has built her own sophisticated missiles—the *Malkara* and the *Ikaru*. Even Israel has the capacity to produce small arms, and has exported some of this equipment to other countries. Although it will be a long time before the developing countries are entirely self-sufficient, it is clear that their total dependence on external suppliers has not deterred them from seeking independent capabilities for their own arms requirements.

So far it has been assumed that some degree of arms control in these areas is a good idea. But it is important to decide *what* particular arms need to be controlled. Each of the areas discussed has different characteristics—it is impossible to equate the high-powered arms race in the Middle East with the more leisurely incidents in sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the recommendations that have been made in the past two years for controlling arms in developing areas emphasize the appearance of sophisticated offensive weapons—attack aircraft, tanks, and warships—and argue that, for a start, these sorts of weapons should be banned. It is quite clear that the qualitative arms race in the Middle East is dangerous and should be curbed. But it does not follow that the appearance of sophisticated weapons in other areas should be viewed with equal distress. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, it is the less sophisticated items of equipment—helicopters, armoured cars, and small arms—that present the real dangers for conflict. And perhaps more ominous than the spread of the small weapons is the growth of armies in these countries. In many cases an extra parachute battalion, armed with automatic weapons and provided with adequate transport aircraft, is a far more serious

threat to a local balance of power than a 'squadron of high-performance' aircraft.

The present conflict situations in the developing world call for a more dispassionate consideration of the basic problems of arms sales and arms control. Some attempt must be made to distinguish between the military and political effects which the inputs of *all* types of weapons have on each conflict area and the criteria that determine the supply and demand for weapons systems in these areas. Until this is done all discussions on arms control are likely to prove unrealistic. For a start, the industrial Powers should re-examine their present policies for selling or giving arms to so many different countries and consider the long-term, as well as the short-term, implications of the international arms trade for the security of the developing world and, eventually, for everyone.

Indonesia and Malaysia: the changing face of confrontation

MICHAEL LEIFER

THE Bangkok Accord of 1 June was immediately hailed in Kuala Lumpur as sufficient evidence of the end of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. A further response was the disinterment of ties of blood and religion between former enemies. Indeed, such a rediscovery of common bonds was to precede the meeting in Bangkok between Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, and Tun Abdul Razak, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister. Two days before the talks, an Indonesian military mission from KOGAM (the Crush Malaysia Command) flew, at short notice, to Kuala Lumpur to be greeted warmly by Malay Ministers and officials, and was then invited to Alor Star to talk with the Malaysian Prime Minister. When the party arrived at the Tunku's house, they were confronted by a banner in Malay above the door which proclaimed: 'Welcome to our blood-brothers on this goodwill visit.'

The Bangkok Accord centred on a document containing an exchange of letters which embodied recommendations to normalize relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. Its implementation was to be dependent on ratification by the Governments concerned. In the Malaysian capital,

Dr Leifer is Fellow in South East Asian Studies in the University of Hull; he has just returned from a visit to South East Asia.

'ratification was regarded as a mere formality; at least, this was the impression given to the public, and the Alliance Cabinet duly proceeded to approve the document. But ratification was to be delayed by the Indonesian Government. And even now that the Accord has been formally ratified in Jakarta on 11 August by the Indonesian Foreign Minister and the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, there is some doubt as to the manner in which the end of confrontation will come to be interpreted in the Indonesian capital. Doubt is mixed with suspicion that Indonesia in good faith may be found wanting. And suspicion is mixed in turn with certain embarrassment on the Malaysian side, on the part of those who were involved personally in the Bangkok meeting.

There are, of course, quite sound reasons relating to the state of the political game in Indonesia which can be advanced to explain the delay in the ratification of the Bangkok Accord. The attitude of President Sukarno towards the ending of confrontation is well known, and despite his diminution in stature, he is not to be discounted as a political lightweight. At the installation of the Cabinet headed by General Suharto, in the end of July, the Indonesian President announced publicly that confrontation against Malaysia would continue. The new rulers in Jakarta are well aware that Sukarno still enjoys support from the marine corps and from elements in both the army and air force. He also has a popular following in East and Central Java where half of Indonesia's population lives. Because of the dangers of civil war, the triumvirate of Suharto, Malik, and the Sultan of Jogjakarta is clearly inhibited from doing more than constricting as tactfully as possible the powers and the influence of the President. It can be argued that, as a consequence, they feel the necessity to go slowly over the ending of confrontation. Indeed, Adam Malik told the press at Bangkok: 'Our people have been led to crush Malaysia for the past three years by the former regime. It takes time for us to prepare them to accept the new situation.'

If one takes a charitable view, it becomes plausible to argue that the principals of the present Cabinet in Indonesia are fundamentally sincere in their expressed desire to bring confrontation to a speedy conclusion. However, internal political difficulties have presented them with an irksome task. If one were to take a much less charitable view, then it also becomes possible to reach a similar conclusion in seeking to explain the excessive delay in ratifying the Bangkok Accord. For if the present Indonesian Government wished to continue with confrontation and to promote the further fragmentation of Malaysia by covert rather than military means, then formal ratification would be an important prerequisite to such a policy. To employ such a strategy of confrontation, it would be highly desirable to resume diplomatic relations with Malaysia at the highest level. From this vantage point, the Indonesians could begin to exploit the mythology and actuality of ties of blood and promote dis-

affection among the Malay community, particularly by playing on racial problems. They could also inundate Malaysia with missions of a cultural and of a more subversive variety. Indeed, a similar policy to that just enunciated was pursued before confrontation became a conventional term in the political vocabulary.¹ There is an additional reason why Indonesia should implement the Bangkok Accord, no matter the ultimate policy to be pursued towards Malaysia. It is common knowledge that a resumption of large-scale economic aid, which is required so desperately by Indonesia, is dependent on a formal end to confrontation. This fact was admitted by the Indonesian army-controlled newspaper *Ampera* at the end of July.

It may be overfacile to suggest that the above analysis is open to challenge because it attempts to explain Indonesian political behaviour too much in terms of Western rationality and logic. However, given the emotional intensity with which confrontation has been prosecuted for more than three years, there may be some value in reconsidering some of the happenings associated with the so-called ending of confrontation. The net result may be the same, yet there are a number of nagging doubts still to be removed.

Some preliminary gambits

It is clear that following Indonesia's abortive *coup* of 30 September last year, and the consequent anti-Communist purge and rupture of the Peking-Jakarta axis, the Malaysian Government was concerned to seize an appropriate opportunity to re-establish a different relationship. It was impelled by the increasing expense of countering confrontation and the concomitant diversion of resources from economic development. It was encouraged also by the prospect of Britain's shedding of military obligations in the process of reassessing her overseas commitments. However, there was no real opportunity to begin a genuine dialogue with Jakarta until a Government appeared there which seemed willing to begin talks outside the context of the dismemberment of Malaysia. In early March 1966, General Suharto succeeded in assuming the executive powers of President Sukarno. He then proceeded to obtain the arrest of many former Ministers, including Dr Subandrio, who, as Foreign Minister, had been intimately associated with the prosecution of confrontation. He was able also to secure the formal banning of the Indonesian Communist Party. By 27 March the triumvirate of Suharto (Minister of Defence), Adam Malik (Foreign Minister), and the Sultan of Jogjakarta (Minister of Economic Affairs) seemed to be confirmed in office, apparently in charge of the nation's destinies, at least in Jakarta itself. This trio gave the appearance of being dedicated to economic rehabilitation as opposed

¹ See *Indonesian Intentions Towards Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Information Office, 1964).

'to the continuation of conflict with Malaysia. Suharto's statement that 'Confrontation will go on as usual but Indonesia has opened the door for a peaceful solution' was regarded as an initiative designed to save Sukarno's face rather than as anything equivocal. Early the following month, it became known that soundings had been taken by Indonesia for the resumption of Western aid, which, of course, implied that confrontation would have to be reconsidered. By this time, representatives of Indonesia and Malaysia had begun talking in Bangkok and Hong Kong.

In the midst of the apparently directed drift away from confrontation, with a fairly pacific Borneo border, an episode occurred which might be regarded as provoking second thoughts about Indonesia's good faith. On 9 April, a meeting of the Indonesian Cabinet presidium took place in Bogor, with President Sukarno in the chair, but from which General Suharto was absent.² The Foreign Minister was to tell reporters afterwards that 'The meeting put special emphasis on the issue of an intensified confrontation'. He went on to say that 'in keeping with the recent decisions of KOGAM, where confrontation is to be made more intensive, President Sukarno has, as the first step, instructed the Foreign Minister to make preparations for a possible recognition of Singapore by the Indonesian Government'.³ This initiative marked a distinct change in the Indonesian attitude to Singapore. While Dr Subandrio had been Foreign Minister, up to the month previous, the continued presence of British bases in the island-State had been an obstacle to recognition. To take a charitable view once again, it is possible to interpret this new willingness to recognize Singapore as an indication of an Indonesian desire to build up her foreign-exchange reserves. A resumption of trade through Singapore would be the most direct way to activate such a process. It has also been argued 'that the decision to recognize Singapore was taken with the aim of moving towards peace talks with Malaysia. . . But the move had to be disguised as a step towards intensifying the confrontation with Malaysia in order to obtain President Sukarno's approval'.⁴

Such a view, however, takes no account of the timing of the Indonesian declaration of intent and the existing friction between Singapore and Malaysia. For, just a week prior to the Indonesian Cabinet decision, Singapore had withdrawn from the Joint Defence Council, which had been set up for mutual defence at the time of her separation from the Federation in August 1965. This act seemed to mark a culmination to a

² At the time Suharto was holding a press conference and was reported as saying that Indonesia was 'compelled to continue the confrontation without closing the possibility to peaceful methods'. *The Times*, 11 April 1966.

³ *News and Views* (A synopsis of Indonesian press reports and comments). Consulate General of the Republic of Indonesia, New York. No. 122. 12 April 1966, p. 1.

⁴ Nicholas Turner in *The Sunday Times*, 17 April 1966.

series of profound disagreements between Singapore and Malaysia. In February, there was acute apprehension in Singapore over the implications of a quarrel concerning the occupation of barracks by a battalion of the Royal Malay Regiment, whose presence was provided for in the Separation Agreement. One correspondent was to comment: 'Singapore's fear, to put it bluntly, was that the manoeuvre over these troops could have been the first step in a plot to overpower this independent island-State.'⁵

The close concurrence of events between the decision by Singapore to leave the Joint Defence Council and the Indonesian declaration of intent to recognize the island-State can be interpreted to suggest that Indonesia was seeking to exploit the rift to her own advantage. Certainly, the news of the withdrawal was welcomed in Jakarta, while the *Indonesian Herald* was to claim that the decision to recognize Singapore was part of a plan to isolate Kuala Lumpur. Indeed, it went on to say that, now that Singapore had shown her desire for independence, Indonesia would help her to break out of neo-colonialist encirclement. The Malaysian Government responded with some fury to what it regarded as a piece of mischief-making on the part of the Indonesians, and became incensed over the statement by the Singapore Foreign Minister which welcomed the gesture.⁶ The reaction of the Malaysian Government, which included the imposition of new immigration controls, demonstrated clear doubts about Indonesian good faith. The Tunku was quoted as saying: 'All this talk of Indonesia wanting to make peace is sheer hypocrisy . . . with one breath she talks of peace and in the other she talks of intensifying the confrontation.' Singapore was told to choose whom she wanted as a friend, Malaysia or Indonesia. The response of the Singapore Prime Minister, then in Bangkok, was to cable the Tunku that 'We should not allow Indonesia to exploit the different styles in which we publicly deal with their moves'.⁷ And the public comment by Adam Malik 'that it was "good news", when asked what he thought about the statement by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Premier of the neo-colonialist puppet Federation of "Malaysia", that Singapore should choose either "Malaysia" or Indonesia as her friend',⁸ tended to lend substance to Lee Kuan-yew's admonition of caution. Of course, the whole affair may have been one huge misunderstanding aggravated by the unfortunate wording of Singapore's

⁵ *The Times*, 22 February 1966.

⁶ The full statement by Mr Rajaratnam was as follows: 'It is the policy of the Singapore Government to maintain friendly relations with all its neighbours, therefore it welcomes the statement of the Indonesian Government to normalize relations with Singapore. At the same time it wishes to assure the Malaysian Government that there will be consultation in all matters where Malaysia's defence interests are affected.' *ibid.*, 12 April 1966.

⁷ This cable was published ten days after its dispatch. See *Straits Times*, 26 April 1966.

⁸ *News and Views*, No. 124 (14 April 1966), p. 1.

reception of Indonesia's declared intent. Certainly, Malaysia appeared to cast aside the episode in her evident haste to come to terms with Indonesia.

On to Bangkok

Despite the Tunku's charges of Indonesian bad faith, the Malaysian Government continued to seek a settlement with its antagonist, and some time during the remaining days of April, a decision was probably taken to establish contact at the highest level. On 30 April, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, went to Bangkok for talks with the Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary, Narciso Ramos. Confrontation was high on the agenda, and Malik was to express a desire to find a peaceful solution of the Malaysian problem in accordance with the 'spirit and letter' of the Manila Agreement. This Agreement, reached in the summer of 1963, had been a matter of some dispute, and controversy over its implementation in Sabah and Sarawak was central to the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia. Malik had another, but unpublicized, meeting in Bangkok. Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the permanent head of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had come unannounced to the Thai capital and spent three hours in private discussion with the Indonesian Foreign Minister. And these conversations were to pave the way to the Ministerial meeting.

Throughout May, statements emanating from Indonesia gave no indication of any fundamental change of attitude towards confrontation. For example, on 5 May, Malik declared that confrontation could be ended if the right of self-determination was guaranteed to the people of Sabah and Sarawak and if British bases in South East Asia were liquidated. The official news agency, *Antara*, announced that two more battalions of volunteers would leave for the Borneo border area, and in mid-May a KOGAM spokesman indicated that 'the door for peaceful settlement on the basis of the Manila Agreement is still open'. It is, of course, possible to dismiss such statements as merely an indication of an Indonesian desire to save face, and of the unsettled political condition of the country. The Malaysian Government could not have taken them at their face value, or, at least, it must have received private assurances which encouraged it in pursuing negotiations. Such was the apparent purpose of the Indonesian military mission which arrived in Kuala Lumpur with a letter from General Suharto on 27 May.

Talks between representatives of Indonesia and Malaysia began in Bangkok on 29 May. Singapore was not invited, though it is not too clear which party benefited most from her absence. It has been reported that President Sukarno was adamantly opposed to negotiations, and instructed Malik to ensure that they did not succeed. In the event, it would seem that there was sufficient disagreement at Bangkok without any intervention from Sukarno. The Bangkok meeting did not turn out to be the

purely formal occasion which the Indonesian military mission. As in previous negotiations, the question of Sabah and Sarawak proved to be a contentious issue, though arousing somewhat less feeling than on previous such occasions. The Indonesian opening bid was to ask for a plebiscite in Borneo to determine whether the people there wished to remain in Malaysia; however, it seems that the voice of the military was instrumental in changing this approach. Nevertheless, agreement took time to materialize and when it appeared it was more in outline than in substance. One indication of hard bargaining was that a special unscheduled meeting of principals took place on the morning of 1 June before final signature of the Accord. Malik admitted that a 'slight hitch' had in fact developed over the question of Sabah and Sarawak. In the event, the Malaysian Government made a gesture to meet Indonesian demands, and the key phrase of the Accord ran somewhat as follows: 'The people's desire to remain in Malaysia shall be tested by elections as soon as possible.'

The Bangkok Accord was sealed with an incongruous champagne toast and a prayer to Allah. The agreement, which was not then made public, was to be submitted for approval to the respective Governments and was said to contain 'the principles upon which practical steps to restore relations between the two countries shall be based'.

Despite observers' comments that the Bangkok Accord was much less than what Malaysia had hoped for,² the Malaysian delegation returned to Kuala Lumpur to behave as if confrontation had ended. Tun Razak announced that confrontation was 'over for good' and began to talk of Britain withdrawing her troops from Borneo. Significantly, Malik was reported as saying that the end of confrontation would mean the return of British troops in Malaysia 'to their original bases', a phrase clouded by a certain ambiguity.

The end of confrontation?

The Bangkok talks were to be followed by a growing sense of anticlimax, despite the pronouncement by the *Straits Times* of 2 June that 'except for the formality of official approval of the Bangkok proceedings, confrontation has ended'. One immediate observation was that Jakarta was still speaking with more than one voice. Adam Malik, on his return from Bangkok, informed the press that no further negotiations would be needed because, as soon as the agreement had been ratified, a settlement would have been reached. However, at a meeting of KOGAM on 8 June, presided over by President Sukarno, a different viewpoint emerged. A spokesman announced that 'the meeting is of the opinion that the results of the talks on the settlement of the "Malaysia" dispute held in Bangkok

² *The Times*, 2 June 1966.

recently constitute a basis for the settlement of the "Malaysia" question' but that 'there are still things needing clarification and settlement'.¹⁰ The meeting appointed General Suharto to establish the necessary contacts and Malik was to confirm that his task as Foreign Minister 'in this matter has been completed'.

The formal explanation for the postponement of ratification is that President Sukarno had refused to lend his approval to the document and that the triumvirate did not feel able to coerce him into compliance. Opposition to the Bangkok settlement was also to appear from other quarters. Hardi, First Chairman of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), which had been purged of its Communist element, told an *Antara* reporter on 8 June that he hoped that the Tunku would be responsible enough to implement the Manila Agreement honestly. Reference was also made to this agreement by Suwito, the Deputy Foreign Minister (also Dr Subandrio's deputy), who said that Indonesia insisted on the principle of the right of self-determination. Clearly the question of Sabah and Sarawak was still an obstacle to an end to confrontation. Meanwhile, Sukarno was enjoying the support of the Nahdatul Ulama (Muslim Scholars') Party in obstructing a settlement; the NU had attached themselves to him in the hope of preventing the re-emergence of their banned political rivals, the moderate Muslim Masjumi. There were undoubtedly internal political obstacles to a formal ratification, and Suharto and Malik were either unable or unwilling to overcome these.

An indication of Malaysian concern was the visit to Jakarta by the permanent head of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry. Little appeared to be resolved, however, for, later in June, a further Indonesian mission was dispatched to Kuala Lumpur, also without tangible result. Even after the meeting of the Indonesian People's Consultative Congress early in July, which approved the Government's policy to settle the Malaysian question, no moves were made to ratify. And this Congress confirmed Suharto in the exercise of executive power, as well as cutting Sukarno down to political size by removing his title of President-for-life. However, an indication of the political balance was Sukarno's comment on the decision of the Congress to call for elections by 1968. He made known: 'If possible, I would want the elections tomorrow. . . I know that the will of the people is not only that reflected in Jakarta.' Suharto, for his part, stated that he was in favour of settling the conflict with Malaysia as long as the prestige of the State and nation was not being sacrificed. He looked forward to a settlement on the basis of the Manila Agreement. It was clear that, in the existing circumstances, the end of confrontation seemed to be dependent on concessions by Malaysia over the question of Sabah and Sarawak.

One difficulty in seeking to assess Indonesian motives is that it is still

¹⁰ *News and Views*, No. 161 (9 June 1966), p. 1.

unclear who is speaking ¹⁰ —
 Borneo must, however, still remain softnews. —
 along the border were not to cease with the Bangkok meeting. A major
 engagement involving Indonesian regular troops took place after the
 signing of the agreement in Bangkok and the actual penetration of the
 border occurred as negotiations were in progress. This clash with security
 forces took place at Bau, which is close to Kuching in the first division of
 Sarawak. It is possible to regard this incident as the initiative of a subor-
 dinate commander hardly subject to control from Jakarta. But some
 diplomatic observers in Kuala Lumpur are less inclined to be so charit-
 able, particularly as it is believed that probing parties continue to pene-
 trate the border. However, the Malaysian Government is anxious, for
 obvious reasons, to enforce a discreet silence on this subject. Suspensions
 of Indonesian intentions were not lessened when a spokesman for their
 Embassy in Canberra announced that thousands of volunteers would
 remain along the border area as settlers after confrontation had come to
 an end.¹¹ Of greater significance was the statement issued on 21 July in
 Jakarta on behalf of the Revolutionary Government of North Kaliman-
 tan. It said that if peace with Malaysia brought 'an adverse political situa-
 tion for the people in their fight to get self-determination' they would
 'continue to take up arms until they get their freedom'.¹² Given the purge
 that has taken place within the Indonesian news agency and press circles
 and the degree of press control exercised by the army, such a statement
 cannot be dismissed as the empty vapourings of the adherents of a lost
 cause.

Some Malaysian difficulties

By early August, the problem of clarification of the Bangkok Accord
 appeared resolved and the Tunku announced that his deputy would fly
 to Jakarta to sign a peace pact. No one seemed to question the need for
 such a mission by asking whether or not a peace agreement had already
 been signed. On 11 August, Tun Razak and Malik appended their sig-
 natures for a second time and it was this joint act and not formal approval
 by the Indonesian Government in concert which was deemed to mark the
 ratification of the Bangkok Accord. The agreement made public in
 Jakarta included provision for elections in Sabah and Sarawak as soon as
 practicable in order that the people there could reaffirm their desire to
 remain in the Federation.

The Malaysian Government, having committed itself to an electoral
 process to test the cohesion of the Federation, has a difficult task ahead.
 By agreeing to elections, it has not only provided for the possibility of a
 negative vote on Malaysia but has also exposed the Alliance Party position

¹¹ *Straits Times*, 15 July 1966.

¹² Quoted by Dennis Bloodworth in *The Observer*, 24 July 1966.

THE WORLD TODAY

September 1966

to political challenge throughout North Borneo earlier than might otherwise have been necessary. In Sabah an attempt to test popular feeling at the polls about remaining in Malaysia could well be exploited by the United Pasokmomogun Kadazan Organization, which is currently engaged in seeking to detach itself from the Sabah Alliance in circumstances which will work to its electoral advantage. In Sarawak the Federal Government (or rather its nominees) face a court action as a result of the apparently unconstitutional manner in which Dato Stephen Ningkam was removed from the office of Chief Minister in June. The new Chief Minister, Penghulu Tawi Sli, now rules over a precarious coalition subject to ethnic discord. At the same time, his stand on issues which led to the dismissal of Ningkam, such as the speed at which Malay is likely to be introduced as the official language or the retirement of ex-patriate civil servants, is not likely to improve Federal-state relations. In both Sabah and Sarawak, friction with Kuala Lumpur is a factor making for political weakness in the Federation as a whole. Considerable foreboding is felt also in Sarawak about the Sarawak Communist Organization, which is composed in the main of local Chinese and which has a well-entrenched political organization. Its potential as an instrument for subversion and terror is believed to be well above that of the Communists in Malaya at the time of the Emergency, particularly in terms of Malaysia's ability unaided to maintain internal security. It is no wonder that the British Defence Minister, after a visit to Malaysia including Sarawak, announce that British troops would be withdrawn from Borneo 'as soon after the ratification of the Bangkok Agreement as Malaysian Forces can take full responsibility for the defence of Eastern Malaysia'.¹⁴

In mainland Malaya, the Bangkok Accord led to an increase in racial tension as the Chinese community became apprehensive at the prospect of a *rapprochement* with Indonesia. Their fears were prompted by the expression of pan-Malay feeling among Muslim Malays and knowledge of the experience of fellow Chinese during the post-*coup* blood-letting in Indonesia. A significant number of politically minded Malays, particularly of the younger and more educated generation, seem to be attracted by an anti-imperialist Indonesia free of international Communist associations. And these people offer a point of entry for the Indonesians to export such attitudes to their advantage. Indeed, many Malays would feel alarmed at Indonesian hegemony; such an arrangement would relegate economically dominant and numerically important Chinese communities to the similar minority position which they occupy in Indonesia.

The Malaysian Government has no desire to sacrifice its independent existence on the altar of Malay blood-brotherhood, yet the Bangkok Accord and the related agreement in Jakarta may have opened Pandora's box of racial enmity which could be a more serious threat

military confrontation. At the same time, there is every indication that the Indonesian Government (let alone President Sukarno) regards the occasion of elections in Borneo as a serious test of Malaysia's continued viability in its present form, rather than as a mere formality. And there is no guarantee that it will not try and influence the results. In the circumstances, however, the attitude of the Malaysian Government would seem to be that Suharto and Malik are the best Indonesians available and that there is no alternative but to trust them.

|

THE WORLD TODAY

BACK ISSUES

Back issues and volumes of *The World Today* from 1945 to 1963 are obtainable from:

Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd

Back Issues Department

16 West Street

Telephone
Farnham 4664

Farnham, Surrey

17037.0
16.9.26

THE WORLD TODAY

ORDER

Please hand to your newsagent or bookseller, or post to: Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London, N.W.10. (Dollis Hill 8080).

Please enter my subscription for one year to *The World Today*

Annual subscription 35s. post free (In U.S.A. and Canada \$5.30)

Students' rate 30s.

☐ Cheque/P.O. enclosed.

☐ Please send invoice.

NAME (Mr/Mrs/Miss)

ADDRESS

DATE ..

Some features to be found in SEPTEMBER'S

Contemporary Review

now on sale 5s.

America *David Tribe*

The Revival of the German Right . . . *David Childs*

President Johnson's Problems . . . *George Soloveyitchik*

The Case Against Golding's Simon-Piggy . *Harry Taylor*

Together with current book reviews in an eight-page literary supplement

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, 36 Broadway, London, S.W.1

Founded 1866

MIZAN USSR - CHINA - AFRICA - ASIA

MIZAN examines the policies of the Soviet Union and China towards the Third World, and in particular towards the countries of Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia.

Articles in the July/August issue include:

Peking's Purge and Foreign Policy

The Soviet Union and Senegal

Soviet Views on 'The Religious Factor'

A Soviet Work on Buddhism

Supplements (issued separately):

MIZAN SUPPLEMENT A: Middle East and Africa, Soviet and Chinese Press Reports

MIZAN SUPPLEMENT B: South-East Asia, Soviet and Chinese Press Reports

Subscription rates:

MIZAN: £3 per year (six issues); single copies 10s.

SUPPLEMENTS: each £1 10s. per year (six issues); single copies 5s.

CENTRAL ASIAN RESEARCH CENTRE

66A and B King's Road, London, S.W.3

In association with St Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group

Sole distribution agents in the USA only:

International Publications, 303 Park Avenue South, New York, N. Y. 10010.

The Journal of

conflict
RICHMOND

RESOLUTION

*A quarterly for research
related to war and peace*

SUE (X, 3)

Aggressive behaviors within politics: a cross-national study

Rosalind L. and Ivo K. Feierabend

Bipolarity, multipolarity, and the future

Richard N. Rosecrance

A theory of conflict processes and organizational offices

Ralph M. Goldman

Other articles; gaming section; book reviews

\$7.00 per year for individuals, \$8.00 for institutions; \$3.00 per issue

Published by The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution

The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, NEW DELHI-1

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES contains articles on International Politics, Economics, and Law as well as on political, economic, and social developments in practically all parts of the world.

**Special Double Issue on
INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN**

Vol 8, Nos. 1-2, JULY-OCTOBER 1966

Contents

The Tashkent Declaration: Retrospect and Prospect	M. S. Rajan
India's Policy towards Pakistan	Sisir Gupta
India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other's Foreign Policies	Jayanta Kumar Ray
Foreign Military Aid and the Defence Strength and Policies of India and Pakistan: A Comparative Study	D. Som Dutt
America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership	M. S. Venkataraman
China and Indo-Pakistani Relations	V. P. Dutt
The Commonwealth and Indo-Pakistani Relations	S. C. Gangal
The Soviet Union and Indo-Pakistani Relations	Harish Kapur
India, Pakistan, and West Asia	M. S. Agrawal
India, Pakistan, and South-East Asia	Vishal Singh

Bibliography

Indo-Pakistani Relations, 1947-1965 R. K. Garman, J. C. Tandon, and Dahir Singh

Annual Subscription: Rs. 40, 72s., \$9.00 Single Copy: Rs. 10, 18s. \$2.25

Published by: ASIA PUBLISHING HOUSE

Bombay : London : New York

